Chicago IP Attorney & Lawyer : R. David Donoghue : Chicago IP Litigation Blog

Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Montrose Wholesale Candies & Sundries, Inc., No. 03 C 5311 & 0844, 2008 WL 954161 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 8, 2008) (Cole, Mag. J.).

Judge Cole denied plaintiff's motion for inspection and seizure of assets in its trademark counterfeiting case. The Court previously entered judgment for plaintiff – click here for more about this case in the Blog's archives. Plaintiff brought this motion seeking to identify and seize cash, checks and other financial instruments to satisfy the judgment. The Court held that the motion essentially sought a search warrant directed by plaintiff and utilizing Federal Marshals:

The reality is that the motion is tantamount to a request for a search warrant for Lorillard to enter and search the home of Ray and Sandra Hazemi and the business premises of Montrose Wholesale Candies and Sundries, Inc. (which is owned by them) and for permission to seize any cash, checks or other negotiable instruments belonging to the Hazemis and Montrose and to seize or at least copy all of their financial and accounting records. Nothing in the Motion, itself, suggests that the search and seizure will be accomplished by anyone other than Lorillard. It is not until one looks at the Proposed Order granting the motion that there is even a motion of United States Marshals. But even then, it is Lorillard, through its counsel of record, who is to carry out the search and seizure. The Marshals are merely to accompany Lorillard.

The Court held that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not authorize search warrants. The Court further held that the request was not like a seizure of counterfeit goods, which was authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1)(A), because it sought a post-judgment search to satisfy a judgment.

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Autotech Techs. Ltd. Partnership v. Automationdirect.com, Inc., No. 05 C 5488 2008 WL 783301 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2008) (Cole, Mag. J.).*

Judge Cole granted in part defendant Automationdirect.com's ("ADC") motion to compel additional records from plaintiff Autotech's database. The parties agreed that an ADC expert would be allowed to develop queries which Autotech would run on its database. After a dispute regarding how to produce the results of the search, the Court ordered production of the documents, which related to records of, among other things, customer confusion. Upon review of the records, ADC demanded that Autotech supplement them with information such as the date of the communication and the identity of the Autotech employees involved. Autotech eventually supplemented the documents with an index identifying, among other things, the identity of the Autotech employee involved in each communication, but not the dates of the communications. ADC moved to compel the production of all fields in Autotech's database for each entry identified by ADC's query. But Autotech countered that it had produced all fields generated by ADC's expert's query. Had the query generated all available fields, they, presumably, would have been produced them all. Because Autotech produced the information generated by ADC's search and supplemented that production with an index, sanctions were not warranted. But the Court did order production, at ADC's expense, of the dates of each communication. The Court also ordered the parties to meet and confer to determine how to produce the dates in a useful format.

*Click here for more of this case in the Blog's archives.

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Autotech Techs. Ltd. Partnership v. Automationdirect.com, Inc., No. 05 C 5488, 2008 WL 783303 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2008) (Cole, Mag. J.).*

Judge Cole granted in part plaintiff Autotech's motion to compel communications between defendant Automationdirect.com, Inc. ("ADC") and any third party regarding ADC's competing C-More touch screen panel. The Court held that ADC need not produce documents related to source code for the C-More product. The Court previously denied Autotech's motion to amend its complaint adding claims related to that source code. But the Court held that ADC's third party communications could be relevant to show whether ADC has complied with its contractual obligation to use its best efforts to sell Autotech's product, or if its C-More sales efforts interfered with sales of Autotech's products. The Court also held that any communication evidencing customer confusion must be produced.

Practice Tip: Do not employ new arguments in reply briefs. The Court did not consider Autotech's reply brief because it changed the scope of its argument on reply. Autotech's opening brief sought ADC's third party communications with the exception of those regarding ADC's source code because claims regarding ADC's software were not in the case. But on reply, Autotech also sought the source code related communications.

*Click here for more about this case in the Blog's archives.

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Se-Kure Controls, Inc. v. Diam USA, Inc., No. 06 C 4857, 2008 WL 169029 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 17, 2008) (Cox, Mag. J.).*

Judge Cox granted in part a motion to compel discovery regarding defendant’s advice of counsel defense. The Court ordered defendants to product a technical witness that provided opinion counsel information because opinion counsel was unable to remember the substance of conversations between the two.

The Court also ordered production of communications between opinion counsel and trial counsel related to the patent in suit. These communications were within the scope of defendant’s waiver, even though a deposition of trial counsel would not have been allowed.

