Chicago IP Attorney & Lawyer : R. David Donoghue : Chicago IP Litigation Blog

Vulcan Golf, LLC v. Google Inc., No. 07 C 3371, 2008 WL 818346 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2008) (Manning, J.).

Judge Manning granted in part the defendants' Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiffs' RICO, Lanham Act and related state law claims. Plaintiffs alleged that the "parking defendants" – entities that allegedly register common misspellings of domain names – worked together and conspired with defendant Google to populate the misspelled domains with revenue-generating advertising related to the actual web sites' business.*

Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act ("ACPA")

The Court denied the Parking Defendants motion to dismiss plaintiffs' ACPA claims. While plaintiffs did not allege that the Parking Defendants were the registrants of the domains at issue, they did allege that the Parking Defendants registered, owned, and controlled the sites. Furthermore, the Court would not rule on the factual issue of whether the domains – for example, vulcangolf.com and vulcanogolf.com – were confusingly similar to plaintiffs' marks.

The Court denied Google's motion to dismiss because while Google did not register or own the domains at issue, it was sufficient that they allegedly "trafficked" in them by working in concert with the other defendants.

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Biopolymer Eng'ing, Inc. v. Biorigin, No. O7 C 4234, 2008 WL 927984 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 4, 2008) (Shadur, J.).

Judge Shadur, on the Court's own motion, struck the portions of defendant Biorigin's Answer that denied plaintiff's claims because plaintiff misspelled Biorigin – spelling it “Biorgin” instead of “Biorigin.” The Court noted that a denial based upon misspelling was an argument “only a patent lawyer could love.” And the Court explained that, despite plaintiff's misspelling, Biorigin understood that it was the intended target of plaintiff's complaint.

The Court also struck Biorigin's lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficient service and insufficient process affirmative defenses. The Court held that by filing a counterclaim, Biorigin affirmatively invoked the Court's jurisdiction, forfeiting these affirmative defenses.

As to Biorigin's lack of standing affirmative defense, the Court noted that it was pled on information and belief and required that Biorigin, should it find facts to support its defense, file a motion with such facts as quickly as possible because standing should be addressed as early as possible.

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Eva’s Bridal Ltd. v. Halanick Enter., Inc., No. 07 C 1668, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 2008) (Darrah, J.).*

Judge Darrah denied plaintiff’s (collectively “Eva’s Bridal”) motion to dismiss defendants’ (collectively “Halanick”) counterclaims, including Halanick’s claim for declaratory judgment that Eva’s Bridal abandoned its Eva’s Bridal mark.** Halanick’s allegations that Eva’s Bridal caused its mark to lose significance by “destroy[ing]” its good name and failing to stop Halanick’s use of the mark after the parties’ business relationship ended were sufficient to state a claim.

* Click here for a copy of the opinion.

** Halanick had non-IP claims related to the business relationship between the parties, but they will not be addressed here.

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Am. Needle, Inc. v. New Orleans, Louisiana Saints, No. 04 C 7806, 2007 WL 4766815 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).

Judge Moran dismissed plaintiff’s remaining antitrust monopolization claim against various NFL entities and the 32 NFL teams.* Despite the fact that the NFL teams were a single entity for licensing purposes,** the NFL team could still be liable for monopolization outside of coordinated licensing efforts . But the alleged monopolization – licensing of defendants’ trademarks – can be done at defendants’ whim without violating antitrust laws based on the NFL’s status as a single entity.

*  Congrats to the New York Giants and Michigan Man Amani Toomer on a great Super Bowl victory.

** Click here for the post on that opinion in the Blog’s archives.

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Matteo v. Rubin, No. 07 C 2536, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Dec. 3, 2007) (Kendall, J.).

Judge Kendall denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s copyright infringement and related state law claims. Plaintiff photographed defendant’s daughter’s wedding pursuant to a contract between plaintiff and defendant’s wife. Defendant was allegedly unsatisfied with plaintiff’s photographs and, therefore, allegedly created numerous website regarding plaintiff’s photographs including defamatory comments about both plaintiff and his photographs. The Court held that plaintiff stated a claim for copyright infringement because he pled that he owned copyrights in his photos and that defendant infringed those copyrights by posting the pictures on websites. Plaintiff was not required to plead that defendant received any economic benefit from his alleged infringement. Additionally, plaintiff did not have to register his copyright before defendant’s allegedly infringing acts. Finally, the Court held that defendant’s fair use defense was not grounds for dismissal. Fair use is a factual inquiry best resolved on summary judgment or at trial.

