Chicago IP Attorney & Lawyer : R. David Donoghue : Chicago IP Litigation Blog

Fasteners for Retail, Inc. v. Andersen, No. 11 C 2164 Slip. Op. (N.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 2011) (Kennelly, J.). 

Judge Kennelly denied defendant Andersen’s motion to dismiss this patent and trade secret case. The Court had personal jurisdiction over Andersen because he worked for defendant K International, an Illinois entity, and Andersen had solicited his former customers in Illinois.

Venue was also proper in the Northern District. A substantial part of the facts at issue occurred in Illinois. The parties’ prior agreement did not release plaintiff’s trade secret claims because they were not contemplated when plaintiff signed the agreement.

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Modern Trade Comms., Inc. v. PSMJ Resources, Inc., No. 10 C 5380, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2011) (Pallmeyer, J.).

Judge Pallmeyer granted defendants PSMJ Resources' ("PSMJ") and Oser Communications' ("Oser") motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in this Lanham Act case involving plaintiff Modern Trade Communications' ("MTC") rights in its Metal Construction News mark for a metal industry trade publication. At the Metalcon tradeshow in 2010, Oser distributed a daily publication entitled Metal Daily News at PSMJ's direction. MTC alleged that the Metal Daily News title infringed its Metal Construction News mark, which MTC used to publish an official show guide at the same conference. 

PSMJ was a Massachusetts company without offices or personnel in Illinois. It approximated that 3% of its revenue at the 2009 Metalcon show in Florida was from Illinois residents. PSMJ's website was not interactive. PSMJ did produce six training seminars unrelated to Metalcon in Illinois. PSMJ's small revenues from Illinois residents did not create general jurisdiction. While related to Metalcon, PSMJ's contract with a third party in Illinois did not create specific jurisdiction. And PSMJ's production of the 2002 Metalcon in Illinois did not create specific jurisdiction because the accused Metal Daily News was only distributed at the 2010 Metalcon in Las Vegas. The Court, therefore, had neither general nor specific jurisdiction over PSMJ.

Oser was an Arizona company without offices or personnel in Illinois, although Oser did distribute publications at two to three trade shows per year in Chicago. Oser's website was passive, except that the 2010 Metal Daily News was available on the site for downloading. Attendance at two to three trade shows each year in Chicago did not create the systematic contacts necessary for general jurisdiction. Oser's website was not sufficient to create specific jurisdiction. MTC made no allegation that the website was targeted at Illinois, and the availability of the publication as a free download was not sufficient either. And MTC did not allege how Oser's alleged infringement in Las Vegas was tied to Oser's Illinois activities. Furthermore, the sale of an advertisement in the Metal Daily News to an Illinois resident, even combined with the website allegations, was not sufficient to create specific jurisdiction.

The Court also denied MTC's motion to amend because it did not allege any new facts that might create personal jurisdiction.

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Culligan Int'l Co. v. Water Sys. of Birmingham, Inc., No. 10 C 8199, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Apr. 27, 2011) (Bucklo, J.).

The Court granted defendants' Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in this trademark dispute regarding plaintiff's CULLIGAN marks. Defendants were Alabama entities without offices, employees or agents in Illinois. All of defendants' business was conducted in Alabama. The parties' agreement was negotiated and executed in Alabama, and there was no indication of a choice of law provision selecting Illinois law. The only connection to Illinois was that plaintiff did business in Illinois, and that was not sufficient to create jurisdiction over defendants.
 

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TechnoLines, LP v. GST Autoleather, Inc., No. 11 C 965, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jun. 30, 2011) (Grady, J.).

Judge Grady granted defendant GST's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' patent claims for improper revenue and lack of production and dismissed the remaining state law claims without prejudice to be refiled pursuant to diversity jurisdiction, if possible.

The Court's key rulings were:

• GST's failed license negotiations with plaintiff Echelon in Illinois alone could not create personal jurisdiction.
   
• Echelon residing in Illinois and, therefore, having been allegedly harmed in Illinois does not create personal jurisdiction. GST's conduct must have been specifically directed at Illinois. And there was no evidence that GST sold product into Illinois.
   
• GST's phone calls and emails to Echelon in Illinois did not create personal jurisdiction.
   
• The Court refused supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims, and gave plaintiff a deadline for repleading based upon diversity jurisdiction, if it could.

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Revenue Realization LLC v. H&R Block, Inc., No. 11 C 85, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 2011) (Shadur, Sen. J.).

Judge Shadur granted defendant H&R Block's motion to dismiss, after granting plaintiff Revenue Realization leave to file its response to the motion and fully considering it. Revenue Realization accused H&R Block of patent infringement. H&R Block moved to dismiss because it was a passive holding company for a variety of subsidiaries and, therefore, was not the proper H&R Block defendant.