The Court did not allow plaintiff to take any additional fact depositions. Plaintiff argued it had waited to take certain fact depositions because the witnesses were expected to be Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) designers regarding defendants’ willfulness defense. But the Court did not allow the deposition because fact discovery was closed and because plaintiff had deposed other witnesses on the same topics. 

The most exciting part of this opinion, however, was its form, not its substance – Judge Cox used footnotes for cites. While this format is infinitely more readable and has many prominent advocates – Brian Garner, the (new) legal writer,  Wayne Scheiss and me (perhaps not the most prominent but I am an advocate of footnote citation) – it is a bold move in the typically conservative realm of judicial writing. At least one other Northern District Judge, Chief Judge Holderman, has used footnote citation. If you are aware of other examples, let me know. 

Thank you Judge Cox.

* Click here for more on this case and related cases in the Blog’s archives.

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Degregorio v. Phillips Electronics. N. Am. Corp., No. 07 C 2683, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Dec. 28, 2007) (Cox, Mag. J.).

Judge Cox granted in part defendants’ motion for a protective order regarding plaintiff’s subpoenas of defendants’ customers in this patent dispute. Plaintiff subpoenaed defendants’ customers of allegedly infringing hair trimmers with built in vacuums, seeking sales and inventory information, as well as promotional materials and purchase orders. The Court denied the motion as to the sales and inventory information. The customers’ sales were potentially relevant to commercial success of the patented device for plaintiff’s non-obviousness case. The Court did enter a protective order as to the request for purchase orders and marketing materials. The Court held that the purchase orders were cumulative of the other requested sales information and marketing materials were too tangential to commercial success to be discoverable.

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Goss Int'l Am., Inc. v. Graphic Management Assocs., Inc., No. 05 C 5622, 2007 WL 161684 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 2007) (Valdez, Mag. J.).*

Magistrate Judge Valdez granted in part the parties’ cross motions to compel various discovery. Each party’s alleged waived privilege is of particular interest. The Court denied plaintiff’s motion to compel all documents reflecting defendants’ trial counsel’s** mental impressions of the case, whether or not they were shared with defendants. In light of In re Seagate, the Court held that defendants’ reliance upon advice of counsel does not waive its privilege as to trial counsel’s mental impressions not communicated to defendants. 

The Court denied in part defendants’ motion to compel all previously privileged documents related to prosecution of the patent in suit. Defendants alleged that plaintiff’s production of a Record of Invention document prepared by the inventors at counsel’s direction and request waived privilege. The Court held that plaintiff intentionally waived privilege by disclosing the document, but limited the waiver to documents related to development of plaintiff’s invention.

* Click here for more on this case in the Blog’s archives.

** It is not entirely clear, but it appears from the opinion that defendants used the same firm or attorneys for both opinion counsel and trial counsel.

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Nutrinova Nutrition Specialties & Food Ingredients GmbH v. Viachem, No. 07 C 4232, Min. Order (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 2007) (St. Eve, J.).

Judge St. Eve granted in part plaintiff’s motion to compel various discovery. The Court ordered defendants to produce various once-privileged documents disclosed to unidentified customers pursuant to an alleged common interest privilege. The Court acknowledged that common interest could protect such disclosures. But defendants failed to identify the specific customers that were shown documents, which documents were disclosed or when the disclosures occurred. On that record, the Court could not find that defendants had maintained the privilege. 

The Court also ordered defendants to update their privilege log to identify any attorneys on the log. And the Court ordered the parties to meet and confer regarding uncrystalized disputes over defendants’ answers to some interrogatories.

Practice Tip: It is the rare judge that appreciates discovery motions, let alone motions where the parties did not identify what the actual issues were. It is very important to follow both the letter and the spirit of Local Rule 37.2 meet and confers.

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RRK Holding Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 04 C 3944, Min. Order (N.D. Ill. Sep. 10, 2007) (Coar, J.).*

Judge Coar denied the parties’ damages motions in limine.* First, the Court held that defendant Sears, Roebuck & Co. (“Sears”) could have its damages expert Catherine Lawton testify regarding her analysis of a hypothetical September 2001 negotiation between the parties. Plaintiff RRK Holding (“RRK”) argued that the misappropriation began in March 2000, not when Sears began selling its product in September 2001. As a result, Sears contended that Lawton’s September 2001 hypothetical negotiation should not be allowed into evidence. But the Court held that the timing of the misappropriation was a question of fact for the jury and, therefore, allowed Lawton’s testimony.

