Chicago IP Attorney & Lawyer : R. David Donoghue : Chicago IP Litigation Blog

Eva's Bridal Ltd. v. Halanick Enterprises, Inc., No. 07 C 1668, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. May 19, 2010) (Darrrah, J.).

Judge Darrah granted in part defendants' and denied plaintiffs' summary judgment motions in this Lanham Act case over the use of the name "Eva's Bridal." The Court granted defendants' summary judgment as to plaintiffs' trademark infringement claim because plaintiffs presented no evidence that they federally registered the "Eva's Bridal" trademark.

Plaintiffs' Lanham Act unfair competition and trademark dilution claims did not require a federally registered trademark. But because the mark was not registered, plaintiffs had the burden of proving ownership of the mark.  Plaintiffs created at least a question of fact as to ownership with evidence that plaintiffs' business was a continuation of the original use of the mark. And because the mark was based upon a first name and not a last name the mark was not necessarily descriptive. The Court, therefore, held there was a question of fact as to whether the mark was descriptive. 

Defendants agreed that plaintiffs abandoned the mark by licensing it without maintaining any quality control. Plaintiffs, however, presented sufficient evidence of control to create a question of fact.

Defendants' argument that plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of confusion was not relevant to a dilution analysis. And defendants' argument that the Eva's Bridal mark was not famous failed because it was not developed. Defendants' argument was a single sentence without elaboration or support.

There was also a question of fact as to defendants' laches and acquiescence claims. Plaintiffs cited evidence that during the alleged delay the parties engaged in various negotiations and defendants made various payments.

Finally, the Court denied plaintiffs' summary judgment motion. Plaintiffs failed to comply with Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) requiring a statement of uncontested material facts supported by admissible evidence. Plaintiffs' statements were largely taken verbatim from its amended complaint, were largely irrelevant to the summary judgment issues and were largely not supported by cites to the record. The Court, therefore, denied plaintiffs' motion without analyzing it on the merits. 

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Bobak Sausage Co. v. A & J Seven Bridges, Inc. d/b/a Bobak's Signature Events, No. 07 C 4718, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Apr. 26, 2010) (Dow, Jr.).

Judge Dow denied without prejudice defendants' Fed. R. Evid. 702 motion to exclude plaintiff's trademark survey expert in this Lanham Act case involving plaintiff's Bobak marks. Plaintiff's eight question survey was flawed. The survey's relevant universe was too broad. 

Metropolitan Chicago residents were surveyed, not just those in the market for the parties' products. The survey was also underinclusive because it excluded businesses, a large percentage of defendants' business. Additionally, the survey asked leading questions, and did not use the parties' visual marks. Finally, the survey used only minimal controls. 

Despite having identified technical defects in the survey, the Court did not exclude the survey. Although the defects substantially limited the usefulness of the survey, the survey was not one of the "rare" ones that are "completely unhelpful" to the trier of fact. But the Court stressed that its decision was preliminary. And the Court was more comfortable allowing a flawed survey because it was the trier of fact. 

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AutoZone, Inc. v. Strick, No. 03 C 8152, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2010) (Darrah, J.).

Judge Darrah, after a bench trial, held that defendant’s use of his Oil Zone and Wash Zone marks did not create a likelihood of confusion with plaintiff AutoZone’s Auto Zone trademarks.*

Likelihood of Confusion

Only one of the seven likelihood of confusion factors weighed in AutoZone’s favor – the strength of AutoZone’s mark. But the strength of the mark was outweighed by the dissimilarity of both the marks and the services offered by the parties. Apart from the common use of the word “zone” there was little similarity between plaintiff’s AutoZone and defendant’s Oil Zone/Wash Zone. And while AutoZone sells auto parts, defendant performs automatic services.

Laches

AutoZone’s four-year delay exceeded the analogous Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act three-year statute of limitations. The fact that defendant’s alleged infringement “fell through the cracks” and was not acted on for four years, was not a sufficient excuse for the delay. And defendant was prejudiced by AutoZone’s delay based upon defendant’s four years of advertising the Oil Zone/Wash Zone names.

*  Click here for more on this case in the Blog’s archives.

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Morningware v. Hearthware Home Prods., Inc., No. 09 C 4348, Slip. Op. (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2009) (St. Eve, J.).

Judge St. Eve denied defendant Hearthware's Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiff Morningware's Lanham Act unfair competition and product disparagement claims, as well as related state law claims.  Hearthware allegedly bought Morningware's trademarks as Google AdWord keywords so that when a Google user searched for Morningware's trademarks, a Hearthware "sponsored link" showed up above the standard search results, along with the following text written by Hearthware:

        The Real NuWave® Oven Pro Why Buy an Imitation?  90 Day Gty.

Hearthware did not dispute that the MORNINGWARE mark was protectible or that it was owned by Morningware.  Instead, Hearthware argued that purchasing "Morningware" as an AdWord keyword was not a "use" in commerce.  The Court noted that although the Seventh Circuit had not decided the issue, courts have largely adopted a broad reading of "use" that included AdWords purchases.  But in this case, the Court could not decide the issue without fact-finding which was not appropriate in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.  The Court, therefore, denied the motion to dismiss.

Hearthware also argued that purchasing AdWords could not create customer confusion.  But the Court held that Morningware pled sufficient facts to show initial interest confusion which is actionable pursuant to the Lanham Act, even if the confusion is only brief and the customer is aware of the true source of the goods by the time a purchase is made.

The Court also held that Hearthware's alleged "Why Buy an Imitation" advertisement text was sufficient for a disparagement case as a fact-finder could determine that the text could lead a consumer to believe that Morningware's product was an imitation of Hearthware.  Morningware's state law claims survived the motion to dismiss for the same reasons as the Lanham Act claims. 
 

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Loufrani v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 09 C 3062, Slip. Op. (N.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 2009) (Kendall, J.).

Judge Kendall denied counterclaim defendants' (collectively "Smiley Company") Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss counterclaim plaintiff Wal-Mart's Lanham Act and related state law declaratory judgment claims related to Smiley Company's potential use of Wal-Mart's Mr. Smiley Mark, from Wal-Mart's well-known roll back campaign, after the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board ("TTAB") held that Smiley Company's mark was not distinctive and that the mark would create a likelihood of confusion with Wal-Mart's Mr. Smiley Mark.

First, the  Court held that Wal-Mart had plead sufficient facts to establish a controversy existed warranting Wal-Mart's declaratory judgment claims.  All of Wal-Mart's claims related to likelihood of confusion.  And the parties had developed "clear positions" on likelihood of confusion through their TTAB proceedings.  Furthermore, Smiley Company had already raised numerous claims against Wal-Mart, evidencing an actual controversy.  The Court also noted that this case was not like Geisha v. Tuccilli, 552 F. Supp. 2d 1002 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (click here and here to read more about the case in the Blog's archives).  In that case, the Court held there was no controversy, but declaratory judgment defendant had never used its mark and if he did use it by opening a restaurant, it would have been easy for declaratory judgment plaintiff to identify the use and alleged infringement.  Smiley Company, however, admitted to using its mark internationally since the 1970s.  Furthermore, Geisha was a summary judgment decision where the parties and the Court had the benefit of discovery.

Smiley Corp. also argued that the Court should only address its appeal of the TTAB decision and not Wal-Mart's broader claims.  The Court, however, held that a district court is free to decide infringement and likelihood of confusion issues as part of reviewing a TTAB decision.  The TTAB review instituted by Smiley Company was both an appeal and a new action which allowed the Court to address new issues and to admit new evidence.

Finally, Wal-Mart's Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act claim was not insufficient for failing to plead actual damages.  While actual damages were required, they could not exist in a declaratory judgment claim seeking to prevent future acts and, therefore, future damages.
 

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World Wide Sales, Inc. v. Church & Dwight Co., Inc., No. 08 C 1198, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2009) (Kennelly, J.).

Judge Kennelly granted defendant Church & Dwight (“CD”) summary judgment on each of plaintiff World Wide Sales’ (“WWS”) claims for trademark infringement, Lanham Act unfair competition and fraud on the Patent and Trademark office. WWS claimed that CD infringed and unfairly competed with WWS’s Forever Fresh for the Fridge trademark, used with a refrigerator odor elimination product, by using CD’s Fridge Fresh mark with its Arm & Hammer refrigerator deodorizer product.

Lanham Act

The parties stipulated that CD’s mark was protectable for purposes of this motion. The only issue, therefore, was whether there was a likelihood of confusion. Generally, a court would consider whether consumers believed CD’s mark referred to WWS’s product. But WWS relied upon a theory of reverse confusion, arguing that CD had so saturated the market with its junior mark that consumers believed WWS’s products were CD’s products. Courts apply the same likelihood of confusion factors in both reverse confusion and confusion cases, although the factors are weighted differently:

• Similarity of Products. The products had similar deodorizing uses, but they were presented so differently that there was little chance of consumer confusion.
   
• Degree of Similarity. Beyond both using “Fridge” and “Fresh” the marks were not similar. Among other things, WWS’s mark was surrounded by pictures of refrigerated food stored with or without its product, CD’s mark was against a yellow-orange background, similar to other Arm & Hammer products without any pictures of food. The factor weighed strongly in CD’s favor as it was “extraordinarily unlikely” that consumers would be confused.
   
• Use and Manner of Concurrent Use. The parties' distribution channels were vastly different. WWS offered no evidence of the products being sold in the same store or advertised in the same publication.
   
• Strength of Mark. WWS’s mark was descriptive and relatively little had been invested in promoting the mark. As a result, the Court held that the mark was relatively weak.
   
• Consumers’ Degree of Care. While the products at issue were relatively inexpensive, the Court still held that there was little chance consumers would confuse the products.
   
• CD’s Intent. Because the junior user does not seek to profit from the senior user’s mark in reverse confusion cases, CD’s intent was irrelevant.
   
