Chicago IP Attorney & Lawyer : R. David Donoghue : Chicago IP Litigation Blog

Jewel Am., Inc. v. Combine Int’l., Inc., No. 07 C 3596, 2007 WL 4300589 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2007) (Guzman, J.).

Judge Guzman denied defendants’ 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) motion to transfer this copyright case to the Eastern District of Michigan. Plaintiff argued that its choice of forum should be given deference because its relevant subsidiary was an Illinois entity with its place of business and all of its operations in Illinois. But the Court looked to the residence of the named plaintiff, not the plaintiff’s subsidiary. Because the named plaintiff was a New York entity, plaintiff’s chosen forum was not given deference. Further, the situs of material events was Michigan. Defendants were Michigan entities and the alleged infringement and related planning occurred in Michigan. The Court discounted the location of documents because, “[i]n this age of faxing, scanning and overnight courier services, however, the location of documentary evidence is largely irrelevant.”

No party identified a third party witness that would be required to testify. And convenience of the parties tipped slightly to plaintiff whose subsidiary’s business would be disrupted if its main employees and key witnesses had to travel from Illinois to Michigan for court proceedings and depositions. Based upon these factors, the Court held that defendants had not shown that the Eastern District of Michigan was clearly more convenient and denied the motion.

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Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2008) (Moran, Sen. J.).*

Judge Moran denied defendants’ (collectively “eSpeed”) motion for judgment as a matter of law that plaintiff Trading Technologies’ (“TT”) patents were unenforceable because of patent misuse. TT’s open letter to the futures market was not patent misuse despite the facts that:

1. The letter requested a 2.5 cent fee for every transaction an exchange processed regardless of whether infringing software was used; and
   
2. The fees did not end when the patents expired. 

Had such a license been entered, it would have been per se patent misuse. But because no exchange ever accepted the offer or even entered serious negotiations with TT based upon the offer, there was no patent misuse.

Terms in certain license agreements that prevented licensees from using eSpeed software, regardless of whether the eSpeed software infringed, were improper. But the terms did not rise to the level of patent misuse because the effect of the clauses was not anti-competitive. The clauses were only in two of TT’s fifteen settlement agreements. And TT argued that the intent of the parties in the two agreements was only to restrict the use of infringing eSpeed products. Furthermore, the other thirteen agreements only restrict use of infringing software. 

Terms in the agreements requiring royalties on any trade for which licensed software could be used, as opposed to just those for which patented software was actually used, were not patent misuse. The agreements required only that royalties be paid on trades made using licensed products or any software when licensed and unlicensed software was linked such that either could be used to make the trade. If unlicensed software that was not linked to the licensed software was used, no royalty was due.

Finally, the provisions preventing licensees from assisting third parties to invalidate the TT patents were not patent misuse. Licensees that had not agreed to a consent judgment as part of a settlement were free to challenge the validity of the patents on their own. Furthermore, no licensee was prevented from participating in court-ordered invalidity proceedings or from assisting a government entity, such as the PTO, that was considering the validity of the patents.

* Click here to read much more about this case in the Blog’s archives and click here for a copy of the opinion.

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Goss Int’l Ams., Inc. v. A-Am. Mach. & Assembly Co., No. 07 C 3248, 2007 WL 4294744 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2007) (Gettleman, J.).

Judge Gettleman denied defendant’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss plaintiff’s copyright for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff alleged that defendant violated plaintiff’s copyrights in its simplified machine drawings of its commercial printing machines by placing them on the internet without authorization. The Court held that plaintiff’s simplification of its drawings and addition of part numbers were sufficient to meet copyright’s originality requirement. The Court also looked to the Fifth and Eighth Circuits and held that the registration requirement was met when plaintiff filed its copyright registration, as opposed to when the Copyright Office acted on it. In this case, plaintiff filed its application in May 2007 and was waiting on registration as of the date of the opinion. The Court reasoned that because plaintiff would also have a cause of action if the registration was denied, there was no reason to make plaintiff wait until the Copyright Office acted.