Second, the Court held that Sears could introduce the 2003 sale of some of RRK’s assets for $17M as part of Sears’s damages case. The Court held that the value of the sale was relevant to RRK’s alleged injury based upon the alleged misappropriation.

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Tomorrow is the first anniversary of the “new” electronic data discovery (“EDD”) rules.* In fact, the EDD rules were not new, they were intended to be a codification of the basic rules already in use by the various district courts. Despite that, a study conducted by LexisNexis at the October Association of Corporate Counsel 2007 Annual Meeting in Chicago found that corporate counsel continue to struggle with implementation of the rules and confusion about what the EDD rules required. For example, 70% of respondents believed that electronic files had to be produced in their native formats. In fact, you simply must work with opposing counsel to decide what format to produce the files in, either their native formats or some chosen standard format. This confusion should not have surprised anyone. Even in IP circles, lawyers rarely fully understand a company’s IT infrastructure and the IT people rarely understand the legal process. This disconnect can be very dangerous when it comes to meeting EDD obligations.

If your company is still struggling with the EDD rules or, worse, avoiding them completely, you can solve your problems with some relatively simple actions. First, take a breath, open your copy of the Federal Rules and read them thoughtfully and then set up a meeting with the head of your company’s IT infrastructure, the head of your company’s legal department or litigation staff and an outside counsel with EDD experience. Working together, come up with a general plan for gathering and preserving the appropriate information as cases arise. Pay special attention to how your plan fits with the company’s overall data retention policies (yes, your company should have data retention policies and the policy should be followed carefully) and how to suspend any periodic or automatic data removal when a litigation hold needs to be instituted. Once you have a plan, meet periodically to update it and to ensure that it is being followed. If you are prepared for EDD, it is an excellent litigation tool. If you are not, it is a potential disaster.

For more on EDD, check out these blogs:

Alextronic Discovery

Dennis Kennedy

EDD Update

E-Discovery Team

E-discovery 2.0

Electronic Discovery Blog

Electronic Discovery Law (another LexBlog blog)

Ride the Lightning

Sound Evidence

Hat tip to the EDD Blog Online via Legal Blog Watch for identifying the LexisNexis survey..

* Tomorrow is also the date that the next set of changes to the Federal Rules becomes effective. Fortunately, these changes are largely focused on making the rules more readable instead of adding or changing obligations. But once you are prepared for the EDD rules, you should still turn back to your copy of the Federal Rules and read through the revisions.  Look for a blog post next week highlighting some of the substantive changes.

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Rudnick v. WPNA 1490 AM, No. 04 C 5719, Slip. Op. (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).

Judge Moran denied defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f)-type motion for further discovery and ordered the parties to brief plaintiff’s motion to preclude defendants from arguing non-registration.” The Court held that the requested deposition of plaintiff was not required to determine whether plaintiff’s registrations were proper or timely. The Court explained that:

The copyright registration procedures are, apparently, many and varied. Plaintiff just wants to know if defendants believe he has followed the right procedures and, if not, what they think he needs to do.

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APC Filtration v. Becker, No. 07 C 1462, 2007 WL 3046233 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2007) (Ashman, J.)

Judge Ashman granted in part plaintiff’s motion for discovery sanctions based upon defendant William Becker’s (“Becker”) disposal of his personal computer, which had allegedly crashed, in a dumpster twenty miles from Becker’s home, after plaintiff filed its Complaint. The Court held that Becker’s post-filing destruction of evidence was in bad faith and ordered sanctions pursuant to the Court’s inherent powers and Fed. R. Civ. P. 37. The Court did not grant a default judgment, but held that the destruction prejudiced plaintiff’s misappropriation claims. And as an intermediate sanction, the Court held that defendant Becker had communications with two third-party customers of plaintiff during Becker’s employment with plaintiff for the purpose of inducing the third parties to enter exclusive agreements with defendant SourceOne Plus, Becker’s new employer. The Court also awarded plaintiff certain related attorney’s fees and costs.

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Autotech Techs. Ltd. Ptnshp. V. Automation Direct.com Inc., No. 05 C 5488, 2007 WL 2746654 (N.D.Ill. Sep. 18, 2007) (Cole, Mag. J.).*

Judge Cole denied plaintiffs’ (collectively “Autotech”) motion to compel production of defendant Koyo Electronics’ (“Koyo”) touchscreen source code. In Autotech’s Third Amended Complaint – filed without the leave of Court required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, but later allowed by Chief Judge Holderman – Autotech alleged that defendants infringed Autotech’s copyrights in its touchscreen display images. Autotech also alluded to source code infringement, but did not explicitly claim it. 