H&R Block offered to identify the proper entities for Revenue Realization. But Revenue Realization refused the offer, as well as the Court's suggestion that it file against all possible subsidiaries and narrow the defendants based upon the entities' subsequent motions to dismiss. Instead Revenue Realization argued that the Federal Circuit's decision in Nuance Commc'ns, Inc. v. Abbyy Software House, 626 F.3d 1222 (Fed. Cir. 2010) confirmed that the Court had jurisdiction over a passive parent entity in patent cases. The Court, however, held that the opinion stood for quite a different proposition and was a "weak reed to lean on." In fact, Nuance dealt with a subsidiary entity that had direct contacts with the forum. In contrast, H&R Block was a true holding company. And the fact that H&R Block defined itself as including its subsidiaries in certain SEC filings was irrelevant to the Court's analysis.

The Court finished the opinion referring to the New Yorker's old practice of filling the final page of an article that otherwise would have left a portion blank with a section captioned "Department of Clotted Nonsense" containing amusing quotations and reprinted errors from other publications. The Court then granted plaintiff leave to file its response brief, and noted that the Court had already fully considered it.
 

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Deckers Outdoor Corp. v. Does 1-55, No. 114 C 10, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. May 24, 2011) (Darrah, J.)

Judge Darrah dismissed without prejudice plaintiff's motion for a default judgment in this Lanham Act case about the UGG mark. The Court held that it would not exercise personal jurisdiction over the Does based solely on interactive websites without additional facts as to whether the websites were aimed at Illinois.
 

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Trading Techs. Int.'l, Inc. v. BCG Partners, Inc., No. 10 C. 715 (Consolidated), Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2011) (Kendall, J.).

Judge Kendall denied without prejudice defendant's (collectively "BCG") motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. BCG argued that its named entities were holding companies without operational responsibility, and that none had officers in Illinois. Plaintiff Trading Technologies ("TT"), however, produced evidence that one or more of the BCG entities had Illinois officers in Illinois for the purposes of selling the accused eSpeed software. Furthermore, certain government filings suggested that one or more of the BCG entities were operational entities. The Court, therefore, denied BCG's motion with leave to refile after the parties completed limited jurisdictional discovery and TT replead to the extent it felt necessary.
 

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Salud Natural Entrepreneur, Inc. v. Nutricento Internacional, Inc., No. 09 C 4417, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 2011) (Zagel, J.).

Judge Zagel denied defendant Azteca Products' ("Azteca") Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in this Lanham Act case. Azteca's officer, a non-lawyer, purported to file an answer on Azteca's behalf. Azteca then hired counsel who participated in Rule 26 scheduling conferences. Azteca's officer then filed a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss without counsel, which the Court struck because it was not filed by counsel, and a corporate entity cannot act pro se. The Court then entered a default judgment and an injunction against Azteca. Azteca hired counsel and asked through counsel that the default be vacated. The Court vacated the judgment and agreed to consider whether Azteca's personal jurisdiction arguments had been waived. Noting the "bizarre posture of the case, the Court held that Azteca had not preserved its jurisdiction arguments.

The answer did not waive Azteca's arguments because as a pro se filing it was treated as never having been filed. But counsel did participate in Rule 26(f) conferences, although he filed no notice of appearance, and offered no suggestion that Azteca would challenge jurisdiction during that time. Furthermore, jurisdiction was challenged for the first time more than thirty days after the other defendants settled based upon discussions that Azteca did not participate in. Regardless of the legal impact of Azteca's filings, by the time Azteca challenge jurisdiction, plaintiff had developed a "reasonable expectation" that Azteca would defend itself in Illinois.
 

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Insubuy, Inc. v. Community Ins. Agency, No. 10 C 3925, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2010) (St. Eve, J.).

Judge St. Eve granted counter-plaintiff Community Insurance Agency's ("CIA") motion for expedited jurisdictional discovery regarding individual counter-defendants. CIA established a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction warranting discovery based upon public records and affidavits that established that the individual defendant:

• Was a director, owner and the CEO of plaintiff Insubuy.
   
• Registers and maintains domains for Insubuy.
   
• Had prior notice of CIA's trademarks and that CIA was an Illinois corporation.
   

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Poulsen Roser A/S v. Jackson & Perkins Wholesale, Inc., No. 10 C 1894, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Nov. 15, 2010) (St. Eve, J.).

Judge St. Eve denied plaintiff Pousen Rosen's ("Poulsen") Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 60(b) motion for reconsideration of the Court's decision dismissing the case as to the individual defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction in this Lanham Act case.

First, "new evidence" in the form of the District of South Carolina Bankruptcy Court's order consolidating the corporate defendants was irrelevant and did not alter the Court's analysis. The Bankruptcy Court made no finding regarding the relationship between the corporate and individual defendants.

Second, the Court reconsidered and upheld its analysis regarding the corporate defendants' internet contacts. The Seventh Circuit rejected the Zippo case's sliding scale for internet-based jurisdiction because of the possibility of creating universal jurisdiction:

__ F.3d __, 2010 WL 3547647, at *6 (7^th Cir. 2010).

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Trading Techs., Intl., Inc. v. BGC Partners, Inc., No. 10 C 715, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Aug. 17, 2010) (Kendall, J.).

