Chicago IP Attorney & Lawyer : R. David Donoghue : Chicago IP Litigation Blog

Recycled Paper Greetings, Inc. v. Davis, No. 08 C 236, __ F. Supp.2d __, 2008 WL 282687 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 1, 2008) (Bucklo, J.).

Judge Bucklo denied plaintiff’s, Recycled Paper Greetings (“RPG”), motion for a temporary restraining order in this trade secret misappropriation action. RPG argued that it was either part of a joint venture or, at least, a confidential relationship with defendant Kathy Davis to develop a signature line of greeting cards. RPG contends that Davis took confidential information regarding the greeting card line to a competitor. Davis countered that she had terminated her contract with RPG pursuant to the contract’s termination provision before working with RPG’s competitor and there was, therefore, no breach or misappropriation. At an initial hearing, the Court suggested that live testimony might be required to fully resolve the motion for the TRO. But both parties told the Court that their respective witnesses would not be available during the necessary time frame to testify. Because no witnesses were available, the Court denied the TRO, holding that it lacked sufficient information to determine that RPG maintained its alleged trade secrets with sufficient secrecy or the nature of the relationship between RPG and Davis.

Practice tip: If you are seeking a TRO, line up commitments from your potential witnesses to be available both flexibly and quickly. Not many judges will grant TROs if plaintiff cannot present requested witnesses.

• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Johnson Controls Interiors LLC, No. 2007-1314-1467, Slip Op. (Fed. Cir. Feb. 19, 2008).

The Federal Circuit reversed Judge Moran’s construction of “binary code” and, therefore, reversed the limited preliminary injunction entered by the Northern District - click here and here for the Blog’s posts regarding the injunction. The Northern District construed “binary code” as a code represented by two values, but not necessarily a binary number – click here and here for the Blog’s posts regarding the Northern District’s claim and construction opinions. The Federal Circuit praised the Northern District’s claim construction analysis, but reversed the construction:

The district court commendably strove to follow this court’s rules for claim construction. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318-19. In this regard, the trial court weighed the intrinsic evidence along with the extrinsic evidence and properly sought to avoid importing a limitation from the specification into the claims. See id. Nonetheless, this court discerns that the ‘544 patent specification gives particular limiting meanings to the language in the claims.

The Federal Circuit held that “binary code” required a binary (or base two) number. Otherwise, any values would meet the limitation because all values, whether in base two, three, the more standard ten or any other, are represented by computers using two values – 1 and 0. Because the revised claim construction called into question the Northern District’s likelihood of success analysis, the Federal Circuit reversed the preliminary injunction.

• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

Brian Higgins's Maryland IP Law Blog post about the progeny of In re Seagate, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007), inspired me to do follow up posts identifying Northern District cases discussing recent major IP decisions.  The first looks at cases discussing eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S.Ct. 1837, 164 L.Ed.2d 641 (2006).  Here they are:*

• Black & Decker Inc. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., No. 04 C 7955, 2006 WL 3446144 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2006) (St. Eve, J.). -- Granting a permanent injunction in a case between competitors.
  
• Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Lear Corp., No. 05 C 3449, 2007 WL 1017751 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2007) (Moran, J.). -- Granting a preliminary injunction in a case between competitors and holding that in eBay the Supreme Court limited the automatic presumption of irreparable harm based upon infringement.

For further analysis of post-eBay decisions, check out my post about Michael Smith's analysis (click here) and my post discussing Ray Nimmer's thoughts on the potential for compulsory licensing regimes because of eBay (click here).

*  A brief note on methodology:  this was not a thorough study and does not include cases that granted or denied injunctions without discussion.  For a more comprehensive list of decisions nationwide (updated through the end of 2007) go to the Fire of Genius.

• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

Am. Fam. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Roth, No. 05 C 3839 & 3869, 2008 WL 168693 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 2008) (Guzman, J.).

Judge Guzman adopted Magistrate Judge Cole’s Report and Reconsideration in full, holding defendants in contempt for violating the Court’s injunctions requiring that defendants return various customer information taken from plaintiff, defendant’s former employer – click here for more on the prior opinions in the Blog’s archives. It was defendants’ responsibility to ensure that defendants’ former counsel, who had copies of relevant documents, comply with the injunction by turning the documents over to plaintiff. The fact that defendants did not have direct control over their former counsel’s copies did not matter.