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Junction Solutions, LLC v. MBS Dev., Inc., No. 06 C 1632, 2007 WL 4234091 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 20, 2007) (Gottschall, J.).*

Judge Gottschall dismissed defendant’s Lanham Act false representation and Consumer Fraud Act claims.** Both claims were based on letters allegedly sent by plaintiff to a third party containing false statements about defendant. The Court dismissed the Lanham Act claim because the allegedly false statements were not made in plaintiff’s marketing materials and were not about defendant’s products. Similarly, a letter to one third party was not the general commercial communication required by the Consumer Fraud Act.

* Click here for more on this case in the Blog’s archives.

** The Court also considered other non-IP claims.

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Geneva Int’l Corp. v. Petrof, Spol, S.R.O., No. 07 C 4214, 2007 WL 4522621 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).

Judge Moran denied plaintiff Geneva International’s preliminary injunction motion and the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment on Geneva’s anticipatory breach of contract claim.* Geneva signed a variety of agreements with defendant Petrof making Geneva the exclusive U.S. distributor of Petrof’s pianos and the exclusive U.S. licensee of the “Petrof” trademark for use with Petrof’s pianos, through 2012. In 2007, Petrof gave Geneva the required six months notice to terminate the parties’ contract (but not their trademark license agreement which did not have the same termination provisions) and notified Geneva that Petrof planned to start selling its pianos using its trademark in the U.S.

Geneva sough a preliminary injunction to stop Petrof’s U.S. sales because Geneva continued to be the exclusive licensee of the Petrof trademark. But the Court held Geneva would not be irreparably harmed without the preliminary injunction. Geneva’s alleged irreparable harm — lost goodwill of its customers because Geneva would not be Petrof’s exclusive distributor — was caused by the contract, not breach of the trademark license. Petrof’s contract termination meant that Geneva could not be Petrof’s U.S. distributor, exclusive or otherwise. Because the alleged irreparable harm did not stem from the license at issue, the Court denied the injunction.

* Because they are not IP-specific, I will not fully address the contract issues. I will say that the disputes arose from the fact that the three agreements were signed on the same day, but did not all mention each other and had differing integration clauses, some mentioning the other agreements and some not. Practice tip: When drafting parallel agreements, make very clear how the agreements relate or that they do not.

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The Tribune ran a story in its weekly legal industry column yesterday about Ray Niro, senior partner in local patent litigation firm Niro Scavone and a very accomplished trial attorney. Niro is in a dispute with anonymous blogger Troll Tracker. Troll Tracker focuses his blog on cases brought by patent licensing companies or non-practicing entities,* a number of whom are represented by Niro and the Niro Scavone firm. Because of the firm’s prominence in plaintiff-side patent work, Troll Tracker has also discussed both Niro and the firm. That drew Niro’s attention. Niro sent the anonymous Troll Tracker a letter accusing him of infringing a patent held by client Global Patent Holdings which the Tribune described as “covering the compression of data over the Internet, a technology that allows, for instance, Web sites to display JPEG images.” Niro then offered a $5,000 “bounty” for unmasking Troll Tracker’s identity, which he later increased to $10,000. Here is how Niro explained the bounty in the Tribune article:

I want to find out who this person is . . . . Is he an employee with Intel or Microsoft? Does he have a connection with serial infringers? I think that would color what he has to say."

I have generally stayed away from this story because it is closer to patent gossip than the Northern District IP litigation that is the focus of this blog. But I felt that I should cover it since it ran in the Tribune. 

* I have posted before about my dislike of the patent troll name – click here for a post which discussed the Troll Tracker blog and here for a post about Ray Niro’s article calling for an end to the use of patent troll. I think it carries unnecessary baggage and creates unnecessary animosity in legal proceedings that tend to generate plenty without injecting more. So, I was glad to see last week that Troll Tracker is pulling away from the use of the name – click here for Troll Tracker’s post about the term.

