Chicago IP Attorney & Lawyer : R. David Donoghue : Chicago IP Litigation Blog

Genender Int'l, Inc. v. Skagen Designs, Ltd., No. 07 C 5993, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Apr. 14, 2008) (Grady, J.).

Judge Grady denied defendant Skagen's Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) motion to dismiss plaintiff Genender's declaratory judgment ("DJ") case. The Court also granted in part Skagen's Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, dismissing Genender's tortious interference claim. Skagen argued that Genender's DJ suit should be dismissed in favor of Skagen's later-filed suit for design patent and trade dress infringement filed in the District of Nevada. Skagen argued that dismissal was required by the Seventh Circuit's standard as set forth in Tempco Elec. Heater Corp. v. Omega Eng., Inc., 819 F.2d 746 (7th Cir. 1987). The Court, however, held that Federal Circuit law controlled because of the design patent claims. And the Federal Circuit explicitly rejected Tempco in Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (abrogated on other grounds). Instead, the Federal Circuit required that Skagen provide a "sound reason" that proceeding with the DJ would be unjust or inefficient. Skagen provided no such reason and, in fact, Skagen's counsel agreed at argument that it did not matter whether the case was tried in the Northern District or in the District of Nevada.

The Court dismissed without prejudice Genender's tortious interference claim. Genender alleged that Skagen interfered with Genender's business relationship with customer Sears by copying Sears personnel on cease and desist letters. But the claim was deficient because Genender did not allege that it lost any Sears business because of Skagen's actions.

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Biopolymer Eng'ing, Inc. v. Biorigin, No. O7 C 4234, 2008 WL 927984 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 4, 2008) (Shadur, J.).

Judge Shadur, on the Court's own motion, struck the portions of defendant Biorigin's Answer that denied plaintiff's claims because plaintiff misspelled Biorigin – spelling it “Biorgin” instead of “Biorigin.” The Court noted that a denial based upon misspelling was an argument “only a patent lawyer could love.” And the Court explained that, despite plaintiff's misspelling, Biorigin understood that it was the intended target of plaintiff's complaint.

The Court also struck Biorigin's lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficient service and insufficient process affirmative defenses. The Court held that by filing a counterclaim, Biorigin affirmatively invoked the Court's jurisdiction, forfeiting these affirmative defenses.

As to Biorigin's lack of standing affirmative defense, the Court noted that it was pled on information and belief and required that Biorigin, should it find facts to support its defense, file a motion with such facts as quickly as possible because standing should be addressed as early as possible.

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Integrated Genomics, Inc. Kyrsides, No. 06 C 6706, 2008 WL 63065 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2008) (Lefkow, J.).

Judge Lefkow dismissed defendant Ivanova for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, held that the Court had subject matter jurisdiction over defendant Kyrsides, and denied defendants' Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims based upon preemption. Plaintiff alleged that defendants' breached their non-compete agreements and otherwise named plaintiff when defendants resigned from plaintiff, where they worked with genome software, and joined plaintiff's competitor in similar roles. Defendants each argued that plaintiff had not sufficiently pled diversity jurisdiction because plaintiff had not shown that $75,000 or more was in controversy. In response, plaintiff alleged that they lost customers to defendants' new employer after defendants resigned. But that was insufficient because plaintiff did not allege that defendants were responsible for, or the cause of, those lost customers. The Court, therefore, dismissed defendant Ivanova. But for Kyrisides, plaintiff also relied upon an email sent from Kyrsides to plaintiff's employees explaining Krysides's view that his resignation cost plaintiff a very large number of contracts. Kyrsides statements were sufficient proof that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000.

The Court held that a motion to dismiss was not the appropriate vehicle for deciding the scope of the relevant non-compete agreements. The scope of a non-compete was fact-intensive and best determined after additional discovery.

Finally, the Court held that plaintiff's claims were not preempted by the Illinois Trade Secret Act ("ITSA"). While the claims could encompass trade secret information, they were based upon the broader category of confidential information. Because the claims were potentially broader than trade secrets, they were not preempted.

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Strom v. Strom Closures, Inc., No. 06 C 7051, 2008 WL 489363 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2008) (Der-Yeghiayan, J.).