Additionally, the Court held that it did not matter that plaintiff did not originally make a “big deal” out of defendant’s non-compliance. Defendants argued that they presumed there was no need to comply with the Court’s injunctions because nobody was making a “big deal” about the return of the materials. That presumption was flawed. Neither party moved to modify either the preliminary injunction or the amended preliminary injunction. Thus, defendants had a duty to comply with the Court’s injunctions as written.

Practice Tip: Do not fall in to the trap of believing that substantial compliance with a court order is sufficient. While that could be true in some cases, you should always contact the court if you have a problem complying with an order. Compliance with orders is one case where the adage that you are better off asking forgiveness than asking permission does not hold true.

• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

Geneva Int’l Corp. v. Petrof, Spol, S.R.O., No. 07 C 4214, 2007 WL 4522621 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).

Judge Moran denied plaintiff Geneva International’s preliminary injunction motion and the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment on Geneva’s anticipatory breach of contract claim.* Geneva signed a variety of agreements with defendant Petrof making Geneva the exclusive U.S. distributor of Petrof’s pianos and the exclusive U.S. licensee of the “Petrof” trademark for use with Petrof’s pianos, through 2012. In 2007, Petrof gave Geneva the required six months notice to terminate the parties’ contract (but not their trademark license agreement which did not have the same termination provisions) and notified Geneva that Petrof planned to start selling its pianos using its trademark in the U.S.

Geneva sough a preliminary injunction to stop Petrof’s U.S. sales because Geneva continued to be the exclusive licensee of the Petrof trademark. But the Court held Geneva would not be irreparably harmed without the preliminary injunction. Geneva’s alleged irreparable harm — lost goodwill of its customers because Geneva would not be Petrof’s exclusive distributor — was caused by the contract, not breach of the trademark license. Petrof’s contract termination meant that Geneva could not be Petrof’s U.S. distributor, exclusive or otherwise. Because the alleged irreparable harm did not stem from the license at issue, the Court denied the injunction.

* Because they are not IP-specific, I will not fully address the contract issues. I will say that the disputes arose from the fact that the three agreements were signed on the same day, but did not all mention each other and had differing integration clauses, some mentioning the other agreements and some not. Practice tip: When drafting parallel agreements, make very clear how the agreements relate or that they do not.

• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

Federal Trade Comm. v. Trudeau, No. 03 C 3904, 2007 WL 4109607 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2007) (Gettleman, J.).

Judge Gettleman held defendant Kevin Trudeau ("Trudeau") in contempt for violating the Court's Stipulated Permanent Injunction (the "Injunction").  In 2003, plaintiff Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") filed suit against Trudeau* alleging, among other things, false advertising pursuant to the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 52(a).  The advertisements at issue included various informercials in which Trudeau allegedly claimed that the coral calcium in his supplement Coral Calcium Supreme could treat cancer, multiple sclerosis and heart disease, among other medical conditions.  In settlement of the FTC's suit, the parties agreed to and the Court entered the Injunction.  The Injunction generally prohibited Trudeau from producing infomercials, with the exception that he could make infomercials promoting books, so long as the infomercials did not misrepresent the books.  The FTC argued that a series of three infomercials promoting Trudeau's new book The Weigh Loss Cure "They" Don't Want You to Know About (the "Book") violated the Injunction because Trudeau made claims in the infomericals that the weight loss program described in the book was "easy,"  "simple" and prevented weight gain forever once complete. 

The weight loss plan had four phases, the last of which was to be followed for the remainder of a person's life.  Each phase had various requirements (or strong recommendations) including colonics, various organ cleansings, avoiding use of over the counter or prescription drugs, daily walks and eating only 100% organic foods.  Phase two also required daily injections of human chorionic gonadotrophin ("HCG").  HCG is available only by prescription in the US, but the FDA specifically stated that it should not be used for treating obesity.  Trudeau argued that the claims were mere puffery and opinion which, therefore, did not violate the Injunction.  But the Court held that Trudeau's claims that the Book detailed an "easy" diet were false.  Furthermore, Trudeau's claims that once the diet was complete you could eat anything you wanted were false because the fourth phase of the diet lasted for the remainder of the dieter's life.  The Court, therefore, held Trudeau in contempt  and set a hearing to determine an appropriate remedy.

 

 

Continue Reading...

• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

Last week the intellectual property world obsessed over injunctions – specifically, a preliminary injunction hearing in the Eastern District of Virginia resulting in an injunction against the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office’s (“PTO”) new continuation rules. There was a lot of analysis about the injunction, including live blogging by Patent Practice Center Patent Blog and a lot of post-injunction analysis by, among others: 271 Patent Blog; FileWrapper; Patent Baristas; Patent Docs (and here); Patent Prospector; PHOSITA; Patently-O; WSJ Law Blog; and Washington State Patent Law Blog. For those of you who have no idea what a continuation is or just do not care about the particulars of the rules, I promise that I am done with patent continuations for this post. Honestly, I find the rules rather tedious myself. I prefer to focus on litigating patents, rather than the PTO’s prosecution rules. So, today we talk about injunctions:

According to TechCrunch, Patent Monkey received a permanent injunction when it was sold to the Internet Real Estate Group. But Patent Monkey’s patent search technology will see its injunction lifted when it is used on www.patents.com. Hopefully, for those like me who enjoyed it, Patent Monkey’s Infinite Monkey Theorem Blog will also see its injunction lifted.

Virtually Blind has an interesting report on Second Life’s* new Patent & Trademark Office, the SLPTO. No word on whether the SLPTO and the Second Life legal system generally will allow for any permanent injunctions. Right now it appears that the SLPTO will be heavily skewed toward copyright and trademark, which makes sense in a virtual world. And before we learn whether the SLPTO has any enforcement mechanisms, Blawg IT is offering to represent virtual clients before the SLPTO. I would get a retainer up front Brett – virtual clients can be difficult to track down when the bills are due.

The Patry Copyright Blog shows why Second Life injunctions may be necessary. Six Second Life players have sued a Queens man in the Eastern District of New York for trademark and copyright infringement based upon sales of goods in Second Life. I wonder if the trademarks and copyrights were registered with the SLPTO or the US PTO/Copyright Office. And does the E.D.N.Y. have authority to issue cyber-injunctions?

Promote the Progress provides an interesting piece on the long-term effects of last week’s injunction against the PTO on shaping patent reform.

Continue Reading...

• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks (6)

Yesterday, I blogged briefly about the Eastern District of Virginia's injunction preventing the PTO's new continuation rules from taking effect today, November 1st.  But the Court's order was not available yet.  The order has been issued -- click here for a copy -- and it is very interesting.  The Court held that plaintiff GSK had shown a likelihood of success on the merits regarding several issues:

• That limiting the number of continuations a party can file violates 35 U.S.C. Section 120, which states that later filed applications have the same effect as their parent applications.
  
• That the new rules are impermissably retroactive because the limits on numbers of claims and continuations will change the terms of the bargain struck between inventors currently prosecuting their applications and the PTO when those inventors filed their applications, prior to the new rules going into effect.
  
• That the requirements for Examination Support Documents ("ESD") are impermissably vague because they do not sufficiently define the paramters of the search required.

The Court also held that GSK would be irreparably harmed by implementation of the rules because GSK has about 2,000 pending applications and GSK's rights in each of those applications would be materially altered by the new rules. 

[Updated with more links after the jump.]

Continue Reading...

• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

Bryant v. Gordon, __F.Supp.2d__, 2007 WL 2440208 (N.D. Ill. August 30, 2007) (Kennelly, Jr.).*

Judge Kennelly denied defendants James Gordon’s (“Gordon”) and Mach 1’s motions for judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) and entered an injunction against Gordon’s and Mach 1’s continued use of the copyrighted pictures at issue – pictures of a parachutist and a sniper used in motivational posters. Gordon and Mach 1 argued that the jury’s verdict that Gordon and Mach 1 infringed plaintiff’s copyrights was inconsistent with the jury’s verdict that defendant John Urtis (“Urtis”) – who took the infringing sniper photo – did not infringe plaintiff’s copyright. But the Court held that JMOL cannot be used to harmonize jury verdicts. Furthermore, the Court held that the infringement verdicts were supported by the facts.

Because of a threat of continued infringement, the Court granted a permanent injunction against Gordon and Mach 1. But the Court held that it could not issue the injunction against Urtis because the jury’s verdict was in Urtis’s favor. The Court did, however, caution Urtis not to aid the other defendants in violating their injunction.