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Nutrinova Nutrition Specialties & Food Ingredients GmbH v. Viachem, No. 07 C 4232, Min. Order (N.D. Ill. Nov. 27, 2007) (St. Eve, J.).

Judge St. Eve granted in part plaintiff’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e) motion for a more definite statement regarding defendant The Ingredient House’s (“TIH”) affirmative defenses and counterclaim. The Court ordered TIH to amend its patent misuse affirmative defense to provide factual allegations outlining the alleged misuse. TIH’s original defense simply stated that plaintiff’s claims were “barred by patent misuse.” The Court also ordered TIH to amend “incongruous statements” in its pleading that appeared to be clerical errors.

The Court denied plaintiff’s motion as to TIH’s defamation counterclaim. TIH was not required to plead which state’s law governed TIH’s defamation claim.

Practice Tip: Defendants frequently plead affirmative defenses with an unsupported statement of the defense. The better practice, and the one that avoids Rule 12(e) motions, is to plead at least the basic facts underlying the defense.

 

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WMH Tool Group, Inc. v. Woodstock Int’l, Inc., No. 07 C 3885, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 2007) (Darrah, J.).*

Judge Darrah denied defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiff WMH Tool Group’s (“WMH”) Lanham Act dilution claim and its related Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (“Consumer Fraud Act”) claim. WMH registered a trade dress for the color white on its woodworking and metal working products, sold under its JET brand. WMH alleged that its white trade dress was both famous and exclusively associated with WHM’s tools. WMH further alleged that defendant Woodstock International (“Woodstock”) diluted WMH’s trade dress by selling woodworking and metal working tools in WMH’s distinctive white color under Woodstock’s Shop Fox brand. Similarly, WMH alleged that defendant Grizzly Industrial (“Grizzly”) diluted WMH’s trade dress by selling woodworking and metal working tools in WMH’s distinctive white color under Grizzly’s Grizzly or Grizzly Industrial brands. 

Defendants argued that WMH did not state a claim for dilution because the complaint did not specify the date when WMH’s trade dress became famous and that defendants’ allegedly infringing sales began after that date. But the Court held that notice pleading did not require that WMH plead specific dates. It was enough that WMH pled that the trade dress had become famous and that defendants' infringement of the trade dress occurred after the fame was acquired.

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Mullen v. Society of Stage Directors & Choreographers, No. 06 C 6818, 2007 WL 2892654 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 30, 2007) (Coar, J.).

Judge Coar granted in part defendant United Scenic Artists’ (“USA”) Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment (“DJ”) claims and denied all defendants’ motions seeking dismissal of plaintiffs’ defamation claim. Plaintiffs are the various production heads of the Chicago production of the musical “Urinetown!” (“Chicago Production”). The Chicago Production was performed pursuant to a license from Blue Dog Entertainment, LLC. But despite that license, plaintiffs each received a cease and desist letter from counsel for defendants (the heads of production of the Broadway Urinetown! production (“Broadway Production”) and their unions USA and the Society of Stage Directors & Choreographers (“SSDC”). The letter warned that plaintiffs willfully copied copyrighted aspects of the Broadway Production and attempted to pass off the Chicago Production as the award-winning Broadway Production. Defendants demanded an accounting of revenues from the Chicago Production in order to calculate damages. Defendants also held a press conference during which they publicly stated that the plaintiffs “plagiarized” the Broadway Production. Plaintiffs responded by filing suit seeking declaratory judgments that the Chicago Production did not infringe any of plaintiffs’ copyrights and that it was not Lanham Act passing off. And based upon the press conference, plaintiffs included a defamation claim.

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Sotelo v. Suburban 171, Inc., No. 07 C 2447, 2007 WL 2570355 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 2007) (Der-Yeghiayan, J.).

Judge Der-Yeghiayan denied defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ Lanham Act unfair competition claim. Plaintiffs operated a salon called “Studio 171.” Defendants took over the location of plaintiffs’ salon and operated their own salon using all of the Studio 171 signage and marks. Defendants argued that plaintiffs’ unfair competition claim should be dismissed because the Studio 171 mark was either descriptive or generic and plaintiff did not plead secondary meaning. But the Court held that the argument was premature. A plaintiff need not plead secondary meaning.* And furthermore, plaintiffs did plead secondary meaning, stating that the Studio 171 mark had developed “considerable value” and become “uniquely associated” with plaintiffs’ business. The Court did, however, dismiss plaintiffs’ RICO claim for failing to plead their fraud allegations with particularity pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).