Judge Der-Yeghiayan granted plaintiff Victoria Strom’s (“Strom”) motion to dismiss defendants’ (collectively “SCI”) counterclaims. SCI filed an earlier suit charging Strom with patent infringement. The parties settled that suit pursuant to a Settlement Agreement (“Agreement”). SCI alleged that Strom breached the Agreement and was once again, therefore, infringing SCI’s patents. But the Court held that once a district court dismisses a case with prejudice, it cannot reopen the case for enforcement of a related agreement without independent jurisdiction. SCI’s appropriate claim was for breach of the Agreement, not patent infringement. Because breach of the Agreement was a state law claim and because there was no diversity (SCI pled that all parties were Illinois residents), the Court lacked jurisdiction. Finally, the Court held that there was not supplemental jurisdiction based upon Strom’s federal employment claims. Strom’s claims and the breach of the Agreement were not sufficiently related.

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U.S. Gypsum Co. v. 3M Innovative Props. Co., No. 07 C 6381, 2008 WL 514976 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2008) (Darrah, J.).

Judge Darrah granted defendants’ (collectively “3M”) Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) motion to dismiss for lack of venue. Plaintiff United States Gypsum (“Gypsum”) filed this action asserting its own patent and seeking declaratory judgments regarding 3M’s patents, all to low dust construction compounds. Shortly thereafter, 3M filed a corresponding suit in the District of Minnesota. Prior to filing their suits, the parties were in extended negotiations regarding cross-licensing of their patents. Pursuant to those negotiations, the parties entered a confidentiality agreement (“Agreement”) requiring that all disputes “arising from the subject matter of this Agreement shall be brought . . . exclusively in [D. Minn.]” Because the express subject matter of the Agreement was the patents in suit and because the Agreement, negotiated by sophisticated parties, set D. Minn. as the exclusive jurisdiction, the Court dismissed the case in favor of 3M’s action filed in the D. Minn.

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Gabbanelli Accordions & Imports, L.L.C. v. Italo-Am. Accordion Mfg. Co. et al., No. 02 C 4048, 2008 WL 351860 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 2008) (Zagel, J.)*

Judge Zagel granted plaintiff summary judgment of trademark and trade dress infringement regarding plaintiff’s “wildly colorful” and “heavily ornamental” accordions. The Court awarded plaintiff approximately $500,000 in damages, attorneys fees and costs. Defendants – Italian entities that sold accordions in the United States – chose not to participate in the case. Instead, they filed an Italian case after this case was filed, but before defendants were served pursuant to the Hague Convention. The Court previously stayed a portion of the case pending the outcome of the Italian case, but noted that the stay may have been a mistake. Years after filing, the Italian case had not been resolved and defendants failed to participate in the U.S. proceeding based upon a belief that the Italian proceeding controlled. For example, defendants admitted personal jurisdiction when they failed to respond to jurisdictional Requests for Admission and instead of filing a motion to dismiss, defendants sent the Court an unsupported letter listing their complaints with the case and the Court’s jurisdiction over them. By failing to participate in discovery and not following the Court’s rules, defendants preempted whatever ability they might have had to make their case.

Practice tip: Participate and play by the rules. Even if you cannot or will not afford counsel, you must answer discovery, respond to motions and appear when required to. Failing to participate will not insulate you from judgment.

* Click here for more on this case in the Blog’s archives.

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Palantir.net, Inc. v. Palantir Techs., Inc., No. 07 C 4271, Min. Order (N.D. Ill. Nov. 27, 2007) (Guzman, J.).*

Judge Guzman granted defendant's motion to transfer this Lanham Act case to the Northern District of California ("N.D. Cal.") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a).  Defendant's principal place of business was in the N.D. Cal. and defendant had an earlier-filed case against plaintiff pending in the N.D. Cal.  The Court, therefore, held that the convenience of the parties and the witnesses, as well as the interests of justice, were best served by transferring the case to the N.D. Cal.

*  Click here for a copy of the case.

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Morton Grove Pharms., Inc. v. Nat'l. Pediculosis Assoc., __ F. Supp.2d __, 2007 WL 4259422 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2007) (Bucklo, J.).

Judge Bucklo granted in part defendants Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss and denied defendants’ motion to transfer the case to the Eastern District of Michigan. Plaintiff manufactures a line of lotions and shampoo which are FDA-approved for treating lice and scabies.  Defendants are a Michigan non-profit group, Ecology Center, Inc., and related individuals (collectively the "Center"), as well as the National Pediculosis Association. The Center mailed two newsletters related to passage of Michigan legislation to approximately 19,000 addresses of which 44 were in Illinois.  99% of the Center's donors were from Michigan, with just .23% from Illinois (18 Illinois-based donors total).  The Center's strongest ties to Illinois consisted of two donations totaling $270,000 from an Illinois-based foundation and an interactive website which accepts donations, although none have come from Illinois.  The Court previously held that these contacts did not create general jurisdiction.* 

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Jewel Am., Inc. v. Combine Int’l., Inc., No. 07 C 3596, 2007 WL 4300589 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2007) (Guzman, J.).