In a later interrogatory response, Autotech stated that it was not claiming that defendants’ source code infringed Autotech’s copyrights, but reserved the right to amend the complaint adding such charges. Because Autotech had not sought leave to add source code infringement claims to its complaint, the Court held that the requested source code was not relevant and production was not required. The Court also noted that the request seeking source code was improper because it was served less than thirty days before the fact discovery close in violation of Local Rule 16.1. It did not matter that the deadline was ultimately extended because the extension was granted after the original fact discovery close and after the deadline for responding to the document requests.

Practice tip: Whenever a Court issues a fact discovery close, get out your calendar, count backward thirty days and mark the last day for serving discovery requests. You would be amazed at how many litigators do not take note of this important date.

*Click here for more on this case in the Blog's archives.

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Flentye v. Kathrein, No. 06 C 3492, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Oct 2, 2007) (Cole, Mag. J.).*

Judge Cole continued defendants’ motion to compel for one week because defendants had not conducted a Local Rule 37.2 conference before filing their motion. But the Court also provided its thoughts on the prosecution of discovery, both in this specific case and generally. The Court noted that after one year of discovery, “not a single document was produced in response to the 70 paragraph document request!”

But what is most interesting about the opinion is the Court’s quotes on various discovery issues. On discovery generally: 

“[D]iscovery is the bane of modern federal litigation.” Rossetto v. Pabst Brewing Co., Inc., 217 F.3d 539, 542 (7th Cir. 2000). It is intrusive, unpleasant, time-consuming and costly. It is, like life itself, “nasty [and] brutish …” Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapt XIII. Unfortunately, it is not generally “short.”

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Trading Technologies Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, 2007 WL 2566291 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).

Judge Moran denied plaintiff Trading Technologies’ (“TT”) motion for a protective order to prevent depositions after the close of fact discovery and days before trial was scheduled to begin, although the Court did preclude one deposition. The Court held that defendant eSpeed could depose third party Lorin at Lorin’s convenience for no more than two hours. But eSpeed can only introduce Lorin’s testimony in support of its claim that the alleged prior art GL Win with Trade Pad software existed before the critical date (you can read more about the parties’ dispute over whether the GL Win with Trade Pad software invalidates TT’s patents in the Blog’s archives). The Court, however would not permit the deposition of third party Doug Moneison. TT relied upon Moneison’s declaration in opposing eSpeed’s GL Win with Trade Pad invalidity summary judgment motion. But in its reply brief, TT stated that it would not call Moneison at trial or directly rely upon his declaration. The Court, therefore, held that Moneison’s deposition was not necessary. The Court also allowed eSpeed to file an additional expert report regarding hard drives produced by third party Chicago Mercantile Exchange (“CME”) – CME’s production is discussed in the Blog’s archives – because the Court had been aware of the hard drives and their likely use at trial for some time. Finally, the Court denied TT’s request that evidence regarding GL’s Win with Trade Pad software be precluded at trial because of GL’s alleged failure to produce documents from its website regarding its software. The Court did, however, require that GL perform an additional word search of its website using terms specified by the Court and produce any additional materials found by the search.

Trial started the week of September 10. Expect to see several more opinions in this case and its related cases. Additionally, work has made it difficult for me to observe the trial, but I spent a few hours watching last week and will post some thoughts on it later this week.

*You can read much more about this case and related cases in the Blog's archives.

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Am Fam. Mutual Ins., Co. v. Roth, No. 05 C 3839, 2007 WL 2410074 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 2007) (Cole, Mag. J.).

Judge Cole granted in part plaintiff’s motion to strike evidence and bar its use. The documents at issue were commission statements including plaintiff’s customer information. The Court previously ordered defendants to return to plaintiff all documents in its possession including plaintiff’s customer information in this trade secret matter. After that order, defendants filed the commission statements, including customer information, with the clerk as an exhibit to another document. The Court held that filing of the commission statements was public disclosure which violated the Court’s order that defendants not retain or disclose such information. But the Court held that plaintiff’s preferred sanction for retaining and filing the documents, barring their use as evidence at trial, was not proportional with defendants’ wrong in keeping the document and filing them publicly with the Court. 