Judge Kendall denied defendant BGC Partners' ("BGC") motion to dismiss as moot because of plaintiff Trading Technologies' ("TT's") subsequently filed amended complaint. Courts routinely deny without prejudice motions to dismiss when an amended complaint is filed, but this case was unique because TT opposed dismissal. TT argued that BGC's improper service argument should be dismissed with prejudice and the remaining arguments should be heard to avoid delay because TT continued asserting similar claims in the amended complaint. The service arguments were, however, moot because BGC did not make the service arguments in response to the amended complaint.

The Court also denied the motion to dismiss without prejudice as to the remaining arguments. While the claims may have remained factually similar, BGC's arguments went to jurisdiction, not the sufficiency of the facts. Furthermore, the amended complaint added several new defendants. BGC and the other defendants would have been prejudiced if they were not given the opportunity to review the amended complaint and to collectively decide how to address any jurisdiction or venue issues.

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Merrill Primack v. Polto, Inc., No. 08 C 4539, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jul. 8, 2010) (Dow, J.).

Judge Dow granted defendants' Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss this Lanham Act case over plaintiff's "Credit Lifeline" mark for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff did not claim general jurisdiction, relying only upon specific jurisdiction. Defendants' only Illinois contacts were the sale of 212 books unrelated to the Credit Lifeline mark into Illinois. And defendants' offer for sale of its Credit Lifeline book via an interactive website could not alone create specific jurisdiction. Similarly, injury to intellectual property alone did not create jurisdiction based upon the effects test. Harm to the plaintiff in the jurisdiction did not satisfy the test by itself. Defendant's actions must have been intentional, aimed at the forum state and defendant had to know that plaintiff's harm was likely to be suffered. But there was no indication that defendant was even aware of plaintiffs' Credit Lifeline mark, or of plaintiff, from defendant's first use of the mark in 2001 until, at the earliest, when plaintiff registered its mark in 2008.

Finally, the Court held that there was no persuasive reason that exercising personal jurisdiction would have comported with "fair play and substantial justice." 

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Alta Mere Indus., Inc. v. DBC Window Tinting, Inc., No. 10 C 266, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. May 6, 2010) (Darrah, J.).

Judge Darrah granted defendant Impact's Fed. R. Civ. 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss plaintiff Alta Mere's Lanham Act claims regarding its marks related to automotive window tinting and alarm systems. Impact operated a local Texas business and had no other identified Illinois contacts. Alta Mere argued that the Court had specific jurisdiction over Impact because of Impact's interactions with other defendants who were Alta Mere franchisees, as well as two letters allegedly sent to Impact warning that a franchise agreement governing defendant Cader's use of the Alta Mere marks were governed by Illinois law.

The Court considered jurisdiction over each defendant separately and, therefore, did not consider the other defendants' Illinois contacts in analyzing jurisdiction over Impact. Impact alleged that it never received Alta Mere's letters. But even if Impact had received them, correspondence sent to a defendant outside the forum could not alone create jurisdiction. The letters were "random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts."

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Viskase Companies, Inc. v. World Pac Int'l AG, No. 09 C 5022, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. May 10, 2010) (Bucklo, J.).

Judge Bucklo granted declaratory judgment defendants' (collectively "World Pac") motion to dismiss declaratory judgment plaintiff Viskase's state law tort claims as preempted by Viskase's declaratory judgment patent claims. Patent holders have a basis right to assert their patents. In order to make tort claims based upon patent assertions, therefore, Viskase had to show that defendants acted in bad faith in asserting their patents, and the bad faith had both objective and subjective components. Viskase's general statement of bad faith did not meet the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standards. Furthermore, defendants need not have stated in their assertion letters to third parties that Viskase objected to defendants' claims.

The Court had specific jurisdiction over foreign defendant World Pac. World Pac's filing for U.S. patents and its enforcement letters regarding the patents-in-suite created specific jurisdiction.

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Viskase Companies, Inc. v. World Pac Int'l AG, No. 09 C 5022, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. May 10, 2010) (Bucklo, J.).

Judge Bucklo granted declaratory judgment defendants' (collectively "World Pac") motion to dismiss declaratory judgment plaintiff Viskase's state law tort claims as preempted by Viskase's declaratory judgment patent claims. Patent holders have a basic right to assert their patents. In order to make tort claims based upon patent assertions, therefore, Viskase had to show that defendants acted in bad faith in asserting their patents, both objectively and subjectively. Viskase's general statement of bad faith did not meet the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standards. Furthermore, defendants need not have stated in their assertion letters to third parties that Viskase objected to defendants' claims.

The Court had specific jurisdiction over foreign defendant World Pac. World Pac's filing for U.S. patents and its enforcement letters regarding the patents-in-suite created specific jurisdiction.

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Merrill Primack v. Pearl B. Polto, Inc., No. 08 C 4539, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jul. 8, 2009) (Dow, J.).