Judge Guzman denied defendants’ 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) motion to transfer this copyright case to the Eastern District of Michigan. Plaintiff argued that its choice of forum should be given deference because its relevant subsidiary was an Illinois entity with its place of business and all of its operations in Illinois. But the Court looked to the residence of the named plaintiff, not the plaintiff’s subsidiary. Because the named plaintiff was a New York entity, plaintiff’s chosen forum was not given deference. Further, the situs of material events was Michigan. Defendants were Michigan entities and the alleged infringement and related planning occurred in Michigan. The Court discounted the location of documents because, “[i]n this age of faxing, scanning and overnight courier services, however, the location of documentary evidence is largely irrelevant.”

No party identified a third party witness that would be required to testify. And convenience of the parties tipped slightly to plaintiff whose subsidiary’s business would be disrupted if its main employees and key witnesses had to travel from Illinois to Michigan for court proceedings and depositions. Based upon these factors, the Court held that defendants had not shown that the Eastern District of Michigan was clearly more convenient and denied the motion.

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Goss Int’l Ams., Inc. v. A-Am. Mach. & Assembly Co., No. 07 C 3248, 2007 WL 4294744 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2007) (Gettleman, J.).

Judge Gettleman denied defendant’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss plaintiff’s copyright for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff alleged that defendant violated plaintiff’s copyrights in its simplified machine drawings of its commercial printing machines by placing them on the internet without authorization. The Court held that plaintiff’s simplification of its drawings and addition of part numbers were sufficient to meet copyright’s originality requirement. The Court also looked to the Fifth and Eighth Circuits and held that the registration requirement was met when plaintiff filed its copyright registration, as opposed to when the Copyright Office acted on it. In this case, plaintiff filed its application in May 2007 and was waiting on registration as of the date of the opinion. The Court reasoned that because plaintiff would also have a cause of action if the registration was denied, there was no reason to make plaintiff wait until the Copyright Office acted.

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Tamburo v. Dworkin, No. 04 C 3317, 2007 WL 3046216 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 2007) (Gottschall, J.).

Judge Gottschall granted defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs sell a dog breeding and pedigree software program and sought, among other things, a declaratory judgment that certain allegedly factual information (date of birth, gender, parent’s names, titles, color, medical information, etc.) included in its pedigree database was not copyrightable and, therefore, could not be infringed by plaintiffs. Defendants either offer allegedly competing software or are dog breeders who use such software. The Court held that it lacked general or specific jurisdiction over each of the defendants. There was no general jurisdiction because plaintiffs identified, at most, minimal interactions with and sales to Illinois residents. And defendants various websites were not sufficiently targeted to Illinois to alone create general jurisdiction. The Court similarly found that it lacked specific jurisdiction. Of particular interest, the Court held that defendants’ posts to internet chat groups and message boards could not create specific jurisdictions. The posts allegedly accused plaintiffs of theft and trafficking in stolen goods, among other things. The Court held that, while the Seventh Circuit had not addressed the issue or expressly adopted the Zippo sliding scale analysis, posts to internet chat rooms and message boards would fall below passive websites, which make up the bottom of the Zippo scale. Defendants are not alleged to own the chat rooms or to use them to transact or target business within Illinois. The Court reasoned that a holding that specific jurisdiction was created by postings to chat rooms would make jurisdiction boundless because the chat rooms have no geographic restrictions.

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Papst Lic. GmbH & Co. KG v. Fujifilm Corp., No. 07 C 3401, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Nov. 27, 2007) (Holderman, C.J.).

Judge Holderman transferred this case to the District of the District of Columbia (“D.D.C.”) pursuant to an order of the Multidistrict Litigation Panel (“MDL Panel”). Plaintiff Papst Licensing (“Papst”) sought centralization pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1407 of this case and four others – two in the D.D.C, one in the District of Delaware and on in the District of New Jersey. The MDL Panel centralized the cases, but centralized them in the D.D.C., instead of the Northern District. The first, and the most advanced, of the cases was pending in the D.D.C. And the MDL Panel held that the East Coast would be the most convenient location for the majority of the parties.

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Abbott Labs. V. Church & Dwight, Inc., No. 07 C 3428, 2007 WL 3120007 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 2007) (Kennelly, J.).