* For more on this case, click here in the Blog’s archives.

• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

Coilcraft, Inc. v. Inductor Warehouse, Inc., No. 98 C 0140, 2007 WL 2728754 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 13, 2007) (Guzman, J.).

Judge Guzman conducted a Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 de novo review of Magistrate Judge Cole’s report which recommended that the Court hold defendant in contempt for violating the Court’s permanent injunction limiting defendant’s use of plaintiff’s Coilcraft mark (click here for further discussion in the Blog’s archive). The Court adopted Judge Cole’s Report in its entirety and gave plaintiff fourteen days to submit a proposed order and proof of its attorneys' fees and costs related to this motion. The Court also held that Judge Cole was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing before issuing the Report because there were no genuine issues of material fact. The dispute was governed by the language of the Court’s injunction which was not disputed. And the only issue was whether defendant’s advertisements, the contents of which were not disputed, violated the injunction – a matter of law.

• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

American Fam. Mut. Ins., Co. v. Roth, No. 05 C 3839, 2007 W LL377335 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 2007) (Cole, Mag. J.).

Judge Cole recommended that plaintiff’s motion be granted in part requiring defendants to comply with the Court’s preliminary injunction and holding defendants in contempt for failing to comply with the Counts TRO and PI. The Court first explained that no injunction could be a general prohibition against using trade secrets. Rather, an injunction – whether temporary, preliminary or permanent – must include specific recitals limiting defendants’ actions or requiring that actions be performed. The Court then analyzed whether defendants’ actions or inactions violated specific provisions of the TRO and the PI issued by the Court. The Court reported that defendants had retained possession of plaintiff’s customer list and defendants failed to provide a list of their customer contacts with sufficient detail. The Court, therefore, recommended that defendants be held in contempt for failing to comply with the TRO and the PI.

• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

Glenayre Elecs., Inc. v. Jackson, No. 02 C 0256, 2007 WL 2492105 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 2007) (Leinenweber, J.).

Judge Leinenweber denied a motion for an injunction against declaratory judgment defendant Jackson (“Jackson”) making arguments in a related malpractice case against Jackson’s prior counsel Niro Scavone (“Niro”). In the original case, the jury returned a verdict for Jackson finding direct infringement and awarding him $12.1M. Jackson accepted a remittitur of $2.65M which the Court ruled prevented Jackson from pursuing further indirect infringement claims against declaratory judgment plaintiff Glenayre Electronics (“Glenayre”). Jackson appealed the issue to the Federal Circuit which upheld the Court’s decision. Jackson then sued his Niro in Illinois state court for, among other things, malpractice. Niro brought the instant motion in this case seeking to prevent Jackson from taking any position that contradicts the principle that the $2.65M remittitur represented all possible damages in the case. Because Niro had already moved the state court to prevent the arguments at issue, the Court had to determine whether the relitigation exception applied to allow the Court to reconsider the decision rendered by the state court. The Court held that the exception did not apply for two reasons. First, Counsel showed no “equitable entitlement” to the relitigation exception. Counsel may still appeal the state court decision through the state appellate system. And the costs of litigation are not a sufficient equitable consideration. Second, the characterization of the Court’s ruling was incorrect. The Court held only that once he accepted the remittitur, Jackson was not entitled to any further damages for the infringement. The Court did not hold that Jackson had never been entitled to more than the $2.65M remittitur.

• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 05 C 5373, 2007 WL 1549498 (N.D. Ill. May 24, 2007) (Coar, J.).

Judge Coar denied defendant Sandoz, Inc.'s ("Sandoz") motion to stay the Court's preliminary injunction pending appeal to the Federal Circuit pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(c).  The Court previously granted plaintiff Abbott's motion for a preliminary injunction (you can read more about that decision and related cases in the Blog's archives).  The PI enjoined defendant Sandoz from selling a generic version of Abbott's patented extended release antibiotic (clarithromycin, an erythromycin derivative which Abbott markets as Biaxin XL).  Sandoz argued that the PI should be stayed pending appeal because of conflicting Federal Circuit law regarding the Court's claim construction and because of the Supreme Court's KSR decision. 

Continue Reading...

• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks (1)

Bucciarelli-Tieger v. Victory Records, Inc., No. 06 C 4258, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).