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Trading Techs. Int'l., Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No 04 C 5312, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).*

Judge Moran denied defendant eSpeed’s motion to compel production of damages documents from plaintiff Trading Technologies (“TT”). eSpeed sought, among other things, monthly licensing reports, monthly product profitability reports and documents for determining TT’s costs and sales budgets. TT argued that it had already produced the requested information, to the extent that it was kept in the form requested. And to the extent that the information was not kept in the requested form, TT stated that it had provided documents sufficient to determine the requested information. Noting that counsel are officers of the Court, the Court relied upon TT’s representations and denied eSpeed’s motion because TT stated that the documents had been produced.

Trial is set to start in this case the week of September 10. Between now and then expect to see several more opinions in this case and its related cases (there are two weighty summary judgment opinions still in my queue, as well as several other smaller opinions and orders). Additionally, I have some other obligations that week, but am planning to blog some of the trial. Stay tuned.

*You can download this opinion here and you can read much more about this case and related cases in the Blog's archives.

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Trading Techs. Int'l., Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No 04 C 5312, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Aug. 17, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).*

Judge Moran denied plaintiff Trading Technologies’ (“TT”) motion to compel an additional Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) witness. TT noticed a 30(b)(6) deposition of defendant eSpeed, Inc. (“eSpeed”) identifying twenty four topics, including someone with knowledge of the names of customers or potential customers of eSpeed’s accused products. eSpeed provided a witness on the topic, but he was only able to identify eSpeed’s customers and potential customers, he had no knowledge regarding any demonstrations to those customers or use of the accused products by those customers. TT, therefore, served a second notice, after the close of fact discovery, seeking a witness to testify regarding any demonstrations to or use by eSpeed customers. eSpeed refused to produce a witness in response to the second notice. The Court denied TT’s motion to compel because the original deposition sought only the identity of the customers, so the witness did not need to have any knowledge regarding demonstrations to or use by those customers. 

What is most interesting about this opinion, however, is the Court’s statements regarding the fact discovery history of the case. The Court shows some frustration with what appears to have been a very protracted and contentious discovery process:

Both parties in this case have been pushing discovery up to and through the close of discovery, which has been extended time and time again . . . . Enough is enough.

Trial is set to start in this case the week of September 10. Between now and then expect to see several more opinions in this case and its related cases. Additionally, I have some other obligations that week, but am planning to blog some of the trial. Stay tuned.

*You can download this opinion here and you can read much more about this case and related cases in the Blog's archives.

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Fast Food Gourmet, Inc. v. Little Lady Foods, Inc., No. 05 C 6022, 2007 WL 2156665 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 26, 2007) (Cole, M.J.)

Judge Cole granted in part defendant Little Lady Foods’ (“LLF”) Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 motion to bar evidence of allegedly late–identified trade secrets. Plaintiff Fast Food Gourmet (“FFG”) originally identified four trade secret elements of its process for making thin crust frozen pizza (you can read more about this case in the Blog's archives). FFG’s Vice President of Operations Crause identified four additional elements during his deposition. And FFG later identified two additional elements. LLF argued that FFG should be limited to the first four elements because FFG never updated its interrogatory responses to include the six additional elements. The Court held that the four additional elements disclosed during the deposition had “otherwise been made known” pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e) and, therefore, were not required to be added to FFG’s interrogatory responses. The Court excluded the other two elements. FFG argued that it had identified the elements by identifying documents containing the elements in its interrogatory responses pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(d). But the Court held that the documents FFG identified only identified the two elements sporadically, and in connection with elements that were not trade secrets. This, combined with Crause’s testimony that he had identified all of the trade secret elements, made FFG’s Rule 33(d) statements insufficient.

Practice Tip: Rule 33(d) is often seen as a simple escape from answering cumbersome or difficult interrogatories. Of course, it is also often warranted. But when you use Rule 33(d), make sure to identify the correct documents, and make sure the identified documents fully support your position.

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Faruki v. Eagle Seven, No. 06 C 7125, Min. Order (N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2007) (Mason, J.).

Magistrate Judge Mason denied plaintiffs' motion for a protective order to prevent a third party deposition.  Plaintiffs argued that the third party's only knowledge relevant to the case was outside the relevant time frame.  But the Court did not reach the merits of the motion because plaintiffs filed their motion two business days prior to the deposition.  The motion was filed so close to the date of the deposition that the motion was noticed for the day after the deposition was set to be taken.  Plaintiffs were aware of the subpoena and the deposition date for at least two weeks prior to filing their motion and the parties appeared before the Court during that time, but plaintiffs failed to raise the issue.  The Court, therefore, denied the motion as untimely.