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There were 138 trademark cases filed in the Northern District during 2007, a 9% decrease from the 151 patent cases filed in 2006.  Of those 138 cases, nearly half, 66, were disposed of during 2007. 

A list of each case, the case number, the filing date and, where appropriate, the date the case was resolved are provided after the jump. Earlier this week, I did a similar post regarding patent filings (click here for the post). Look for a similar trademark post next week.

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In a recent post on the University of Houston Law Center Faculty Blog (another LexBlog site), Ray Nimmer asks whether the Supreme Court's recent eBay v. MercExchange permanent injunction decision will lead to compulsory licensing.  Nimmer discusses two alternatives when a permanent injunction is not granted after a patent infringement finding:

One response is simply to assess damages as to past infringement, leaving any future use of the patent for a voluntary agreement of the parties (a license) or a subsequent infringement suit for the subsequent infringements. That is clearly the preferable option, although it does raise limited issues of judicial economy.

A second alternative is to permit subsequent use by the defendant subject to the payment of a reasonable royalty imposed by the court. This is a form of compulsory licensing that rewards the wrongdoer, unless the remedy has been requested by the patent owner. Nevertheless, a panel of the Federal Circuit indicated that such a remedy may be appropriate. One wonders why.

Nimmer concludes that courts should not impose compulsory licensing for future infringement absent substantial public policy reasons:

The preconditions should be both an opportunity to negotiate a license and, failing a bargain, a request by both parties for the court to impose a royalty as part of the remedy for infringement. A patent creates a right to exclude and, where the patent owner prefers to exercise that right, it should not be forced into a licensing arrangement resulting from a case in which it prevailed on the infringement claim. There may be some cases in which vital public policy interests justify this result, but those cannot be grounded simply in the fact that the court denied a permanent injunction or the parties have not agreed to license terms. A remedy should not penalize the person to whom the remedy is awarded. 

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Junction Solutions, LLC v. MBS Dev., Inc., No. 06 C 1632, 2007 WL 4233995 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 20, 2007) (Gottschall, J.).*

Judge Gottschall denied defendant’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) motion to dismiss plaintiff’s trade secret misappropriation complaint based upon the parties’ prior settlement agreement and resulting dismissal with prejudice by the District of Colorado. While the alleged misappropriation was the same — defendant employees leaving plaintiff to start their own competing software company — the use of the trade secrets was different. In the Colorado case, defendants allegedly harmed plaintiff by starting a competitor using plaintiff’s trade secrets. In this case, the alleged harm was developing competing software, after the Colorado settlement and dismissal. Claim preclusion, therefore, did not apply. Issue preclusion did not apply because the Colorado court did not make any substantive final judgments. The settlement agreement could have barred plaintiff’s claim, but the agreement’s release expressly excluded claims arising after the agreement’s effective date.

* Click here for more on this case in the Blog’s archives.

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There were 129 copyright cases filed in the Northern District during 2007, a 37% decrease from the 206 patent cases filed in 2006.  2006 was an exceptionally busy copyright year for the Northern, 100-150 copyright cases is the Northern District's norm over the last several years.  Of 2007's 129 copyright cases, 81 or 63% were disposed of during 2007 -- nearly double the percentage of patent cases that were resolved within the year. The fact that substantially more copyright cases settled during the calendar year in which they were filed is not surprising as copyright cases tend to be more straightforward and less document intensive than patent cases.

A list of each case, the case number, the filing date and, where appropriate, the date the case was resolved are provided after the jump. Earlier this week, I did a similar post regarding patent filings (click here for the post). Look for a similar trademark post next week.

A hat tip to the Maryland Intellectual Property Law Blog for its 2007 IP review series that pushed me to start my own review of 2007 IP cases.

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The blogs are full of commentary about yesterday's Supreme Court patent exhaustion argument.  But no one is declaring a winner.  Instead, like my earlier post, people are focusing on trends in the Justices questions.  Here are some of the best commentaries:

• Amster, Rothstein & Ebenstein has a guest post all over the blogs -- read it at Patently-O, 271 Patent Blog, and Philip Brooks' Patent Infringement Updates.
  