Judge Kennelly denied defendant Church & Dwight’s (“C&D”) 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a) motion to transfer this patent case to the District of New Jersey, where a related case between the parties was pending, and granted C&D’s motion to dismiss a claim that the New Jersey Court previously dismissed for lack of standing. In New Jersey, C&D sued plaintiff Abbott Laboratories (“Abbott”) alleging infringement of patents covering lateral flow immunology devices, and pregnancy and ovulation testing methods. Abbott counterclaimed alleging infringement of three patents, including U.S. Patent No. 6,534,320 (the “’320 patent”). The New Jersey Court ultimately dismissed Abbott’s counterclaim, holding that Abbott was a nonexclusive licensee of the ‘320 patent and, therefore, lacked standing. The New Jersey Court also held that standing could not be cured by Abbott’s effort to involuntarily join its licensor Inverness pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 19.  Based upon the New Jersey Court’s ruling, this Court held that issue preclusion prevented Abbott from re-litigating its standing to sue. Unless Abbott revised its license agreement with Inverness, giving Abbott additional rights, the New Jersey Court’s ruling was preclusive. The Court, therefore, dismissed Abbott’s ‘320 patent infringement claim.

The Court denied C&D’s motion to transfer the case to New Jersey. The Court gave Abbott’s choice of forum deference. And the Court gave little weight to the parties’ ongoing New Jersey patent suit because the New Jersey Court dismissed Abbott’s counterclaims before making any substantive rulings. The New Jersey Court, therefore, would not have been in a better position to decide any issues in the case. 

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ExcelStor Tech., Inc. v. Papst Licensing GMBH & Co. KG, No. 07 C 2467, 2007 WL 3145013 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2007) (Der-Yeghiayan, J.).

Judge Der-Yeghiayan granted defendant Papst Licensing’s (“Papst”) Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs, various related ExcelStor Technology entities (collectively “ExcelStor”) licensed Papst’s patent portfolio (the “Agreement”) related to hard disk drives (“HDD”). ExcelStor alleged that when the Agreement was signed, Papst had already given third party Hitachi a license covering the same HDDs. Furthermore, ExcelStor alleged that Papst concealed the Hitachi license from ExcelStor. 

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Medallion Products, Inc. v. H.C.T.V., Inc., No. 06 C 2597, 2007 WL 3085913 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 18, 2007) (Darrah, J.).

Judge Darrah dismissed defendant Broadcast Arts Group (“BAG”) for lack of personal jurisdiction, but held that the Court had personal jurisdiction over defendant ICC, Woodridge Specialty Products Corp. and James Timlin (collectively “ICC Defendants”). Plaintiffs argued that BAG’s tortious acts against plaintiffs, all Illinois residents, created personal jurisdiction based upon the effects test doctrine. But the Court held that the alleged tortious acts against were not sufficient for jurisdiction because BAG was a Florida resident and all of its allegedly tortious acts were performed in Florida or Pennsylvania, at the request of non-Illinois residents. 

The alleged tortious acts of the ICC Defendants, however, did create personal jurisdiction pursuant to the effects test doctrine. The ICC Defendants allegedly entered an agreement to develop, market and sell a counterfeit pet-stain removal product that was packaged in bottles using plaintiff’s “Urine Gone” logo. The alleged acts and resulting injury would have occurred in Illinois.

The Court also held that plaintiffs met the Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 pleading standards as clarified in Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, ____ U.S. ____, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007). So, the Court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ state law claims.

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Kammin v. Smartpros, Ltd., No. 07 C 2665, 2007 WL 3046128 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 2007) (Guzman, J.)

Judge Guzman transferred this copyright case to the Southern District of New York pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1404. While plaintiff’s choice of forum is usually given significant weight, no party was a resident of the Northern District – both parties were New York residents. Furthermore, the non-party witnesses were closer to New York. And New York had a significant interest in deciding a case between its citizens regarding a dispute arising within New York.

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Mitchell v. First Northern Credit Union, No. 07 C 1891, 2007 WL 2948374 (N.D. Ill. October 4, 2007) (Norgle, J.).

Judge Norgle granted defendant Arizona State Credit Union’s ("ASCU") motion to transfer to the District of Arizona pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1404 in this patent dispute. The Court acknowledged that plaintiff’s chosen forum was given significant weight. But the ease of access to the evidence in Arizona dictated that the case be transferred. Plaintiff was an Arizona resident, at least as of his filing date. And ASCU, all of its documents and all of its employees were in Arizona.

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Chicago Architecture Foundation v. Domain Magic LLC, No. 07 C 764, Slip Op. (N.D.Ill. October 12, 2007) (Norgle, J.).