Practice tip:  Deposition scheduling issues are often negotiated until very near the planned date, but if you think you might bring the issues before the Court make sure to warn the Court if you are appear while you are aware of the issue and, if at all possible, file your motion with sufficient time to notice your motion before the deposition is scheduled.

* The minute order is available here.

 

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United States Gypsum Co. v. LaFarge N. Am., Inc., No. 03 C 6027, 2007 WL 2091020 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 18, 2007) (Hart, J.).

Judge Hart granted in part defendants motion to enforce the Court’s order and denied plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery. The Court previously ruled upon the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, holding that plaintiff’s state law claims were not preempted by the Illinois Trade Secrets Act, but significantly limiting the claims and removing some defendants (you can read more in the Blog’s archives). Defendant sought reconsideration of the Court’s preemption ruling. But the Court held that the motion, filed three months after the Court’s opinion, was untimely and that it presented no new arguments. The Court granted defendant’s request that plaintiff be limited to the trade secrets it identified during fact discovery and prior to summary judgment briefing.

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Meyer Intellectual Props. Ltd. V. Bodum, Inc., __ F.Supp.2d __, 2007 WL 2110931 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 24, 2007) (Shadur, J.).

Judge Shadur granted plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs related to a motion discovery dispute won by plaintiff, but modified its original award based upon defendant’s explanations (you can read more about this case in the Blog’s archives). The Court explained that the relevant Federal Rule, Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4)(A), could be paraphrased as “loser pays,” unless the Court finds the losing parties actions or lack of actions were justified or that other circumstances make a fee award unjust. The Court held that defendant’s explanation warranted reducing the original award by 50%. While the Court did not detail the explanation, this case identifies the broad discretion courts have in determining whether to award attorneys’ fees and costs, as well as the size of those awards.

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Fast Food Gourmet, Inc. v. Little Lady Foods, Inc., No. 05 C 6022, 2007 WL 1673563 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 8, 2007) (Cole, J.).

Judge Cole denied plaintiff Fast Food Gourmet, Inc.'s ("FFGI") motion to compel responses to interrogatories, in this trade secret case involving frozen pizzas (you can read more about this case in the Blog's archives).  FFGI served defendants with an interrogatory seeking information regarding which brands of frozen pizza (aside from the accused DiGiorno Thin Crispy Crust Pizza) defendants baked in the ovens which were allegedly part of FFGI's trade secret crust-making process for stone hearth oven, thin crust, frozen pizzas.  Defendants objected to the interrogatory, which led to a meet and confer between the parties on February 15, 2007, two weeks before the close of fact discovery on March 1.  The meet and confer did not resolve the dispute.  On April 1, FFGI submitted its expert reports and then, six weeks after the close of discovery, FFGI moved to compel responses to the interrogatories.  But FFGI failed to notice the motion until more than one month later on May 18.  The Court noted that, while it had discretion to grant the motion, motions to compel filed after the close of fact discovery are generally held to be untimely unless accompanied by a "reasonable and persuasive justification" for the delay.  FFGI, however, provided no justification for its delay. 

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Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., No. 03 C 7713, 2007 WL 1610449 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 2007) (Moran, J.).*

Judge Moran granted defendant Siebert’s motion for reconsideration of the Court’s earlier claim construction ruling.  Based upon it reconsidered construction, the Court granted Siebert summary judgment of noninfringement of plaintiff Baldwin Graphic Systems’ (“Baldwin”) patent claiming printing press cleaning components. The Court originally construed the claims at issue and then denied Siebert’s first motion for reconsideration in 2005 -- the Court held that Siebert's 2005 motion for reconsideration simply repackaged arguments the Court considered in its original claim construction opinion. At that time the Court construed “reduced air content cleaning fabric” as not excluding fabric having its air content reduced by winding or rewinding the fabric on to a roll. In its current motion, Siebert argued that “reduced air content cleaning fabric” includes only fabric having its air content reduced by mechanical means before being wound on to a roll. The Court acknowledged that this was a new argument and, therefore, considered it.  The Court held that the claim language itself was not helpful in construing the term, but the language of the dependent claims combined with the patent’s specification made clear that “reduced air content cleaning fabric” required that the fabric have its air content reduced by “some method” before being wound on to a roll. Because there was no evidence that Siebert’s fabric underwent no mechanical process for removing air prior to being wound on to a roll, the Court granted Siebert summary judgment of noninfringement.