Judge Moran granted plaintiffs a preliminary injunction preventing defendants from interfering with plaintiffs' right to record new music with producers or record labels of plaintiffs' choice.  The Court also denied defendants an opposing preliminary injunction that would have prevented plaintiffs from recording new music with anyone other than defendants.  Plaintiffs are members of an Ohio-based band called Hawthorne Heights (collectively "HH") -- in addition to clicking on "Hawthorne Heights" to go to the band's website, you can also read about them on Wikipedia, listen to them online or see them live June 12th in Urbana, Illinois's Canopy Club.  HH entered into a contract (the "Agreement") with defendants to produce and promote four albums.  The first album was created and promoted seemingly without incident, but just before release of the second album the relationship soured.  HH sent defendants a letter which purported to terminate the Agreement and listed several ways that defendants had allegedly harmed HH.  This suit arose from that dispute.  Plaintiffs allege breach of contract, as well as copyright and trademark infringement for promotions and sales after the date of HH's letter allegedly terminating the Agreement and related state law claims.  In a prior opinion (discussed in the Blog's archives), the Court held that the Agreement was not exclusive because it did not contain any exclusivity provisions, which left HH free to record other songs or records with another company during the life of the Agreement.  Based upon the Court's ruling, HH moved the Court for a preliminary injunction confirming that defendants could not interfere with any of HH's efforts to record new music with a third party.  Defendants cross-moved to prevent HH from working with anyone but defendants.  The Court held that HH showed a likelihood of success on the merits based upon the Court's prior ruling that the Agreement was not exclusive.  Similarly, the Court held that defendants did not show a likelihood of success in light of the same ruling.  Because defendants had no likelihood of success, their motion for a PI was denied.  Defendants argued that HH could not base a motion for preliminary injunction upon claims for declaratory relief, but the Court held that numerous courts had granted preliminary injunctive relief based upon claims for declaratory judgment.

Continue Reading...

• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

CertainTeed Corp. v. Williams, __ F. Supp.2d __, 2007 WL 1297165 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 3, 2007) (Holderman, C.J.).

Pursuant to a remand and forthwith mandate from the Seventh Circuit, Chief Judge Holderman preliminarily enjoined defendant, Williams, from continued employment by plaintiff's competitor, IKO Industries, Inc. ("IKO"), based upon a non-compete agreement ("Agreement") defendant signed with his previous employer, CertainTeed Corp. ("CT").  But the Court made clear that the preliminary injunction violated defendants' right to due process and violated the Erie doctrine.  When Williams began working for CT, he signed the Agreement which required, among other things, that for one year after working for CT, Williams not perform work:  (i) regarding any product, process or service that is competitive with or similar to any product, process or service Williams was involved with at CT; or (ii) regarding any product, process or service of CT's for which Williams had access to CT's confidential information during his employment.  After leaving CT's employ, Williams took a position with IKO.  Based upon that employment, CT sued Williams and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent Williams's continued employment by IKO.

Continue Reading...

• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 07 C 1721, Slip op. (N.D. Ill. May 3, 2007) (Anderson, J.).

Judge Anderson denied plaintiffs'  motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent defendants Sandoz, Inc. ("Sandoz") and Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd. ("Teva") from selling a generic version of plaintiff Abbott Laboratories' ("Abbott") antibiotic cefdinir, which it markets using the name Omnicef.  Plaintiffs' original patent, U.S. Patent No. 4,559,334 (the "'334 patent"), covering a form of cefdinir expired on Sunday, May 6, 2007 at 10:59 p.m. CDT.  Plaintiffs' second patent, U.S. Patent No. 4,935,507 (the "'507 patent"), covering a crystalline cefdinir, does not expire until December 4, 2011.  Plaintiffs argued that Sandoz's and Teva's respective formulations of cefdinir (the "accused products"), which the parties agree can be classified as cefdinir monohydrate, infringed the '507 patent and, therefore, sales of the accused products should be enjoined.  The Court, with agreement of the parties, adopted a prior claim construction from Judge Payne of the E.D. Virginia for purposes of the PI determination.  Using Judge Payne's construction, the Court held that the accused products did not likely infringe the '507 patent.  First, cefdinir monohydrate only displayed four of the seven peaks in an x-ray diffraction pattern that the '507 patent identified as indicative of crystalline cefdinir within the +/-.1 degree margin of error that the Court determined was the proper construction of the '507 patent's "about" qualifier.  Second, the Court held that "trace" amounts of crystalline cefdinir that were allegedly in the accused products in addition to the cefdinir monohydrate did not likely amount to literal infringement.