• Anticipate This!
  
• I/P Updates -- quoting Chief Judge Roberts:  "We've had experience with the Patent Office where it tends to grant patents a lot more liberally than we would enforce under the patent law."  Ouch.
• ScotusWiki -- This is a companion to the well-known SCOTUSblog (which does not have any commentary about the argument posted yet).  ScotusWiki does not provide any commentary, but it is a great resource for information about this case, and any other Supreme Court case.
  
• Troll Tracker -- predicting a 5-4 or 6-3 reversal of the Federal Circuit (although only "leaning" that way and only predicting a "slight" reversal) and, similar to my post, picking up on Justice Breyer's cycling theme, but without professing a love for the sport.

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Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., No. 06-937 (Jan. 16, 2008).

The Supreme Court heard argument yesterday regarding the bounds of patent exhaustion, as explained in my previous posts on the case -- click here to read them.  The transcript was posted late yesterday and is an interesting read, although not one of the Supreme Court’s most entertaining arguments.  I was thrilled to see Justice Breyer use a cycling hypothetical (regular readers will remember that I am a huge fan of cycling). Justice Breyer, apparently not 100% at ease with chipsets, used the hypothetical of selling patented bicycle pedals either as part of a bicycle or to be used with a bicycle. Here are Justice Breyer’s hypos and a few of the responses from G. Carter Phillips, arguing on behalf of LG:

JUSTICE BREYER: But you couldn't put in --you are authorized to sell the bicycle pedals that I have patented only if you impose a restriction that will tell the bicycle user that he must send me a check for $15 in addition to whatever he pays you. That sounds unlawful under contract law.

* * *

JUSTICE BREYER: Well, there's a reason, I guess, that would be so. Imagine that I want to buy some bicycle pedals, so I go to the bicycle shop. These are fabulous pedals. The inventor has licensed somebody to make them, and he sold them to the shop, make and sell them. He sold them to the shop. I go buy the pedals. I put it in my bicycle. I start pedaling down the road.

Now, we don't want 19 patent inspectors chasing me or all of the other companies and there are many doctrines in the law designed to stop that. One is the equitable servitudes on chattel. Another is the exhaustion of a patent. And now you talk about implied license.

I would say, why does it make that much difference? What we're talking about here is whether after those pedals are sold to me under an agreement that the patent -- you know, you have a right to sell them to me -- why can't I look at this as saying that patent is exhausted, the patent on the pedals and the patent for those bicycles insofar as that patent for the bicycles says I have a patent on inserting the pedal into a bicycle.

Call it exhaustion, call it implied license. Who cares?

MR. PHILLIPS: I don't have any problem with your hypothetical because it's not this case. Your hypothetical deals with the situation of what would have happened if you had bought the chip. Would we be in a position to say, even though you bought the chip, we nevertheless want to retain some right to come out -- to come after you claiming we still have a patent in that chip? And the answer is no. We exhausted -- that was exhausted by the sale of the chip.

The question is if you buy a pedal, can you then take that pedal that was designed for a bicycle, put it into a Stair Master --

* * *

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Degregorio v. Phillips Electronics. N. Am. Corp., No. 07 C 2683, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Dec. 28, 2007) (Cox, Mag. J.).

Judge Cox granted in part defendants’ motion for a protective order regarding plaintiff’s subpoenas of defendants’ customers in this patent dispute. Plaintiff subpoenaed defendants’ customers of allegedly infringing hair trimmers with built in vacuums, seeking sales and inventory information, as well as promotional materials and purchase orders. The Court denied the motion as to the sales and inventory information. The customers’ sales were potentially relevant to commercial success of the patented device for plaintiff’s non-obviousness case. The Court did enter a protective order as to the request for purchase orders and marketing materials. The Court held that the purchase orders were cumulative of the other requested sales information and marketing materials were too tangential to commercial success to be discoverable.