This opinion is especially remarkable because, while I do not have statistics confirming this, motions for reconsideration do not have a high success rate.  And it is even more rare for a second motion for reconsideration of the same opinion to succeed.

* You can read more about this case in the Blog’s archives.

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Rosenthal Collins Group, LLC v. Trading Techs. Int'l, Inc., No. 05 C 4088, 2007 WL 1597928 (N.D. Ill. May 16, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).

Judge Moran granted declaratory judgment defendant Trading Technologies' ("TT") motion to compel documents and things identified by third party declarant Walter Buist during his deposition, despite declaratory judgment plaintiff Rosenthal Collins Group's ("RCG") assurances that the documents and things had already been produced.  RCG previously filed a motion for summary judgment of invalidity of TT's patents based upon a declaration by Buist regarding software that he developed, at least partially, more than a year before TT filed its patent applications.  In a previous opinion, the Court held that RCG's motion was "somewhat misleading" and possibly "disingenuous," but refused to dismiss the case (you can read the Blog's discussion of that opinion here, as well as more on this case generally in the Blog's archives). 

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Rembrandt Techs., LP v. Comcast Corp., No. 07 C 1010, 2007 WL 1598003 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 2007) (Moran, J.).

Judge Moran granted defendants' motion to compel documents from third party Zenith Electronics Corp. ("Zenith"), but restricted access to the documents by plaintiff, Rembrandt Technologies' ("Rembrandt") inhouse counsel.  In the underlying action, E.D. Texas Case No. 05 C 443,  Rembrandt alleged that defendants infringed its patents.  Zenith was identified as a leading licensor of Rembrandt's technology.  So, defendants subpoenaed Zenith to determine what Zenith paid for its license.  Zenith essentially agreed to produce the documents pursuant to the subpoena, but wanted to restrict access to the documents so that no party's inhouse counsel received access.  Defendants agreed to the restriction, but Rembrandt argued that its chief patent counsel, John Meli, was a chief decisionmaker in the case and, therefore, required access to the documents.  The Court acknowledged that Meli was a decisionmaker in the case and noted that the Texas court's protective order allowed Meli access to highly confidential documents.  Therefore, the Court granted Meli access to any license agreements produced by Zenith pursuant to the subpoena.  But the Court denied Meli access to any other documents produced by Zenith.

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Trading Techs. Int'l., Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No 04 C 5312, 2007 WL 1628352 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 1, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).

Judge Moran denied plaintiff Trading Technologies' ("TT") motion for a protective order to prevent the deposition of Robert Klinger, related to defendant eSpeed's inequitable conduct defense (more on this case in the Blog's archives).  The Court held that discovery is a "balancing act."  eSpeed's assertion that Klinger was involved in drafting a response to a USPTO Office Action at the center of its inequitable conduct claim outweighed TT's best argument -- that the deposition was duplicative because defendants had deposed or have scheduled the depositions of two lead outside patent prosecutors, TT's in-house patent prosecutor and the relevant patent examiner.  The Court also noted that the case is approaching the discovery close, so we may start seeing fewer discovery motions in the case and more substantive motions.

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Trading Techs. Int'l., Inc. v. GL Consultants, No. 05 C 4120, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2007) (Gottschall, J.).*

Judge Gottschall denied defendant GL Trade SA's ("GL SA") motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, with leave to refile after completion of jurisdictional discovery.  GL SA is a French company located in Paris.  GL SA does not have an office or any assets in Illinois, but it does have a subsidiary, defendant GL Americas, Inc. ("GL Americas").  GL Americas maintains a regional office in Chicago.  The Court noted that despite three rounds of briefing on jurisdiction, neither party "provided anything of substance to the court."  Plaintiff Trading Technologies ("TT") treated GL SA's subsidiary GL Americas as GL SA, and had not submitted evidence of GL SA's specific contacts with Illinois.  GL SA submitted several declarations, but none sufficiently clarified that GL SA did not have minimum contacts with Illinois.  As a result, the Court held that it lacked sufficient evidence to rule upon the motion, and granted TT's motion for jurisdictional discovery.

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Trading Techs. Int'l., Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).

Judge Moran denied plaintiff Trading Technologies' ("TT") motion to compel additional production from third party Chicago Mercantile Exchange ("CME").  TT served CME with a subpoena seeking, among other things, anything referring or relating to potential prior art to the patents at issue and communications between CME and any other entity regarding the patents at issue, including any joint defense agreement between CME and such parties.  After TT filed the motion to compel, CME produced thousands of pages, including what it stated were all documents in its possession regarding possible prior art.  Because all prior art documents had been produced, the Court denied TT's motion to compel additional prior art-related documents.