Continue Reading...

• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Lear Corp., No. 05 C 3449, 2007 WL 1238908 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 2007) (Moran, J.).

Judge Moran denied defendant Lear's motion to stay the Court's preliminary injunction pending appeal to the Federal Circuit,* but did allow third party General Motors ("GM") to intervene of right and modified the PI to limit harm to defendant and GM.  In a March 30, 2007 opinion and order, the Court granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, preventing defendant from marketing and selling its garage door opener transmitters based upon the Court's prior claim constructions (these opinions are available in the Blog's archives).  The Court held that Lear could not show a likelihood of success on the merits, in part because the Court's "Markman decision and subsequent reconsideration dealt an enormous blow to [Lear's] case."  The Court acknowledged that while plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm without the PI, both Lear and GM could suffer irreparable harm because of the PI.  In order to resolve the irreparable harm issue, the Court revised the PI to exempt Lear's sales to GM.  Because GM was Lear's only client and because the exemption allowed GM to continue sourcing Lear's product  the revised PI would remove harm to GM and substantially reduce Lear's harm.  While Lear would not be able to add new customers, it would not have to idle its related workers and factories because Lear would not lose any customers.  Because the removal of GM sales from the PI substantially limits Lear's potential harm, the Court denied Lear's motion, supported by GM, to increase the bond from $10,000,000 to $50,000,000.

Continue Reading...

• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks (1)

Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 05 C 5373, 2006 WL 1141635 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 2007) (Coar, J.).

Judge Coar granted plaintiff Abbott's motion for a preliminary injunction, after having previously denied it a TRO.*  The PI enjoined defendant Sandoz from selling a generic version of Abbott's patented extended release antibiotic (clarithromycin, an erythromycin derivative which Abbott markets as Biaxin XL).  The Court held that Sandoz had shown a substantial likelihood of materiality and Abbott's intent to deceive the PTO  based upon Abbott's failure to disclose certain taste perversion data during prosecution.  But because Abbott abandoned the claims to which the taste perversion data was relevant of its own accord, the Court did not find the patent preliminarily unenforceable.  The Court explained its reasoning as follows:

Redemption is one of the core principles of the American ethos.  Thus in addition to being contrary to the spirit of Scribbs, Kimberly-Clark and the Code of Federal Regulation, it seems wholly inequitable to hold a patent to be invalid for fraudulent conduct in the prosecution of a claim that was withdrawn before actual prosecution had even begun.

 

Continue Reading...

• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Lear Corp., No. 05 C 3449, 2007 WL 1017751 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2007) (Moran, J.).

Judge Moran granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, preventing defendant from marketing and selling its garage door opener transmitters.  Relying upon its two prior claim construction decisions (which can be found in the Blog's archives), the Court first determined that plaintiffs had proven a likelihood of success on its infringement claims.  Then the Court considered plaintiffs' irreparable harm claims.  The Court denied plaintiffs' argument that its showing of a strong likelihood of success creates a presumption of irreparable harm.  Citing eBay, Inc.  v. Merc Exchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006), the Court held that the Supreme Court limited the automatic presumption of irreparable harm based upon infringement.  Instead, the Court determined that plaintiffs' had shown that they were irreparably harmed because defendant's sales had eroded its prices and strained its customer relations.

Continue Reading...

• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks (2)

Chicago Tribune Co. v. Fox News Network LLC, No. 07 C 0865, 2007 WL 1052508 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 4, 2007) (Bucklo, J.).*

Judge Bucklo denied plaintiff Chicago Tribune's ("Tribune") motion for a preliminary injunction.  The Tribune sought an injunction which would have required defendant Fox News Networks ("Fox") to change the name of its "Redeye" late-night television news program based upon alleged infringement of the Tribune's Redeye mark related to its Redeye newspaper.  The Court held that the Tribune had only shown a "possibility" that it would prevail on the merits.  The Court found that the Tribune's Redeye mark was at least suggestive and, therefore a strong mark.  And the Court held that while the marks did not visually resemble each other, the Tribune proved a likelihood that the marks were aurally identical.  But the evidence did not favor the Tribune on either of the other two "most important" factors in deciding likelihood of confusion:  defendant's intent and actual confusion.  No evidence showed that Fox "passed off" its program as coming from the Tribune, so the issue of Fox's intent favored Fox.  As to actual confusion, the Tribune put forth a witness that testified that he suffered "momentary actual confusion" when he first learned of Fox's Redeye program, but that it was cleared up almost immediately by someone he was talking with about the program.  Additionally, the witness did not have cable television, so could not watch the show.  While initial confusion can be sufficient to show actual confusion, the Court disregarded the witnesses testimony because he admitted that he was a consumer of neither the Tribune's nor Fox's products. 

