Parties Warned to Cooperate in Discovery Disputes

Scandaglia v. Transunion Interactive, Inc., No. 09 C 2121, Slip. Op. (N.D. Ill. Jan 21, 2010) (Hibbler, J.)

Judge Hibbler granted in part plaintiffs’ discovery motion in this Lanham Act case involving the alleged infringement of plaintiffs’ “Always Know Where You Stand” registered trademark. After wading through the parties’ 267 pages of briefing and exhibits, the Court cautioned both parties to avoid bad faith and work together to resolve disputes:

 

Throughout its review of the parties’ materials it finds that both parties have acted in bad faith in this discovery dispute and therefore denies Plaintiffs’ request for attorneys fees. Both parties have obstinately drawn lines in the sand that have not been warranted: [Defendant] asserting, generally, that Plaintiffs are entitled to virtually nothing; Plaintiffs asserting, generally, that they are entitled to virtually everything. The Court has committed substantial judicial resources to reviewing the parties’ cumbersome materials and resolving a dispute that the parties should have been able to resolve themselves. Such resources have been diverted from resolving other claims. 

 

The Court hopes that in the future the parties will demonstrate a greater degree of professionalism and collegiality and make a good faith effort to resolve their disputes before consuming the Court’s resources.

 

The Court held that defendant’s production of documents sufficient to show its revenues, profits, and expenditures was enough. Defendant need not produce every such document. On a related issue, the Court warned defendant that actual confusion was not required in the case, only a likelihood of confusion. And the Court warned against misrepresenting law or fact: 

 

Lawsuits are not shell games in which counsel should try to hide the peanut from the Court’s eye. The Court will tolerate no further misrepresentation of fact or law to bolster an argument.

 

The Court also warned the parties against compound document requests because they were “bound to produce difficulties.”  And the Court refused to compel further production without proof of withheld documents, pursuant to a request seeking “everything, including the kitchen sink.” This request sought all documents related to the Complaint, answer, counterclaim and affirmative defenses. The Court would only enforce it with evidence of withheld documents. The Court held that an interrogatory seeking proof supporting defendant’s request for admission denials did not contain discrete subparts, ordering defendants to answer the interrogatory.

 

The Court held that defendant’s identification of people that potentially had relevant knowledge was a sufficient response because it answered plaintiffs’ broad interrogatory. If plaintiffs wanted only those people with actual knowledge, it should have prepared a narrower interrogatory. The Court ordered defendant to supplement its Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(d) response to a contention interrogatory regarding defendant’s genericness defense as more documents were identified. And defendant was directed to provide a “general statement of its legal basis.”

Court Refuses Unnecessarily Burdensome Restrictions on Source Code Production

 

Bergstrom v. Glacier Bay, Inc., No. 08 C 50078, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jan. 22, 2010) (Mahoney, Mag. J.).

Judge Mahoney granted in part the parties' cross-motions regarding production of defendant Glacier Bay's source code, and denied Glacier Bay's other discovery motions. Plaintiff Bergstrom sought production of the source code as an OCR'ed tiff document, consistent with other production in the case. Glacier Bay offered to provide supervised access to the code for an expert and one lawyer on a laptop during business hours. The Court held that Glacier Bay's proposal was unnecessarily restrictive. It would have been unnecessarily burdensome to only allow Bergstrom's expert access to the 23,500 pages of source code on only a laptop, and to only allow screenshots of selected portions of the code. The Court, therefore, ordered production of the source code in the case-standard OCR'ed tiff format. 

The Court also denied Glacier Bay's request to prevent anyone involved in prosecuting Bergstrom's patents from viewing the source code. The Court held such a blanket ban was unnecessary, but did exclude one attorney that had both prosecution and litigation duties for Bergstrom from viewing the software.

The Court also denied Glacier Bay's motion to compel documents related to a failed settlement discussion between Bergstrom and a third party. The Court reasoned that while Fed. R. Evid. 408 was not an evidentiary rule, the spirit of Fed. R. Evid. 408 – protecting and promoting open settlement talks – counseled against production of the requested documents.

Finally, the Court denied Glacier Bay's motion to compel answers to requests for admissions regarding whether Bergstrom provided certain alleged prior art to its patent prosecution counsel. Compelling those answers would have potentially compelled Bergstrom to breach its attorney-client privilege with patent prosecution counsel.

 

FRE 502 Applies in Case Pending on 502's Effective Date

Heriot v. Byrne, No. 08 C 2272, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill., Mar. 20, 2008) (Ashman, Mag. J.).

 
Judge Ashman denied in part and granted in part Defendants' discovery motion seeking certain allegedly privileged documents, and denied in part and withheld ruling on the remainder of plaintiffs discovery motion regarding allegedly privileged documents.  Of particular interest, the Court held that new Fed. R. Evid. 502 governing inadvertent disclosure of privileged documents applied in this case although it was not filed after the rule took effect because the case was pending at that time and because defendants, who opposed application of the rule, identified no reason that its application in this case would be unjust.  Having decided that Fed. R. Evid. 502(b) applied to allegedly inadvertent disclosures, the Court identified the test to determine whether the disclosure was a waiver of privilege as follows:  1) determine whether the disclosed material was privileged; 2) determine whether all three Fed. R. Evid. 502(b) factors are met, including inadvertence.  The Court also noted that in analyzing the three factors courtss were free to consider any of the five factors from Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc. v. Latini-Hohberger Dhimantec, 529 F.3d 371 (7th Cir. 2008).

 

 

Court Finds National Rates Reasonable & Awards Attorney's Fees

UTStarcom, Inc. v. Starent Networks, Corp., No. 07 C 2582, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Apr. 13, 2009) (Bobrick, Ret. J. & Special Master).

Special Master Bobrick, a retired judge, awarded defendant Starent its attorneys fees  related to Starent's efforts to get complete interrogatory responses from plaintiff UTStarcom.  In an earlier opinion (click here for the Blog's related post), the Court denied Starent's request to dismiss plaintiff's trade secret misappropriation claim as a sanction for UTStarcom's incomplete responses, but awarded attorneys fees.  Of particular interest, the Special Master held that block billing was not inappropriate and that block billed entries could be recovered.  Additionally, based in part on UTStarcom's failure to provide its rates as part of a reasonableness analysis, the Special Master held that Starent's rates were not unreasonable, although they may have been more than standard local rates.  The Court also noted that patent cases required special expertise which often commands a premium.  The Special Master did, however, reduce the rates of Starent's law students whom the Special Master noted were neither lawyers nor paralegals.  Finally, the Special Master reduced by one-third the bills for certain time that was added to Starent's Bill of Costs late.

Court Barely Denies Motion to Dismiss for Delayed Interrogatory Answers

UTStarcom, Inc. v. Starent Networks, Corp., No. 07 C 2582, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jan. 22, 2009) (Bobrick, Ret. J. & Special Master).

Special Master Bobrick, a retired judge, denied defendant Starent's motion to dismiss plaintiff UTSI's trade secret misappropriation claim for repeatedly deficient interrogatory responses related to the claim.  Over the course of a year, UTSI served six responses to the interrogatories at issue based upon various requests by Starent and orders by the Special Master.  After the sixth set of responses, Starent agreed that the answers were sufficient.  Starent, however, requested dismissal of the claim based upon UTStarcom's repeated failure to provide a substantive answer.  UTStarcom responded that dismissal was a drastic remedy that was not warranted because had provided substantive answers and because Starent had not been prejudiced by the delay.  UTStarcom even suggested other remedies like exclusion of late produced evidence.  The Special Master held that it was a close case and that either outcome would be defensible.  The Court however, denied Starent's motion to dismiss but did award attorney's fees for the filing of Starent's motion.

Trading Technologies v. eSpeed: Parties Ordered to Work Out Discovery Issues

Trading Techs. Int'l., Inc. v. CQG, Inc., No. 05 C 4811, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Feb. 17, 2009) (Moran, Sen. J.).

Judge Moran denied a motion to reconsider an earlier order continuing a summary judgment motion and staying the case pending the appeal of a related case, Trading Technologies v. eSpeed.*  The Court also ordered the parties to meet and confer regarding how to exchange defendants' sensitive trading information.  The Court previously ordered defendants to work with plaintiff Trading Technologies ("TT") to determine how to produce defendants' raw transaction data, which was required for a damages calculation.  The parties could not agree on how to exchange the information because of defendants' unwillingness to provide  such sensitive data to TT without restrictions.  The Court ordered the parties to continue trying to resolve the issue and suggested various ways that the information could be exchanged without forcing defendants to provide all of their sensitive business information.