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Trading Techs. Int'l., Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 05 C 4120, (N.D. Ill. May 16, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).

Judge Moran granted in part and denied in part plaintiff Trading Technologies' ("TT") motion to compel additional production from defendants GL Consultants, Inc. and GL Trade SA (collectively "GL").  The Court required GL to update certain interrogatory responses and to produce documents based upon an earlier priority date that GL had argued for, as opposed to stopping at the later priorit date alleged by TT.  The Court also required GL to provide TT access to original source code and certain electronic archives, without regard to whether TT had provided GL similar access.  Finally, the Court denied TT's request to lower the confidentiality designation of the source code for GL's "GL Tradepad" software.  But what is most interesting about the Court's opinion is its reminder to the parties about how the Court expects them to conduct discovery:

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Murata Mfg., Ltd. v. Bel Fuse, Inc., __ F.R.D. __, 2007 WL 1317100 (N.D. Ill. May 2, 2007) (Cole, Mag. J.).

Judge Cole granted in part defendants' motion to compel the testimony of plaintiff's former employee, Sakamoto, who was a named inventor on the patent in suit residing in Japan.  Earlier in the litigation, defendants argued for a longer discovery period because of the time it would take to secure Sakamoto's deposition.  But through a series of miscommunications, delays and unfortunate circumstances, defendants had not been able to secure  Sakamoto's agreement to be deposed, in Japan or elsewhere, until near the close of discovery.  As a result, defendants filed the instant motion to compel plaintiff to produce Sakamoto for deposition in the United States either as a managing agent pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(1) or based upon language in the patent assignement document which obligated Sakamoto to aid plaintiff in patent-related matters.  As an initial matter, the Court denied plaintiff's request to dismiss the motion for failure to meet and confer pursuant to Local Rule 37.2.  The Court explained that based upon the parties' history on the issue, compliance would have been futile and, therefore, it excused defendants' alleged non-compliance.

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Se-Kure Controls, Inc. v. Vanguard Prods. Group, Inc., No. 02 C 3767, 2007 WL 781250 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2007) (Cole, Mag. J.).

Judge Cole denied plaintiff's motion to exclude plaintiff's document as a Rule 37 sanction for defendants' failure to identify its potential reliance upon the document and the person who created it.  During the discovery process, plaintiff produced a "Contact Report" listing calls made by one of its sales employees (who eventually left plaintiff's employ).  Defendants sought to rely upon the document as part of their 35 USC Section 102(b) on sale bar defense (similar to the issue in the Court's last opinion in this case).  Plaintiff argued that defendants should not be allowed to rely upon the document because:  1) defendants failed to identify the Contact Report in their responses to plaintiff's invalidity interrogatory; and 2) defendants did not identify the Contact Report's author (plaintiff's former employee) in their Rule 26 disclosures.  As with plaintiff's previous Rule 37 arguments, the Court denied them because defendants made plaintiff aware of the documents during discovery.  The Court noted that plaintiff was arguing defendants should be barred from relying on a document plaintiff produced for failure to identify plaintiff's document to plaintiff.  The Court was not swayed by defendants' failure to identify the Contact Report's author because he was plaintiff's ex-employee and because he had passed away and, therefore, would not be brought as a witness.  Finally, the Court explained that while a party has a right to be apprised of an opposing party's evidence, but not necessarily the weight or significance the opposing party places on that evidence.

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Se-Kure Controls, Inc. v. Vanguard Prods. Group, Inc., No. 02 C 3767, 2007 WL 781253 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 2007) (Cole, Mag. J.).

Judge Cole denied plaintiff's motion to exclude two defense witnesses as a Rule 37 sanction for failing to properly disclose the witnesses.  During the discovery process, defendants identified two witnesses, through declarations signed by the witnesses, as having knowledge of a 35 USC Section 102(b) on sale bar.  Although defendants provided plaintiff the witnesses' declarations and otherwise identified the witnesses to plaintiff, defendants failed to add the witnesses to their respective Rule 26 disclosures and they failed to supplement their respective responses to plaintiff's interrogatory seeking details of all of defendants' invalidity defenses.  Plaintiff argued that these failures led to plaintiff's decision not to depose the witnesses and that defendants' should be barred from relying upon the witnesses for failure