Judge Norgle denied defendant’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Although defendant was a Florida corporation, defendant’s website – www.chicagoarchitecturefoundation.com – played upon plaintiff Chicago Architecture Foundation’s (“CAF”) name and only included links to other Chicago businesses. The Court, therefore, held that defendant’s website targeted the Northern District creating general personal jurisdiction.

Additionally, as a Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 sanction for failing to answer interrogatory responses as the Court ordered, the Court held that defendant generated revenue from the use of CAF’s trademark. 

Practice tip: Answer discovery requests on time and, if you cannot for some reason, at least answer them by the Court ordered deadline. 

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Geisha, LLC v. Tuccillo, No. 05 C 5529, 2007 W> 2608558 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 4, 2007) (Pallmeyer, J.).

Judge Pallmeyer held that the Court lacked jurisdiction over plaintiff Geisha’s declaratory judgment claim. Geisha operates a series of restaurants, each called Japonais – Japonais Chicago, Japonais New York and Japonais Las Vegas. Between the openings of Japonais Chicago and Japonais New York, defendant Roy Tuccillo (“Tuccillo”) filed an intent to use trademark application for a nearly identical Japonais mark, with the “firm intent” to open a restaurant using the mark. Geisha registered Japonais with the State of Illinois, but never federally registered the mark. Geisha sought, among other things, a declaratory judgment that Geisha owned the Japonais mark and that Tuccillo’s opening of a Japonais restaurant would infringe Geisha’s mark. The Court noted that the Seventh Circuit looks to patent law when considering whether there is an actual controversy in a trademark declaratory judgment action. The Court, therefore, relied upon the Supreme Court’s recent MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 765 (2007), decision which required that a controversy be “real and immediate,” overturning the Federal Circuit’s reasonable apprehension of suit test. The Court held that there was no “real and immediate” controversy. While Tuccillo had filed for registration of a Japonais mark nearly identical to Geisha’s and expressed his firm intent to open a Japonais restaurant, Tuccillo’s actions did not suggest that there was “imminent danger” that he would actually open a restaurant when the suit was filed. Tuccillo testified that he had generally looked at some properties to purchase for the restaurant, but he did not remember when he had done that and could not identify specific properties. Additionally, Tuccillo purchased a Chinese restaurant in 2002, but leased the space without opening a Japonais restaurant in 2003, two years before Geisha filed this suit.

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Abbott Labs v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., No. 04 C 0836, 2007 WL 2875503 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 28, 2004) (Guzman, J.).

Judge Guzman granted plaintiff Abbott Laboratories’ (“Abbott”) Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) motion to amend its Complaint dismissing claims regarding its U.S. Patent No. 6,444,859 (the “’859 patent”). After the Federal Circuit held the parent of the ‘859 patent invalid, Abbott Labs v. Baxter Pharm. Prods., 471 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2006), Abbott gave defendant Baxter Healthcare (“Baxter”) a covenant not to sue Baxter on the ‘859 patent (“Covenant”). Abbott, therefore, sought leave to dismiss its claims regarding the ‘859 patent. But Baxter argued that the claims should not be dismissed because the Covenant excluded any reissue or reexamination of the ‘859 patent, thereby creating an actual controversy. The Court held that Abbott’s potential suit based upon its potential reissue or reexam of the ‘859 patent did not create a current controversy. The Court, therefore, allowed Abbott to amend its Complaint dismissing claims regarding the ‘859 patent. 

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Minemyer v. R-Boc Reps., Inc., No. 07 C 1763, 2007 WL 2461666 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 2007) (Coar, J.).

Judge Coar denied individual defendant Timothy Grimsley’s (“Grimsley”) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Grimsley argued that all of his involvement in allegedly infringing plaintiff’s patented couplers was undertaken within the scope of his employment for defendant Dura-Line and, therefore, was protected by the fiduciary shield doctrine. But the Court disagreed. The parties provided conflicting evidence regarding whether Grimsley was an officer of Dura-Line and Grimsley’s level of control over Dura-Line’s coupler business. Additionally, the parties provided conflicting evidence regarding whether Grimsley was aware that Dura-Line’s couplers infringed plaintiff’s patents, but continued to market and sell them despite that knowledge, acts which would go beyond the scope of his employment because of his knowledge of their illegality. The Court, therefore, held that based on the current evidence the fiduciary shield doctrine was not available to Grimsley. But the Court acknowledged that further evidence may reverse that analysis and allowed Grimsley to refile his motion should discovery present that additional evidence.