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This morning the Chicago Tribune ran an article (click here for the Tribune's piece) based upon IFI Patent Intelligence's ranking of 2007's top U.S. patent assignees -- click here for IFI's press release.   The article focused on Motorola's movement from number 34 in 2006 to 44 in 2007.  Motorola explained that it has shifted focus from a goal of being one of the largest patent assignees to a more limited portfolio focused around Motorola's core technologies.  I was quoted in the story about the value of what I refer to as "strategic patenting":

Motorola's approach is a more common one across industries, said David Donoghue, special counsel at DLA Piper in Chicago who specializes in intellectual property. In general, most companies are "focusing their patenting efforts on their most important technologies and their biggest innovations -- the things that differentiate them from their competitors," Donoghue said.

There is also value in having a large patent portfolio, particularly if you need to use your portfolio for cross-licensing or defensively against a patent-aggressive competitor, or if you are not sure which of your technologies will drive your industry and profits in five or ten years. 

Shortly after reading the Tribune article this morning, an IPLaw 360 article caught my attention (click here for the story, subscription required).  The article discussed a study by Morgan Lewis attorneys Craig Opperman and Carina Tan (to read the Intellectual Asset Management article about Opperman's and Tan's research, click here on Opperman's biography and click the link to the article in the upper right hand corner of the page).*  Opperman and Tan argue that a high volume, low cost (per application) patenting strategy has a greater final cost than a strategic patenting strategy in which a company pays more for each individual application, but files fewer applications clustered around their core technologies.  They also offer to provide a spreadsheet proving their analysis to anyone who contacts them and asks for it.  It is an interesting premise.  Of course, it does not appear to take in to account those companies that have a high volume strategy without unnaturally driving down their patent costs.  I think few would argue that, if a company has the resources either in terms of in-house prosecutors or prosecution budget, more high value patents are better than fewer high value patents. 

*  I would provide you a pdf of the article, but I want to stay on the right side of the copyright laws.

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There were 140 patent cases filed in the Northern District during 2007, an 11% increase from the 126 patent cases filed in 2006. This maintains the Northern District’s status as the fifth largest patent district. According to TrollTracker (click here for TrollTracker’s year end filing analysis), the Eastern District of Texas was first with 364 filings, more than 2.5 times the Northern District’s filings. The Central District of California came in a distant second with 272 patent filings, followed by the District of New Jersey at 187, the District of Delaware at 147 and then the Northern District. Of the Northern Districts 140* filings, 49 or 35% were disposed of during 2007.

A list of each case, the case number, the filing date and, where appropriate, the date the case was resolved are provided after the jump. In the next week or two, I will be doing similar posts for trademark and copyright cases filed during 2007.

A hat tip to the Maryland Intellectual Property Law Blog for its 2007 IP review series that pushed me to start my own review of 2007 IP cases.

* TrollTracker reports 137 patent cases. The discrepancy may be explained by several cases filed during the last few days of the year that did not make it to Pacer until after January 1.

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Tomorrow, the Supreme Court hears arguments in Quanta Computer Inc. v. LG Electronics Inc., 06-937 -- click here for a collection of the many briefs filed in the case at Patently-O.  The Court will be deciding whether parties can contract around patent exhaustion.  The patent exhaustion doctrine, also known as the first sale doctrine, holds that a royalty can only be charged once per product.  Once one link in the supply chain has paid a royalty for a patented product, or a key component, the patent is exhausted and no other link in the chain must pay a royalty for the same patent.  LG Electronics attempted to contract around patent exhaustion.

LG Electronics owned a group of patents claiming microprocessors used in personal computers.  They licensed the patents to Intel, but expressly excluded from the license any Intel customer that combined a licensed Intel microprocessor with non-Intel components.  As part of the license, Intel sent letters to its customers warning of this license exclusion.  LG Electronics sued Intel's post-license customers that were allegedly combining the licensed Intel chips with non-Intel products.   