Judge Dow granted the Polto defendants' (collectively "Polto") Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in this Lanham Act dispute regarding plaintiff's "Credit Lifeline" mark.  Plaintiff alleged only specific jurisdiction, not general jurisdiction.  Plaintiff's evidence of specific jurisdiction was based upon the following facts: 1) Polto's 2006 trip to Chicago to put on a Credit Lifeline seminar; and 2) Polto's interactive website.  Polto, however, had not been aware of plaintiff's trademark during the 2006 trip.  Plaintiff did not file for its trademark until 2008.  So, when Polto made its 2006 trip there was no evidence of notice of plaintiff's mark.  Furthermore, no one attended Polto's 2006 Chicago seminar and Polto returned to Philadelphia immediately after leaving the seminar site.  Finally, the Court held that Polto's interactive website by itself could not confer specific jurisdiction.

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MacLean-Fogg Co. v. Edge Composites, L.L.C., No. 08 C 6367, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Apr. 14, 2009) (Conlon, J.).

Judge Conlon granted defendants' motion to dismiss.  Plaintiffs (collectively "MacLean") alleged that defendant Edge Composites ("Edge") violated plaintiffs' carbon fiber bicycle wheel patent and together with the individual defendant, a former MacLean employee and current Edge employee, violated MacLean's trade secrets, as well as breaching the individual defendant's nondisclosure agreement with MacLean.  First, the Court held that the MacLean entities that lacked an ownership in the patent when the complaint was filed lacked standing.  It was not sufficient that the MacLean entities entered an agreement creating joint ownership amongst them after the complaint was filed.

The Court also held that it lacked supplemental jurisdiction over MacLean's state law trade secret and breach of contract claims.  The patent infringement claims were based upon manufacture and sale of carbon fiber wheels.  The trade secret and breach of contract claims were based upon defendants' alleged  use of MacLean's trade secrets.  Because MacLean never met its burden of showing how the claims overlapped factually, the Court dismissed the state law claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

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C.S.B. Commodities, Inc. v. Urban Trend (HK) Ltd., No. 08 C 1548, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jan. 7, 2009) (Dow, J.).

Judge Dow granted corporate defendant Urban Trend's (“Urban Trend”) and denied the individual defendant's respective Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) motions to dismiss plaintiff's Lanham Act unfair competition and related state law claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff served the individual defendant, who was Urban Trend's president, while he was representing Urban Trend at a trade show in Illinois. The Court held that personal service created jurisdiction over the individual defendant, even though the Court may not have had jurisdiction but for personal service. And while the individual defendant was in Illinois as part of his job responsibilities representing Urban Trend at the trade show, the Fiduciary Shield Doctrine did not protect him. As Urban Trend's president, the individual defendant would have gained independent economic benefit from selling Urban Trend's products at the trade show. And as president, the individual defendant had at least some control over whether to sell or promote products in Illinois.

The Court, however, held that personal service upon Urban Trend's president was not sufficient to create jurisdiction over Urban Trend. And tradeshow attendance alone was not sufficient to create specific jurisdiction over Urban Trend. There was no evidence that Urban Trend's tradeshow efforts were particularly focused on Illinois sales, or that Urban Trend completed any sales.

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Moran Indus., Inc. v. Higdon, No. 07 C 6092, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill., Jul. 26, 2008) (Guzman, J.).

Judge Guzman held that the Court had personal jurisdiction over the defendants, but dismissed plaintiff’s trademark and breach of contract case for improper venue. Defendants, various franchisees of plaintiff, were all residents of and operated their franchises in various combinations of Indiana, Kentucky and Tennessee. Each relevant franchise agreement had a forum selection clause consenting to jurisdiction in the Northern District. But the Court held that the clause was permissive, allowing defendants to challenge personal jurisdiction. While defendants were not Illinois residents, their numerous contacts with plaintiff — sending plaintiff royalty payments and reports to Illinois and attending training in Illinois, among others — created personal jurisdiction.

While defendants were subject to personal jurisdiction in Illinois, the Court held that the Northern District was not the proper venue. A substantial part of the harm alleged occurred not in Illinois, but in Indiana, Kentucky and Tennessee. Those were the states where defendants allegedly failed to make payments, not Illinois. The Courts, therefore, dismissed the case.

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Judge Castillo dismissed some defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction (the wrong defendants) and denied defendant Strategic Commercial Solutions (“SCS”). Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Plaintiff Medline alleged that defendants violated its trademark and related federal and state laws by selling “Medline Savings” packages with telemarketers.

Personal Jurisdiction

The Court did not have personal jurisdiction over the Wong defendants. The Wong defendants, all individuals, did not direct any of their allegedly infringing and fraudulent calls to Illinois residents. Their only contacts with Illinois were calls to and from Illinois banks regarding processing payments and refunds. These secondary contacts were not sufficient to create personal jurisdiction.

SCS similarly did not have sufficient contacts with Illinois. But Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(K)(2) provided for national, and therefore, there was personal jurisdiction in Illinois because SCS argued it was not subject to jurisdiction in any U.S. state or territory.

Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Act

SCS argued that Medline could not bring its Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Act claim because it was not a “private person” that was “adversely affected” by the telemarketing as required by the Act. But the Court held that while Medline was not an aggrieved consumer, the alleged unfair use of Medline’s trademarks could have caused Medline the harm it alleged.

Trademark Infringement

The Court noted that it was not aware of a similar case in which a party was accused of trademark infringement for using marks in telemarketing. But SCS’s alleged use of Medline’s marks was a use in commerce.

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Judge Norgle dismissed plaintiff’s copyright infringement case for lack of personal jurisdiction, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). The Court agreed with plaintiff that the alleged injury was suffered in Illinois because plaintiff was an Illinois resident. But that was not enough to create personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff identified no supported facts showing that defendants intended to impinge upon an Illinois interest or otherwise purposely availed themselves of Illinois.

And the individual defendants’ contract with plaintiff in Illinois did not create personal jurisdiction either. All of the individual defendants’ contracts occurred before the corporate defendant was incorporated. And after incorporation, the defendants did no business in Illinois or with Illinois residents. Defendants did maintain a website, but plaintiff’s evidence regarding the website was insufficient.

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Judge Conlon denied defendants' (collectively “Wound Care Plus”) motion to dismiss plaintiff Wound Care Education Institute's (“WCEI”) trademark and copyright infringement case for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue and forum non conveniens. WCEI provided wound treatment education to health professionals across the country using copyrighted materials, and is largely based in the Northern District. It alleged that Wound Care Plus attended three of its seminars and then began running competing seminars, including at least one in Chicago, using course materials that were substantially similar to or exact copies of WCEI's copyrighted course materials. Wound Care Plus also operated a website which allowed its customers to register online for the Wound Care Plus seminars.

Personal Jurisdiction

The Court held that it had specific personal jurisdiction over Wound Care Plus, a New York resident, because it advertised its Chicago seminars in national publications seeking to register Illinois customers. Additionally, Wound Care Plus's website created jurisdiction because it was an active, commercial website that allowed Wound Care Plus's customers to register for, among others, its Chicago seminar online.

Venue

Venue was proper in the Northern District, despite the fact that Wound Care Plus did not reside in Illinois because a substantial part of the events giving rise to WCEI's claims, the Chicago seminars, occurred within the Northern District.

Forum Non Conveniens

The Court noted that the motion should have been brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a), instead of the common law forum non conveniens.  Forum non conveniens was inapplicable to this case because the alternate forum was not abroad or a state court. 

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Judge Lindberg granted individual defendants Mr. and Ms. Greiling's Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Both Greilings were German citizens and residents. Mr. Greiling was previously Managing Director of plaintiff's parent company, but no longer held that role. First, the Court held that the Greilings were not amenable to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2) nationwide service of process because the Lanham Act, which created federal question jurisdiction in this trade secret misappropriation case, did not provide for nationwide service, as some acts do. As a result, the Greilings' general contacts with the United States were irrelevant. The issue was whether the Greilings had sufficient minimum contacts with Illinois for specific jurisdiction.

The Court did not have specific jurisdiction over Ms. Greiling because she had no contacts with Illinois. She had never been to or conducted business in Illinois and she had no other attachments to Illinois.

Mr. Greiling was a closer question, but the Court held that it lacked specific jurisdiction over him as well. Mr. Greiling was formerly Managing Director of plaintiff's parent entity, and plaintiff was an Illinois entity. But Mr. Greiling was no longer employed by plaintiff's parent. And plaintiff provided no facts indicating that Mr. Greiling had any contacts with Illinois during the time relevant to the case.

The Court also denied plaintiff's request for jurisdictional discovery. Plaintiff had not made a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction and jurisdictional discovery was not appropriate without the prima facie showing of jurisdiction.

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Gabbanelli Accordions & Imports, L.L.C. v. Italo-Am. Accordion Mfg. Co. et al., No. 02 C 4048, 2008 WL 351860 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 2008) (Zagel, J.)*

Judge Zagel granted plaintiff summary judgment of trademark and trade dress infringement regarding plaintiff’s “wildly colorful” and “heavily ornamental” accordions. The Court awarded plaintiff approximately $500,000 in damages, attorneys fees and costs. Defendants – Italian entities that sold accordions in the United States – chose not to participate in the case. Instead, they filed an Italian case after this case was filed, but before defendants were served pursuant to the Hague Convention. The Court previously stayed a portion of the case pending the outcome of the Italian case, but noted that the stay may have been a mistake. Years after filing, the Italian case had not been resolved and defendants failed to participate in the U.S. proceeding based upon a belief that the Italian proceeding controlled. For example, defendants admitted personal jurisdiction when they failed to respond to jurisdictional Requests for Admission and instead of filing a motion to dismiss, defendants sent the Court an unsupported letter listing their complaints with the case and the Court’s jurisdiction over them. By failing to participate in discovery and not following the Court’s rules, defendants preempted whatever ability they might have had to make their case.

Practice tip: Participate and play by the rules. Even if you cannot or will not afford counsel, you must answer discovery, respond to motions and appear when required to. Failing to participate will not insulate you from judgment.

* Click here for more on this case in the Blog’s archives.

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Morton Grove Pharms., Inc. v. Nat'l. Pediculosis Assoc., __ F. Supp.2d __, 2007 WL 4259422 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2007) (Bucklo, J.).

Judge Bucklo granted in part defendants Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss and denied defendants’ motion to transfer the case to the Eastern District of Michigan. Plaintiff manufactures a line of lotions and shampoo which are FDA-approved for treating lice and scabies.  Defendants are a Michigan non-profit group, Ecology Center, Inc., and related individuals (collectively the "Center"), as well as the National Pediculosis Association. The Center mailed two newsletters related to passage of Michigan legislation to approximately 19,000 addresses of which 44 were in Illinois.  99% of the Center's donors were from Michigan, with just .23% from Illinois (18 Illinois-based donors total).  The Center's strongest ties to Illinois consisted of two donations totaling $270,000 from an Illinois-based foundation and an interactive website which accepts donations, although none have come from Illinois.  The Court previously held that these contacts did not create general jurisdiction.* 

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Tamburo v. Dworkin, No. 04 C 3317, 2007 WL 3046216 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 2007) (Gottschall, J.).

Judge Gottschall granted defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs sell a dog breeding and pedigree software program and sought, among other things, a declaratory judgment that certain allegedly factual information (date of birth, gender, parent’s names, titles, color, medical information, etc.) included in its pedigree database was not copyrightable and, therefore, could not be infringed by plaintiffs. Defendants either offer allegedly competing software or are dog breeders who use such software. The Court held that it lacked general or specific jurisdiction over each of the defendants. There was no general jurisdiction because plaintiffs identified, at most, minimal interactions with and sales to Illinois residents. And defendants various websites were not sufficiently targeted to Illinois to alone create general jurisdiction. The Court similarly found that it lacked specific jurisdiction. Of particular interest, the Court held that defendants’ posts to internet chat groups and message boards could not create specific jurisdictions. The posts allegedly accused plaintiffs of theft and trafficking in stolen goods, among other things. The Court held that, while the Seventh Circuit had not addressed the issue or expressly adopted the Zippo sliding scale analysis, posts to internet chat rooms and message boards would fall below passive websites, which make up the bottom of the Zippo scale. Defendants are not alleged to own the chat rooms or to use them to transact or target business within Illinois. The Court reasoned that a holding that specific jurisdiction was created by postings to chat rooms would make jurisdiction boundless because the chat rooms have no geographic restrictions.

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Medallion Products, Inc. v. H.C.T.V., Inc., No. 06 C 2597, 2007 WL 3085913 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 18, 2007) (Darrah, J.).

Judge Darrah dismissed defendant Broadcast Arts Group (“BAG”) for lack of personal jurisdiction, but held that the Court had personal jurisdiction over defendant ICC, Woodridge Specialty Products Corp. and an individual defendant (collectively “ICC Defendants”). Plaintiffs argued that BAG’s tortious acts against plaintiffs, all Illinois residents, created personal jurisdiction based upon the effects test doctrine. But the Court held that the alleged tortious acts against were not sufficient for jurisdiction because BAG was a Florida resident and all of its allegedly tortious acts were performed in Florida or Pennsylvania, at the request of non-Illinois residents. 

The alleged tortious acts of the ICC Defendants, however, did create personal jurisdiction pursuant to the effects test doctrine. The ICC Defendants allegedly entered an agreement to develop, market and sell a counterfeit pet-stain removal product that was packaged in bottles using plaintiff’s “Urine Gone” logo. The alleged acts and resulting injury would have occurred in Illinois.

The Court also held that plaintiffs met the Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 pleading standards as clarified in Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, ____ U.S. ____, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007). So, the Court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ state law claims.

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Chicago Architecture Foundation v. Domain Magic LLC, No. 07 C 764, Slip Op. (N.D.Ill. October 12, 2007) (Norgle, J.).

Judge Norgle denied defendant’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Although defendant was a Florida corporation, defendant’s website – www.chicagoarchitecturefoundation.com – played upon plaintiff Chicago Architecture Foundation’s (“CAF”) name and only included links to other Chicago businesses. The Court, therefore, held that defendant’s website targeted the Northern District creating general personal jurisdiction.

Additionally, as a Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 sanction for failing to answer interrogatory responses as the Court ordered, the Court held that defendant generated revenue from the use of CAF’s trademark. 

Practice tip: Answer discovery requests on time and, if you cannot for some reason, at least answer them by the Court ordered deadline. 

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Steiner Indus., Inc. v. Auburn Mfg., Inc., No. 07 C 668, 2007 WL 1834176 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 22, 2007) (Darrah, J.).