Continue Reading...

• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

SMC Corp., Ltd. v. Lockjaw, LLC, __ F. Supp.2d __, 2007 WL 983850 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 3, 2007) (Castillo, J.).

Judge Castillo granted plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, enjoining defendants from breaching the parties' agreement, unless plaintiff acted in a manner triggering the agreement's termination provision, and from contacting plaintiff's customers for any purpose without plaintiff's consent.  Plaintiff was the exclusive distributor of defendants' patented Lockjaw pliers in certain Western European countries.  For about eighteen months, plaintiff's distributed defendants' pliers without incident.  But then defendants altered payment terms, which was their right if they followed certain procedures.  Plaintiff alleges that defendants did not follow those procedures and based on this dispute the relationship appears to have broken down.  Shortly after defendants altered the payment terms, plaintiff filed this suit seeking, among other things, a declaratory judgment that the agreement is binding and enforceable, and that defendants breached the agreement.  Plaintiff also sought an injunction to prevent the defendants from terminating the agreement and/or contacting plaintiff's customers.  Relying upon the UCC, the Court found that plaintiff had a likelihood of success on the merits based upon, among other things, the fact that its brief (and cured) nonpayment for two shipments likely did not constitute a breach of the agreement.

Continue Reading...

• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

Bobak Sausage Co. v. Bobak Orland Park, Inc., No. 06 C 4747, 2007 WL 846505 (N.D. Ill. Jar. 19, 2007) (Kennelly, J.).

After an evidentiary hearing, Judge Kennelly held defendants in contempt for violating the stipulated permanent injunction entered by the Court and ordered defendants to comply with the injunction within three weeks or face daily fines.  Plaintiff Bobak Sausage Co. ("Bobak's") makes and sells meat products and operates a related restaurant in Chicago.  Bobak's founder, Frank Bobak, transferred ownership of Bobak's to his sons.  In early 2006, Bobak's reorganized, which led to two of the sons owning Bobak's and a third owning a grocery store that Bobak's had been building.  As part of the reorganization, Bobak's granted two entities rights to use Bobak's trademarks at retail locations for a six month period.  After the six month period ended, Bobak's filed suit against defendants (including the third son and the licensed retail locations) for, among other things, trademark infringement based upon the continued use of the Bobak's marks.  The parties settled that dispute based at least in part upon a stipulated permanent injunction, which the Court entered, which set various limits on what marks each defendant could use, requirements that the defendants remove and change their signage and requirements that defendants use disclaimers that they were not affiliated with Bobak's. 

Continue Reading...

• Print
• Comments (2)
• Trackbacks

Clarus Transphase Scientific, Inc. v. Q-Ray, Inc., No. 06 C 4634, 2006 WL 4013750 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 6, 2006) (Cole, Mag. J.).

Magistrate Judge Cole denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction holding that plaintiff had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on its trademark, trade dress and copyright infringement claims.  Plaintiff marketed and sold pendants incorporating its "Sympathetic Resonance Technology" which it claimed enhanced the human biofield under its "Q-Link" mark.  Defendants sold a line of pendants and bracelets under the "Q-Ray" mark which they claim are "bio-magnetic ionized" which they claim enhance a person's overall well-being.  The Court held that there was no likelihood of success on the trademark infringement claims because the three most important likelihood of confusion factors -- the similarity of the marks, defendants' intent and evidence of actual confusion -- all favored defendants.  The marks, "Q-Link" and "Q-Ray" share only one letter, "Q," and a hyphen and use substantially different fonts, making even the Q's employed in each mark look different.  Plaintiff's actual confusion evidence consisted of a declaration from plaintiff's employee stating that she had added a Professional Golfers Association ("PGA") trade show at which "a number of attendees" were confused as to whether plaintiff sold the "Q-Ray" pendants.  The Court noted that the number of attendees that stated there confusion could have been as low as two.  As a result, the Court could not find a likelihood of success on the issue of actual confusion. 