Click here for much more on this case and the related cases in the Blog's archives.

Stay Pending Reexam Granted as to One of Three Patents

Fellowes, Inc. v. Aurora Corp. of Am., No. 07 C 7237, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Feb. 10, 2009) (Kocoras, J.).

Judge Kocoras granted defendants' motion to stay the litigation as to U.S. Patent No. 7,311,276 ("'276 patent") pending the '276 patent's reexamination.  The Court previously denied defendants' motion to stay the case as to the two other patents in suit.  But the Court granted a stay as to the '276 patent based upon the substantial new question of patentability identified by the Patent Office in granting the reexam.  The Court acknowledged that defendants would be able to challenge the '276 patent's validity after the reexam, but held that a stay would still reduce the burden of the litigation on all parties and the Court.

Trial/Prosecution Counsel Not Deposed Until After 30(b)(6) Deposition

WMH Tool Group, Inc. v. Woodstock, Int'l., Inc., No. 07 C 3885, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jan. 14, 2009) (Mason, Mag. J.).

Judge Mason granted plaintiff's motion to quash the deposition notice of plaintiff's trial counsel ("Counsel") for this trademark infringement dispute, who was also plaintiff's trademark prosecution counsel for the mark in suit.  The Court held that regardless of what the proper standard was for determining whether to depose trial counsel, it had not been met.  Until defendants took plaintiff's Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, there was no way to tell whether Counsel had any specialized knowledge or whether his knowledge could be more easily obtained from another source.  The Court, therefore, quashed the deposition notice, but allowed defendants to seek leave to depose Counsel after document production is complete and all relevant depositions have been taken.

Court Warns Parties That Future Fee Motions May be Granted

Rosenthal Collins Group, LLC v. Trading Techs. Int'l, Inc., No. 05 C 4088, Min. Order (N.D. Ill. Feb. 2, 2009) (Moran, Sen. J.).*

In this pair of entries, Judge Moran denied plaintiff Trading Technologies' motions for fees and costs related to a discovery motion and referred another fees motion to Magistrate Judge Schenkier.  In the first entry, the Court noted that it was time to end "unnecessary [discovery] battles" in the case and that it might not be as forgiving with the next fees motion.  In the other entry, the Court transferred a fees motion to Judge Schenkier, but questioned how "a single discovery dispute could blossom into a claim for over $300,000.

Click here to read much more about this case and the related cases in the Blog's archives.

e-Communications are e-Discoverable

Every litigator knows that email is discoverable, and that it can be dangerous because of a tendency to be less formal in email writing.  And litigators are increasingly aware that instant messages are often archived and are likely discoverable, especially where they are used in the ordinary course of business.  There is also an interesting question as to whether document retention policies should require that instant messages be archived and retained, but that is difficult issue for a separate post.  But many litigators are unaware of the latest frontier in internet communications -- Twitter posts, or tweets.  Tweets are posts of no more than 140 characters that the user shares with, except in some limited cases, anyone who wishes to see them.  And Lawyers USA has an interesting news brief (click here to read it) arguing that they are discoverable.  So, the question for litigants and potential litigants is what to do about it.  The answer to that question is very fact specific, but as a starting point you should be aware that tweets may be discoverable and corporations should make their employees, particularly those that tweet at the direction of the company, aware that their tweets may become part of future litigations.

Litigants Cooperating? Sedona Conference says "Yes."

 Yesterday the Sedona Conference (a nonprofit research and educational institute dedicated to the advanced study of law and policy in the areas of antitrust law, complex litigation, and intellectual property rights) issued its Cooperation Proclamation -- click here to read the Proclamation and click here for the slides from the related press conference.*  Every litigator knows that she has a duty to be a zealous advocate for her client.  The Cooperation Proclamation focuses on the litigator's other main duty, the one that is sometimes forgotten in the quest for zealous advocacy -- the attorney as an officer of the court.  As an officer of the court the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that we cooperate to fully and properly complete the discovery process.  Unfortunately, the discovery process (just like code pleading that open discovery was created to fix) can become a ritualized fight  focused on procedural rules and technicalities, instead of exchanging the necessary facts so that the case can be pared down and prepared for trial, mediation or settlement.

The Sedona Conference suggests that litigators first focus on their roles as officers of the court to cooperatively define the scope of and complete discovery in a case.  Then, once all of the facts have been made available to the extent possible, the attorney focuses on the role of zealous advocate, working the produced evidence to make the client's case.  The Sedona Conference bills this as a somewhat radical proposal that will require fairly extensive awareness campaigns and retraining.  But my experience suggests that the change may not be as radical as the Sedona Conference thinks.  In many cases (although not all) the parties do try to produce the relevant documents and witnesses, and to resolve discovery disputes reasonably.  I think what needs radical change is a pervasive lack of trust between litigators.  Everyone is afraid their opponent is gaming the system and hiding the smoking guns.  What most needs change is trust among the officers of the court.  Perhaps the Sedona Conference's plan of educating attorneys to perform cooperative discovery will begin to generate that trust.

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Sealing Documents in Federal Courts

Patent Appeal Tracer has run a provocative series of posts discussing the process for and practice of sealing documents in the Eastern District of Texas cases, focused of course on patent disputes.  The first post details the procedures as they understand it and questions whether parties should be allowed to file sealed documents without the court's review -- click here to read it. 

The second post includes the comments of Michael Smith from his E.D. Texas Weblog -- click here to read it.  Smith explains that the sealing rules have changed since those quoted by Patent Tracer, but that it is still possible for pre-approval to be granted in cases giving the parties initial control over what is sealed.  Smith acknowledges that too much may be filed under seal, but explains that the E.D. Texas Rules Committee is balancing the public right to information with a workable process:

Now the question of whether too much is being filed under seal is a valid one - I've seen a couple of cases recently where it seemed everything was under seal, and it wasn't immediately apparent that anything confidential was involved. But that is definitely the exception in my experience. . . . But I can say that our principal concern, at least on the ED Tex's rules committee when the issue has come up, was coming up with a mechanism to make filing under seal as easy as possible where the reason for the filing was that confidential documents were attached.

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Trading Technologies: Rule 37 Sanctions Based Upon Fault

Rosenthal Collins Group, LLC v. Trading Techs. Int'l, Inc., No. 05 C 4088, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jul. 17, 2008) (Moran, Sen. J.).

Judge Moran denied declaratory judgment plaintiff Rosenthal Collins Group's ("RCG") motion to vacate the Court's March 14, 2007 order awarding declaratory judgment defendant Trading Technologies' ("TT") Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 sanctions – click here to read the Blog's post about that opinion and click here to read much more about this case and the related cases. In that earlier order, the Court held that RCG's motion for summary judgment of invalidity was "somewhat misleading" and possibly "disingenuous." Instead of dismissing the case as TT requested, the Court struck the declaration underlying RCG's motion, denied RCG's summary judgment motion with leave to refile a motion "supported by proper evidence" and awarded TT its costs and attorneys fees associated with the Rule 37 motion, as well as its software expert's fees.

In this motion, RCG argued that the Court should vacate that sanctions order because the Court held that TT had not proved by clear and convincing evidence that RCG acted willfully or with bad faith. But the Court held that Rule 37 sanctions could be based upon willfulness, bad faith or fault. Fault went to the reasonableness of the party's content, not necessarily intent. And the Court held that RCG's actions met the standard for fault. Furthermore, while clear and convincing was the burden of proof for dismissal, clear and convincing proof is not required for lesser sanctions.

Finally, the Court held that the categories of fees and costs sought by TT were within the scope of the Court's order, but ordered the parties to brief the reasonableness of the specific fees sought by TT, using the Local Rule 54.3 requirements (a rule usually used for post-judgment fees and costs).

Trading Technologies: Court Gives Non-Producing Party "Benefit of the Doubt"

Rosenthal Collins Group, LLC v. Trading Techs. Int'l, Inc., No. 05 C 4088, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jul. 17, 2008) (Moran, Sen. J.).