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Canadian Thermal Windows, Inc. v. Magic Window Co., No. 07 C 1784, 2007 WL 2481295 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).

Judge Moran granted defendant’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Defendant’s business is focused on southeastern Michigan. Defendant’s only connections to Illinois were a passive website, which cannot create jurisdiction, and purchases of certain supplies which were wholly unrelated to defendant’s alleged infringing activities. The Court, therefore, held that it lacked personal jurisdiction. In addition, the Court awarded defendant its attorneys fees and costs for moving to transfer or dismiss the case because plaintiff knew that defendant’s business was localized in southeastern Michigan without any ties to Illinois based on the parties’ ongoing business relationship.

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Farag v. Defense Threat Reduction Agency, No. 07 C 1688, 2007 WL 2404625 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2007) (Hart, J.).

Judge Hart dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction plaintiff's suit seeking that the Court order the PTO to place a secrecy order on plaintiff's patent application for a process of separating an isotope from uranium for use in nuclear applications.  Plaintiff's application is about to be published and plaintiff believes that publication of the application would allow use of his process for illicit purposes that might threaten national security.  The Invention Secrecy Act provides a patent applicant the right to appeal the issuance of a secrecy order, but not the right to appeal the denial of a secrecy order.  See 35 U.S.C. Section 181; 35 C.F.R. Section 5.4.  The Invention Secrecy Act also permits a suit for compensatory damages, but only based on damage created by a secrecy order, not the absence of one.  Finally, the Court noted that plaintiff might have a claim pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (the "APA"), but the APA requires that the plaintiff by harmed by the agency (PTO) action.  The Court noted that potential threat to national security based upon a review of plaintiff's patent application was too remote and general to create standing pursuant to the APA.  As a result, the Court dismissed plaintiff's complaint.  It is also interesting to note, the Court instructed plaintiff to file any appeal with the Seventh Circuit, instead of the Federal Circuit despite the fact that the case is focused on PTO procedure. 

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Everything Baseball Ltd., LLC v. Team Athletic Goods, Inc., No 05 C 5526, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 2007) (Pallmeyer, J.).

Judge Pallmeyer denied defendant Team Athletic Goods, Inc.’s (“TAG”) Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of standing. The inventors of the patent at issue, for baseball chest protectors, assigned their rights in the patent to Everything Baseball Ltd. (“EB Ltd.”), but the correct corporate name was Everything Baseball Limited, LLC (“EBL LLC”). Plaintiffs argued that because EBL LLC was not the assignee when it filed suit, the Court should dismiss the case. But the Court held that the assignment to EB Ltd. was a clerical error and that the parties’ clear intent was to assign to plaintiff EBL LLC. The Illinois’s records show that while EBL LLC was incorporated, EB Ltd. never existed. Furthermore, some months after TAG identified the error, EBL LLC amended their assignment with the PTO. But the Court did note that the amended assignment could not create standing in this suit. The Federal Circuit case law is clear that where standing does not exist when the suit is filed, it cannot be corrected during the suit. The difference in this case was the Court’s ruling that the intent of the assignment agreement was to assign the patent in suit to EBL LLC, not EB Ltd., which did not exist.

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Ganjavi v. Smith, No. 06 C 4189, 2007 WL 2298375 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 31, 2007) (Gettleman, J.).

Judge Gettleman granted defendant’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) & (6) motion to dismiss. Plaintiff alleged violation of plaintiff’s attribution and integrity right pursuant to section 106A of the Copyright Act and false presentation in violation of the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, Lanham Act 15 U.S.C. Section 1125, as well as related state law claims. Plaintiff, a classical guitarist, alleged that defendants attacked plaintiff and his business by posting information on an online forum  and by creating websites “mocking” plaintiff’s website. The Court dismissed plaintiff’s attribution and integrity rights claim because Section 106A only applies to “works of visual art” which expressly excludes electronic publications, including websites. The Court dismissed plaintiff’s anti-cybersquatting claim because plaintiff failed to allege a “bad faith intent to profit” from the alleged cybersquatting as required by the act.