The district court held that Intel's license exhausted LG Electronics' downstream patent royalty rights.  But the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that when parties expressly restrict a license a court should infer that the parties also negotiated a more limited royalty to reflect the limited rights given in the license.  As a result, patent exhaustion should not apply to restricted licenses.  Quanta argues that the Federal Circuit's decision contradicts a long history of both Federal Circuit and Supreme Court precedent requiring that patent licenses cannot be restricted to one link in the supply chain.

This is another case that has major implications for the business of patent law.  If the Supreme Court overturns the Federal Circuit it could dramatically change the model of many patent licensing programs.  I will keep you posted both on what occurs during the argument and the Court's ultimate decision.

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Blawg Review #142 is now available at the Build A Solo Practice Blog.  The review is done as a letter to new lawyers providing some very insightful advice for starting and shaping a legal career.  It also links to my post from Friday about following the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure -- click here for that post.

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Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jan. 2, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).*

Judge Moran denied defendants’ (collectively “eSpeed”) motion for judgment as a matter of law that plaintiff Trading Technologies’ (“TT”) patent was invalid for indefiniteness based upon the claim term “single action of a user input device” (“Single Action”). The Court previously construed Single Action as “an action by a user within a short period of time that may comprise one or more clicks of a mouse button or other input device.” Before trial, the Court used the definition to exclude evidence regarding a Tokyo Stock Exchange (“TSE”) software package that required double clicking, entering a quantity and pressing “enter” – click here for the Blog’s discussion of that opinion.

TT argued that the phrases “one or more clicks” and “short period of time” in the Court’s construction were indefinite because they did not sufficiently delineate the scope of the term. The Court noted that it did not need absolute clarity to define a claim term and held that the Single Action was sufficiently definite. The Court reasoned that it had been able to construe the term based largely upon the specification. And neither “one or more clicks” nor “short period of time” rendered the claim indefinite because the phrases are part of the definition, not the claim language. 

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As I mentioned several days ago, Northwestern's excellent IP Law Week series begins Monday, January 14.  The student IP group is hosting a panel each day next week.  The Monday through Thursday panels will run from noon until 1:15.  Friday's panel starts at 1:40 and ends at 2:35.  All events will be held in Rubloff 140.  The panels are listed below and promise to be very interesting.  I am part of Monday's Patent Reform panel, and I look forward to seeing you there.

• Monday: Patent Reform – Motivations, Impact and Controversy
  
• Tuesday: Balancing the Right to Life vs. the Right to Patent
  
• Wednesday: Copyright Law and Media Distribution over the Internet
  
• Thursday: Patent and Pharmaceutical / Drug Issues
  
• Friday: KSR v. Teleflex and Patent Prosecution

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Yes! Following the rules, all of them, matters – federal and local, substantive and procedural, big and small. Regular readers will not be surprised by my answer. I have repeatedly reminded people, as do the Northern District judges (click here for examples of both), to comply with Local Rule 56.1.

But I also think it matters for more “minor” rules, such as the newly revised Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 & 26, which now require that counsel include an e-mail address along with a physical address and phone number (click here for my previous post on the December 1, 2007 Fed. R. Civ. P. amendments.)

My experience since December 1 is that most attorneys are not following the e-mail address requirement. It is unlikely that courts will sanction counsel for failure to provide an e-mail address, but to me, and I presume to at least some judges and clerks, it signals sloppy lawyering. It says that counsel is not staying current with changes in the profession. And it makes me wonder what else counsel is not current with. Have they explored the significant codification of electronic discovery rules from December 1, 2006? At least it is unprofessional, and at most it is an indication of a lack of knowledge of the current state of the law — a significant advantage to those of us that keep current.

Am I overreacting because these are "minor" rules that likely are not sanctionable? Comment to this post or send me an e-mail with your thoughts. I will post about whatever feedback I receive (without names, of course).