• Actual Confusion. WWS offered no evidence of actual confusion.

Based upon the factors, the Court held that no reasonable fact finder could find a likelihood of confusion.

Fraud on the PTO

Because WWS’s registration disclaimed the exclusive use of “fridge” and “fresh,” no reasonable fact finder could have found that CD lacked a reasonable belief that “fridge” and “fresh” were unprotected words. And therefore, failing to disclose WWS’s "Forever Fresh for the Fridge" registration to the PTO during the prosecution of CD's "Fridge Fresh" mark was not fraud.

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Aguila Records, Inc. v. Nueva Generacion Music Group, Inc., No. 07 C 3399, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 2009) (Der-Yeghiayan, J.).

Judge Zagel granted in part and denied in part plaintiffs', collectively "Aguila Records") motion for a preliminary injunction in this trademark and copyright infringement dispute.  Aguila Records, a music management and recording agency, was in a dispute with defendants' musical group Alacranes Musical (“Alacranes”).  Based upon that dispute, Aguila Records sought a preliminary injunction preventing defendants' use of the Alacranes word mark and scorpion logo.

                                               Likelihood of Success

Because the parties agreed that the Alacranes marks were protectable and that there was a likelihood of confusion if two groups used the marks, the only likelihood of success issue was whether Aguila Records owned the marks.  The Court held that the proof of ownership was at best "in conflict" and that the agreements were contradictory.

                                               Irreparable Harm

The Court held that a preliminary injunction against performing using the Alacranes Musical mark would irreparably harm defendants who would be forced to negotiate with Aguila Records for rights to use the name or change their name, but it was undisputed that the band's success was intertwined with its name.  Alternatively, if the Court did not grant an injunction defendants would continue performing using the name and would likely continue to grow in popularity and earn additional income, which would be lost to Aguila Records.  But that harm would not be irreparable because it could be repaid financially. 

                                               Conclusion

While Aguila Records did not demonstrate a strong likelihood of success, it did demonstrate a "greater than negligible chance of winning."  The Court, therefore, enjoined defendants from using the marks on compact disks, other recording media and merchandise such as t-shirts and hats, all uses for which Aguila Records had trademark registrations.  But the Court did not enjoin the use of the marks for live performances because Aguila Records did not have registered marks for live performances and the balance of harms tipped in defendants' favor for live performances.

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Minemyer v. B-Roc Reps., Inc., No. 07 C 1763, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2009), (Cole, Mag. J.). 

Judge Cole granted defendants' motion for summary judgment regarding plaintiff's Lanham Act trade dress and related state law claims. Plaintiff alleged that defendants infringed his trade dress in certain plastic pipe couplers. The trade dress consisted of the coupler's length, diameter, internal lead-in taper, flutes, arrows, the solid reinforced area between the flutes and end taper, and the base coloring of the material. But the Court held that plaintiff admitted that each element of his alleged trade dress was functional. Of particular note, the coupler's color was dictated by the parties' customers. And the flutes were the subject of a utility patent held by plaintiff. The fact that the flutes could have been designed using another shape did not matter. The Court held that once an element is functional, you need not consider whether there are other ways to obtain the function. 

Although the case was resolved on functionality grounds, the Court also considered plaintiff's secondary meaning arguments. But plaintiff provided no direct evidence of secondary meaning. Instead of survey evidence or consumer testimony, plaintiff relied upon direct copying. But event assuming defendants copied plaintiff's coupler, that alone did not create secondary meaning. Plaintiff also needed to show that defendants intended to steal plaintiff's goodwill. No such evidence was offered.

The Court also held that there was not a likelihood of confusion. Defendants printed their names on their products. And the parties' customers were very sophisticated purchasers and were unlikely to be confused. The customers competitively bid its purchases of the couplers, so purchasing decisions were made directly with the parties, not by looking at the products in bins side-by-side at a hardware store.

Finally, the Court held that plaintiff's state law Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim were coterminous with the Lanham Act claim. The Court, therefore also granted summary judgment as to the state law claims.

* Click here fore more on this case in the Blog's archives.

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Frayne v. Chicago 2016, No. 08 C 5290, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Oct. 2, 2009) (Kennelly, J.). 

Judge Kennelly denied defendants Chicago 2016's and the United States Olympic Committee's ("USOC") motion for summary judgment regarding its Stevens Act and Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act ("ACPA") claims regarding plaintiff's www.chicago2016.com website. And the Court granted defendants summary judgment as to plaintiff's federal and state constitutional claims, and plaintiff's laches defense. Plaintiff registered the Chicago2016.com domain in 2004, and after the sale, the domain registrar maintained a parking page on the site which included advertising links. Revenues for the links went to the registrar, not plaintiff.

Stevens Act*

The Court held that the parking page was commercial. But there was a question of fact as to whether plaintiff "used" the trademark, in this case the domain, for commercial purposes as required by the Stevens Act. Plaintiff did not receive revenues from the parking page and it was even unclear whether plaintiff knew of the parking page or consented to the registrar's use of the parking page.

The Court also analyzed whether Chicago 2016 was a mark that fell within the Stevens Act. While city-plus-Olympic-year combinations were not automatically protectable marks within the scope of the Stevens Act, certain city-plus-Olympic-year combinations can acquire an association with the USOC and the Olympics. Chicago 2016 likely gained that association by April 2007 when the USOC picked Chicago as a 2016 Olympic candidate. But the parties did not brief the issue of when the association occurred, so the determination required further proceedings.

ACPA

The ACPA claim was not ripe for summary judgment because it depended upon a determination that Chicago 2016 was a protected mark pursuant to the Stevens Act which the Court had held required further proceedings. Additionally, there was a question of fact as to whether plaintiff had a bad faith intent to profit from the Chicago 2016 mark.

Laches

The Court granted defendants summary judgment on plaintiff's laches claim. Plaintiff argued that if he had been aware of defendants' intent to pursue this suit, he would have challenged defendants' Chicago 2016 mark in the Patent & Trademark Office. But defendants second Chicago 2016 mark application was published concurrently with their first threat to take action against plaintiff. Plaintiff did not, however, challenge that application. No reasonable fact-finder could find plaintiff was prejudiced in those circumstances.

Constitutional Claims

The Court granted defendants summary judgment as to plaintiff's constitutional claims based upon the Noer-Pennington doctrine. Noer-Pennington protects a party's right to file a lawsuit so long as the suit is not a sham. Defendants' claims regarding their Chicago 2016 mark were backed by precedent. Defendants cited several cases in which WIPO ruled for Olympic organizations regarding city-plus-Olympic-year combination marks. 

* For more on the Steven Act, which grants the USOC absolute rights in certain Olympics-related trademarks click here. 

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Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Elston Self Serv. Wholesale Grocs., Inc., No. 03 C 4753, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jun. 9, 2009) (Gottschall, J.).

Judge Gottschall granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion for summary judgment regarding plaintiff’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act and fraud* claims regarding sales of recirculated Newport cigarettes. Plaintiff claimed that defendants purchased cigarettes from retailers to take advantage of plaintiff’s discount program and resold those recirculated cigarettes to other entities, sometimes recurring a second relate for those purchases. Plaintiff further alleged that some of the recirculated cigarettes were old and stale. But the Court held that the accrued recirculation and sale of record that cigarettes could not make a Deceptive Practices Act claim because of the likelihood of confusion requirement. Like in the trademark law, likelihood of confusion as to origin. But plaintiff did not allege that there was any common confusion regarding that plaintiff was the source of the cigarettes. Confusion as to whether the cigarettes were first or second hand was irrelevant.

* This post does not address the fraud claims.

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Mindy's Restaurant, Inc. v. Watters, No. 08 C 5448, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jun. 9, 2009) (Der-Yeghiayan).

Judge Der-Yeghiayan granted defendants' Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction even though plaintiff brought a federal Lanham Act trademark infringement claim.  While Lanham Act claims are generally considered federal questions creating subject matter jurisdiction, plaintiffs claims were in essence breach of contract claims.  Plaintiff was a franchisor of Mindy's Restaurants.  Defendants were franchisees, until they allegedly stopped making required franchise payments and plaintiff terminated the franchise agreement.  While plaintiff's claims were for use of plaintiff's trademarks when defendants allegedly continued operating their restaurant after the franchise agreement was canceled.  As a result, the Court held that the parties dispute and plaintiff's claims sounded in contract, not the Lanham Act.  The reason the trademarks were allegedly infringed was the termination of the franchise agreement.

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WMH Tool Group, Inc. v. Woodstock Int'l, Inc., No. 07 C 3885, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Apr. 8, 2009) (Darrah, J.).

Judge Darrah granted in part defendants' motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff's Lanham Act claims related to plaintiff's trademark for white exteriors applied to woodworking and metalworking machines.  Defendants sought summary judgment based upon the fact that their products were green and tan, and that plaintiff's counsel admitted that green and tan machines did not infringe plaintiff's trademark white color.  But the Court held that summary judgment was not appropriate even if plaintiff admitted the green and tan products did not infringe because the parties disputed which of the products were green and tan and whether defendants also sold green and white products.  Additionally, the Court held that there was a question of fact as to whether the alleged green and white products infringed plaintiff's trademarks.  The Court did, however, grant summary judgment as to plaintiff's dilution claim because plaintiff did not respond to the summary judgment arguments.

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Tomorrow, Saturday, June 13 at 12:01 a.m., Facebook begins allowing users to create personalized URLS for Facebook pages.  A user's Facebook page has previously been designated by a seemingly random number assigned for each user.  But starting just after midnight tonight, users will be able to register more meaningful URLs, such as facebook.com/RDavidDonoghue.  Facebook users are very excited about this and it could be good for business that utilize Facebook, but it also poses a threat for trademark holders.  Facebook users could accidentally or intentionally register site names including your trademarks or terms confusingly similar to them.  To Facebook's credit, they have provided a mechanism to help prevent trademark infringement.  You can click here for an online Facebook form which asks for your name, contact email, company, exact trademark and trademark registration number.  It is unclear whether Facebook will act on common law trademarks that have not been registered.  Additionally, you will need to resubmit the form separately for each trademark you wish to identify to Facebook.  I would encourage trademark owners to register their marks with Facebook and to strongly consider securing personalized Facebook pages with their trademarks to further protect themselves, if you use Facebook with your business or think that someone else might.

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SPSS Inc. v. Nie, No. 08 C 66, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Apr. 2, 2009) (Darrah, J.).

Judge Darrah denied the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment.  Plaintiff SPSS sought a declaratory judgment that defendants, SPSS's founders and former officers, were estopped from asserting any rights pursuant to the parties' Trademark Agreement.  Defendants countersued for trademark infringement.  While still officers of SPSS, defendants entered a Trademark Agreement with SPSS by which defendants gave SPSS rights to use the SPSS trademark.  Defendants argue that SPSS's continued use of the SPSS mark is an infringement.  SPSS argued that it owns the mark and, as proof, cited various documents signed by a defendant when SPSS went public.  In those documents, defendants allegedly made assurances that SPSS owned its trademarks and otherwise failed to disclose the Trademark Agreement. 

The Court denied plaintiff's summary judgment motion because the parties disputed defendant's state of mind when the documents at issue were signed.  Because  estoppel required a finding as to defendant's intent when he signed the documents, summary judgment was not appropriate.  Similarly, the Court denied the parties' cross-motions regarding SPSS's trademark infringement claim.  There were factual disputes regarding defendant's conduct during the public offering, which party made the first sale using the SPSS mark, and SPSS's knowledge of the Trademark Agreement.

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Americash Loans, LLC v. AO Ventures, LLC, No. 08 C 5147 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2009) (Der-Yeghiayan, J.).

Judge Der-Yeghiayan denied defendant AO Ventures (“AOV”) motion to dismiss plaintiff Americash Loans' Lanham Act and related state law claims. Americash Loans alleged that AOV infringed Americash Loans' “Americash Loans” mark by advertising confusingly similar mark on AOV's website. First, the Court held that Americash Loans' prior settlement of a trademark dispute with a third party did not preclude this suit. The prior suit involved a different mark, “Americash,” and Americash Loans did not allege that AOV was acting as an agent of the third party involved in the earlier settlement when it allegedly used the infringing marks.

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Geisha LLC d/b/a Japonais v. Tuccillo, No. 05 C 5529, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2009) (Pallmeyer, J.).*

Judge Pallmeyer denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment regarding its Lanham Act false designation claim. Plaintiff began using the Japonais mark in conjunction with its Chicago area European/Japanese fusion restaurant in 2003. Plaintiff later opened New York and Las Vegas locations. But plaintiff did not register the Japonais mark. In 2004, defendant filed an intent to use trademark application for the Japonais mark to be used in connection with restaurants. In order to receive the registration, defendant was required to use the mark in commerce. Once that use occurred and was properly documented, defendant's mark would have a 2004 constructive use date, as opposed to the later date of actual first use. Defendant has filed a verified statement of use, so the parties agree that defendant's registration is a formality. Plaintiff, however, believed that it would succeed in a cancellation proceeding against the mark.

The Court noted that as the senior user, plaintiff had a right to use the mark in the Chicago area. But there was a question of fact as to whether plaintiff's later opened New York restaurant had sufficiently penetrated the New York market before defendant's 2004 constructive use date. Furthermore, to the extent plaintiff had actual notice of defendant's application, any rights plaintiff might have had in New York would not be enforceable against defendant. Furthermore, the Court noted that granting plaintiff's motion could result in the bizarre outcome of defendant being liable for violating plaintiff's trademark today, but tomorrow, after issuance of defendant's mark, defendant may be able to assert the trademark against plaintiff.

* For more on this case, click here to read the Blog's archives about the case or here for a Las Vegas Trademark Attorney post about the case.

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DeVry Inc. v. Univ. of Medicine & Health Sciences -- St. Kitts, No. 08 C 3280, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Feb. 3, 2009) (Coar, J.).

Judge Coar denied defendant's Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for trademark infringement or Lanham Act false designation and false representation. Plaintiffs own and operate the Ross University School of Medicine and are the owners of ROSS and ROSS UNIVERSITY marks.  Defendant marketed its medical school as "Founded by Dr. Robert Ross" and used at least one domain for email addresses including the word "ross." Defendant is not associated with or sponsored by plaintiffs' Ross University.

Defendant argued that its representations that its institution was founded by Dr. Ross and that Dr. Ross founded Ross University were fair uses constituting an impenetrable defense requiring dismissal. The Court, however, held that the defenses did not warrant dismissal for several reasons:

• Whether the use of Dr. Ross's name constituted the use of a mark or simply his name was a question of fact not appropriate for a decision on the pleadings;
   
• While the Seventh Circuit has not explicitly adopted a normative fair use defense, it was not clear that defendant's use of Dr. Ross's name met the criteria for the defense; 
   
• There was a question of fact as to whether defendant's repeated use of the name was more than reasonably necessary to identify the product; and
   
• There was a question of fact as to whether the use of the Ross name implied sponsorship or endorsement.

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Frayne v. Chicago 2016, No. 08 C 5290, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 2009) (Kennelly, J.).

Judge Kennelly granted defendants' motion to dismiss as to plaintiff's Lanham Act Section 114(2)(D) reverse domain name highjacking and attempted highjacking claims.*  Plaintiff registered Chicago2016.com in 2004 at which time plaintiff was not aware that Chicago intended to bid for the 2016 Olympics.  In 2007, plaintiff was contacted by a representative of Chicago 2016 and asked whether plaintiff would entertain offers for the website.  Plaintiff refused and defendants eventually initiated proceedings before the World Intellectual Property Organization alleging that plaintiff registered the domain name in bad faith and in violation of the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute Resolution Policy ("UDRP").  Plaintiff's domain name, however, was never suspended, disabled or transferred to defendants.

Plaintiff conceded that highjacking claim should be dismissed because the domain name had not been suspended, disabled or transferred.  And the Court held that the Lanham Act did not create a cause of action for attempted highjacking.  The text of the statute specifically required that the domain name actually be suspended, disabled or transferred.

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C.S.B. Commodities, Inc. v. Urban Trend (HK) Ltd., No. 08 C 1548, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jan. 7, 2009) (Dow, J.).

Judge Dow granted corporate defendant Urban Trend's (“Urban Trend”) and denied the individual defendant's respective Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) motions to dismiss plaintiff's Lanham Act unfair competition and related state law claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff served the individual defendant, who was Urban Trend's president, while he was representing Urban Trend at a trade show in Illinois. The Court held that personal service created jurisdiction over the individual defendant, even though the Court may not have had jurisdiction but for personal service. And while the individual defendant was in Illinois as part of his job responsibilities representing Urban Trend at the trade show, the Fiduciary Shield Doctrine did not protect him. As Urban Trend's president, the individual defendant would have gained independent economic benefit from selling Urban Trend's products at the trade show. And as president, the individual defendant had at least some control over whether to sell or promote products in Illinois.

The Court, however, held that personal service upon Urban Trend's president was not sufficient to create jurisdiction over Urban Trend. And tradeshow attendance alone was not sufficient to create specific jurisdiction over Urban Trend. There was no evidence that Urban Trend's tradeshow efforts were particularly focused on Illinois sales, or that Urban Trend completed any sales.

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Publications Int'l. Ltd. v. LeapFrog Enters., Inc., No. 08 C 2800, Slip Op. (Dec. 4, 2008) (Guzmán, J.).

Judge Guzmán granted declaratory judgment defendant LeapFrog's Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss plaintiff Publication International's (“PIL”) claim for declaratory relief regarding the POINGO mark used in association with a pen-like electronic reading device. PIL alleged, and LeapFrog admitted, that LeapFrog used the POINGO mark for a pen reader system in one presentation to a retailer, but never marketed or sold a pen reader using the name and never sought to register the mark with the PTO. PIL also alleged that LeapFrog sent PIL cease and desist letters warning that LeapFrog's earlier use of the POINGO mark gave it priority in the mark. The Court held that PIL had not met its burden because it had not alleged that LeapFrog had used the mark on products in commerce or that LeapFrog had sufficient intent to use the mark in commerce. Without a use in commerce or an intent to use, the immediacy required for a declaratory judgment action was not present.

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Welsh v. Big Ten Conf., Inc., No. 08 C 1342, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 2008) (Gottschall, J.).

Judge Gottschall granted defendant the Big Ten Conference's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, but denied the Big Ten's motion for its attorney's fees. Plaintiff claimed that it presented the Big Ten with a trade secret business plan for a Big Ten television network named the "Big Ten Network." The Big Ten allegedly told plaintiff it was not interested and then several years later started the Big Ten Network using plaintiff's trade secrets, including the Big Ten Network name. Plaintiff claimed that the Big Ten violated § 38 of the Lanham Act by filing a false declaration with the PTO stating that the Big Ten had the sole right to use the Big Ten Network mark in commerce. Plaintiff argued that the Big Ten should have disclosed plaintiff's trade secret rights in the mark. But the Court held that even if plaintiff could establish trade secret rights, the Seventh Circuit had held that it was "far from clear" whether trade secret claims fall within the scope of § 38, which is directed to statements about ownership, as opposed to statements about use in commerce. Additionally, the Court held that plaintiff's alleged development of the name did not necessarily grant plaintiff any rights in the trademark. Trademark rights are granted based upon use, not discovery or invention. And inclusion in a business plan is not a "use in commerce." Having dismissed plaintiff's federal claim and noting that the parties were not diverse, the Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims and dismissed the case.

The Court denied the Big Ten's request for its fees. First, the case was resolved on a motion to dismiss filed two months after the complaint and while plaintiff's arguments lost, the theory had not been "squarely rejected by the Seventh Circuit." As such, plaintiff's suit could not be deemed "oppressive" as is required for an award of fees.

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Foboha GMBH v. Gram Tech., Inc., No. 08 C 969, 2008 WL 4619795 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 2008) (Grady, J.).

Judge Grady denied defendants' (collectively “Gram”) Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiffs' (collectively “Foboha”) Lanham Act unfair competition and related state law claims. Foboha alleged that Gram made false and misleading statements about Gram's patent and about Foboha's alleged infringement of the patent. In particular, Gram allegedly claimed that its technology was patented while its application was still being processed and that Gram made false statements about the status of the reexamination filed by Foboha. The Court held that Foboha's claims were governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)'s heightened pleading requirements because they were based upon Gram's allegedly false and misleading statements. And at least for the statements allegedly made about the patent during reexam, Foboha met the heightened standard by explaining what statements were made, when and where they were made, who made them and how they were made.

The Court did, however, hold that Gram's direct communications, in person or in letters to individuals, did not constitute commercial advertising and, therefore, did not constitute Lanham Act unfair competition. But Gram's statements on its website and press releases could constitute commercial advertising.

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Vito & Nick’s, Inc. v. Barraco., No. 05 C 2764, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Oct. 10, 2008) (Nolan, Mag. J.)

Judge Nolan granted defendants’ motion for litigation costs, but denied defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees. Plaintiff sued defendants alleging trademark infringement, Lanham Act unfair competition, Illinois Deceptive Trade Practices and related state law claims based upon a dispute over sibling’s competing use of the name of a family business. After initiation of the suit, the parties engaged in extensive settlement negotiations resulting in a framework for settlement. But plaintiff was unable to come up with funds necessary for the settlement and then lost its counsel. Because plaintiff was unable to find replacement counsel, and because corporations cannot appear pro se, plaintiff’s case was eventually dismissed for want of prosecution.

The Court held that plaintiff’s conduct resulting in dismissal did not constitute bad faith warranting an award for attorney’s fees. Plaintiff actively participated in the case and settlement negotiations, until it was unable to come up with the funds required, and lost its counsel. Furthermore, the Court had not had occasion to review the viability of plaintiff’s claim and, therefore, a bad faith finding could not be based upon the viability of the claims.

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Aller-Caire, Inc. v. Am. Textile Co., No. 07 C 4086, 2008 WL 4066976 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 2008) (Andersen, J.)

Judge Andersen granted in part and denied in part defendant American Textile Co.’s (“ATC”) Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiff Aller-Caire’s trademark infringement case. Aller-Caire allegedly began using its ALLER-CAIRE mark in 1990, but never registered it.  ATC registered its ALLER CARE mark in 2006. Both use the marks to market, at least, allergy sensitive pillow and mattress encasements. The Court dismissed Aller-Caire’s trademark count with leave to refile because it did not expressly allege a likelihood of confusion. It was not sufficient that the complaint alleged facts sufficient to infer confusion, plaintiff must plead confusion. The Court did not dismiss Aller-Caire’s tortious interference claim. Aller-Caire’s allegations would have been insufficient pursuant to Illinois law because Aller-Caire did not plead that ATC interfered with Aller-Caire’s business expectancy with a specific third party. But federal pleading requirements governed, and did not require identification of an entity.

Finally, a competitor’s privilege did not defeat Aller-Caire’s tortious interference claim. Competition cannot be tortious interference unless the competition employs wrongful means. Aller-Caire’s allegation that ATC’s alleged trademark infringement was done with malice constituted wrongful means.

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Jones Day v. BlockShopper.com, No. 08 C 4572 (N.D. Ill.) (Darrah, J.).

As I have described in earlier posts (click here, here and here) plaintiff Jones Day sued defendants, BlockShopper LLC and two individuals associated with the website (collectively "Blockshopper"), for allegedly using Jones Day’s service marks and linking to its website in at least two articles discussing Chicago real estate transactions of Jones Day associates. Jones Day claims service mark infringement, Lanham Act false designation of origin, Lanham Act dilution, and state law deceptive trade practices and unfair competition. Plaintiff also moved for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”).  The parties stipulated to a TRO which the Court entered ordering defendants not to:  1) use Jones Day's service mark; 2) use any content from or link to Jones Day's website; or reference Jones Day in Blockshopper headlines. 

Last Friday, Blockshopper filed a motion to dismiss.  And several public interest groups -- the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Public Knowledge and the Citizen Media Law Project -- has sought leave to file this amicus brief supporting Blockshopper's motion to dismiss.  Jones Day opposed the motion, arguing that the three groups and their arguments do not meet any of the Seventh Circuit's standards for amicus filings.  I will keep you posted about the case generally and as to  whether the Court enters the amicus brief.

And the case continues to draw fairly strong legal blog interest:

• The Prior Art
   
• Real Lawyers Have Blogs (LexBlog's Kevin O'Keefe)
   
• Public Citizen at its Consumer Law & Policy blog (acknowledging that he was incorrect as to the timing of an alleged quote from Judge Darrah, which he also did in a comment to my post discussing the alleged quote)
   
• Las Vegas Trademark Attorney
   
• Citizen Vox
   
• Ars Technica (and here, discussing the amicus brief)

The legal blog commentary continues to run heavily against Jones Day and in favor of Blockshopper.

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Blawg Review #178 is up at Peter Black's Freedom to Differ -- click here to read it.  Black also cross-posted each link in this week's Review on Twitter.  I admit that I have not grasped the full power of Twitter, but I am working on it.  And I do grasp the power of Black's Review.  It is well done and contains lots of interesting links.

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Jones Day v. BlockShopper.com, No. 08 C 4572 (N.D. Ill.) (Darrah, J.).

• Consumer Law & Policy Blog -- considering the merits of the claims.
   
• [UPDATE]:  Las Vegas Trademark Attorney -- pointing out that individuals could avoid being the subject of a Blockshopper story by purchasing through a trust.
   
• Legal Blog Watch -- questioning the PR ramifications of the suit.
   
• [UPDATE]:  MediaPost -- noting that Blockshopper's Florida stories also run in the South Florida Sun-Sentinel based on a deal with the Tribune company.
   
• Techdirt

While I generally save my commentary for the opinions, there is one point that needs to be made.  Many bloggers are using an alleged quote from Judge Darrah (I did not hear it and have not seen a transcript of the hearing, so cannot confirm it) warning Blockshopper that defending the suit would be very expensive.  Unless the comment was made in a hostile or aggressive manner, which I very much doubt and which has not been suggested in the posts I have seen, that is simply a statement of legal reality.  Defending federal intellectual property cases has become expensive, very expensive.  And defense costs are a factor in the calculus of every defendant's business decisions about  a law suit.

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MPC Containment Sys., Ltd. v. Moreland, No. 05 C 6973, 2008 WL 2875007 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 23, 2008) (Aspen, Sen. J.).*

Judge Aspen granted in part and denied in part defendants’ summary judgment motion regarding plaintiffs’ copyright, Lanham Act, trade secret and related state law claims.** Plaintiffs and defendants both design, manufacture and sell flexible fuel storage tanks. Corporate defendant MIL was formed by at least individual defendants John and Lawrence, both of whom previously worked for plaintiffs in various capacities and later worked for MIL in direct competition with plaintiffs over, at least, a United States Air Force contract.

Trade Secret Misappropriation

The Court held that plaintiffs’ pricing and warranty provisions were not trade secrets and, therefore, granted summary judgment in defendants’ favor. But the Court held that there was a question of fact as to whether plaintiffs’ tank designs were trade secrets. Additionally, the Court noted that the question of whether sufficient efforts were used to maintain secrecy of the alleged trade secrets was a question of fact for jurors in all, but the most extreme cases. Because plaintiffs identified several precautions taken to protect their trade secrets, the Court denied summary judgment. The fact that tank designs were provided to plaintiffs’ independent contractors without confidentiality did not warrant summary judgment for defendants. There are circumstances where independent contractors have independent, professional duties of confidentiality regardless of whether agreements were signed.

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Jones Day v. BlockShopper.com, No. 08 C 4572, Order (N.D. Ill. Aug. 18, 2008) (Darrah, J.).*

Judge Darrah entered the parties stipulated temporary restraining order ("TRO").  Plaintiff Jones Day sued defendants, BlockShopper.com and two individuals allegedly associated with the website, for allegedly using plaintiff’s service marks and linking to plaintiff’s website in at least two articles that discuss Chicago real estate transactions of plaintiff’s associates. Plaintiff claimed service mark infringement, Lanham Act false designation of origin, Lanham Act dilution, and state law deceptive trade practices and unfair competition and sought a TRO – click here for the Blog's earlier post on the case.

The Court entered the parties' stipulated TRO, ordering defendants not to:

1. Use reproductions or imitations of plaintiff's service mark;
    
2. Use any content from or link to plaintiff's website; or
    
3. reference plaintiff in its headlines.

Defendants were also ordered to remove any website content already on the site that would violate the TRO if written after its entry. 

As you would expect, other blogs and mainstream media have noticed the case.  At Legal Blog Watch, Robert J. Ambrogi just wrote about the dispute (click here), noting my post and discussing an article by Lynne Marek that will appear in next week's National Law Journal -- click here (subscription required).  According to the NLJ story, plaintiff asked only $10,000 to settle the case, but defendants rejected the offer, explaining:

Bending to the law firm's demands to stop coverage of the firm's lawyers would strangle the company's business model of using public records and publicly available Internet information, he said. Blockshopper, founded by former newspaper industry professionals, considers itself a next generation media outlet entitled to First Amendment protections just like any other news organization, he said.

Ambrogi sums up the issue at the heart of the dispute well:

In this age of electronically enhanced transparency, this whole dust-up reflects a sentiment I encounter time and again: "We like our public records to be public -- just not too public.

*  Click here for the Order.

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Jones Day v. BlockShopper.com, No. 08 C 4572 (N.D. Ill.) (Darrah, J.).

Plaintiff Jones Day sued defendants, BlockShopper.com and two individuals allegedly associated with the website, for allegedly using plaintiff’s service marks and linking to plaintiff’s website in at least two articles that allegedly discuss Chicago real estate transactions of plaintiff’s associates. Plaintiff claims service mark infringement, Lanham Act false designation of origin, Lanham Act dilution, and state law deceptive trade practices and unfair competition – click here for the complaint. Plaintiff also moved for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) – click here for the TRO motion. In addition to the use of its service marks, plaintiff alleged that defendants used pictures of plaintiff’s associates that appear to be identical to pictures on plaintiff’s website.

A January 2007 Chicago Tribune article described defendants’ website as one that provides details surrounding Chicago-area real estate transactions using a Cook County list of home sales and internet research, noting that subjects of some posts do not like the stories:

But BlockShopper goes beyond the basic who-what-and-how-much, revealing tantalizing tidbits such as what the parties do for a living and what the sellers originally paid for the property, plus satellite maps and even photos of the property and the parties.

The TRO hearing was noticed for Tuesday, August 19. I will keep you updated as decisions are issued.

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Proskauer Rose's just launched New Media & Technology  Law Blog* has a very interesting post by Jeff Neuburger on the upcoming scarcity of IP addresses (the numeric identifier required for each unique location on the internet) -- click here to read the post.  The current IP address protocol, IPv4, is a 32-bit scheme that provides about 4.3B addresses.  That is an astounding number, but according to some reports we could use all of those addresses as early as 2010 or 2011.  The most likely solution to the problem is a switch to the 128-bit scheme that is known as IPv6.  But doing that will come at the cost of switching out hardware not designed for IPv6 and retraining network operators. 

You may be wondering whether there is a legal take away from this, and here it is.  Neuburger's post discusses the US government's efforts to prepare for the change over by beginning to require new equipment to be IPv6 compliant.  Of course, this is just as much an issue for corporations as it is for governments.  And if we are running out of IPv4 addresses and if there is a switch to IPv6, we could see a large number of technology contract disputes and law suits over whether agreements were breached by failing to provide IPv6 ready hardware.  But those suits will be more effective if you add a IPv6 representation and warranty to your new agreements, as Neuburger explains:

If you are an attorney involved in technology transactions, at a minimum, become IPv6 aware. You might want to query your clients on the need for representations and warranties on IPv6 capability in technology transactions. And keep your eye on the horizon for legal developments related to IPv6. If the alarmists are right and scarcity of addresses is truly looming, we may see legal disputes over issues such as hoarding of IP addresses, and efforts to create a market for IP addresses, the allocation of which is currently controlled by non-profit corporations.

* The New Media & Technology  Law Blog, another LexBlog site, is off to a great start and is worth a spot in your RSS feed.  In particular, I was very impressed with the quality of the writing.

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Nordstrom Consulting, Inc. v. M&S Techs., Inc., No. 06 C 3234, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2008) (Darrah, J.).*

Judge Darrah granted in part and denied in part the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff and counter-defendant (collectively "NCI") developed visual eye chart software that defendants and counter-plaintiffs (collective "M&S") incorporated into their visual acuity system which was sold to ophthalmalic distributors and end users. For a period of time, the parties worked together, selling and servicing product and sharing office space. But eventually the relationship broke down and NCI began selling a competing system. The parties charged each other with various IP claims and related state law claims. Each of the IP-related claims is addressed below.

Copyright Infringement

The Court held that NCI was the sole owner of the copyright and that its principal Nordstrom was the sole author of the copyrighted software. M&S argued that its principal Marino contributed to the software. But the Court held that Nordstrom wrote the software and Marino only offered direction and ideas.

The Court granted M&S summary judgment for all copyrighted software sales during the terms of the parties' agreements, but not as to sales outside of the agreement dates. And the Court granted summary judgment of non-infringement as to M&S's new software package "Sports Vision Testing" ("SVT"). NCI argued that SVT was an infringing derivative work. But NSI failed to produce evidence or expert testimony refuting M&S's evidence that it created its SVT software independent of NCI's software using clean room procedures.

Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA")

NCI alleged that M&S violated the DMCA by circumventing protections on a computer containing the software code in order to aid an NCI licensee of the code. Because the code was accessed to aid a licensee, NCI could not show that the password had been bypassed for the purpose of infringing NCI's copyright. The Court, therefore, granted summary judgment for M&S. 

The Court also denied summary judgment as to M&S's claim that NCI violated the DMCA by accessing a portion of M&S's computer system for which NCI lacked authorization and passwords. Summary judgment was not appropriate because the parties disputed whether NCI accessed the computers and whether the accessed material was copyrighted.

Lanham Act

The Court denied M&S summary judgment on NCI's Lanham Act false advertising claim and its related state law claims. M&S argued that it had not made any statements likely to cause customer confusion. But NCI countered that M&S stated in advertising that it had used the same system for five years. NCI argued that the statement must be false because M&S switched to its new SVT software during that time. Because of these disputed facts, summary judgment was not appropriate.

Illinois Trade Secret Act

The parties agreed that prior to terminating their relationship, NCI took various information from M&S's offices and computers. But the parties disagreed as to whether M&S took reasonable measures to protect the information's confidentiality. The parties agreed that M&S password protected the information. But NCI argued passwords alone were not enough and suggested other protections that allegedly could and should have been employed. The Court held that password protection alone was not per se insufficient. But the Court required more information regarding M&S's actions and the feasibility of alternative protections before it could rule on summary judgment.

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Allen Bros., Inv. v. AB Foods LLC, No. 06 C 1269, 2008 WL 345600 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 6, 2008) (Andersen, J.).

Judge Andersen granted defendant AB Foods summary judgment of likelihood of confusion and dismissed plaintiff Allen Brothers’ Lanham Act claim and related state law trademark infringement claim. Allen Brothers, a seller of gourmet meats, argued that AB Foods infringed its AB trademark by using it to sell AB Foods’ gourmet meats. The Court held that this was the rare case that was so one-sided as to warrant summary judgment that there was no likelihood of confusion, even though AB Foods uses its AB mark in direct competition with Allen Brothers: 

• The marks were not similar because Allen Brothers always used its full name along with its AB mark;
  
• Allen Brothers’ customers are sophisticated meat purchasers, as evidenced by Allen Brothers’ high prices;
  
• The strength of Allen Brothers’ mark is in its full name, not just AB;
  
• Allen Brothers’ produced no evidence of actual confusion; and
  
• Allen Brothers produced no evidence that AB Foods intended to pass off its meats as Allen Brothers products.

The Court, therefore, granted AB Foods summary judgment and dismissed the case.

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Gabbanelli Accordions & Imports, L.L.C. v. Italo-Am. Accordion Mfg. Co. et al., No. 02 C 4048, 2008 WL 351860 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 2008) (Zagel, J.)*

Judge Zagel granted plaintiff summary judgment of trademark and trade dress infringement regarding plaintiff’s “wildly colorful” and “heavily ornamental” accordions. The Court awarded plaintiff approximately $500,000 in damages, attorneys fees and costs. Defendants – Italian entities that sold accordions in the United States – chose not to participate in the case. Instead, they filed an Italian case after this case was filed, but before defendants were served pursuant to the Hague Convention. The Court previously stayed a portion of the case pending the outcome of the Italian case, but noted that the stay may have been a mistake. Years after filing, the Italian case had not been resolved and defendants failed to participate in the U.S. proceeding based upon a belief that the Italian proceeding controlled. For example, defendants admitted personal jurisdiction when they failed to respond to jurisdictional Requests for Admission and instead of filing a motion to dismiss, defendants sent the Court an unsupported letter listing their complaints with the case and the Court’s jurisdiction over them. By failing to participate in discovery and not following the Court’s rules, defendants preempted whatever ability they might have had to make their case.

Practice tip: Participate and play by the rules. Even if you cannot or will not afford counsel, you must answer discovery, respond to motions and appear when required to. Failing to participate will not insulate you from judgment.

* Click here for more on this case in the Blog’s archives.

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Palantir.net, Inc. v. Palantir Techs., Inc., No. 07 C 4271, Min. Order (N.D. Ill. Nov. 27, 2007) (Guzman, J.).*

Judge Guzman granted defendant's motion to transfer this Lanham Act case to the Northern District of California ("N.D. Cal.") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a).  Defendant's principal place of business was in the N.D. Cal. and defendant had an earlier-filed case against plaintiff pending in the N.D. Cal.  The Court, therefore, held that the convenience of the parties and the witnesses, as well as the interests of justice, were best served by transferring the case to the N.D. Cal.

*  Click here for a copy of the case.

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Junction Solutions, LLC v. MBS Dev., Inc., No. 06 C 1632, 2007 WL 4234091 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 20, 2007) (Gottschall, J.).*

Judge Gottschall dismissed defendant’s Lanham Act false representation and Consumer Fraud Act claims.** Both claims were based on letters allegedly sent by plaintiff to a third party containing false statements about defendant. The Court dismissed the Lanham Act claim because the allegedly false statements were not made in plaintiff’s marketing materials and were not about defendant’s products. Similarly, a letter to one third party was not the general commercial communication required by the Consumer Fraud Act.

* Click here for more on this case in the Blog’s archives.

** The Court also considered other non-IP claims.

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On Sunday, the Chicago Tribune reported on the latest round of the Sugar v. Splenda fight (click here for the article).  An initial hearing was scheduled for yesterday in the Central District of California regarding the suit five U.S. sugar companies -- American Sugar Refining Inc., C&H Sugar Co. (owned by American Sugar), Imperial Sugar Co., Rio Grande Valley Sugar Growers Inc. and Western Sugar Cooperative (collectively "Sugar Companies") -- brought against Johnson & Johnson's McNeil Nutritionals ("McNeil") which makes Splenda.  Splenda is a sugar substitute which McNeil advertises with the tagline, "tastes like sugar."  The Sugar Companies alleged that the "tastes like sugar" advertising campaign was false advertising in violation of the Lanham Act.  And they further alleged that McNeil continued its advertisements despite knowledge that consumers were confused.  McNeil countered that consumers were not misled by its advertisements.

The parties have engaged in various out-of-court disputes as well as this action and the two cases already settled, one in France and one in the United States.  For example, the parties maintain opposing websites regarding Splenda:  McNeil's is www.splendatruth.com and the Sugar Companies maintain www.truthaboutsplenda.com. 

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WMH Tool Group, Inc. v. Woodstock Int’l, Inc., No. 07 C 3885, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 2007) (Darrah, J.).*

Judge Darrah denied defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiff WMH Tool Group’s (“WMH”) Lanham Act dilution claim and its related Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (“Consumer Fraud Act”) claim. WMH registered a trade dress for the color white on its woodworking and metal working products, sold under its JET brand. WMH alleged that its white trade dress was both famous and exclusively associated with WHM’s tools. WMH further alleged that defendant Woodstock International (“Woodstock”) diluted WMH’s trade dress by selling woodworking and metal working tools in WMH’s distinctive white color under Woodstock’s Shop Fox brand. Similarly, WMH alleged that defendant Grizzly Industrial (“Grizzly”) diluted WMH’s trade dress by selling woodworking and metal working tools in WMH’s distinctive white color under Grizzly’s Grizzly or Grizzly Industrial brands. 

Defendants argued that WMH did not state a claim for dilution because the complaint did not specify the date when WMH’s trade dress became famous and that defendants’ allegedly infringing sales began after that date. But the Court held that notice pleading did not require that WMH plead specific dates. It was enough that WMH pled that the trade dress had become famous and that defendants' infringement of the trade dress occurred after the fame was acquired.

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Mullen v. Society of Stage Directors & Choreographers, No. 06 C 6818, 2007 WL 2892654 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 30, 2007) (Coar, J.).

Judge Coar granted in part defendant United Scenic Artists’ (“USA”) Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment (“DJ”) claims and denied all defendants’ motions seeking dismissal of plaintiffs’ defamation claim. Plaintiffs are the various production heads of the Chicago production of the musical “Urinetown!” (“Chicago Production”). The Chicago Production was performed pursuant to a license from Blue Dog Entertainment, LLC. But despite that license, plaintiffs each received a cease and desist letter from counsel for defendants (the heads of production of the Broadway Urinetown! production (“Broadway Production”) and their unions USA and the Society of Stage Directors & Choreographers (“SSDC”). The letter warned that plaintiffs willfully copied copyrighted aspects of the Broadway Production and attempted to pass off the Chicago Production as the award-winning Broadway Production. Defendants demanded an accounting of revenues from the Chicago Production in order to calculate damages. Defendants also held a press conference during which they publicly stated that the plaintiffs “plagiarized” the Broadway Production. Plaintiffs responded by filing suit seeking declaratory judgments that the Chicago Production did not infringe any of plaintiffs’ copyrights and that it was not Lanham Act passing off. And based upon the press conference, plaintiffs included a defamation claim.

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Aguila Records, Inc. v. Federico, No. 07 C 3993, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Oct. 10, 2007) (Der-Yeghiayan, J.).

Judge Der-Yeghiayan denied defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiff’s Lanham Act, copyright infringement and breach of contract complaint. Plaintiff, a music management and recording agency, alleged that it entered into an oral agreement with individual defendant Sergio Federico (“Federico”), a musician, giving plaintiff exclusive rights to Federico’s and his musical group Alacranes Musical’s (“Alacranes”) recordings. Shortly after agreeing to a ten-year extension of the agreement, plaintiff alleged that Federico quit the Alacranes and joined defendant musical group Aliados de la Sierra (“Sierra”). Plaintiff claimed that defendants infringed its scorpion trademark by using scorpion logos in their promotional material. Plaintiff also alleged that defendants violated plaintiff's copyright in the song “Por Tu Amor” – click here to watch the Alacranes’ music video on YouTube – by performing the song without authorization. Defendants argued that plaintiff failed to state its claims because several of plaintiff’s allegations were false, unsupported or otherwise incorrect. But the Court held that plaintiff had sufficiently pled its claims and that a Rule 12(b)(6) motion was not the appropriate vehicle for evaluating the strength of the evidence.

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Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., No. 05 C 1171, 2007 WL 2875232 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 28, 2004) (Kendall, J.)

Judge Kendall granted plaintiff’s motion to dismiss its Lanham Act case with prejudice and awarded defendant its costs but not its fees pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). The Court held that attorney’s fees were not warranted because the case and its dismissal after substantial fact discovery were not exceptional. Plaintiff dismissed its case because of two significant events which plaintiff believed reduced its likelihood of success.

            First, during discovery Congress passed the Trademark Dilution Revision Act (“TDRA”)* which changed the definition of “famous” such that fame within a niche market was no longer sufficient for dilution. Plaintiff was not certain it could prove fame outside its market. Second, defendant changed the trade dress, and particularly the color scheme, of its accused SKIL line of power tools. Plaintiff believed that defendant’s new trade dress was less similar to plaintiff’s and, therefore, plaintiff’s case was more difficult to prove. The Court accepted plaintiff’s reasoning and, therefore, held that the case was not exceptional. The Court did, however, award costs, which plaintiff had originally agreed it would pay.

* For more on the TDRA, click here for the Seattle Trademark Lawyer’s coverage of the TDRA this week in honor of the TDRA’s first anniversary.

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Top Tobacco, L.P. v. North Atlantic Op. Co., No. 08 C 950, 2007 WL 2688452 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 6, 2007) (Kennelly, J.).

Judge Kennelly previously granted defendant summary judgment on all claims in this trademark infringement case regarding plaintiff’s “TOP and “Fresh-Top Canister” marks and awarded defendant’s attorneys’ fees pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).* The Court reduced the rates charged by defendant’s counsel Kirkland & Ellis’ summer associates from $185 to $125, more in line with paralegal rates. The Court acknowledged that Kirkland & Ellis’s attorneys showed skill “commensurate with its… high rates,”** but reduced Kirkland & Ellis’s rates because that skill did not result in the time savings (as required by the Seventh Circuit). Kirkland & Ellis billed roughly 30% more hours than plaintiff’s counsel. The Court, therefore, reduced Kirkland & Ellis’s rates to those charged by plaintiff’s counsel.

* Click here to read more about this case and related cases in the Blog’s archives.

** Having worked with Kirkland & Ellis’s lead counsel on this matter, Paul Garcia, I can confirm the Court’s praise.

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Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Montrose Wholesale Candies & Sundries, Inc., No. 03 C 5311 & 03 C 4844, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jul. 27, 2007) (Cole, J.).*

Judge Cole recommended granting plaintiff Lorillard Tobacco’s (“Lorillard”) petition for attorneys fees, but reduced the requested fees by about $80,000. Lorillard received a default judgment against defendants in 2006 and, as a result, brought this petition seeking its fees and costs. The Court’s opinion is an excellent guide for anyone preparing a fee petition. The Court refused to consider Lorillard’s costs because although Lorillard submitted a list of costs, it did not total the costs or discuss them in its petition and supporting declaration. Next, the Court accepted most of the costs for the four attorneys whose billing rates were explained in the supporting declaration, but denies any fees for the other nineteen people whose fees were not explained in the declaration. The Court notes that these nineteen people could be partners, associates or paralegals, but the Court cannot assess the reasonableness of their rates or billed activities without knowing their roles. And even for the four, the Court notes that it would have preferred some explanation of each attorney’s experience in past Lanham Act cases, in order to judge whether the attorneys’ billing rates were commensurate with their experience. 

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Central Mfg., Inc. v. George Brett, __ F.3d __, Slip Op. (7th Cir. Jul. 9, 2007).

The Seventh Circuit upheld Judge Coar's cancellation of plaintiff's "Stealth" mark for use with baseball bats.  The result is not that surprising in light of the fact that plaintiff had not been able to provide any evidence that it used the Stealth mark for baseball bats prior to defendant, and Hall of Famer, George Brett's and his company Brett Brothers Sports International's first sale of a Stealth bat in 1999 (plaintiff filed a mark application for Stealth in connection with baseball bats in 2001).  Additionally, according to the Seventh Circuit plaintiff is controlled by Leo Stoller who is, according to the Seventh Circuit, a "hyperactive trademark litigator."  The Seventh Circuit also discussed the frivolous nature of most of Stoller's cases:

In fact, Stoller's cases have generally proven so frivolous and wasteful of court resources that since this appeal was filed the Northern District of Illinois has enjoined him or any of his companies from filing any new civil action in the district's courts without first obtaining the court's permission.

 Stoller has appealed the Executive Committee's injunction, and the Executive Committee has already denied Stoller's first request to file a new case in the Northern District.

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Steiner Indus., Inc. v. Auburn Mfg., Inc., No. 07 C 668, 2007 WL 1834176 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 22, 2007) (Darrah, J.).

Judge Darrah denied declaratory judgment defendant Auburn Manufacturing’s (“Auburn”) motion to dismiss. Auburn argued that plaintiff’s (collectively “DJ Plaintiffs”) suit improperly anticipated Auburn’s complaint which alleged Lanham Act claims of false designation and false advertising, as well as related state law claims. Auburn filed its complaint in the District of Maine within a week of DJ Plaintiffs’ filing. Auburn alleged that DJ Plaintiffs’ use of “FM Approved” and “Made in the USA” in their catalogs and website advertising in connection with their welding blankets constituted false designation and false advertising. DJ Plaintiffs were aware of the allegations before they filed suit because, as part of an ongoing negotiation with plaintiffs, Auburn had provided plaintiffs a copy of its complaint. The Court acknowledged its discretion to dismiss the case in favor of Auburn’s later filed complaint, but did not dismiss the case. The two cases mirrored each other, so either could resolve the parties’ dispute. And because both cases were filed in federal courts, there was no concern that the DJ case would cause friction between federal and state courts. The deciding issue was whether the Maine Court could offer a full remedy. DJ Plaintiffs had a motion to transfer or dismiss pending before the Maine Court. In that motion, DJ Plaintiffs argued that the Maine Court lacked personal jurisdiction over two of the three DJ Plaintiffs – Steiner Industries, Inc. and Lab Safety Supply, Inc. DJ Plaintiffs, therefore, asked the Maine Court to transfer the case to the Northern District of Illinois or to dismiss the case.  The Court held that if the Maine Court transferred the case to the Northern District or dismissed Steiner and Lab Safety for lack of jurisdiction, those factors would weigh in favor of maintaining the DJ action. If, however, the Maine Court denied DJ Plaintiffs’ motion and held that it had jurisdiction over all DJ Plaintiffs, then the Main Court could more effectively decide the dispute than the Northern District. The Court, therefore, denied the motion to dismiss with leave to refile if the Maine Court finds it has jurisdiction over all DJ Plaintiffs and does not transfer the case to the Northern District.

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Hickory Farms, Inc. v. Snackmasters, Inc., No. 05 C 4541, 2007 WL 1576124 (N.D. Ill. May 29, 2007) (Kennelly, J.).

Judge Kennelly denied plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the Court’s decision that plaintiff’s "Beef Stick" and "Turkey Stick" marks were generic and the Court’s cancellation of the Beef Stick mark (you can read more about that opinion in the Blog’s archives). The Court denied plaintiff’s argument that it should be given more time, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) to conduct a survey to show that the marks are not generic. But the Court reasoned that plaintiff was free to conduct such a survey in the fourteen months of discovery leading up to defendant’s summary judgment motion. Furthermore, in its responsive briefing plaintiff specifically stated that plaintiff would “not seek to delay the briefing of this matter with its own survey at this time.” Instead, plaintiff suggested that it would conduct a survey if the Court denied defendant’s summary judgment motion. The Court held that after these statements, plaintiff’s current request to perform a survey was almost “frivolous.”

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Republic Tobacco L.P. v. North Atlantic Trading Co., No. 06 C 2738, 2007 WL 1424093 (N.D. Ill. May 10, 2007) (Der-Yeghiayan, J.).*

Judge Der-Yeghiayan granted plaintiff/counter-defendant Republic Tobacco’s (“Republic”) motion for summary judgment on defendant/counter-plaintiff North Atlantic Trading’s (“North Atlantic”) counterclaims and granted North Atlantic’s motion for summary judgment as to each of Republic’s claims. Republic brought claims against North Atlantic for Lanham Act false advertising, violation of the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“IDTPA”) and other state law claims, all arising out of an allegedly “false and misleading” presentation entitled “Cigarette Paper Review” (“CPR”) which North Atlantic allegedly gave to various Republic customers. The CPR allegedly criticized Republic, saying among other things that Republic’s cigarette rolling papers were the same as North Atlantic’s and that Republic’s Chairman Donald Levin had “lied” about the composition of Republic’s cigarette papers. North Atlantic filed counterclaims alleging Lanham Act false advertising, violation of the IDTPA and other state law claims, all arising out of Republic’s alleged sales of orange cigarette papers similar in color and size to North Atlantic’s orange Zig-Zag papers, for the purpose of confusing or deceiving consumers.

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Papa John's Int'l, Inc. v. Rezko, No. 04 C 3131, 2007 WL 1521472 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 2006) (Moran, J.).

Relying on its prior opinion, which included a detailed analysis of the Complaint and notice pleading standards (you can read discussion of that opinion in the Blog's archives), the Court denied defendants' various Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss plaintiff's trade secret and trademark infringement claims.  Defendants argued that plaintiff did not sufficiently which defendants were alleged to have performed the acts at issue.  But the Court reasoned that defendants had notice of plaintiff's claims and that notice is all the Federal Rules require.  The Court pointed out that it had "covered much of this same ground in much greater detail" in its prior opinion and cautioned that "this case will not go away for any defendant by a motion to dismiss . . . ."

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Days Inns Worldwide, Inc. v. Lincoln Park Hotels, Inc., No. 06 C 2960, 2007 WL 1455798 (N.D. Ill. May 16, 2007) (Der-Yeghiayan, J.)

Judge Der-Yeghiayan granted in part defendants' motion for reconsideration of the Court's award of plaintiff's attorneys fees' and costs for preparing summary judgment motions.  Plaintiff owns various marks relating to its Days Inn chain (the "Days Inn Marks").  Plaintiff licensed defendants Lincoln Park Hotels, Inc. and Richard Erlich (collectively "LPH") to use the Days Inn Marks in connection with the operation of a hotel in Chicago's Lincoln Park neighborhood.  In 2005, LPH sold the hotel to defendant Gold Coast Investors ("GCI") without informing plaintiff, in violation of the parties' license agreement.  GCI continued operating the hotel using the Days Inn Marks without licensing the rights to the marks from plaintiff.  As a result, plaintiff brought this suit against defendants alleging that, among other things, GCI infringed plaintiff's Days Inn Marks and LPH contributorily infringed plaintiff's Days Inn Marks by selling the hotel to GCI with the knowledge that GCI intended to continue using the Days Inn Marks and without informing plaintiff of the sale or removing the Days Inn Marks from the hotel, as required in the parties' license agreement.  In February, the Court granted plaintiff's summary judgment motion on twelve of fifteen counts and dismissed the remaining three counts as moot (you can find discussion of that opinion in the Blog's archives).  The Court also awarded plaintiff its attorneys' fees, approximately $150,000, for preparing its summary judgment motion.  Defendants moved the Court to reconsider, arguing that the Court should have required the parties to meet to resolve the attorneys fees dispute pursuant to  Local Rule 54.3 before ruling on the fees and that the Court should specifically apportion the fees between defendants.  The Court held that it was not required to follow the Local Rule 54.3 procedure in this case because defendants did not object to plaintiff's requests for fees made in its summary judgment briefing and because additional briefing required by the rule would not have benefited the Court because of its intimate knowledge of the case.  The Court did, however, apportion the fees that it was able to identify as only applicable to one group of defendants.  And the Court awarded an additional $35,000 of fees and costs that had not been presented in the initial motion.

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Gencor Pacific, Inc. v. Nature's Thyme, LLC, No. 07 C 167, 2007 WL 1225362 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2007) (Kocoras, J.).

Judge Kocoras granted defendants' Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2)&(3) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and venue and dismissed the case.  Plaintiff brought this Lanham Act false advertising and copyright infringement case alleging that defendants used portions of plaintiff's copyrighted studies regarding the efficacy of a weight-loss and appetite suppressant containing Caralluma Fimbriata extract.  Defendants, a business and two individuals employed by the business, were residents of New Jersey and had a single sale to an Illinois customer, valued at $300.  Defendants only other contacts with Illinois were an interactive website accessible in Illinois and the fact that one or two of defendants' general solicitations may have been sent to Illinois.  Defendants did not own property in Illinois and there was no proof that any defendants sent any of the allegedly infringing information to Illinois.  The Court held these contacts were not sufficient to create either general or specific jurisdiction.  The Court also held that venue was not proper in the Northern District of Illinois because defendants were not residents of Illinois and the acts at issue in the suit did not occur in the Northern District.

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Flentye v. Kathrein, __ F. Supp.2d __, 2007 WL 1175576 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 18, 2007) (Filip, J.).

Judge Filip denied defendants' motions to dismiss, except as to plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, because Illinois law does not allow punitives for IIED.  Plaintiffs (collectively "Flentye") promoted apartment rental services , including some properties owned by Flentye, using their family name, Flentye.  Defendants competed with Flentye promoting similar apartments, some of which were owned by defendant Kathrein LLC.  Flentye brought suit against defendants alleging violations of the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act ("ACPA"), Lanham Act unfair competition and related state law claims.  Flentye alleges that defendants lost a dispute before the UDRP and were forced to return certain domain names to Flentye, including timflentye.com, flentye.com and flentyeproperties.com.  Flentye alleged that defendants then registered new domain name timflentye-not.com and used it to direct traffic to defendants' competing websites.  Flentye also alleged that defendants improperly used the term "Flentye" in its meta tags (key words embedded into a site's source code to director search engines to the site) to direct users seeking information regarding Flentye to defendants sites. 

Defendants first argued that Flentye failed to plead its veil-piercing claims and that, therefore, corporate defendant Kathrein LLC should be dismissed because there were not sufficient allegations against it without a veil-piercing theory.  But the Court held that notice pleading was sufficient for a veil-piercing argument and that Flentye met the notice standard.  It was sufficient that Flentye pled that individual defendant Kathrein  created defendant Kathrein LLC "for the sole purpose of holding title to local real estate through which [Kathrein] operates Lee Street Management" and that in the caption Kathrein LLC was identified as "d/b/a Lee Street Management."  The Court noted that while these allegations might not be sufficient to prove that the veil was pierced, they were sufficient for Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) notice pleading.  The Court also noted that a claim of corporate veil-piercing did not require Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) heightened pleading.

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Top Tobacco, L.P. v. North Atl. Operating Co., No. 06 C 950, 2007 WL 118527 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 2007) (Kennelly, J.).

Judge Kennelly granted defendants' motion for attorneys' fees and granted in part their bill of costs.  In January, Judge the Court granted summary judgment for defendants on plaintiff's trademark, unfair competition and dilution claims (read more about that decision in the Blog's archives).  The Court ruled that no reasonable jury could find that consumers were confused between plaintiffs' TOP mark and defendants' "Fresh-Top Canister" mark.  Defendants then filed the instant bill of costs and motion for attorneys' fees arguing that the case was exceptional.  The Court held the case exceptional for three reasons.  First, the Court found that plaintiffs' infringement and dilution claims were "exceptionally weak" stating that "a simple look at the canisters as they appeared on store shelves shows the virtual impossibility that consumers would be confused . . . ."  The Court disregarded plaintiffs' purported evidence of actual confusion, which it presented for the first time in its response to the motion for attorneys' fees.  Second, plaintiffs argued before the PTO that other "top" marks in the tobacco classification were narrow.  But before the Court plaintiffs took the "diametrically opposite" position, arguing that their TOP mark should enjoy broad protection.  Third, the Court found defendant Top Tobacco's chairman Donald Levin's testimony that the two products looked identical because they were both cans of tobacco "absurd."  The Court analogized Levin's argument to the position that all the books on library shelves are identical because they are all books, without regard to their titles, jacket designs or colors.

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Chicago Tribune Co. v. Fox News Network LLC, No. 07 C 0865, 2007 WL 1052508 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 4, 2007) (Bucklo, J.).*

Judge Bucklo denied plaintiff Chicago Tribune's ("Tribune") motion for a preliminary injunction.  The Tribune sought an injunction which would have required defendant Fox News Networks ("Fox") to change the name of its "Redeye" late-night television news program based upon alleged infringement of the Tribune's Redeye mark related to its Redeye newspaper.  The Court held that the Tribune had only shown a "possibility" that it would prevail on the merits.  The Court found that the Tribune's Redeye mark was at least suggestive and, therefore a strong mark.  And the Court held that while the marks did not visually resemble each other, the Tribune proved a likelihood that the marks were aurally identical.  But the evidence did not favor the Tribune on either of the other two "most important" factors in deciding likelihood of confusion:  defendant's intent and actual confusion.  No evidence showed that Fox "passed off" its program as coming from the Tribune, so the issue of Fox's intent favored Fox.  As to actual confusion, the Tribune put forth a witness that testified that he suffered "momentary actual confusion" when he first learned of Fox's Redeye program, but that it was cleared up almost immediately by someone he was talking with about the program.  Additionally, the witness did not have cable television, so could not watch the show.  While initial confusion can be sufficient to show actual confusion, the Court disregarded the witnesses testimony because he admitted that he was a consumer of neither the Tribune's nor Fox's products. 

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Hickory Farms, Inc. v. Snackmasters, Inc., No. 05 C 4541, 2007 WL 772919 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2007) (Kennelly, J.).

Judge Kennelly held that plaintiff's "Beef Stick" and "Turkey Stick" marks were generic and canceled the Beef Stick mark, plaintiff had already let its "Turkey Stick" registration lapse.  Plaintiff alleged that defendant infringed its marks by marketing defendant's beef and turkey snacks in stick forms and labeling them "Beef Sticks" and "Turkey Sticks," respectively.  But defendant countered with evidence that numerous companies use the terms to refer to meat products sold sell in stick form.  For example, Trader Joe's, Flat Iron, Jimmy Dean, Slim Jim and Tombstone all sell meat stick products using the marks.  The Court held that the terms were generic because they name a class of goods -- meat packaged in a stick form.  The Court also noted that "it [was] difficult to imagine what else a seller would call a beef or turkey product packaged in stick form."

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Allied Ins. Co. v. Bach, No. 05 C 5945, 2007 WL 627635 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2007) (Leinenweber, J.).

Judge Leinenweber granted declaratory judgment defendants/counter-plaintiffs (collectively "defendants") summary judgment DJ plaintiff/counter-defendant's ("plaintiff") duty to defend defendants against Lanham Act and related state law claims.  Defendants were sued by third party Acushnet which accused defendants of willful and intentional violation of Acushnet's marks related to its Titlest Pro VI golf ball based upon defendants' alleged marketing of counterfeit golf balls.  Defendants sought defense and indemnification from plaintiff, their insurer.  Defendants' insurance policy covered, among other things, defendants' infringement of third party marks or copyrights in defendants' advertising so long as the infringement was not done with knowledge or intent of the infringement.  Although the Complaint charges defendants' with willful and intentional violations of the marks, the Lanham Act provides claims without regard to intent.  Because not all of Acushnet's claims require intent, plaintiff has a duty to defend defendants' against the suit.  The Court did note, however, that should Acushnet prove that defendants' acts were willful and intentional, plaintiff would have no duty to indemnify.

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Gabbanelli Accordions & Imports, L.L.C. v. Italo-Am. Accordion Manufacturing Co., No. 02 C 4048, 2007 WL 465423 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 6, 2007) (Zagel, J.).

Judge Zagel held that the Court had jurisdiction over plaintiff's trademark infringement action and ordered defendant to respond to plaintiff's summary judgment motion on the merits of the case.  In October 2002, the Court stayed the case pending resolution of contractual disputes related to ownership of the marks at issue in an Italian court.  The Court lifted the stay in May 2005.  Plaintiff distributed defendant's accordions in the United States.  In 1997, Plaintiff registered the mark at issue, which defendant claims to own.  While the contract at issue in the Italian court may play a role in determining ownership of the mark, the Court held that if plaintiff can prove ownership of the mark prior to the Agreement, then the Court can exercise jurisdiction and resolve the trademark infringement dispute.

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Specialized Seating, Inc. v. Greenwich Indus., L.P., 472 F. Supp.2d 999 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 2, 2007) (Holderman, C.J.).

Judge Holderman held declaratory judgment defendant's, Greenwich Industries ("Greenwich"), trademark invalid and held that Greenwich committed fraud on the USPTO while prosecuting its trademarks.  Declaratory judgment plaintiff, Specialized Seating ("Specialized"), and Greenwich are competing manufacturers of folding chairs.*  Greenwich has a trademark to a configuration of a folding chair with certain physical characteristics.  Because Greenwich secured patents for most or all of the features identified in its trademark, the Court held that Greenwich's trademark was functional and, therefore, invalid.  In addition to having held patents on the claimed features, Greenwich had also touted the functional benefits of the features in advertising.

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International Profit Assocs., Inc. v. Paisola, 461 F. Supp.2d 672 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 2006) (Bucklo, J.).

Judge Bucklo held that plaintiff was likely to succeed on its Lanham Act and cyberpiracy or cybersquatter, 15 U.S.C. Section 1125(d), claims and issued a temporary restraining order ("TRO") preventing defendants from conduct that likely infringed plaintiff's trademarks.  Based upon the cyberpiracy claim, Defendants were ordered to stop making content available through their website, www.ipaopinion.com, which was likely confusingly similar to plaintiff's site, www.ipaopinions.com.  The Court also ordered defendants to stop using plaintiff's trademarks as search terms in Google's Adwords program. 

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Top Tobacco, L.P. v. North Atl. Operating Co., No. 06 C 950, 2007 WL 118527 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 2007) (Kennelly, J.).

Judge Kennelly granted summary judgment for defendants on plaintiff's trademark, unfair competition and dilution claims.  Plaintiffs, Top Tobacco and Republic Tobacco ( collectively "Top Tobacco ") own various trademarks associating the word "top" or a picture of a toy top with tobacco products.  Both Top Tobacco and defendant, North Atlantic Operating and National Tobacco Company ("National Tobacco"), are large players in the "make your own" and "roll your own" cigarette market.  Top Tobacco alleged that its Top marks were infringed and diluted by National Tobacco's use of its "Fresh-Top Canister" mark.  The Court granted summary judgment of non-infringement because it ruled that no reasonable jury could find that consumers were confused between Top Tobacco's TOP mark and National Tobacco's "Fresh-Top Canister" mark.  The Court held that they were visually distinct and cited Top Tobacco's remarks to the USPTO during prosecution of its marks that its TOP marks were visually distinct from marks relating to lids, as does the National Tobacco mark.  Additionally, the Court noted that Top Tobacco had chosen not to present a consumer survey to show actual confusion and did not explain why no survey was done.

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Best Vacuum, Inc. v. Ian Design, Inc., No. 04 C 2249, 2006 WL 3486879 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2006) (Hort, J.).

In this trademark and Lanham Act unfair competition suit, Judge Hort granted summary judgment for defendant and dismissed the case.  Plaintiff had operated under the name "Best Vacuum" since 1983 and operated a www.bestvacuum.com website since 1996.  In 2003, defendant began operating a www.bestvacuumcleaners.com website, but when plaintiff complained, defendant changed its website to www.bestchoicevacuums.com.  After defendant refused to take down its second site, plaintiff sued.  Plaintiff's trademark infringement claim was dismissed earlier in the case because plaintiff never registered its "Best Vacuum" mark.  The case was before the Court on cross summary judgment motions.

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Gail Green Licensing & Design Ltd. v. Accord, Inc., No. 05 C 5303, 2006 WL 2873202 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 2006) (St. Eve, J.).

Judge St. Eve dismissed plaintiffs's Lanham Act false advertising claim, but refused to dismiss plaintiffs's breach of contract claim, among others.  Both claims are based upon defendants's receipt of plaintiffs's copyrighted designs for pet clothing and accessories pursuant to a Non-Disclosure and Confidentiality Agreement (the "NDA") and defendants's subsequent alleged sale of  goods based upon plaintiffs's copyrighted designs.

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