Chicago IP Attorney & Lawyer : R. David Donoghue : Chicago IP Litigation Blog

Card Activation Techs., Inc. v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., No. 07 C 1230, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2008) (Gottschall, J.).

Judge Gottschall denied defendants' motion for summary judgment of invalidity. Each of plaintiff's independent claims – covering a counter-top terminal for processing debit card payments – included a “telecommunications means” limitation. The parties agreed that “telecommunications means” was a means plus function limitation. Defendants argued that the “telecommunications means” was indefinite because the patent's specification did not recite any corresponding telecommunications structure, such as a modem. The Court held that the specification did not disclose any specific telecommunications structure. But the Court held that no structure was required, where one of ordinary skill in the art would know what the structure was based upon the specification, citing Aristocrat Tech. Australia PTY LTD v. Multimedia Games, Inc., __ F.3d __, 2008 WL 484449 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 22, 2008). Relying upon plaintiff's expert, the Court held that based upon the specification, one of ordinary skill in the art would understand telecommunications means to be a modem.

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Black & Decker, Inc. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., No. 2007-1243, 1244, Slip Op. (Fed. Cir. Jan. 7, 2008).*

The Federal Circuit affirmed the Northern District jury’s obviousness verdict, and Judge St. Eve’s denial of defendant’s inequitable conduct claim. But the Federal Circuit reversed the Northern District’s construction of “power conversion circuit” and remanded for further proceedings and, perhaps, a new trial.** The Federal Circuit held that the Northern District relied largely upon claim differentiation for its construction and, in the process, gave the patent scope beyond the disclosed invention.

The Federal Circuit held that the Northern District’s pre-KSR obviousness jury instruction was not reversible because defendants identified no evidence in the record that supported an obviousness finding even under the broader KSR standard.

* Click here for extensive coverage of this case in the Blog’s archives.

**  The Court scheduled a status conference early next week.  We may learn at that conference whether a new trial is being scheduled or whether summary judgment will be briefed or a settlement conference scheduled first.

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Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Johnson Controls Interiors LLC, No. 2007-1314-1467, Slip Op. (Fed. Cir. Feb. 19, 2008).

The Federal Circuit reversed Judge Moran’s construction of “binary code” and, therefore, reversed the limited preliminary injunction entered by the Northern District - click here and here for the Blog’s posts regarding the injunction. The Northern District construed “binary code” as a code represented by two values, but not necessarily a binary number – click here and here for the Blog’s posts regarding the Northern District’s claim and construction opinions. The Federal Circuit praised the Northern District’s claim construction analysis, but reversed the construction:

The district court commendably strove to follow this court’s rules for claim construction. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318-19. In this regard, the trial court weighed the intrinsic evidence along with the extrinsic evidence and properly sought to avoid importing a limitation from the specification into the claims. See id. Nonetheless, this court discerns that the ‘544 patent specification gives particular limiting meanings to the language in the claims.

The Federal Circuit held that “binary code” required a binary (or base two) number. Otherwise, any values would meet the limitation because all values, whether in base two, three, the more standard ten or any other, are represented by computers using two values – 1 and 0. Because the revised claim construction called into question the Northern District’s likelihood of success analysis, the Federal Circuit reversed the preliminary injunction.

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Emergis Techs., Inc. v. PNM Resources & Otter Tail Corporation, Nos. 2007-1247 & 1252, Slip Op. (Fed. Cir. Jan. 31, 2008) (Moran, Sen. Jr.).*

Judge Moran, sitting by designation, authored the Federal Circuit’s decision reversing in part the District of New Mexico’s and the District of Minnesota’s claim constructions and upholding the Court’s findings of noninfringement. The Court held that payments that went “directly” from customer to invoicer were correctly construed as requiring no third party involvement. But the Court held that based on the specification, “customer invoice account number” was an invoice number as opposed to a more generic customer number. The Court upheld the non-infringement decision because the accrued systems either used third parties to process payments or did not use an invoice number.

* Click here for the opinion.  And thanks to Dennis Crouch of Patently-O for pointing out this decision.