Judge Darrah denied declaratory judgment defendant Auburn Manufacturing’s (“Auburn”) motion to dismiss. Auburn argued that plaintiff’s (collectively “DJ Plaintiffs”) suit improperly anticipated Auburn’s complaint which alleged Lanham Act claims of false designation and false advertising, as well as related state law claims. Auburn filed its complaint in the District of Maine within a week of DJ Plaintiffs’ filing. Auburn alleged that DJ Plaintiffs’ use of “FM Approved” and “Made in the USA” in their catalogs and website advertising in connection with their welding blankets constituted false designation and false advertising. DJ Plaintiffs were aware of the allegations before they filed suit because, as part of an ongoing negotiation with plaintiffs, Auburn had provided plaintiffs a copy of its complaint. The Court acknowledged its discretion to dismiss the case in favor of Auburn’s later filed complaint, but did not dismiss the case. The two cases mirrored each other, so either could resolve the parties’ dispute. And because both cases were filed in federal courts, there was no concern that the DJ case would cause friction between federal and state courts. The deciding issue was whether the Maine Court could offer a full remedy. DJ Plaintiffs had a motion to transfer or dismiss pending before the Maine Court. In that motion, DJ Plaintiffs argued that the Maine Court lacked personal jurisdiction over two of the three DJ Plaintiffs – Steiner Industries, Inc. and Lab Safety Supply, Inc. DJ Plaintiffs, therefore, asked the Maine Court to transfer the case to the Northern District of Illinois or to dismiss the case.  The Court held that if the Maine Court transferred the case to the Northern District or dismissed Steiner and Lab Safety for lack of jurisdiction, those factors would weigh in favor of maintaining the DJ action. If, however, the Maine Court denied DJ Plaintiffs’ motion and held that it had jurisdiction over all DJ Plaintiffs, then the Main Court could more effectively decide the dispute than the Northern District. The Court, therefore, denied the motion to dismiss with leave to refile if the Maine Court finds it has jurisdiction over all DJ Plaintiffs and does not transfer the case to the Northern District.

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Varitalk, LLC v. Lahoti, No. 07 C 1771, 2007 WL 1576127 (N.D. Ill. May 30, 2007) (Conlon, J.).

Judge Conlon denied defendant Dave Lahoti’s (“Lahoti”) Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for reconsideration of the Court’s previous opinion denying Lahoti’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue and forum non conveniens (you can read more about the previous decision in the Blog’s archives). Lahoti, a California resident, operated a website from California using the domain name www.veritalk.com. Lahoti’s site was an internet portal which allowed visitors to his site to click through links to buy various products or services. The Court held that Lahoti’s website fell in the gray area between active websites (which create specific jurisdiction) and passive websites (which do not create specific jurisdiction). But the portal’s interactive and commercial nature combined with plaintiff Varitalk’s evidence that some consumers were confused and erroneously visited Lahoti’s website created personal jurisdiction. Lahoti argued for reconsideration because he contends that his website did not link to businesses located in or doing business in Illinois, and that a third party puts the content on his website. The Court denied both of these arguments, explaining that Varitalk had put presented evidence that Lahoti’s website included links to business with substantial Illinois operations and that whether Lahoti or an agent of his placed the content on his website did not change the Court’s analysis. But the Court’s procedural analysis may be the most useful part of this case for litigators. The Court notes that Lahoti styled his motion as a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for reconsideration, but that it is actually a Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) motion. Rule 60(b) is for reconsideration of final judgments, where as Rule 54(b) is for interlocutory decisions. A denial of a motion to dismiss is necessarily interlocutory.

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Trading Techs. Int'l., Inc. v. GL Consultants, No. 05 C 4120, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2007) (Gottschall, J.).*

Judge Gottschall denied defendant GL Trade SA's ("GL SA") motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, with leave to refile after completion of jurisdictional discovery.  GL SA is a French company located in Paris.  GL SA does not have an office or any assets in Illinois, but it does have a subsidiary, defendant GL Americas, Inc. ("GL Americas").  GL Americas maintains a regional office in Chicago.  The Court noted that despite three rounds of briefing on jurisdiction, neither party "provided anything of substance to the court."  Plaintiff Trading Technologies ("TT") treated GL SA's subsidiary GL Americas as GL SA, and had not submitted evidence of GL SA's specific contacts with Illinois.  GL SA submitted several declarations, but none sufficiently clarified that GL SA did not have minimum contacts with Illinois.  As a result, the Court held that it lacked sufficient evidence to rule upon the motion, and granted TT's motion for jurisdictional discovery.

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Morton Grove Pharms., Inc. v. Nat'l. Pediculosis Assoc., __ F. Supp.2d __, 2007 WL 1302971 (N.D. Ill. May 3, 2007) (Bucklo, J.).