Continue Reading...

• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

International Profit Assocs., Inc. v. Paisola, 461 F. Supp.2d 672 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 2006) (Bucklo, J.).

Judge Bucklo held that plaintiff was likely to succeed on its Lanham Act and cyberpiracy or cybersquatter, 15 U.S.C. Section 1125(d), claims and issued a temporary restraining order ("TRO") preventing defendants from conduct that likely infringed plaintiff's trademarks.  Based upon the cyberpiracy claim, Defendants were ordered to stop making content available through their website, www.ipaopinion.com, which was likely confusingly similar to plaintiff's site, www.ipaopinions.com.  The Court also ordered defendants to stop using plaintiff's trademarks as search terms in Google's Adwords program. 

Continue Reading...

• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

American Fam. Mutual Insur. Co. v. Roth, No. 05 C 3839, 2007 WL 63983 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 2007) (Cole, Mag. J.).

Judge Cole recommended denying defendants' motion to modify Judge Guzman's preliminary injunction for lack of jurisdiction.  Judge Guzman, following Judge Cole's recommendation, issued a preliminary injunction to prevent defendants from using a list of confidential information regarding plaintiff's policy holders.  Defendants ultimately appealed the preliminary injunction and then filed a motion to clarify seeking modifications to the injunction  equivalent to what they were asking to be overturned on appeal.  After an exhaustive analysis of the procedural rules, the Court recommended denying the motion to modify for lack of jurisdiction because once defendants appealed the injunction, the district court loses jurisdiction over the appealed issues.

• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

Black & Decker Inc. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., No. 04 C 7955, 2006 WL 3883937 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 27, 2006) (St. Eve, J.).

Judge St. Eve denied defendant's emergency motion to prohibit plaintiff from sending Rule 65(d) notice letters regarding the Court’s permanent injunction to defendant’s customers (more on this case and the injunction in the Blog's archives). But before analyzing defendant’s emergency motion, the Court first addressed defendant’s prior motion to clarify the injunction which the Court previously denied. In the motion to clarify, defendant stated that it had sold approximately 150,000 infringing radios to various resellers prior to being enjoined. Defendant argued that those resellers should be free to sell their supplies of infringing radios. The Court denied the motion because it was first raised in a sur-reply brief regarding plaintiff’s motion for a permanent injunction without presentation of any detailed facts, legal argument or supporting case law. 

Continue Reading...

• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

Black & Decker Inc. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., No. 04 C 7955, 2006 WL 3883919 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2006) (St. Eve, J.).

This is Judge St. Eve's permanent injunction order (numerous opinions from this case and its resulting jury trial have been analyzed in the Blog and can be found in the Blog's archives).  The injunction is notable for its thoroughness, in describing both the claims at issue and the enjoined products or classes of products.  The order even includes electrical schematics of a portion of the enjoined invention.

• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., No. 06-1101, __ F.3d __ (Fed. Cir. 2007).

While this is not a Northern District case, it is relevant to the Blog because it is an appeal of a Northern District case and because it confirms Judge Coar's ruling (discussed here) that a preliminary injunction holding lacked preclusive effect in the related case Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 05 C 5373, 2006 WL 3718025 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 2006).  In this patent dispute plaintiff, Abbott Laboratories ("Abbott"), alleged that defendant's, Andrx Pharmacueticals ("Andrx") sale of a generic form of Abbott's patented extended release antibiotic (clarithromycin, an erythromycin derivative) which Abbott markets as Biaxin XL.  The Northern District held that Abbott had established a likelihood of success on the merits of its infringement claim and that Andrx had not established a likelihood that the patent would be held invalid.  As a result of those holdings, the Northern District issued a preliminary injunction.  In its appeal, Andrx argued that Abbott was precluded from obtaining a preliminary injunction because the Federal Circuit overturned a previous Northern District preliminary injunction for Abbott against another generic antibiotic producer Teva Pharmaceuticals ("Teva").  In that case, the Federal Circuit held that Teva raised a substantial question as to the validity of the claims at issue, sufficient to call Abbott's likelihood of success on the merits into question. 

Continue Reading...

• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks