Chicago IP Attorney & Lawyer : R. David Donoghue : Chicago IP Litigation Blog

Global Patent Holdings, LLC v. Green Bay Packers, Inc., No. 00 C 4623, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Apr. 23, 2008) (Kocoras, J.).

Judge Kocoras reassigned a related case consolidating it with this case and stayed the patent infringement cases pending a second reexamination proceeding. New defendant CDW argued that reassignment of the second case pursuant to Local Rule 40.4 was not appropriate because the first case, which was dismissed without prejudice in light of the first reexam, was filed by TechSearch LLC, instead of the current plaintiff Global Patent Holdings ("GPH"). But original plaintiff TechSearch reopened the case before moving to substitute GPH, the current assignee of the patent in suit and TechSearch's parent, as plaintiff. Because TechSearch reopened the case, the first case retained its first-filed status. The fact that TechSearch and GPH were no longer related entities when the case was reopened was not relevant.

The Court also held that the two cases were related because both accused defendants' websites of infringing the patent because they downloaded or induced others to download JPEG and other files.

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FM Indus., Inc. v. Citicorp Credit Servs., Inc., No. 07 C 1794, 2008 WL 717792 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 2008) (Conlon, J.).

Judge Conlon granted Citicorp defendants and denied defendant Gelfand summary judgment of copyright infringement. Plaintiff FM Industries ("FMI") alleged that Gelfand infringed FMI's copyright in its TUCANS debt-collection software by continuing to use it after Gelfand's license expired. Gelfand argued that FMI could not prove ownership of the copyright because it could not produce the written assignment. But the Court held that FMI's deposition testimony was sufficient to create a material question of fact and, therefore, denied summary judgment.

Citicorp was accused of encouraging and inducing its outside attorneys to use the TUCANS software after their licenses expired. But at least in part because FMI failed to respond to Citicorp's Local Rule 56.1 statements or to submit its own responsive statements of fact, the Court accepted as true Citicorp's evidence that it told its outside attorneys to stop using TUCANS before licenses expired and that Citicorp was unaware that the attorneys continued using TUCANS.

Practice Tip: I cannot say it enough: you must strictly comply with Local Rule 56.1. Click here to read about other opinions considering Local Rule 56.1

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Murata Mfg. Co., Ltd. v. Bel Fuse, Inc., No. 03 C 2934, Order (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 2008) (Gottschall, J.).*

Judge Gottschall denied plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion without prejudice for failure to comply with both Local Rule 56.1 and the Court’s Standing Order — the Standing Order further explained that each short, numbered statement of fact required by Local Rule 56.1 should contain one fact and no attorney argument. Despite Local Rule 56.1’s clear requirements and the Standing Order’s directive to strictly comply with Local Rule 56.1, the Court held that nearly one-third of plaintiff’s 145 statements of fact did not comply with the rules:

• Many were long;
  
• One contained no facts;
  
• Several focused on an expert’s methodology instead of his results; and
  
• The rest contained inferences, argument, or legal conclusions.

The Court explained that the case’s complexity required strict adherence to Local Rule 56.1:

The court simply does not possess the resources to comb through the parties’ statements of fact in an attempt to sift out usable fact from impermissible argument or inference. … The Standing Order and LR 56.1 are composed in plain English and their meaning is clear; the court properly expects experienced and sophisticated attorneys to adhere to them strictly, particularly given the complex and sophisticated nature of this litigation.

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Garcia v. City of Chicago, No. 07 C 5828, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 2007) (Shadur, J.).

Judge Shadur sua sponte struck certain denials in defendant’s answer. The Court held that it was improper to deny those allegations for which defendant stated it lacked sufficient information or belief to respond and, therefore, struck them from the answer. Additionally, the Court noted that defendants had not provided the Court with courtesy copies pursuant to Local Rule 5.2(e).

Practice tip: Courtesy copies often get lost in the administrative shuffle after a complex filing. But there are few things more important than providing the Court with easy access to your papers.

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Yes! Following the rules, all of them, matters – federal and local, substantive and procedural, big and small. Regular readers will not be surprised by my answer. I have repeatedly reminded people, as do the Northern District judges (click here for examples of both), to comply with Local Rule 56.1.

But I also think it matters for more “minor” rules, such as the newly revised Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 & 26, which now require that counsel include an e-mail address along with a physical address and phone number (click here for my previous post on the December 1, 2007 Fed. R. Civ. P. amendments.)

My experience since December 1 is that most attorneys are not following the e-mail address requirement. It is unlikely that courts will sanction counsel for failure to provide an e-mail address, but to me, and I presume to at least some judges and clerks, it signals sloppy lawyering. It says that counsel is not staying current with changes in the profession. And it makes me wonder what else counsel is not current with. Have they explored the significant codification of electronic discovery rules from December 1, 2006? At least it is unprofessional, and at most it is an indication of a lack of knowledge of the current state of the law — a significant advantage to those of us that keep current.

Am I overreacting because these are "minor" rules that likely are not sanctionable? Comment to this post or send me an e-mail with your thoughts. I will post about whatever feedback I receive (without names, of course).

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Nutrinova Nutrition Specialties & Food Ingredients GmbH v. Viachem, No. 07 C 4232, Min. Order (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 2007) (St. Eve, J.).

Judge St. Eve granted in part plaintiff’s motion to compel various discovery. The Court ordered defendants to produce various once-privileged documents disclosed to unidentified customers pursuant to an alleged common interest privilege. The Court acknowledged that common interest could protect such disclosures. But defendants failed to identify the specific customers that were shown documents, which documents were disclosed or when the disclosures occurred. On that record, the Court could not find that defendants had maintained the privilege. 

The Court also ordered defendants to update their privilege log to identify any attorneys on the log. And the Court ordered the parties to meet and confer regarding uncrystalized disputes over defendants’ answers to some interrogatories.

Practice Tip: It is the rare judge that appreciates discovery motions, let alone motions where the parties did not identify what the actual issues were. It is very important to follow both the letter and the spirit of Local Rule 37.2 meet and confers.

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Here is some recent Northern District news:

• Judge Coar recently updated his case management procedures (click here to read them) to state that pursuant to Local Rule 5.2(e), parties are no longer to provide courtesy copies of electronically filed papers to Judge Coar's chambers, except for papers pertaining to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 or Local Rule 56.1 (summary judgment papers).
  
• Magistrate Judges Brown (Eastern Division -- Chicago) and Mahoney (Western Division -- Rockford) are both up for reappointment in early 2008.  Pursuant to federal law, the Court has established a citizen's panel to consider their reappointments.  Members of the bar, as well as the general public, are requested to forward comments regarding the reappointments no later than January 18, 2008, to:

Magistrate Judge Advisory Panel
c/o Mr. Michael W. Dobbins
Clerk of Court
U.S. District Court
219 South Dearborn St. -- Rm. 2050
Chicago, IL 60604

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Shen-Wei (USA), Inc. v. Ansell Healthcare Prods., Inc., No. 05 C 6003, 2007 WL 2903184 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 28, 2007) (Guzman, J.).

Judge Guzman denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment of invalidity pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Defendant argued that plaintiffs sold medical gloves embodying the claims of their patent, U.S. Patent No. 6, 953,582 (the “’582 patent”), to a glove with a coating of a skin-soothing substance in July 1999, approximately two years before the ‘582 patent’s July 1, 2001 critical date. Furthermore, plaintiffs admitted that they sold patented gloves as early as July 1999 by failing to cite any contradictory evidence in their responses to defendant’s Local Rule 56.1 statement.

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Flentye v. Kathrein, No. 06 C 3492, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Oct 2, 2007) (Cole, Mag. J.).*

Judge Cole continued defendants’ motion to compel for one week because defendants had not conducted a Local Rule 37.2 conference before filing their motion. But the Court also provided its thoughts on the prosecution of discovery, both in this specific case and generally. The Court noted that after one year of discovery, “not a single document was produced in response to the 70 paragraph document request!”

But what is most interesting about the opinion is the Court’s quotes on various discovery issues. On discovery generally: 

“[D]iscovery is the bane of modern federal litigation.” Rossetto v. Pabst Brewing Co., Inc., 217 F.3d 539, 542 (7th Cir. 2000). It is intrusive, unpleasant, time-consuming and costly. It is, like life itself, “nasty [and] brutish …” Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapt XIII. Unfortunately, it is not generally “short.”

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Dicam, Inc. v. United States Cellular Corp., No. 07 C 5472, Slip. Op. (N.D. Ill. Sep. 28, 2007) (Shadur, J.).*

Judge Shadur sua sponte ordered plaintiff Dicam to dismiss all parties but defendant United States Cellular (“U.S. Cellular”) and one of its five co-defendants. Dicam’s Complaint alleged patent infringement of telephones sold by U.S. Cellular and manufactured by the other five defendants. The Court could find “no legitimate reason” for brining what it believed were five separate suits as one. The Court explained that if Dicam had filed the suits separately, the Court would not have consolidated them pursuant to Local Rule 40.4, although they might have qualified for coordinated discovery. The Court, therefore, ordered Dicam to dismiss four of the five suppliers, without prejudice to refile separate cases against those suppliers. Dicam has since dismissed all but one of the four suppliers and refiled separate cases against each of the four suppliers with U.S. Cellular named as a co-defendant in each case.

* Click here for a copy of the opinion.

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PSN Illinois, LLC v. Ivoclar Vivadent, Inc., No. 04 C 7232, 2006 WL 3523760 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2006) (Kendall, J.).

Judge Kendall denied plaintiff's Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 motion for reconsideration of the Court's prior ruling (discussed in the Blog's archives) construing the claims of the patent at issue and granting summary judgment of noninfringement on behalf of defendant Ivoclar Vivadent, Inc. ("Ivoclar").  The Court denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration because it considered each of plaintiff's reconsideration arguments in its original Opinion granting summary judgment.  But the Court spent some time on one of plaintiff's claim construction arguments regarding a patent related to porcelain veneers.  On reconsideration, plaintiff argued for a different construction of "ready for mounting."  In its original papers plaintiff did not argue for the proposed construction, although it did propose it in its Local Rule 56.1 Additional Statement of Material Facts.  The Court held that because claim construction is a matter of law, proposed constructions are not material facts and, therefore, cannot be put in LR 56.1 statements.  The Court noted its obligation pursuant to LR 56.1 to disregard legal arguments and conclusions placed in statements of fact.  The Court did, however, go on to consider plaintiff's construction and explain why the Court's original construction was correct.

Practice tip:  Think carefully about what goes into your LR 56.1 statements of material fact.  Do not put arguments in your statements of fact. And by all means, do not put arguments in your statements of fact and then omit those arguments from your brief. The Court will disregard them, and you will be out of luck. 

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Days Inns Worldwide, Inc. v. Lincoln Park Hotels, Inc., No. 06 C 2960, 2007 WL 1455798 (N.D. Ill. May 16, 2007) (Der-Yeghiayan, J.)

Judge Der-Yeghiayan granted in part defendants' motion for reconsideration of the Court's award of plaintiff's attorneys fees' and costs for preparing summary judgment motions.  Plaintiff owns various marks relating to its Days Inn chain (the "Days Inn Marks").  Plaintiff licensed defendants Lincoln Park Hotels, Inc. and Richard Erlich (collectively "LPH") to use the Days Inn Marks in connection with the operation of a hotel in Chicago's Lincoln Park neighborhood.  In 2005, LPH sold the hotel to defendant Gold Coast Investors ("GCI") without informing plaintiff, in violation of the parties' license agreement.  GCI continued operating the hotel using the Days Inn Marks without licensing the rights to the marks from plaintiff.  As a result, plaintiff brought this suit against defendants alleging that, among other things, GCI infringed plaintiff's Days Inn Marks and LPH contributorily infringed plaintiff's Days Inn Marks by selling the hotel to GCI with the knowledge that GCI intended to continue using the Days Inn Marks and without informing plaintiff of the sale or removing the Days Inn Marks from the hotel, as required in the parties' license agreement.  In February, the Court granted plaintiff's summary judgment motion on twelve of fifteen counts and dismissed the remaining three counts as moot (you can find discussion of that opinion in the Blog's archives).  The Court also awarded plaintiff its attorneys' fees, approximately $150,000, for preparing its summary judgment motion.  Defendants moved the Court to reconsider, arguing that the Court should have required the parties to meet to resolve the attorneys fees dispute pursuant to  Local Rule 54.3 before ruling on the fees and that the Court should specifically apportion the fees between defendants.  The Court held that it was not required to follow the Local Rule 54.3 procedure in this case because defendants did not object to plaintiff's requests for fees made in its summary judgment briefing and because additional briefing required by the rule would not have benefited the Court because of its intimate knowledge of the case.  The Court did, however, apportion the fees that it was able to identify as only applicable to one group of defendants.  And the Court awarded an additional $35,000 of fees and costs that had not been presented in the initial motion.

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Days Inns Worldwide, Inc. v. Lincoln Park Hotels, Inc., No. 06 C 2960, 2007 WL 551570 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 22, 2007) (Der-Yeghiayan, J.)

Judge Der-Yeghiayan granted plaintiff summary judgment on its trademark infringement and Illinois Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("IDTPA") claims, among others.  Plaintiff owns various marks relating to its Days Inn chain (the "Days Inn Marks").  Plaintiff licensed defendants Lincoln Park Hotels, Inc. and Richard Erlich (collectively "LPH") to use the Days Inn Marks in connection with the operation of a hotel in Chicago's Lincoln Park neighborhood.  In 2005, LPH sold the hotel to defendant Gold Coast Investors ("GCI") without informing plaintiff, in violation of the parties' license agreement.  GCI continued operating the hotel using the Days Inn Marks without licensing the rights to the marks from plaintiff.  As a result, plaintiff brought the instant action against defendants alleging that, among other things, GCI infringed plaintiff's Days Inn Marks and LPH contributorily infringed plaintiff's Days Inn Marks by selling the hotel to GCI with the knowledge that GCI intended to continue using the Days Inn Marks and without informing plaintiff of the sale or removing the Days Inn Marks from the hotel, as required in the parties' license agreement. 

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Best Vacuum, Inc. v. Ian Design, Inc., No. 04 C 2249, 2006 WL 3486879 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2006) (Hort, J.).

In this trademark and Lanham Act unfair competition suit, Judge Hort granted summary judgment for defendant and dismissed the case.  Plaintiff had operated under the name "Best Vacuum" since 1983 and operated a www.bestvacuum.com website since 1996.  In 2003, defendant began operating a www.bestvacuumcleaners.com website, but when plaintiff complained, defendant changed its website to www.bestchoicevacuums.com.  After defendant refused to take down its second site, plaintiff sued.  Plaintiff's trademark infringement claim was dismissed earlier in the case because plaintiff never registered its "Best Vacuum" mark.  The case was before the Court on cross summary judgment motions.

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The Northern District of California is considering revising its patent rules (enacted in January 2001).  To start its review, the Northern District of California is seeking public comments.  Comments must be sent by December 15, 2006 to patentlocalrulescommittee@gmail.com.  The notice is here.   The Northern District of California Local Rules are not directly relevant to Northern District of Illinois cases, but because the Northern District of California's patent rules serve as a pattern for courts across the country, including in the Northern District of Illinois, any changes to the Northern District of California's rules could effect courts in the Northern District of Illinois and across the country.

Thanks to Dennis Crouch at Patently-O for identifying the request for comments and for an interesting post, followed interesting comments, on proposed changes.

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Although the amendment will still be open for public comment, effective December 1st the Northern District has amended Local Rule 3.2.  In its current form, Local Rule 3.2 requires that any nongovernmental corporate party file a statement identifying its parent corporations and any publicly held company that owns 10% or more of the party.  The Northern District has revised the rule expanding the categories of parties that must file a notification and the scope of the notification.  You can read a redlined version of the amended Local Rule 3.2 here.

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The new electronic discovery amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure become effective in one month, on December 1st.  In preparation for practicing under the amended rules, this Law Practice Today page provides a wealth of links to sites discussing the amendments and electronic discovery generally (thanks to the Illinois Trial Practice Weblog for identifying this excellent resource).  Also, the federal judiciary posts a list of all Federal Rules being amended December 1st here.

Additionally, in April the Northern District amended several of its Local Rules.  You can see a list of the amended rules here.  Amended Local Rule 5.2, among other things, states that where electronic and paper copies of a document are filed, the electronic version controls.  Amended Local Rule 5.2 also requires that the judge receive a courtesy copy of all electronically filed documents, unless the judge requires otherwise.

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Cobra Capital LLC v. LaSalle Bank Corp., __ F. Supp.2d __, 2006 WL 2720626 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 19, 2006) (Bucklo, J.)

In this trademark infringement dispute, Judge Bucklo denied defendants' summary judgment motion because there were material issues of fact regarding, among other things, the protectability of the marks at issue ("Making Impossible Possible" and "Make the Impossible Possible").  Defendants argued that the marks were descriptive of the banking and lease financing industry, and that the marks were "merely common self-laudatory advertising."  The Court, however, disagreed, stating that the latter argument  "borders on frivolous" and noting that defendants' argument was harmed by their corporate parent's pending application for the similar mark "Making More Possible."

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Kenall Mfg. Co. v. Genlyte Thomas Group LLC, 439 F. Supp.2d 854 (N.D. Ill. July 20, 2006) (Castillo, J.).

Judge Castillo denied opposing infringement and invalidity summary judgment motions in this very detailed and thorough opinion. The opinion is most remarkable for its illustration of two basic, but important, practice tips, which are best understood from the following excerpts:

The only thing that the multitude of summary judgment motions and expert reports filed in this hotly-disputed patent case make clear is that multiple issues of material fact remain to be determined. Instead of moving this case toward a timely resolution, the parties are driving up the costs of litigation with superfluous briefing that has repeatedly failed to abide by this Court’s local rules.

                                                                * * *

This case has been poorly litigated up to this point. By failing to file a 56.1 statement of facts and by failing to respond to Genlyte’s 56.1 statement, Kenall’s attorneys have come dangerously close to losing this case for their client based on nothing but their own ineptitude. On the other side, both Genlyte and Kenall have fanned the flame of excessive and superfluous briefing with arguments for unfeasible claim construction and a litany of expert reports that show nothing but material issues of facts. The parties have now spent tens of thousands of dollars on seven expert reports and extensive briefing of three separate motions for summary judgment to prove to this Court that this case is certainly not appropriate for resolution on summary judgment.

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C/F Int’l., Inc. v. Payne, No. 06 C 1329, 2006 WL 22290992 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2006) (Kennelly, J.).

Plaintiff filed suit to enforce a copyright infringement and breach of contract judgment against individual defendant Payne, his wife and two companies run by Payne after Payne allegedly transferred both personal and corporate assets to his wife. Judge Kennelly denied defendants’ motions to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings, and deferred ruling on defendants’ motion to stay based on one defendant’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding.

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Shanklin Corp. v. American Packaging Mach., Inc., No. 95 C 1617, 2006 WL 2054382 (N.D. Ill. July 18, 2006) (Schenkier, Mag. J.).

In this case, Magistrate Judge Schenkier considered plaintiff’s Amended Bill of Costs after the two defendants were found to have infringed plaintiff’s patents, one defendant willfully.  The Court took pains explaining plaintiff’s math and proof-reading errors in plaintiff’s cost spreadsheet.  Apparently, defendant’s (only one defendant objected to the Bill of Costs) initial objections to the Bill of Costs were largely based upon plaintiff’s failure to explain and support its costs. Both parties would have saved attorneys fees – and the court would have been spared the task of sorting this out – had plaintiff taken the time to explain in detail its costs in the first place.  This opinion also provides a useful explanation of which standard costs are recoverable and which are not.

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Zeidler v. A&W Restaurants, Inc., No. 03 C 5063, 2006 WL 1898056 (N.D. Ill. July 6, 2006) (Anderson, J.).

Zeidler is worth mentioning despite the absence of intellectual property issues because it makes a point that many practitioners miss:  disregarding Local Rule 56.1 Statements of Fact or slapping one together at the last minute can have real, potentially case-dispositive consequences. Judge Andersen accepted defendant's statement of facts in its entirety because plaintiff’s statement of facts and his response to defendant’s statement of facts included unsupported statements, made legal arguments, referenced unauthenticated documents, and contradicted other factual evidence.

Plaintiff started at a major disadvantage by choosing to represent himself. But even many experienced members of the N.D. Ill. bar play fast and loose with the Local Rule 56.1 requirements or just ignore them until hours or minutes before filing deadlines. This case is the most recent example that such an approach is foolish and may have case-ending consequences.

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