Judge Bucklo granted defendants' motion and dismissed plaintiff's deceptive trade practices case for lack of personal jurisdiction.  Defendants' sporadic contacts with Illinois did not confer general jurisdiction.  Plaintiff manufactures a line of lotions and shampoo which are FDA-approved for treating lice and scabies.  Defendants are a Michigan non-profit group, Ecology Center, Inc., and related individuals (collectively the "Center"), as well as the National Pediculosis Association which is not a party to the motion to dismiss.The Center mailed two newsletters related to passage of Michigan legislation to approximately 19,000 addresses of which 44 were in Illinois.  99% of the Center's donors were from Michigan, with just .23% from Illinois (18 Illinois-based donors total).  The Center's strongest ties to Illinois consisted of two donations totaling $270,000 from an Illinois-based foundation and an interactive website which accepts donations, although none have come from Illinois.  The Court held that these occasional contacts did not rise to the level of continuous and systematic, as required for general jurisdiction.

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Gencor Pacific, Inc. v. Nature's Thyme, LLC, No. 07 C 167, 2007 WL 1225362 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2007) (Kocoras, J.).

Judge Kocoras granted defendants' Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2)&(3) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and venue and dismissed the case.  Plaintiff brought this Lanham Act false advertising and copyright infringement case alleging that defendants used portions of plaintiff's copyrighted studies regarding the efficacy of a weight-loss and appetite suppressant containing Caralluma Fimbriata extract.  Defendants, a business and two individuals employed by the business, were residents of New Jersey and had a single sale to an Illinois customer, valued at $300.  Defendants only other contacts with Illinois were an interactive website accessible in Illinois and the fact that one or two of defendants' general solicitations may have been sent to Illinois.  Defendants did not own property in Illinois and there was no proof that any defendants sent any of the allegedly infringing information to Illinois.  The Court held these contacts were not sufficient to create either general or specific jurisdiction.  The Court also held that venue was not proper in the Northern District of Illinois because defendants were not residents of Illinois and the acts at issue in the suit did not occur in the Northern District.

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United States Gypsum Co. v. LaFarge N. Am., Inc., No. 03 C 6027, 2007 WL 1100804 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 3, 2007) (Hart, J.).

Judge Hart granted in part and denied in part the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment.  This case was a dispute over technology related to gypsum wallboard manufacturing and included patent infringement, trade secret misappropriation, breach of contract, Stored Communications Act ("SCA"), Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA") and various related state tort claims.  The Court first looked at plaintiff's patent infringement claims regarding methods for making gypsum board and resolved the parties' claim construction disputes.  The Court then turned to defendants' argument that plaintiff was estopped from claiming infringement by equivalents because it failed to expressly refer to the doctrine of equivalents in its complaint or in its contention interrogatory responses.  The Court held that it was sufficient to allege infringement and cite Section 271 in a complaint.  And as to waiver for failure to disclose equivalents in its interrogatory responses, the Court held that defendants had shown no prejudice from plaintiff's failure to disclose equivalents and that while plaintiff did not use the term equivalents in its responses, it did state that it contended defendants infringed the patents even if defendants processes did not meet timing requirements in the claims.  As a result, plaintiff was not barred from arguing infringement pursuant to the doctrine of equivalents.

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GMAC Real Estate, LLC v. E.L. Cutler & Assocs., Inc., 472 F. Supp.2d 960 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 20, 2006) (Bucklo, J.).

Judge Bucklo held that the Court lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant and dismissed plaintiff's complaint.  Plaintiff, a franchiser of residential real estate brokerages, brought this suit alleging that defendant, a former franchisee, breached its agreement with plaintiff and after the breach continued using plaintiff's trade and service marks.  The Court held that defendant's continued business relationship with plaintiff after plaintiff moved from New Jersey to Illinois was not sufficient to create specific jurisdiction.  While defendant had exchanged some communications with plaintiff in Illinois and come to Illinois for business meetings on one or more occasions, the Court lacked jurisdiction because the parties negotiated the underlying agreement in New Jersey (plaintiff's prior main office) and Ohio (defendant's location); defendant paid its franchising fees to plaintiff's Pennsylvania office; defendant's post-termination obligations which it allegedly did not meet were to have been performed in Ohio; and plaintiff's letter to defendant terminating the franchise agreement had a New Jersey return address.  Furthermore, the Court held that the location of defendant's alleged trademark infringement and cybersquatting was in Ohio, not Illinois.

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Kennelsource, Inc. v. Barking Hound Village, LLC, No. 05 C 1788, 2006 WL 2578975 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 5, 2006) (Grady, J.)

Judge Grady dismissed plaintiff's complaint with prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction.  Plaintiff alleged that defendants, several Georgia and Texas entities and individuals, worked together or at each other's direction to steal plaintiff's pet-care business management software and to infringe plaintiff's copyrights for the software.

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Underwriters Labs. Inc. v. Hydrofilm L.P., No. 05 C 5509, 2006 WL 2494748 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2006) (Guzman, J.).

Although this opinion deals solely with non-IP issues, it is interesting because it addresses how corporate websites fit into a personal jurisdiction analysis.  Judge Guzman held that while the Court had subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's declaratory judgment claims (based upon defendants's voluntary withdrawal without prejudice of a related suit against plaintiff), the Court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants. 

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