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Black & Decker, Inc. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., No. 06 C 4440, Min. Order (N.D. Ill. Jul. 13, 2007) (Manning, J.).*

In the first Northern District opinion to address the Supreme Court’s MedImmune declaratory judgment standard, Judge Manning denied plaintiff Black & Decker’s (“B&D”) motion to dismiss defendant Robert Bosch Tool Corp.’s ("Bosch") declaratory judgment counterclaims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In a prior case between the parties before Judge St. Eve (numerous prior opinions are discussed in the Blog's archives), B&D asserted that two models of Bosch's Power Box radio (the "Old Power Box") infringed B&D's two patents (the "Old Patents").  Shortly before Judge St. Eve held trial in the previous case, B&D brought this suit against Bosch asserting that Bosch's new model of its Power Box radio (the "New Power Box") infringed a third patent (the "New Patent").  At about the same time, B&D sought leave to present evidence at trial before Judge St. Eve that the New Power Box infringed the Old Patents.  Judge St. Eve, however, held that B&D had not disclosed the New Power Box as an accused product and that Bosch would be prejudiced by adding it immediately before trial.  After the trial before Judge St. Eve, the jury returned a verdict that the Old Power Boxes willfully infringed certain claims of the Old Patents.

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Steiner Indus., Inc. v. Auburn Mfg., Inc., No. 07 C 668, 2007 WL 1834176 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 22, 2007) (Darrah, J.).

Judge Darrah denied declaratory judgment defendant Auburn Manufacturing’s (“Auburn”) motion to dismiss. Auburn argued that plaintiff’s (collectively “DJ Plaintiffs”) suit improperly anticipated Auburn’s complaint which alleged Lanham Act claims of false designation and false advertising, as well as related state law claims. Auburn filed its complaint in the District of Maine within a week of DJ Plaintiffs’ filing. Auburn alleged that DJ Plaintiffs’ use of “FM Approved” and “Made in the USA” in their catalogs and website advertising in connection with their welding blankets constituted false designation and false advertising. DJ Plaintiffs were aware of the allegations before they filed suit because, as part of an ongoing negotiation with plaintiffs, Auburn had provided plaintiffs a copy of its complaint. The Court acknowledged its discretion to dismiss the case in favor of Auburn’s later filed complaint, but did not dismiss the case. The two cases mirrored each other, so either could resolve the parties’ dispute. And because both cases were filed in federal courts, there was no concern that the DJ case would cause friction between federal and state courts. The deciding issue was whether the Maine Court could offer a full remedy. DJ Plaintiffs had a motion to transfer or dismiss pending before the Maine Court. In that motion, DJ Plaintiffs argued that the Maine Court lacked personal jurisdiction over two of the three DJ Plaintiffs – Steiner Industries, Inc. and Lab Safety Supply, Inc. DJ Plaintiffs, therefore, asked the Maine Court to transfer the case to the Northern District of Illinois or to dismiss the case.  The Court held that if the Maine Court transferred the case to the Northern District or dismissed Steiner and Lab Safety for lack of jurisdiction, those factors would weigh in favor of maintaining the DJ action. If, however, the Maine Court denied DJ Plaintiffs’ motion and held that it had jurisdiction over all DJ Plaintiffs, then the Main Court could more effectively decide the dispute than the Northern District. The Court, therefore, denied the motion to dismiss with leave to refile if the Maine Court finds it has jurisdiction over all DJ Plaintiffs and does not transfer the case to the Northern District.

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Varitalk, LLC v. Lahoti, No. 07 C 1771, 2007 WL 1576127 (N.D. Ill. May 30, 2007) (Conlon, J.).

Judge Conlon denied defendant Dave Lahoti’s (“Lahoti”) Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for reconsideration of the Court’s previous opinion denying Lahoti’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue and forum non conveniens (you can read more about the previous decision in the Blog’s archives). Lahoti, a California resident, operated a website from California using the domain name www.veritalk.com. Lahoti’s site was an internet portal which allowed visitors to his site to click through links to buy various products or services. The Court held that Lahoti’s website fell in the gray area between active websites (which create specific jurisdiction) and passive websites (which do not create specific jurisdiction). But the portal’s interactive and commercial nature combined with plaintiff Varitalk’s evidence that some consumers were confused and erroneously visited Lahoti’s website created personal jurisdiction. Lahoti argued for reconsideration because he contends that his website did not link to businesses located in or doing business in Illinois, and that a third party puts the content on his website. The Court denied both of these arguments, explaining that Varitalk had put presented evidence that Lahoti’s website included links to business with substantial Illinois operations and that whether Lahoti or an agent of his placed the content on his website did not change the Court’s analysis. But the Court’s procedural analysis may be the most useful part of this case for litigators. The Court notes that Lahoti styled his motion as a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for reconsideration, but that it is actually a Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) motion. Rule 60(b) is for reconsideration of final judgments, where as Rule 54(b) is for interlocutory decisions. A denial of a motion to dismiss is necessarily interlocutory.