Judge Moran denied declaratory judgment defendant Trading Technologies' ("TT") contempt motion and, instead, provided declaratory judgment plaintiff Rosenthal Collins Group's ("RCG") two weeks to produce the previously compelled documents and to schedule the ordered deposition of third party declarant Walter Buist, the creator of the alleged prior art trading software Wit DSM. RCG previously filed a motion for summary judgment of invalidity of TT's patents based upon a declaration by Buist regarding his Wit DSM software that he developed, at least partially, more than a year before TT filed its patent applications. In a previous opinion, the Court held that RCG's motion was "somewhat misleading" and possibly "disingenuous," but refused to dismiss the case (you can read the Blog's discussion of that opinion here, as well as more on this case generally in the Blog's archives). 

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Commercially Available Products are Discoverable

Boler Co. v. ArvinMeritor, Inc., No. 03 C 489, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jul. 2, 2008) (Cole, Mag. J.).

Judge Cole decided various discovery and protective order issues in this patent infringement dispute.  Of particular note, the Court denied defendant's motion to preclude inspection of items that were commercially available.  The Court held that commercially available items were discoverable and that because the items were commercially available there were no protective order implications.

The Court also refused to consider certain oral motions, likely those that the parties could have filed before the hearing, because the Court's standing order required that motions be briefed.  Always make sure to read the Court's standing order, as well as the Local Rules.

Google Ordered to Produce YouTube Information

The Chicago Tribune's Jessica Guynn reported last week (click here to read the article) that a Southern District of New York judge ordered Google to produce information about YouTube user's viewing habits.  Viacom sued YouTube and its parent Google, alleging copyright infringement based upon the alleged infringing posting of Viacom's copyrighted content on YouTube.  Guynn reports that privacy advocates are concerned about the ruling.  But Guynn also quotes Viacom's General Counsel Michael Fricklas saying that "unequivocally that this information will not be used" outside of the lawsuit.

The WSJ Law Blog also has a great post about the order -- click here for the post -- explaining the type of information that Google was ordered to disclose:
Viacom wants records from a YouTube database that records each time a video is watched and pairs that with two kinds of information about people who viewed it: log-in names (for YouTube users that have accounts), and IP addresses (for YouTube users without accounts).

For those concerned about the production, there is nothing to be worried about.  Virtually every federal case involving sensitive information is governed by a protective order preventing use or disclosure of the information outside of the litigation.  And in virtually all of those cases the parties honor the protective order and the information is not disclosed or used besides in the litigation.

[UPDATE:]  Randy Picker at the University of Chicago Faculty Law Blog has an interesting post questioning how the information could be kept or produced by Google differently to avoid disclosing identities along with the viewing information, and whether the information is covered by the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 (enacted after Judge Bork's video rental records were obtained during Senate confirmation hearings):

So Viacom has a legitimate interest in seeing YouTube’s viewing records. But of course viewers have a privacy interest in those records as well. Exactly how many views have I contributed to The Evolution of Dance, the, I gather, most-viewed video on YouTube (currently at 91,619,702 views)? (I have watched only because I teach copyright, not because it is quite funny.)

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Federal Rules Do Not Authorize Civil Search and Seizure

Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Montrose Wholesale Candies & Sundries, Inc., No. 03 C 5311 & 0844, 2008 WL 954161 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 8, 2008) (Cole, Mag. J.).

Judge Cole denied plaintiff's motion for inspection and seizure of assets in its trademark counterfeiting case. The Court previously entered judgment for plaintiff – click here for more about this case in the Blog's archives. Plaintiff brought this motion seeking to identify and seize cash, checks and other financial instruments to satisfy the judgment. The Court held that the motion essentially sought a search warrant directed by plaintiff and utilizing Federal Marshals:

The reality is that the motion is tantamount to a request for a search warrant for Lorillard to enter and search the home of Ray and Sandra Hazemi and the business premises of Montrose Wholesale Candies and Sundries, Inc. (which is owned by them) and for permission to seize any cash, checks or other negotiable instruments belonging to the Hazemis and Montrose and to seize or at least copy all of their financial and accounting records. Nothing in the Motion, itself, suggests that the search and seizure will be accomplished by anyone other than Lorillard. It is not until one looks at the Proposed Order granting the motion that there is even a motion of United States Marshals. But even then, it is Lorillard, through its counsel of record, who is to carry out the search and seizure. The Marshals are merely to accompany Lorillard.

The Court held that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not authorize search warrants. The Court further held that the request was not like a seizure of counterfeit goods, which was authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1)(A), because it sought a post-judgment search to satisfy a judgment.

Incomplete Discovery Not Sanctionable Because it Complied With Requestors' Expert Request

Autotech Techs. Ltd. Partnership v. Automationdirect.com, Inc., No. 05 C 5488 2008 WL 783301 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2008) (Cole, Mag. J.).*

Judge Cole granted in part defendant Automationdirect.com's ("ADC") motion to compel additional records from plaintiff Autotech's database. The parties agreed that an ADC expert would be allowed to develop queries which Autotech would run on its database. After a dispute regarding how to produce the results of the search, the Court ordered production of the documents, which related to records of, among other things, customer confusion. Upon review of the records, ADC demanded that Autotech supplement them with information such as the date of the communication and the identity of the Autotech employees involved. Autotech eventually supplemented the documents with an index identifying, among other things, the identity of the Autotech employee involved in each communication, but not the dates of the communications. ADC moved to compel the production of all fields in Autotech's database for each entry identified by ADC's query. But Autotech countered that it had produced all fields generated by ADC's expert's query. Had the query generated all available fields, they, presumably, would have been produced them all. Because Autotech produced the information generated by ADC's search and supplemented that production with an index, sanctions were not warranted. But the Court did order production, at ADC's expense, of the dates of each communication. The Court also ordered the parties to meet and confer to determine how to produce the dates in a useful format.

*Click here for more of this case in the Blog's archives.

Incomplete Discovery No Sanctionable Because it Complied With Requestors' Expert Request

Autotech Techs. Ltd. Partnership v. Automationdirect.com, Inc., No. 05 C 5488, 2008 WL 783303 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2008) (Cole, Mag. J.).*

Judge Cole granted in part plaintiff Autotech's motion to compel communications between defendant Automationdirect.com, Inc. ("ADC") and any third party regarding ADC's competing C-More touch screen panel. The Court held that ADC need not produce documents related to source code for the C-More product. The Court previously denied Autotech's motion to amend its complaint adding claims related to that source code. But the Court held that ADC's third party communications could be relevant to show whether ADC has complied with its contractual obligation to use its best efforts to sell Autotech's product, or if its C-More sales efforts interfered with sales of Autotech's products. The Court also held that any communication evidencing customer confusion must be produced.

Practice Tip: Do not employ new arguments in reply briefs. The Court did not consider Autotech's reply brief because it changed the scope of its argument on reply. Autotech's opening brief sought ADC's third party communications with the exception of those regarding ADC's source code because claims regarding ADC's software were not in the case. But on reply, Autotech also sought the source code related communications.

*Click here for more about this case in the Blog's archives.

Opinion Letter Discovery and Footnote Citation

Se-Kure Controls, Inc. v. Diam USA, Inc., No. 06 C 4857, 2008 WL 169029 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 17, 2008) (Cox, Mag. J.).*

Judge Cox granted in part a motion to compel discovery regarding defendant’s advice of counsel defense. The Court ordered defendants to product a technical witness that provided opinion counsel information because opinion counsel was unable to remember the substance of conversations between the two.

The Court also ordered production of communications between opinion counsel and trial counsel related to the patent in suit. These communications were within the scope of defendant’s waiver, even though a deposition of trial counsel would not have been allowed.

The Court did not allow plaintiff to take any additional fact depositions. Plaintiff argued it had waited to take certain fact depositions because the witnesses were expected to be Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) designers regarding defendants’ willfulness defense. But the Court did not allow the deposition because fact discovery was closed and because plaintiff had deposed other witnesses on the same topics. 

The most exciting part of this opinion, however, was its form, not its substance – Judge Cox used footnotes for cites. While this format is infinitely more readable and has many prominent advocates – Brian Garner, the (new) legal writer,  Wayne Scheiss and me (perhaps not the most prominent but I am an advocate of footnote citation) – it is a bold move in the typically conservative realm of judicial writing. At least one other Northern District Judge, Chief Judge Holderman, has used footnote citation. If you are aware of other examples, let me know. 