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Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jan. 2, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).*

Judge Moran denied defendants’ (collectively “eSpeed”) motion for judgment as a matter of law that plaintiff Trading Technologies’ (“TT”) patent was invalid for indefiniteness based upon the claim term “single action of a user input device” (“Single Action”). The Court previously construed Single Action as “an action by a user within a short period of time that may comprise one or more clicks of a mouse button or other input device.” Before trial, the Court used the definition to exclude evidence regarding a Tokyo Stock Exchange (“TSE”) software package that required double clicking, entering a quantity and pressing “enter” – click here for the Blog’s discussion of that opinion.

TT argued that the phrases “one or more clicks” and “short period of time” in the Court’s construction were indefinite because they did not sufficiently delineate the scope of the term. The Court noted that it did not need absolute clarity to define a claim term and held that the Single Action was sufficiently definite. The Court reasoned that it had been able to construe the term based largely upon the specification. And neither “one or more clicks” nor “short period of time” rendered the claim indefinite because the phrases are part of the definition, not the claim language. 

 

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Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 05 C 5373, 2007 WL 4287501 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2007) (Coar, J.).*

Judge Coar construed the claims of plaintiff Abbott’s patent related to an extended release antibiotic (clarithromycin, an erythromycin derivative which Abbott markets as Biaxin XL), denied defendant Sandoz’s motion for summary judgment of noninfringement and granted Abbott summary judgment regarding anticipation, obviousness and inequitable conduct.  Of particular interest, the Court held that the use of Markush group language – “selected from the group consisting of” – in the specification did not necessarily limit the construction of claim terms. The Court also noted that materiality of a reference in an inequitable conduct analysis was determined from the perspective of a reasonable examiner, not the patentee.

* Click here for more on this case and related cases.

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Easypower Corp. v. Alden Corp., __ F. Supp.2d __, 2007 WL 4191837 (N.D.Ill. Nov. 21, 2007) (Denlow, Mag. J.).

Judge Denlow denied defendant Alden Corp.’s (“Alden”) motion for reconsideration of the Court’s construction of “acute angle relative to the axis.” The Court’s construction required an angle less than 90°, and further required that if there were two or more angles, any two angles together be greater than 90°. Alden argued that the requirement regarding two or more angles was improperly read into the claim without support in the specification. But the Court held that the limitation was required based upon the clear language of the specification. Additionally, the Court noted that the parties were given ample opportunities to argue the issue, both on the papers and during the Markman hearing.

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Everything Baseball Ltd., LLC v. Team Athletic Goods, Inc., No. 05 C 5526, 2007 WL 2608551 (N.D. of Ill. Sep. 4, 2007) (Pallmeyer, J.).*

Judge Pallmeyer construed the claims of plaintiff’s patent to a baseball catcher’s chest protector with flexible shoulder guards. Defendant argued that the “scope and content of the prior art” should be determined before construing the claims, citing the Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) dissent. But the Court held that it need not survey the prior art before construing the claims. And the Court noted that the quoted portion of the Phillips dissent argued that obviousness should receive de novo review, as does claim construction. The dissent was not attempting to add additional claim construction steps.

Additionally, and maybe most importantly for Cubs fans (like me) still smarting over being swept out of the playoffs this season, the Court explained in a footnote Javy Lopez’s (who wore a patented chest protector for at least one year) connection to the Tommy John surgery from which Cubs’ ace Kerry Wood has arguably never fully recovered. If Kerry Wood were still the 20 K kid he once was, maybe the Cubs would have given the Colorado Rockies a run in the NLCS, setting up a Cubs-Red Sox Series that would have been a dream for Cubs fans, baseball historians and network executives. Unfortunately, the Cubs curse (or at least lack of postseason success) lives another year and the Rockies get a chance to complete an amazing rags to riches story.

*Click here for more about this case in the Blog's archives.

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Eazypower Corp. v. Alden Corp., __ F. Supp.2d __, 2007 WL 2601309 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 6, 2007) (Denlow, Mag. J.)

Magistrate Judge Denlow construed the claims of plaintiff’s patents regarding bits for removing damaged screws and fasteners. Of particular interest, the Court defined “in a place including the axis” as “simply what is says”:  “in a plane including the axis.” Plaintiff argued that the Court should read manufacturing tolerances into the term. But the Court held that manufacturing tolerances could not be read into claim terms citing Senned, Inc. v. Richard-Allan Med. Indus., Inc., 888 F.2d 815 (Fed. Cir. 1989).

Of course, if the specifications and prosecution histories do not limit the doctrine of equivalents, plaintiff will be able to recapture products that would meet the “in a plane including the axis” but for manufacturing tolerances.

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Trading Techs. Int’l., Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, 2007 WL 2713335 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 12, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).

Judge Moran granted in part plaintiff Trading Technologies’ (“TT”) motion in limine, precluding defendant eSpeed from arguing to the jury that any feature requiring the specific sequence – a double mouse click, keying in a value and pressing the enter key – fell within the Court’s construction of a “single action.”* The Court reasoned that it defined single action from the perspective of the software end-user. And from the user prospective the double-click/quantity/enter sequence was clearly more than a single action.

The Court acknowledged that taking this decision from the jury was “unusual,” but the Court believed its decision was warranted because of the complexity of the case and how clearly outside the construction of single action the double-click/quantity/enter sequence was: 

The parties have no lack of theories, especially when it comes to invalidity and prior art. Therefore, as we are convinced that it would be impossible for a reasonable jury to find that the three steps described by eSpeed’s attorney could fit into our definition of single action, we grant TT’s motion to exclude evidence that it does. Rather than throw a non-starter at the jury or deal with this issue during post-trial motion practice, we exclude the evidence from the start. Although our decision is nearly akin to a partial summary judgment ruling, we are convinced that it is correct, it will save precious judicial resources, and simplify the case for the jury.  (Citations and footnotes omitted).

I understand that the trial is ongoing.  I am hoping to make it to closing arguments and will post about them if my schedule allows me to see them. 

* Click here to read much more about this case and its related cases in the Blog’s archives.

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Trading Techs. Int'l., Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No 04 C 5312, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).*

Judge Moran denied plaintiff Trading Technologies’ (“TT”) motions to reconsider the Court’s grant of summary judgment of noninfringement regarding defendant eSpeed’s software utilizing automatic and drift recentering of a price axis (discussed here). This opinion is most notable for the Court’s blunt footnote acknowledging that this case will be appealed to the Federal Circuit and that, therefore, the Court believes that “speedy resolution” is in all parties’ best interests:

We recognize that TT may have a valid argument [that an amendment during prosecution did not narrow the claims] and note that this was a close call. We also recognize that our decision may have been influenced by the impending trial and our disinclination to reopen a significant issue for debate. We have previously noted that this case is certain to find itself in front of the Federal Circuit for ultimate resolution and acknowledge our place as a “way station” to the Court of Appeals. Therefore, we are further convinced that speedy resolution of all issues before this court is in everyone’s best interest. . . .

Certainly other courts have thought along these lines, but few voice these opinions. 

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Herman Miller, Inc. v. Teknion Corp., No. 05 C 2761, 2007 WL 2230042 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 30, 2007) (Gettleman, J.).

Judge Gettleman construed the claims of the asserted patents covering features of swivel office chairs and granted partial summary judgment of infringement for plaintiff on one of the two patents, U.S. Patent No. 6,588,741 (the “‘741 patent”), with the exception of claim 10 which plaintiff admitted was not literally infringed, and summary judgment of noninfringement for defendant as to claim 10 of the ’741 patent and the second patent, U.S. Patent No. 6,588,842. But the most interesting part of this opinion is not the Court’s constructions or infringement analysis, but what appears to be plaintiff’s reasonableness – a trait seldom displayed at this stage of the case in my experience. At the beginning of its opinion, the Court noted that the case originally included two other patents and that the parties had filed and briefed cross summary judgment motions regarding those patents as well. But in light of the KSR v. Teleflex decision, plaintiff issued a statement of non-liability as to those patents and the parties voluntarily dismissed all of their claims and counterclaims related to those patents. It must have been an exceptionally strong obviousness case. I have read several post-KSR decisions and this is the first case in which I have seen a plaintiff voluntarily dismiss its claims in light of the “new” obviousness standard.

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PSN Illinois, LLC v. Ivoclar Vivadent, Inc., No. 04 C 7232, 2006 WL 3523760 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2006) (Kendall, J.).

Judge Kendall denied plaintiff's Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 motion for reconsideration of the Court's prior ruling (discussed in the Blog's archives) construing the claims of the patent at issue and granting summary judgment of noninfringement on behalf of defendant Ivoclar Vivadent, Inc. ("Ivoclar").  The Court denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration because it considered each of plaintiff's reconsideration arguments in its original Opinion granting summary judgment.  But the Court spent some time on one of plaintiff's claim construction arguments regarding a patent related to porcelain veneers.  On reconsideration, plaintiff argued for a different construction of "ready for mounting."  In its original papers plaintiff did not argue for the proposed construction, although it did propose it in its Local Rule 56.1 Additional Statement of Material Facts.  The Court held that because claim construction is a matter of law, proposed constructions are not material facts and, therefore, cannot be put in LR 56.1 statements.  The Court noted its obligation pursuant to LR 56.1 to disregard legal arguments and conclusions placed in statements of fact.  The Court did, however, go on to consider plaintiff's construction and explain why the Court's original construction was correct.

Practice tip:  Think carefully about what goes into your LR 56.1 statements of material fact.  Do not put arguments in your statements of fact. And by all means, do not put arguments in your statements of fact and then omit those arguments from your brief. The Court will disregard them, and you will be out of luck. 

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Rowe Int'l Corp. v. Ecast, Inc., No. 06 C 2703, 2007 WL 1498958 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2007) (Kennelly, J.).*

Judge Kennelly issued this claim construction opinion construing the claims of eight patents related to computer jukeboxes and computer jukebox networks.  Of particular note, the Court construed "song selection means" in USPN 5,355,302 (the "'302 patent") as a keyboard separate from a display for generating a signal representing a song selected from the set of songs stored in the jukebox.  Plaintiffs sought a construction that would include a visual touchscreen, arguing that the Court should consider the following language from an unrelated patent by the same patentee (the "'398 patent"), that was not part of the patent in suit or its prosecution history:  "song selection means displayed on said visual screen."  Plaintiffs argued that this language showed that "song selection means" could include on-screen displays.  But the Court held that considering the language was not permissible and that, even if it were, the language only showed that the inventors were capable of claiming an on-screen display, but chose not to in the '302 patent.

*  You can read more about this case in the Blog's archives.

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Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA LLC, No. 04 C 346, 2007 WL 1468630 (N.D. Ill. May 18, 2007) (Zagel, J.).

Judge Zagel construed the claims of the parties' patents, each to chewing gum containing physiological cooling agents.  The Court first construed "menthol" and "physiological cooling agent," but of particular interest was the Court's construction of "N-ethyl-p-methane-3-carboxamide."  Plaintiff/counter-defendant Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co.'s ("Wrigley") argued that the term in defendant/counter-plaintiff Cadbury Adams USA LLC's ("Cadbury") patent should be required to be at least 30% of the cooling composition of the gum based upon alleged disclaimers in the specification, as well as alleged judicial and prosecution history estoppel.  The Court stated that it was a very close issue, but held that the term was not required to make up at least 30% of the cooling composition.  The specification language relied upon by Wrigley was in the preferred embodiment and, therefore, should not be read into the claims.  And while Cadbury may have disclaimed using less than 30% of N-ethyl-p-methane-3-carboxamide in the cooling compound during both the prosecution of other patents and judicial proceedings regarding those patents, the patents had no direct relation to the patent in suit and, therefore, estoppel could not apply. 

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Vanguard Prods. Group, Inc. v. Diam USA, Inc., No. 05 C 1323, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. May 16, 2007) (Bucklo, J.).*

Judge Bucklo granted plaintiffs summary judgment of infringement and denied defendants summary judgment of invalidity.  The Court first construed the two claim terms at issue -- "electrically coupled" and "via the modular connector."  In both cases, the Court adopted the plaintiffs' construction after a detailed review of the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence.  Because neither term was in the original application or appears in the specification, the intrinsic evidence focused on the use of the terms within the claims.  Defendants also attempted to use claim language from a parent application to support their constructions, but the Court held that the prosecution of a term in a parent application generally does not limit different terms in its progeny.  In the instant case, the Court found that the parent application had used the broader term "electrical connection" instead of "electrically coupled" which weighed against defendants' construction.  Having ruled in plaintiffs' favor on the claim construction, the Court held that defendants' products infringed the asserted claims of plaintiffs' patents.  And the Court held that defendants' asserted prior art did not anticipate plaintiffs' patents.

*  Because I beat Westlaw on this one, you can access a copy of the Court's opinion here.  Please note that the Court issued a subsequent order modifying the opinion by deleting footnotes three and four, which were not intended to be part of the opinion.

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Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 05 C 5373, 2006 WL 1141635 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 2007) (Coar, J.).

Judge Coar granted plaintiff Abbott's motion for a preliminary injunction, after having previously denied it a TRO.*  The PI enjoined defendant Sandoz from selling a generic version of Abbott's patented extended release antibiotic (clarithromycin, an erythromycin derivative which Abbott markets as Biaxin XL).  The Court held that Sandoz had shown a substantial likelihood of materiality and Abbott's intent to deceive the PTO  based upon Abbott's failure to disclose certain taste perversion data during prosecution.  But because Abbott abandoned the claims to which the taste perversion data was relevant of its own accord, the Court did not find the patent preliminarily unenforceable.  The Court explained its reasoning as follows:

Redemption is one of the core principles of the American ethos.  Thus in addition to being contrary to the spirit of Scribbs, Kimberly-Clark and the Code of Federal Regulation, it seems wholly inequitable to hold a patent to be invalid for fraudulent conduct in the prosecution of a claim that was withdrawn before actual prosecution had even begun.

 

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Trading Techs. Int'l., Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No 04 C 5312, 2007 WL 611258 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).

Judge Moran denied plaintiff Trading Technologies ("TT") motion for clarification of the Court's claim construction or in the alternative for reconsideration (more on the claim construction and the case generally here).  TT sought clarification of the Court's construction of "static" and a correction to the Court's construction of "plurality."  The Court defined "static" relative to a "price axis" as a line that does not change position unless it is manually re-centered.  TT sought clarification as to whether a product that had a "static" "price axis" for periods of time in between automatic re-centering would fall within the definition of "static" at least for part-time infringement.  The Court denied to clarify the construction as TT requested and held that for something to be "static" it must have "a permanent lack of movement."

 

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Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Lear Corp., No. 05 C 3449, 2007 WL 551579 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2007) (Moran, J.).

Judge Moran granted in part defendant's motion for reconsideration regarding the Court's construction of "binary code."  In its prior claim construction opinion -- discussed here -- the Court defined "binary code" and "trinary code generator," among other terms.  In its discussion of its "binary code" construction, the Court explained that the claims do not limit binary code to a binary number and, therefore, the term encompasses "other numerical and character languages, including trinary code."  Defendant argued that binary code could not be defined as trinary code and that, therefore, the Court should modify its construction to make clear that trinary code cannot be part of binary code.  The Court agreed with defendant that binary code cannot encompass trinary code and, therefore, clarified its explanatory sentence.  The Court explained that binary code could not include trinary code, but that it could include trinary numbers.  But because the Court's actual construction did not mention trinary code, it declined to revise the construction.

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Goss Int'l Am., Inc. v. K & M Newspaper Serves., Inc., __ F. Supp.2d __, 2006 L 3883318 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 29, 2006) (Colon, J.).

In this claim construction opinion, Judge Colon considered several issues regarding whether "means" terms were actually means plus function terms.  The patented technology at issue is "inserts" which are machines that insert advertising materials into newspapers at specific locations within the newspaper.  The Court first held that "article feeder means" was no means plus function language governed by Section 112, para. 6.  Citing the Federal Circuit's MIT v. Abacus Software, 462 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2006) decision, the Court concluded that "article feeder," like "circuitry" in the MIT case, described a known structure in the industry.  Additionally, the patent's prosecution history showed that both the examiner and the patienter understood "article feeder" to refer to a specific structure.  And dictionaries definitions of "feeder" were consistent with its use in the patent-at-issue.  Furthermore, the claims that included the term described the location of the article feeder and certain of its components, giving it structural definition.  Finally, defendant's means plus function definition failed because it sought to import structures that were not necessary to the "article feeder's" function and because certain of the structures were recited in independent claims, violating the doctrine of claim differentiation.

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Andrew Corp. v. Beverly Mfg. Co., No. 04 C 6214, 2006 WL 3486884 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 2006) (Holderman, Chief J.).

In this claim construction opinion regarding several patents relating to cable hangers used for telecommunications towers, Judge Holderman refuses to limit several claim terms based upon the preferred embodiments described in the specifications.  The Court explained that "district courts should not generally rely on preferred embodiments in specifications to confine claims unless the embodiment defines the outer limit of the claim." 

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JVI, Inc. v. Universal Holdings, Inc., __ F.Supp.2d __ (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2006) (Leinenweber, J.).

In this opinion Judge Leinenweber construed the claims of plaintiff's U.S. Patent No. 6,185,897 which covers an improved flange connector for precast concrete double tee members.  Of particular interest, the Court considered whether a specification including a single preferred embodiment limited the scope of the claims and discussed the claim differentiation doctrine.

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Trading Techs. Int'l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, 2006 WL 3147697 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 2006). (Moran, Senior J.)

Judge Moran issued this opinion construing the claims of the patents-in-suit after a Markman hearing.  There are two items of special note.  First, the opinion provides a thorough recitation of the claim construction standards post-Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  Second, the Court provides further proof that claim construction is an organic process which can change througout a case, with this succinct quote:

Although our preliminary injunction construction aligned with plaintiff's view, such construction was, simply put, preliminary.

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Cummins-Allison Corp. v. Glory Ltd., __ F.Supp.2d __, 2006 WL 2931999 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 13, 2006) (Kendall, J.).

Judge Kendall performed a very thorough claim construction in this opinion, but what is most interesting about it is the procedural history.  The Court (with another judge presiding) initially construed the claims at issue in March 2005, without holding a Markman hearing.  Plaintiff then sought reconsideration regarding one of the patents at issue and defendant sought reconsideration regarding the other.  The Court ultimately granted both motions and held a Markman hearing, which is the basis of this opinion.   

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Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Lear Corp., No. 05 C 3449, 2006 WL 2632074 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 2006) (Moran, J.)

In this claim construction opinion, Judge Moran made an interesting holding regarding the use of claim construction to resolve literal infringement issues. Defendant argued that plaintiff’s proposed constructions of “binary code” and “trinary code generator” were improperly driven by plaintiff’s infringement case. The Court noted that this was an infringement argument. The Court, therefore, would not address defendant’s argument in its claim construction opinion. This does not change my advice that you should explain why you are arguing for subtle variations of a construction. Rather, Judge Moran’s opinion illustrates that, after explaining the purpose of your proposed construction, you should be sure to ground your argument in the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence.

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Murata Mfg. Co., Ltd. v. Bel Fuse Inc., __ F. Supp.2d __, 2006 WL 2176241 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 28, 2006) (Gottschall, J.).

This detailed claim construction ruling demonstrates several useful practice tips. First:  work with opposing counsel upfront to determine which terms are actually in dispute. The parties’s initial briefing sought construction of nineteen terms, but when the Court required supplemental briefs post-Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the parties limited their briefing to only seven terms. This highlights the value of sitting down with opposing counsel before claim construction to identify the terms that are actually disputed.  Of course, this requires two reasonable parties represented by reasonable counsel, but you are better off at least trying. It is embarrassing to counsel and expensive for the client to learn, upon receiving the opposing brief, that a term that you spent hours, dollars, and valuable pages briefing is not actually in dispute. And of course, it is frustrating for the Court.

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