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Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, Min. Orders (N.D. Ill. Jan. 3, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).*

In addition to the willfulness decision discussed earlier today (click here for the post) and the invalidity decision that I will blog about early next week, Judge Moran also issued two minute orders deciding several of the outstanding post-trial motions.  The Court denied defendant eSpeed's motion for a new trial and its combined motion for judgment as a matter of law that: 1) the claims are invalid because of anticipation, obviousness, prior sale; and 2) because the claims have a June 9, 2000 priority date they were not infringed.

There are still several pending motions, including various motions regarding damages and interest on the jury's award and eSpeed's motion for an evidentiary hearing regarding inequitable conduct.  I will keep you posted as those are decided.

*  Click here to read much more about this case in the Blog’s archives.

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Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jan. 3, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).*

Judge Moran granted defendants’ (collectively “eSpeed”) motion for judgment as a matter of law that their infringement was no willful. The Court instructed the jury using the objective recklessness standard from In re Seagate Techs., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007), but when the Court reviewed the totality of the circumstances it found no support for the willfulness verdict and, more specifically that plaintiff Trading Technologies (“TT”) had not met its burden of proving that there was an objectively high likelihood of infringement when eSpeed sold its infringing product, Futures View. When eSpeed launched Futures View, TT’s patent had not issued. And while eSpeed was aware of the application, knowledge of an application does not prove willfulness. Furthermore, TT produced no evidence of post-issuance willfulness. TT submitted two internal eSpeed emails, but both were sent before TT’s patent issued and the emails only suggested that eSpeed should mimic certain features of the TT software. And upon learning of TT’s issued patent, eSpeed immediately began a redesign of Futures View, resulting in new software products that the Court granted summary judgment of noninfringement. As a result of the redesign, the infringing Futures View was only on the market for five months after TT’s patent issued. 

TT also argued that eSpeed’s failure to make noninfringement arguments in preliminary injunction proceedings showed willfulness. But the Court held that eSpeed denied infringement in its answer and that there was no need to argue noninfringement of Future View in preliminary injunction proceedings because eSpeed was not selling Future View. There was no danger of an injunction over a product eSpeed was not selling. 

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Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 05 C 5373, 2007 WL 4287503 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2007) (Coar, J.).*

Judge Coar granted defendant Sandoz’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss or in the alternative Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, dismissing plaintiff Abbott’s willfulness claims Abbott alleged that Sandoz willfully infringed Abbott’s patent related to an extended release antibiotic (clarithromycin, an erythromycin derivative which Abbott markets as Biaxin XL). At the time Sandoz entered the market with its generic version of Biaxin XL, the Federal Circuit had issued an opinion based upon an interlocutory appeal of a temporary restraining order, which included statements that Abbott’s patent was susceptible to invalidity and unenforceability argument. The Court held that Sandoz’s reliance on that opinion, regardless of the limited record it was based upon or its non-final nature was objectively reasonable, well above the In re Seagate objective recklessness standard.

* Click here for more on this case and related cases.

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Matteo v. Rubin, No. 07 C 2536, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Dec. 3, 2007) (Kendall, J.).

Judge Kendall denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s copyright infringement and related state law claims. Plaintiff photographed defendant’s daughter’s wedding pursuant to a contract between plaintiff and defendant’s wife. Defendant was allegedly unsatisfied with plaintiff’s photographs and, therefore, allegedly created numerous website regarding plaintiff’s photographs including defamatory comments about both plaintiff and his photographs. The Court held that plaintiff stated a claim for copyright infringement because he pled that he owned copyrights in his photos and that defendant infringed those copyrights by posting the pictures on websites. Plaintiff was not required to plead that defendant received any economic benefit from his alleged infringement. Additionally, plaintiff did not have to register his copyright before defendant’s allegedly infringing acts. Finally, the Court held that defendant’s fair use defense was not grounds for dismissal. Fair use is a factual inquiry best resolved on summary judgment or at trial.

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I enjoyed my first opportunity to host Blawg Review (a weekly review of the best of the legal blog world hosted by a different blog each week) -- click here for my injunction-themed review.  Having hosted a 2007 review gives me the opportunity to nominate my favorite reviews for the Blawg Review of the year award.  Here they are, in chronological order:

• #134 NY Personal Injury Law -- I am a sucker for running and this was an excellent post on top of that.
  
• #127 Deliberations -- One of my favorite blogs.  A must read for anyone that deals with juries, or wants to.
  
• #126 Small Business Trends -- One of the few reviews not hosted by a law blog, which is a nice change of pace.
  
• #106 Blawg IT -- I love running, but motorcycles are too fast for me.  That said, this was an excellent review.
  
• #95 AutoMuse -- Perhaps it was the years I spent in-house with the auto industry, but I enjoyed the automotive theme.

Finally, this week's Blawg Review #141 is available across the pond at Charon QC.

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Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 05 C 5373, 2007 WL 4287501 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2007) (Coar, J.).*

Judge Coar construed the claims of plaintiff Abbott’s patent related to an extended release antibiotic (clarithromycin, an erythromycin derivative which Abbott markets as Biaxin XL), denied defendant Sandoz’s motion for summary judgment of noninfringement and granted Abbott summary judgment regarding anticipation, obviousness and inequitable conduct.  Of particular interest, the Court held that the use of Markush group language – “selected from the group consisting of” – in the specification did not necessarily limit the construction of claim terms. The Court also noted that materiality of a reference in an inequitable conduct analysis was determined from the perspective of a reasonable examiner, not the patentee.

* Click here for more on this case and related cases.

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The Chicago papers had a few IP-related articles this week. First, the Chicago Tribune reported – click here for the story -- that Chicago software company SPSS is in a trademark dispute with its co-founder and former chairman, Norman Nie. Nie has informed SPSS that he believes he owns SPSS’s trademark, which he licensed to SPSS beginning in 1976. Nie is reportedly offering to sell SPSS the mark for $20M.

Second, the Tribune reported – click here for the story – that Motorola and Metrologic Instruments settled their patent disputes regard bar code scanning and mobile computing technology for an undisclosed amount and a limited-term cross-licensing agreement. The Chicago Sun-Times ran a similar story – click here to read it -- and reported that Motorola entered the dispute with Metrologic based upon its 2006 acquisition of Symbol Technologies.

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Angel Sales Inc. v. Hollywood Gadgets Inc., No. 07 C 1362, Min. Order (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 2007) (Denlow, Mag. J.).

Judge Denlow sanctioned defendant in the amount of plaintiff's attorney's fees and costs for preparation and attendance at a settlement conference before the Court.  Defendant's counsel attended the conference, but defendant did not appear.  In a subsequent order, the Court entered a sanctions award of $1,710 based upon plaintiff's fee affidavit.

There is not much to say about this opinion, but I included it as a practice tip and a cautionary tale.  Parties often do not want to personally attend settlement conferences before judges, or they attempt to send a representative without full settlement authority.  But that is a perilous choice.  It can result in sanctions, as here, and, at the least, it usually harms the chances of settlement.  The opposing party that took the time to be at the conference is generally offended that its time was wasted.

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I am sad to report that Mark Banner of Banner & Witcoff passed away over the weekend.  Mark was an important member of Chicago's IP bar and an active participant in educating numerous lawyers as an adjunct professor at both John Marshall in Chicago and my alma mater the Georgetown University Law Center.  My condolences go out to Mark's family and the Banner & Witcoff firm. 

Here is some more information on Mark's legacy from Banner & Witcoff:

Mark was the lead trial counsel in many successful intellectual property trials from both the plaintiff's and the defendant's perspectives. He had a particular passion for jury trials of patent cases and computer-related technologies. Despite battling cancer for the last five years, Mark continued his involvement in litigation and counseling work. “Mark made significant contributions to the field of intellectual property law. He was an extremely gifted attorney, a loyal partner, and a devoted friend. Mark was an integral part of the firm and will be greatly missed,” said Thomas K. Pratt, President of Banner & Witcoff.