Thank you Judge Cox.

* Click here for more on this case and related cases in the Blog’s archives.

Defendants' Customers' Sales Information Relevant to Commercial Success

Degregorio v. Phillips Electronics. N. Am. Corp., No. 07 C 2683, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Dec. 28, 2007) (Cox, Mag. J.).

Judge Cox granted in part defendants’ motion for a protective order regarding plaintiff’s subpoenas of defendants’ customers in this patent dispute. Plaintiff subpoenaed defendants’ customers of allegedly infringing hair trimmers with built in vacuums, seeking sales and inventory information, as well as promotional materials and purchase orders. The Court denied the motion as to the sales and inventory information. The customers’ sales were potentially relevant to commercial success of the patented device for plaintiff’s non-obviousness case. The Court did enter a protective order as to the request for purchase orders and marketing materials. The Court held that the purchase orders were cumulative of the other requested sales information and marketing materials were too tangential to commercial success to be discoverable.

Court Limits Scope of Privilege Waivers

Goss Int'l Am., Inc. v. Graphic Management Assocs., Inc., No. 05 C 5622, 2007 WL 161684 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 2007) (Valdez, Mag. J.).*

Magistrate Judge Valdez granted in part the parties’ cross motions to compel various discovery. Each party’s alleged waived privilege is of particular interest. The Court denied plaintiff’s motion to compel all documents reflecting defendants’ trial counsel’s** mental impressions of the case, whether or not they were shared with defendants. In light of In re Seagate, the Court held that defendants’ reliance upon advice of counsel does not waive its privilege as to trial counsel’s mental impressions not communicated to defendants. 

The Court denied in part defendants’ motion to compel all previously privileged documents related to prosecution of the patent in suit. Defendants alleged that plaintiff’s production of a Record of Invention document prepared by the inventors at counsel’s direction and request waived privilege. The Court held that plaintiff intentionally waived privilege by disclosing the document, but limited the waiver to documents related to development of plaintiff’s invention.

Click here for more on this case in the Blog’s archives.

** It is not entirely clear, but it appears from the opinion that defendants used the same firm or attorneys for both opinion counsel and trial counsel.

Privilege Claims Must be Supported by Specific Facts

Nutrinova Nutrition Specialties & Food Ingredients GmbH v. Viachem, No. 07 C 4232, Min. Order (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 2007) (St. Eve, J.).

Judge St. Eve granted in part plaintiff’s motion to compel various discovery. The Court ordered defendants to produce various once-privileged documents disclosed to unidentified customers pursuant to an alleged common interest privilege. The Court acknowledged that common interest could protect such disclosures. But defendants failed to identify the specific customers that were shown documents, which documents were disclosed or when the disclosures occurred. On that record, the Court could not find that defendants had maintained the privilege. 

The Court also ordered defendants to update their privilege log to identify any attorneys on the log. And the Court ordered the parties to meet and confer regarding uncrystalized disputes over defendants’ answers to some interrogatories.

Practice Tip: It is the rare judge that appreciates discovery motions, let alone motions where the parties did not identify what the actual issues were. It is very important to follow both the letter and the spirit of Local Rule 37.2 meet and confers.

"Negligence and Recklessness" Does Not Warrant Discovery Sanctions

RRK Holding Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 04 C 3944, Min. Order (N.D. Ill. Sep. 10, 2007) (Coar, J.).*

Judge Coar denied the parties’ damages motions in limine.* First, the Court held that defendant Sears, Roebuck & Co. (“Sears”) could have its damages expert Catherine Lawton testify regarding her analysis of a hypothetical September 2001 negotiation between the parties. Plaintiff RRK Holding (“RRK”) argued that the misappropriation began in March 2000, not when Sears began selling its product in September 2001. As a result, Sears contended that Lawton’s September 2001 hypothetical negotiation should not be allowed into evidence. But the Court held that the timing of the misappropriation was a question of fact for the jury and, therefore, allowed Lawton’s testimony.

Second, the Court held that Sears could introduce the 2003 sale of some of RRK’s assets for $17M as part of Sears’s damages case. The Court held that the value of the sale was relevant to RRK’s alleged injury based upon the alleged misappropriation.

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Happy Anniversary Electronic Data Discovery Rules!

Tomorrow is the first anniversary of the “new” electronic data discovery (“EDD”) rules.* In fact, the EDD rules were not new, they were intended to be a codification of the basic rules already in use by the various district courts. Despite that, a study conducted by LexisNexis at the October Association of Corporate Counsel 2007 Annual Meeting in Chicago found that corporate counsel continue to struggle with implementation of the rules and confusion about what the EDD rules required. For example, 70% of respondents believed that electronic files had to be produced in their native formats. In fact, you simply must work with opposing counsel to decide what format to produce the files in, either their native formats or some chosen standard format. This confusion should not have surprised anyone. Even in IP circles, lawyers rarely fully understand a company’s IT infrastructure and the IT people rarely understand the legal process. This disconnect can be very dangerous when it comes to meeting EDD obligations.

If your company is still struggling with the EDD rules or, worse, avoiding them completely, you can solve your problems with some relatively simple actions. First, take a breath, open your copy of the Federal Rules and read them thoughtfully and then set up a meeting with the head of your company’s IT infrastructure, the head of your company’s legal department or litigation staff and an outside counsel with EDD experience. Working together, come up with a general plan for gathering and preserving the appropriate information as cases arise. Pay special attention to how your plan fits with the company’s overall data retention policies (yes, your company should have data retention policies and the policy should be followed carefully) and how to suspend any periodic or automatic data removal when a litigation hold needs to be instituted. Once you have a plan, meet periodically to update it and to ensure that it is being followed. If you are prepared for EDD, it is an excellent litigation tool. If you are not, it is a potential disaster.

For more on EDD, check out these blogs:

Alextronic Discovery

Dennis Kennedy

EDD Update

E-Discovery Team

E-discovery 2.0

Electronic Discovery Blog

Electronic Discovery Law (another LexBlog blog)

Ride the Lightning

Sound Evidence

Hat tip to the EDD Blog Online via Legal Blog Watch for identifying the LexisNexis survey..

* Tomorrow is also the date that the next set of changes to the Federal Rules becomes effective. Fortunately, these changes are largely focused on making the rules more readable instead of adding or changing obligations. But once you are prepared for the EDD rules, you should still turn back to your copy of the Federal Rules and read through the revisions.  Look for a blog post next week highlighting some of the substantive changes.

Plaintiff's Deposition Not Required to Determine Copyright Registration

Rudnick v. WPNA 1490 AM, No. 04 C 5719, Slip. Op. (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).

Judge Moran denied defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f)-type motion for further discovery and ordered the parties to brief plaintiff’s motion to preclude defendants from arguing non-registration.” The Court held that the requested deposition of plaintiff was not required to determine whether plaintiff’s registrations were proper or timely. The Court explained that:

The copyright registration procedures are, apparently, many and varied. Plaintiff just wants to know if defendants believe he has followed the right procedures and, if not, what they think he needs to do.

Discovery Request Due Dates Must Fall Within the Discovery Period

Autotech Techs. Ltd. Ptnshp. V. Automation Direct.com Inc., No. 05 C 5488, 2007 WL 2746654 (N.D.Ill. Sep. 18, 2007) (Cole, Mag. J.).*

Judge Cole denied plaintiffs’ (collectively “Autotech”) motion to compel production of defendant Koyo Electronics’ (“Koyo”) touchscreen source code. In Autotech’s Third Amended Complaint – filed without the leave of Court required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, but later allowed by Chief Judge Holderman – Autotech alleged that defendants infringed Autotech’s copyrights in its touchscreen display images. Autotech also alluded to source code infringement, but did not explicitly claim it. 

In a later interrogatory response, Autotech stated that it was not claiming that defendants’ source code infringed Autotech’s copyrights, but reserved the right to amend the complaint adding such charges. Because Autotech had not sought leave to add source code infringement claims to its complaint, the Court held that the requested source code was not relevant and production was not required. The Court also noted that the request seeking source code was improper because it was served less than thirty days before the fact discovery close in violation of Local Rule 16.1. It did not matter that the deadline was ultimately extended because the extension was granted after the original fact discovery close and after the deadline for responding to the document requests.