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Varitalk, LLC v. Lahoti, No. 07 C 1771, 2007 WL 1576127 (N.D. Ill. May 30, 2007) (Conlon, J.).

Judge Conlon denied defendant Dave Lahoti’s (“Lahoti”) motion to dismiss plaintiff Varitalk’s complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), improper venue pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) and forum non conveniens. Varitalk had a principal place of business in Chicago, where it developed software to relay highly customizable pre-recorded audio messages to consumers that were indistinguishable from live human voice. Varitalk registered a trademark in its name “Varitalk” for use in connection with this business. Lahoti is an individual residing in California where he operates various businesses using websites, such as www.omegaworks.com and www.crosspath.com. Lahoti registered the domain name www.veritalk.com, where he set up an internet portal which allowed visitors to his site to click through links to buy various products or services. The Court held that Lahoti’s website fell in the gray area between active websites (which create specific jurisdiction) and passive websites (which do not create specific jurisdiction). But the portal’s interactive and commercial nature – Lahoti earned income from the site based on how many visitors clicked on links on the site and whether they bought products from the linked sites – combined with Varitalk’s evidence that some consumers were confused and erroneously visited Lahoti’s portal, create specific jurisdiction over Lahoti. On the other hand, Lahoti’s email exchange with Varitalk’s CEO Frederick Lowe, initiated by Lowe, regarding whether Lahoti would sell his portal to Varitalk did not create specific jurisdiction because the exchange was limited and not initiated by Lahoti.

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Rowe Int'l Corp. v. Ecast, Inc., No. 06 C 2703, 2007 WL 1438370 (N.D. Ill. May 14, 2007) (Kennelly, J.).*

Judge Kennelly denied defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' patent infringement complaint for lack of standing.  As to two patents that were not expressly assigned to plaintiffs before the suit was filed (the "Progeny Patents"), the Court used Illinois contract law to interpret the following blanket provision in the assignment agreement regarding the parent patent, which assigned the parent application and any improvements or related applications:

any and all other applications . . . which the undersigned may file . . . on said invention or improvements, and in any and all Letters Patent of the United States and foreign countries, which may be obtained on any of said applications . . . .

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Trading Techs. Int'l., Inc. v. GL Consultants, No. 05 C 4120, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2007) (Gottschall, J.).*

Judge Gottschall denied defendant GL Trade SA's ("GL SA") motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, with leave to refile after completion of jurisdictional discovery.  GL SA is a French company located in Paris.  GL SA does not have an office or any assets in Illinois, but it does have a subsidiary, defendant GL Americas, Inc. ("GL Americas").  GL Americas maintains a regional office in Chicago.  The Court noted that despite three rounds of briefing on jurisdiction, neither party "provided anything of substance to the court."  Plaintiff Trading Technologies ("TT") treated GL SA's subsidiary GL Americas as GL SA, and had not submitted evidence of GL SA's specific contacts with Illinois.  GL SA submitted several declarations, but none sufficiently clarified that GL SA did not have minimum contacts with Illinois.  As a result, the Court held that it lacked sufficient evidence to rule upon the motion, and granted TT's motion for jurisdictional discovery.

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Morton Grove Pharms., Inc. v. Nat'l. Pediculosis Assoc., __ F. Supp.2d __, 2007 WL 1302971 (N.D. Ill. May 3, 2007) (Bucklo, J.).

Judge Bucklo granted defendants' motion and dismissed plaintiff's deceptive trade practices case for lack of personal jurisdiction.  Defendants' sporadic contacts with Illinois did not confer general jurisdiction.  Plaintiff manufactures a line of lotions and shampoo which are FDA-approved for treating lice and scabies.  Defendants are a Michigan non-profit group, Ecology Center, Inc., and related individuals (collectively the "Center"), as well as the National Pediculosis Association which is not a party to the motion to dismiss.The Center mailed two newsletters related to passage of Michigan legislation to approximately 19,000 addresses of which 44 were in Illinois.  99% of the Center's donors were from Michigan, with just .23% from Illinois (18 Illinois-based donors total).  The Center's strongest ties to Illinois consisted of two donations totaling $270,000 from an Illinois-based foundation and an interactive website which accepts donations, although none have come from Illinois.  The Court held that these occasional contacts did not rise to the level of continuous and systematic, as required for general jurisdiction.

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Gencor Pacific, Inc. v. Nature's Thyme, LLC, No. 07 C 167, 2007 WL 1225362 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2007) (Kocoras, J