Practice tip: Whenever a Court issues a fact discovery close, get out your calendar, count backward thirty days and mark the last day for serving discovery requests. You would be amazed at how many litigators do not take note of this important date.

*Click here for more on this case in the Blog's archives.

Court Waxes Eloquent on Discovery

Flentye v. Kathrein, No. 06 C 3492, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Oct 2, 2007) (Cole, Mag. J.).*

Judge Cole continued defendants’ motion to compel for one week because defendants had not conducted a Local Rule 37.2 conference before filing their motion. But the Court also provided its thoughts on the prosecution of discovery, both in this specific case and generally. The Court noted that after one year of discovery, “not a single document was produced in response to the 70 paragraph document request!”

But what is most interesting about the opinion is the Court’s quotes on various discovery issues. On discovery generally: 

“[D]iscovery is the bane of modern federal litigation.” Rossetto v. Pabst Brewing Co., Inc., 217 F.3d 539, 542 (7th Cir. 2000). It is intrusive, unpleasant, time-consuming and costly. It is, like life itself, “nasty [and] brutish …” Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapt XIII. Unfortunately, it is not generally “short.”

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Court Allows New Discovery Weeks Before Trial

Trading Technologies Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, 2007 WL 2566291 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).

Judge Moran denied plaintiff Trading Technologies’ (“TT”) motion for a protective order to prevent depositions after the close of fact discovery and days before trial was scheduled to begin, although the Court did preclude one deposition. The Court held that defendant eSpeed could depose third party Lorin at Lorin’s convenience for no more than two hours. But eSpeed can only introduce Lorin’s testimony in support of its claim that the alleged prior art GL Win with Trade Pad software existed before the critical date (you can read more about the parties’ dispute over whether the GL Win with Trade Pad software invalidates TT’s patents in the Blog’s archives). The Court, however would not permit the deposition of third party Doug Moneison. TT relied upon Moneison’s declaration in opposing eSpeed’s GL Win with Trade Pad invalidity summary judgment motion. But in its reply brief, TT stated that it would not call Moneison at trial or directly rely upon his declaration. The Court, therefore, held that Moneison’s deposition was not necessary. The Court also allowed eSpeed to file an additional expert report regarding hard drives produced by third party Chicago Mercantile Exchange (“CME”) – CME’s production is discussed in the Blog’s archives – because the Court had been aware of the hard drives and their likely use at trial for some time. Finally, the Court denied TT’s request that evidence regarding GL’s Win with Trade Pad software be precluded at trial because of GL’s alleged failure to produce documents from its website regarding its software. The Court did, however, require that GL perform an additional word search of its website using terms specified by the Court and produce any additional materials found by the search.

Trial started the week of September 10. Expect to see several more opinions in this case and its related cases. Additionally, work has made it difficult for me to observe the trial, but I spent a few hours watching last week and will post some thoughts on it later this week.

*You can read much more about this case and related cases in the Blog's archives.

Striking Evidence Too Strong a Remedy for Wrongly Retained Evidence

Am Fam. Mutual Ins., Co. v. Roth, No. 05 C 3839, 2007 WL 2410074 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 2007) (Cole, Mag. J.).

Judge Cole granted in part plaintiff’s motion to strike evidence and bar its use. The documents at issue were commission statements including plaintiff’s customer information. The Court previously ordered defendants to return to plaintiff all documents in its possession including plaintiff’s customer information in this trade secret matter. After that order, defendants filed the commission statements, including customer information, with the clerk as an exhibit to another document. The Court held that filing of the commission statements was public disclosure which violated the Court’s order that defendants not retain or disclose such information. But the Court held that plaintiff’s preferred sanction for retaining and filing the documents, barring their use as evidence at trial, was not proportional with defendants’ wrong in keeping the document and filing them publicly with the Court. 

Court Relies on Parties as Officers of the Court for Discovery Disputes

Trading Techs. Int'l., Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No 04 C 5312, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).*

Judge Moran denied defendant eSpeed’s motion to compel production of damages documents from plaintiff Trading Technologies (“TT”). eSpeed sought, among other things, monthly licensing reports, monthly product profitability reports and documents for determining TT’s costs and sales budgets. TT argued that it had already produced the requested information, to the extent that it was kept in the form requested. And to the extent that the information was not kept in the requested form, TT stated that it had provided documents sufficient to determine the requested information. Noting that counsel are officers of the Court, the Court relied upon TT’s representations and denied eSpeed’s motion because TT stated that the documents had been produced.

Trial is set to start in this case the week of September 10. Between now and then expect to see several more opinions in this case and its related cases (there are two weighty summary judgment opinions still in my queue, as well as several other smaller opinions and orders). Additionally, I have some other obligations that week, but am planning to blog some of the trial. Stay tuned.

*You can download this opinion here and you can read much more about this case and related cases in the Blog's archives.

Court Has Enough of Long Fact Discovery Process

Trading Techs. Int'l., Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No 04 C 5312, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Aug. 17, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).*

Judge Moran denied plaintiff Trading Technologies’ (“TT”) motion to compel an additional Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) witness. TT noticed a 30(b)(6) deposition of defendant eSpeed, Inc. (“eSpeed”) identifying twenty four topics, including someone with knowledge of the names of customers or potential customers of eSpeed’s accused products. eSpeed provided a witness on the topic, but he was only able to identify eSpeed’s customers and potential customers, he had no knowledge regarding any demonstrations to those customers or use of the accused products by those customers. TT, therefore, served a second notice, after the close of fact discovery, seeking a witness to testify regarding any demonstrations to or use by eSpeed customers. eSpeed refused to produce a witness in response to the second notice. The Court denied TT’s motion to compel because the original deposition sought only the identity of the customers, so the witness did not need to have any knowledge regarding demonstrations to or use by those customers. 

What is most interesting about this opinion, however, is the Court’s statements regarding the fact discovery history of the case. The Court shows some frustration with what appears to have been a very protracted and contentious discovery process:

Both parties in this case have been pushing discovery up to and through the close of discovery, which has been extended time and time again . . . . Enough is enough.

Trial is set to start in this case the week of September 10. Between now and then expect to see several more opinions in this case and its related cases. Additionally, I have some other obligations that week, but am planning to blog some of the trial. Stay tuned.

*You can download this opinion here and you can read much more about this case and related cases in the Blog's archives.

Interrogatory Responses Supplemented by Deposition Testimony

Fast Food Gourmet, Inc. v. Little Lady Foods, Inc., No. 05 C 6022, 2007 WL 2156665 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 26, 2007) (Cole, M.J.)

Judge Cole granted in part defendant Little Lady Foods’ (“LLF”) Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 motion to bar evidence of allegedly late–identified trade secrets. Plaintiff Fast Food Gourmet (“FFG”) originally identified four trade secret elements of its process for making thin crust frozen pizza (you can read more about this case in the Blog's archives). FFG’s Vice President of Operations Crause identified four additional elements during his deposition. And FFG later identified two additional elements. LLF argued that FFG should be limited to the first four elements because FFG never updated its interrogatory responses to include the six additional elements. The Court held that the four additional elements disclosed during the deposition had “otherwise been made known” pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e) and, therefore, were not required to be added to FFG’s interrogatory responses. The Court excluded the other two elements. FFG argued that it had identified the elements by identifying documents containing the elements in its interrogatory responses pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(d). But the Court held that the documents FFG identified only identified the two elements sporadically, and in connection with elements that were not trade secrets. This, combined with Crause’s testimony that he had identified all of the trade secret elements, made FFG’s Rule 33(d) statements insufficient.

Practice Tip: Rule 33(d) is often seen as a simple escape from answering cumbersome or difficult interrogatories. Of course, it is also often warranted. But when you use Rule 33(d), make sure to identify the correct documents, and make sure the identified documents fully support your position.

Untimely Protectiver Order Motion is Denied

Faruki v. Eagle Seven, No. 06 C 7125, Min. Order (N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2007) (Mason, J.).

Magistrate Judge Mason denied plaintiffs' motion for a protective order to prevent a third party deposition.  Plaintiffs argued that the third party's only knowledge relevant to the case was outside the relevant time frame.  But the Court did not reach the merits of the motion because plaintiffs filed their motion two business days prior to the deposition.  The motion was filed so close to the date of the deposition that the motion was noticed for the day after the deposition was set to be taken.  Plaintiffs were aware of the subpoena and the deposition date for at least two weeks prior to filing their motion and the parties appeared before the Court during that time, but plaintiffs failed to raise the issue.  The Court, therefore, denied the motion as untimely.

Practice tip:  Deposition scheduling issues are often negotiated until very near the planned date, but if you think you might bring the issues before the Court make sure to warn the Court if you are appear while you are aware of the issue and, if at all possible, file your motion with sufficient time to notice your motion before the deposition is scheduled.

* The minute order is available here.

 

Parties Must File Motions Promptly

United States Gypsum Co. v. LaFarge N. Am., Inc., No. 03 C 6027, 2007 WL 2091020 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 18, 2007) (Hart, J.).

Judge Hart granted in part defendants motion to enforce the Court’s order and denied plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery. The Court previously ruled upon the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, holding that plaintiff’s state law claims were not preempted by the Illinois Trade Secrets Act, but significantly limiting the claims and removing some defendants (you can read more in the Blog’s archives). Defendant sought reconsideration of the Court’s preemption ruling. But the Court held that the motion, filed three months after the Court’s opinion, was untimely and that it presented no new arguments. The Court granted defendant’s request that plaintiff be limited to the trade secrets it identified during fact discovery and prior to summary judgment briefing.

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Court Uses Discretion to Reduce Fee Award by Half

Meyer Intellectual Props. Ltd. V. Bodum, Inc., __ F.Supp.2d __, 2007 WL 2110931 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 24, 2007) (Shadur, J.).

Judge Shadur granted plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs related to a motion discovery dispute won by plaintiff, but modified its original award based upon defendant’s explanations (you can read more about this case in the Blog’s archives). The Court explained that the relevant Federal Rule, Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4)(A), could be paraphrased as “loser pays,” unless the Court finds the losing parties actions or lack of actions were justified or that other circumstances make a fee award unjust. The Court held that defendant’s explanation warranted reducing the original award by 50%. While the Court did not detail the explanation, this case identifies the broad discretion courts have in determining whether to award attorneys’ fees and costs, as well as the size of those awards.

Delayed Filing Leads to Half-Baked Motion to Compel

Fast Food Gourmet, Inc. v. Little Lady Foods, Inc., No. 05 C 6022, 2007 WL 1673563 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 8, 2007) (Cole, J.).

Judge Cole denied plaintiff Fast Food Gourmet, Inc.'s ("FFGI") motion to compel responses to interrogatories, in this trade secret case involving frozen pizzas (you can read more about this case in the Blog's archives).  FFGI served defendants with an interrogatory seeking information regarding which brands of frozen pizza (aside from the accused DiGiorno Thin Crispy Crust Pizza) defendants baked in the ovens which were allegedly part of FFGI's trade secret crust-making process for stone hearth oven, thin crust, frozen pizzas.  Defendants objected to the interrogatory, which led to a meet and confer between the parties on February 15, 2007, two weeks before the close of fact discovery on March 1.  The meet and confer did not resolve the dispute.  On April 1, FFGI submitted its expert reports and then, six weeks after the close of discovery, FFGI moved to compel responses to the interrogatories.  But FFGI failed to notice the motion until more than one month later on May 18.  The Court noted that, while it had discretion to grant the motion, motions to compel filed after the close of fact discovery are generally held to be untimely unless accompanied by a "reasonable and persuasive justification" for the delay.  FFGI, however, provided no justification for its delay. 

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Reconsidered Claim Construction Leads to Summary Judgment of Noninfringement

Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., No. 03 C 7713, 2007 WL 1610449 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 2007) (Moran, J.).*

Judge Moran granted defendant Siebert’s motion for reconsideration of the Court’s earlier claim construction ruling.  Based upon it reconsidered construction, the Court granted Siebert summary judgment of noninfringement of plaintiff Baldwin Graphic Systems’ (“Baldwin”) patent claiming printing press cleaning components. The Court originally construed the claims at issue and then denied Siebert’s first motion for reconsideration in 2005 -- the Court held that Siebert's 2005 motion for reconsideration simply repackaged arguments the Court considered in its original claim construction opinion. At that time the Court construed “reduced air content cleaning fabric” as not excluding fabric having its air content reduced by winding or rewinding the fabric on to a roll. In its current motion, Siebert argued that “reduced air content cleaning fabric” includes only fabric having its air content reduced by mechanical means before being wound on to a roll. The Court acknowledged that this was a new argument and, therefore, considered it.  The Court held that the claim language itself was not helpful in construing the term, but the language of the dependent claims combined with the patent’s specification made clear that “reduced air content cleaning fabric” required that the fabric have its air content reduced by “some method” before being wound on to a roll. Because there was no evidence that Siebert’s fabric underwent no mechanical process for removing air prior to being wound on to a roll, the Court granted Siebert summary judgment of noninfringement.

This opinion is especially remarkable because, while I do not have statistics confirming this, motions for reconsideration do not have a high success rate.  And it is even more rare for a second motion for reconsideration of the same opinion to succeed.

* You can read more about this case in the Blog’s archives.

Discovery Granted Regarding Drafts of Third Party Declaration

Rosenthal Collins Group, LLC v. Trading Techs. Int'l, Inc., No. 05 C 4088, 2007 WL 1597928 (N.D. Ill. May 16, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).

Judge Moran granted declaratory judgment defendant Trading Technologies' ("TT") motion to compel documents and things identified by third party declarant Walter Buist during his deposition, despite declaratory judgment plaintiff Rosenthal Collins Group's ("RCG") assurances that the documents and things had already been produced.  RCG previously filed a motion for summary judgment of invalidity of TT's patents based upon a declaration by Buist regarding software that he developed, at least partially, more than a year before TT filed its patent applications.  In a previous opinion, the Court held that RCG's motion was "somewhat misleading" and possibly "disingenuous," but refused to dismiss the case (you can read the Blog's discussion of that opinion here, as well as more on this case generally in the Blog's archives). 

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Inhouse Counsel's Access to Third Party Documents Limited

Rembrandt Techs., LP v. Comcast Corp., No. 07 C 1010, 2007 WL 1598003 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 2007) (Moran, J.).

Judge Moran granted defendants' motion to compel documents from third party Zenith Electronics Corp. ("Zenith"), but restricted access to the documents by plaintiff, Rembrandt Technologies' ("Rembrandt") inhouse counsel.  In the underlying action, E.D. Texas Case No. 05 C 443,  Rembrandt alleged that defendants infringed its patents.  Zenith was identified as a leading licensor of Rembrandt's technology.  So, defendants subpoenaed Zenith to determine what Zenith paid for its license.  Zenith essentially agreed to produce the documents pursuant to the subpoena, but wanted to restrict access to the documents so that no party's inhouse counsel received access.  Defendants agreed to the restriction, but Rembrandt argued that its chief patent counsel, John Meli, was a chief decisionmaker in the case and, therefore, required access to the documents.  The Court acknowledged that Meli was a decisionmaker in the case and noted that the Texas court's protective order allowed Meli access to highly confidential documents.  Therefore, the Court granted Meli access to any license agreements produced by Zenith pursuant to the subpoena.  But the Court denied Meli access to any other documents produced by Zenith.

Duplicative Deposition May Go Forward

Trading Techs. Int'l., Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No 04 C 5312, 2007 WL 1628352 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 1, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).

Judge Moran denied plaintiff Trading Technologies' ("TT") motion for a protective order to prevent the deposition of Robert Klinger, related to defendant eSpeed's inequitable conduct defense (more on this case in the Blog's archives).  The Court held that discovery is a "balancing act."  eSpeed's assertion that Klinger was involved in drafting a response to a USPTO Office Action at the center of its inequitable conduct claim outweighed TT's best argument -- that the deposition was duplicative because defendants had deposed or have scheduled the depositions of two lead outside patent prosecutors, TT's in-house patent prosecutor and the relevant patent examiner.  The Court also noted that the case is approaching the discovery close, so we may start seeing fewer discovery motions in the case and more substantive motions.

Court Lacks Sufficient Evidence to Rule Upon Personal Jurisdiction

Trading Techs. Int'l., Inc. v. GL Consultants, No. 05 C 4120, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2007) (Gottschall, J.).*

Judge Gottschall denied defendant GL Trade SA's ("GL SA") motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, with leave to refile after completion of jurisdictional discovery.  GL SA is a French company located in Paris.  GL SA does not have an office or any assets in Illinois, but it does have a subsidiary, defendant GL Americas, Inc. ("GL Americas").  GL Americas maintains a regional office in Chicago.  The Court noted that despite three rounds of briefing on jurisdiction, neither party "provided anything of substance to the court."  Plaintiff Trading Technologies ("TT") treated GL SA's subsidiary GL Americas as GL SA, and had not submitted evidence of GL SA's specific contacts with Illinois.  GL SA submitted several declarations, but none sufficiently clarified that GL SA did not have minimum contacts with Illinois.  As a result, the Court held that it lacked sufficient evidence to rule upon the motion, and granted TT's motion for jurisdictional discovery.

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Third Parties' Communications With Other Third Parties Are Not Relevant

Trading Techs. Int'l., Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).

Judge Moran denied plaintiff Trading Technologies' ("TT") motion to compel additional production from third party Chicago Mercantile Exchange ("CME").  TT served CME with a subpoena seeking, among other things, anything referring or relating to potential prior art to the patents at issue and communications between CME and any other entity regarding the patents at issue, including any joint defense agreement between CME and such parties.  After TT filed the motion to compel, CME produced thousands of pages, including what it stated were all documents in its possession regarding possible prior art.  Because all prior art documents had been produced, the Court denied TT's motion to compel additional prior art-related documents.

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Court Reminds Parties of Their Discovery Obligations

Trading Techs. Int'l., Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 05 C 4120, (N.D. Ill. May 16, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).

Judge Moran granted in part and denied in part plaintiff Trading Technologies' ("TT") motion to compel additional production from defendants GL Consultants, Inc. and GL Trade SA (collectively "GL").  The Court required GL to update certain interrogatory responses and to produce documents based upon an earlier priority date that GL had argued for, as opposed to stopping at the later priorit date alleged by TT.  The Court also required GL to provide TT access to original source code and certain electronic archives, without regard to whether TT had provided GL similar access.  Finally, the Court denied TT's request to lower the confidentiality designation of the source code for GL's "GL Tradepad" software.  But what is most interesting about the Court's opinion is its reminder to the parties about how the Court expects them to conduct discovery:

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Assignment Agreement Obligates Assignee to Require Former Inventor to be Deposed

Murata Mfg., Ltd. v. Bel Fuse, Inc., __ F.R.D. __, 2007 WL 1317100 (N.D. Ill. May 2, 2007) (Cole, Mag. J.).

Judge Cole granted in part defendants' motion to compel the testimony of plaintiff's former employee, Sakamoto, who was a named inventor on the patent in suit residing in Japan.  Earlier in the litigation, defendants argued for a longer discovery period because of the time it would take to secure Sakamoto's deposition.  But through a series of miscommunications, delays and unfortunate circumstances, defendants had not been able to secure  Sakamoto's agreement to be deposed, in Japan or elsewhere, until near the close of discovery.  As a result, defendants filed the instant motion to compel plaintiff to produce Sakamoto for deposition in the United States either as a managing agent pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(1) or based upon language in the patent assignement document which obligated Sakamoto to aid plaintiff in patent-related matters.  As an initial matter, the Court denied plaintiff's request to dismiss the motion for failure to meet and confer pursuant to Local Rule 37.2.  The Court explained that based upon the parties' history on the issue, compliance would have been futile and, therefore, it excused defendants' alleged non-compliance.

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Parties Need Not Disclose Case Strategies to Meet Rule 26 Obligations

Se-Kure Controls, Inc. v. Vanguard Prods. Group, Inc., No. 02 C 3767, 2007 WL 781250 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2007) (Cole, Mag. J.).

Judge Cole denied plaintiff's motion to exclude plaintiff's document as a Rule 37 sanction for defendants' failure to identify its potential reliance upon the document and the person who created it.  During the discovery process, plaintiff produced a "Contact Report" listing calls made by one of its sales employees (who eventually left plaintiff's employ).  Defendants sought to rely upon the document as part of their 35 USC Section 102(b) on sale bar defense (similar to the issue in the Court's last opinion in this case).  Plaintiff argued that defendants should not be allowed to rely upon the document because:  1) defendants failed to identify the Contact Report in their responses to plaintiff's invalidity interrogatory; and 2) defendants did not identify the Contact Report's author (plaintiff's former employee) in their Rule 26 disclosures.  As with plaintiff's previous Rule 37 arguments, the Court denied them because defendants made plaintiff aware of the documents during discovery.  The Court noted that plaintiff was arguing defendants should be barred from relying on a document plaintiff produced for failure to identify plaintiff's document to plaintiff.  The Court was not swayed by defendants' failure to identify the Contact Report's author because he was plaintiff's ex-employee and because he had passed away and, therefore, would not be brought as a witness.  Finally, the Court explained that while a party has a right to be apprised of an opposing party's evidence, but not necessarily the weight or significance the opposing party places on that evidence.

Failure to Disclose Witnesses in Rule 26 Statements Did Not Warrant Exclusion

Se-Kure Controls, Inc. v. Vanguard Prods. Group, Inc., No. 02 C 3767, 2007 WL 781253 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 2007) (Cole, Mag. J.).

Judge Cole denied plaintiff's motion to exclude two defense witnesses as a Rule 37 sanction for failing to properly disclose the witnesses.  During the discovery process, defendants identified two witnesses, through declarations signed by the witnesses, as having knowledge of a 35 USC Section 102(b) on sale bar.  Although defendants provided plaintiff the witnesses' declarations and otherwise identified the witnesses to plaintiff, defendants failed to add the witnesses to their respective Rule 26 disclosures and they failed to supplement their respective responses to plaintiff's interrogatory seeking details of all of defendants' invalidity defenses.  Plaintiff argued that these failures led to plaintiff's decision not to depose the witnesses and that defendants' should be barred from relying upon the witnesses for failure to update their Rule 26 disclosures and interrogatory responses.  The Court, however, held that while nondisclosure would generally result in exclusion, exclusion was not warranted in the instant case because defendants did disclose the witnesses in writing.  As a result, "[s]upplementation would have availed nothing required by the [Federal] Rules and was thus unnecessary."

Defendants' Patent Licenses In Different Technology But Same Field Are Discoverable

Trading Techs. Int'l., Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No 04 C 5312, 2007 WL 704525 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 1, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).

Judge Moran granted plaintiff Trading Technologies' ("TT") motion to compel production of documents and answers to interrogatories regarding defendant eSpeed's patent licenses (more on this case in the Blog's archives).  The Court held that the licenses could be relevant to three of the Georgia Pacific factors:  1) Rates paid by the licensee for patents similar to the patents in suit; 2) customary royalty rates in the industry; and 3) the royalty that would have been agreed upon in an arms length negotiation.  The Court acknowledged that the eSpeed licenses were not for the same technology as the patents in suit, but held that the fact that the patents were all for technology within the futures trading industry was sufficient to make them potentially relevant.  And the Court noted that if the eSpeed patents are ultimately not comparable to the patents in suit, the licenses covering the eSpeed patents will not be given weight in the final determination.

 

Crime-Fraud Exception Not Met For Lack of Independent Evidence of Intent

Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharms., Inc., No. 05 C 1490, 2007 WL 551551 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2007) (Brown, Mag. J.).*

The Court denied defendant's motion to compel production of attorney-client privileged documents pursuant to the crime-fraud exception.  Defendant argued that plaintiff's failure to disclose full results from two studies with conflicting results (for and against the applications' claims) to the USPTO, both of which were material to the claims, was both inequitable conduct and fraud.  The studies were conducted during the pendency of one application and prior to two others.  Additionally, three of the named inventors co-authored a journal article detailing the results.  And during her deposition, prosecution counsel admitted being aware of the studies during prosecution of the applications.  The Court held that the evidence warranted in camera review of selected documents from plaintiff's privilege log to determine whether there was evidence of intent.  But after its review, the Court found no direct evidence of intent to defraud the USPTO.  The Court noted that "[n]one of the documents . . . contained a 'smoking gun' or anything close to it."  Furthermore, while intent can be inferred based upon circumstantial evidence, there most be more evidence than failure to disclose to support the inference. 

* You can see more on this case, in particular, various preliminary injunction opinions here and here.

Court Has Discretion In Awarding Fees For Discovery Violations

Ropak Corp. v. Plastican, Inc., No. 04 C 5422, 2007 WL 328880 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 30, 2007) (Valdez, Mag. J.).

Magistrate Judge Valdez awarded plaintiff certain of its fees related to motions to compel based upon the Court's August 15, 2006, order imposing Rule 37 discovery sanctions.  The Court noted its "considerable discretion" before reducing the fees so that they only included fees directly related to the particular discovery motions at issue.  The Court also removed entries for administrative tasks performed by attorneys that could have been performed by support staff.  And finally the Court reduced the hourly rates of the attorneys because plaintiff did not justify its rates by providing the Court information regarding standard rates in the Northern District or any biographical information regarding the attorneys to support their rates based upon their respective experience levels.  Practice tip:  If you are preparing a motion for fees, this opinion is an excellent place to look for determining what information to include in your motion and how to support your rates.

 

Court to Counsel: Play Nice

Martin Eng. Co. v. CVP Group, Inc., No. 06 C 4687, 2006 WL 3541777 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2006) (Cole, J.).

Judge Cole granted defendant's motion for a 21 day extension to respond to written discovery requests.  Plaintiff refused to agree to the extension (for discovery due eight months prior to the close of fact discovery) and filed a written objection to defendant's motion citing a "pattern of dilatory conduct."  As examples of the pattern, plaintiff identified two items.  First, that it took defendant two weeks to respond to plaintiff's settlement offer, and only then after repeated calls from plaintiff.  And second, that defendant's Rule 26 disclosures were served nearly two weeks late.  The Court made clear that it did not condone a party ignoring the Court's deadlines or delay more generally, but noted that "not all delays are the same."

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The Court Limits Third Party Deposition Topics

Trading Techs. Int'l., Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No 04 C 5312, 2006 WL 3541933 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 5, 2006) (Moran, Sen. J.).

Judge Moran denied plaintiff Trading Technologies ("TT") motion to compel additional deposition testimony from third party Brucato, the founder of TT's competitor Catus Technologies.  TT subpoenaed Brucato's deposition relating to Catus's work with defendant eSpeed or TT's software.  Brucato appeared for the deposition and answered questions on those topics, but refused to answer questions regarding work for clients other than eSpeed.  TT argued that evidence of Catus's work with other third party clients was relevant to show proof of widespread copying, which is an indicia of non-obviousness.  The Court acknowledged that, but balanced the relevance against TT's need for the evidence and the hardship to Catus.  The Court found that TT's request was only based upon TT's suspicions or speculations as opposed to any hard facts and that the connection, therefore, was not strong enough to warrant the risk third party Catus faced in providing such information to its competitor TT.

Privilege Logs Bolster Inadvertent Production Arguments

Wunderlich-Malec Sys., Inc. v. Eisenmann Corp., No. 05 C 04343, 2006 WL 3370700 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 2006) (Ashman, Mag. J.).

Magistrate Judge Ashman granted plaintiff's motion to compel certain documents and held that defendant waived privilege as to certain documents it produced despite claiming attorney-client and work product privileges.  Defendant produced for inspection twenty two binders of documents, including four binders which defendant's counsel had internally identified as privileged and did not intend to produce for inspection.  About six weeks after the inspection, defendant realized that it had provided certain of these documents to plaintiff and sought the return of seventeen pages from the four binders.  Then, over the next several weeks, defendant sought the return of the remainder of the produced documents from the four binders claiming that they contained privileged information or trade secrets unrelated to the case.  Plaintiff retained the bulk of the documents arguing that any privilege that existed had been waived by disclosure of the documents.  Defendant argued that the documents were disclosed inadvertently and should be returned.

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Contention Interrogatories Require Complete, Specific Answers By the Close of Discovery

Judge Nolan compelled defendant to provide complete answers, citing specific individuals, documents and things to plaintiff's fact-based contention interrogatories.  Plaintiff served defendant with contention interrogatory seeking to learn each basis for each of defendant's defenses and counterclaims relating to plaintiff's "ULTRA-LITE" and "Monster Tachometer" marks.  Defendant initially provided broad, non-committal answers and eventually supplemented including general statements directing plaintiff to defendant's document production without specifying any Bates ranges. Continue Reading...

More E-Discovery Rules Resources

Because the December 1st e-discovery Federal Rules changes are approaching, I will continue to provide links to resources for understanding and preparing for the changes.  The Legal Talk Network recently published this Coast to Coast podcast discussing the changes and their impact upon corporations.  It is worth listening to and could be a valuable resource for corporate litigants as well.

Thanks to the Illnois Trial Practice Weblog for identifying this podcast.

Changing Federal and Local Rules

The new electronic discovery amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure become effective in one month, on December 1st.  In preparation for practicing under the amended rules, this Law Practice Today page provides a wealth of links to sites discussing the amendments and electronic discovery generally (thanks to the Illinois Trial Practice Weblog for identifying this excellent resource).  Also, the federal judiciary posts a list of all Federal Rules being amended December 1st here.

Additionally, in April the Northern District amended several of its Local Rules.  You can see a list of the amended rules here.  Amended Local Rule 5.2, among other things, states that where electronic and paper copies of a document are filed, the electronic version controls.  Amended Local Rule 5.2 also requires that the judge receive a courtesy copy of all electronically filed documents, unless the judge requires otherwise.

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Loss of Documents Through Sale of a Company Is Not Necessarily Spoliation of Evidence

Litetronics Int'l., Inc. v. Technical Consumer Prods., Inc., No. 03 C 5733, 2006 WL 2850514 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2006) (Ashman, Mag. J.).

Defendant sought sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 arguing spoliation of evidence because plaintiff Coollite sold a factory in China which included various documents defendant had requested during discovery.  Judge Ashman denied the motion for sanctions because defendant had not shown that the documents had been destroyed.  The issue was who controlled the documents, but neither plaintiff nor defendants had requested the documents from the plant's new owner.  Additionally, defendant had not investigated whether the Hague Convention might allow for discovery of the documents.  This leads to an important practice tip:  make sure to ask for third party documents, or at least start the process of asking for them, before seeking help from a court to get the documents.

A Patent Assignment Does Not Guarantee Control Over the Inventors

Litetronics Int'l., Inc. v. Technical Consumer Prods., Inc., No. 03 C 5733, 2006 WL 2850513 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2006) (Ashman, Mag. J.).

Magistrate Judge Ashman denied defendant's motion to compel plaintiffs' production of two inventors of a patent-in-suit for deposition, where the inventors were not, and had never been, employed by plaintiffs.  Defendants argued that the assignment agreement gave plaintiff control over the inventors and obligated plaintiff to produce the inventors for deposition. 

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A Reasonable Voice On Discovery Issues

Trading Techs. Int'l., Inc. v. eSpeed, No. 04 C 5312, 4120 & 5164, 2006 WL 2506293 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 18, 2006) (Moran, J.).

Judge Moran requested additional briefing on remaining discovery disputes and denied defendant's motion to compel additional discovery regarding plaintiff's patent prosecution after both plaintiff and its prosecution counsel represented that they had produced all non-privileged documents.  The opinion itself is somewhat generic, except that Judge Moran made some reasoned comments regarding the discovery process that IP litigators should read and remember:

Discovery is a means for determining the truth, not an end in itself.  Indeed, in criminal cases where liberty, not just money, is at stake, discovery is much circumscribed.  Further, the discovery process depends upon the good faith of the parties and their counsel. . . .  More often, reasonably complete discovery requires some prodding--the party is loath to expend the effort or seeks to use delays as a bargaining chip in getting discovery from others, or is anxious about what full discovery might disclose.  Generally, however, we are convinced that litigants, represented by ethical counsel, recognize their obligations and act accordingly.  Therefore, courts customarily rely upon the representations of counsel that the party has complied. 

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Comply With Discovery Orders or Suffer the Consequences

Ropak Corp. v. Plastican, Inc., No. 04 C 5422, 2006 WL 2385297 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2006) (Valdez, Mag. J.).

Magistrate Judge Valdez’s opinion ruled on plaintiff’s Rule 37 motion for sanctions based upon defendant’s repeated refusal to fully meet its discovery obligations in this patent infringement dispute. The opinion demonstrates an important point: a party must comply with a court’s discovery orders (even orders issued by the most reasonable and forgiving court, as here) or suffer the consequences.
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