* The Court did not cite the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007) (read more about the decision at the University of Chicago Faculty Blog).  But based on other recent opinions citing Twombly for heightened pleading requirements, I wonder if plaintiffs at least should plead secondary meaning now.

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UTStarcom, Inc. v. Starent Networks, Corp., No. 07 C 2582, Min. Order (N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 2007) (Lindberg, J.).

Judge Lindberg denied defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's state law claims and its claim seeking assignment of defendants' patents to plaintiffs.  The Court held that the claim seeking assignment of defendants patents to plaintiff was an invalidity contention.  Plaintiff claimed that it had invented defendants' patented inventions before defendants.  While plaintiff did not use the correct terms, it met the notice pleading standards.  Additionally, plaintiff's state law trade secret and tortious interference claims were sufficiently related to the patent claims to come within the Court's supplemental jurisdiction.

The Court refused to consider plaintiff's requests for additional discovery  because it was made orally in court and in plaintiff's responsive pleading, but never as a written motion as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1).

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Tillman v. New Line Cinema, No. 05 C 910, 2007 WL 2323302 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 2007) (Kennelly, J.)

Judge Kennelly denied plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, despite noting that Fed. R. Civ. P. 15A) requires that leave to amend be given “freely.” Plaintiff alleged that defendants collectively had access to his screen play “Kharisma Heart of Gold” about his experience with a sick child requiring heart surgery, stole it, produced it and released it as the movie “John Q.” Plaintiff filed his first complaint pro se alleging copyright infringement. Plaintiff then hired counsel and filed an amended complaint alleging copyright infringement and numerous other tort claims arising out of the alleged theft of plaintiff’s screen play. Various defendants filed motions to dismiss the amended complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) and for failure to state a claim regarding the non-copyright claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiff did not respond to that complaint, but filed a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. The Court* granted the motion to dismiss the individual defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction and the non-copyright claims against the remaining defendants. The Court also denied plaintiff leave to file its second amended complaint because it was futile. Plaintiff, again proceeding pro se, then sought leave to file a new second amended complaint. But the Court held that plaintiff’s current second amended complaint had no substantive changes from plaintiff’s original second amended complaint. The second amended complaint, therefore, was still futile. Additionally, the second amended complaint attempted to reassert claims against the individual defendants, who had been dismissed from the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction. Because the Court lacked personal jurisdiction, plaintiff could not draw the individual defendants back into the suit. 

* The case was originally before Judge Norberg, who decided the original motions to dismiss and motion for leave to file the second amended complaint, and has since been transferred to Judge Kennelly who heard this motion.

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Gencor Pacific, Inc. v. Federal Labs., Corp., No. 07 C 168, 2007 WL 2298367 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2007) (Guzman, J.).

Judge Guzman granted defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) motion to dismiss for lack of venue. Plaintiff Gencor Pacific (“Gencor”) and defendant Federal Laboratories (“Fedlabs”) both distribute products including caralluma powder. Gencor alleged that Fedlabs infringed Gencor’s copyrights, engaged in unfair competition and other related state law claims by using various Gencor studies and literature to promote Fedlabs’s products. Gencor also alleged that Fedlabs’s Chairman defendant Jeffery Taub left a defamatory voicemail message for an Illinois-based Gencor distributor. Because defendants are all New York residents, venue was only proper in the Northern District if a substantial part of the events at issue occurred in Illinois. Gencor argued that the Illinois voicemail and various Fedlabs mailings to Illinois residents including the copyrighted studies constituted a substantial part of the events at issue. In support of its contentions, Gencor submitted only a transcript of the alleged voicemail. Gencor did not submit any mailings that had been sent to Northern District residents or a declaration stating that the voicemail had been received at a Northern District telephone number. The Court held that Gencor’s unsupported “bare allegations” did not meet Gencor’s burden of proving that venue was proper.

Practice tip: You must support factual allegations with evidence. Local Rule 56.1 forces parties to follow this advice for summary judgment motions (although many fail to follow the rule). But the requirement, although unwritten, is no less important for other motions. If you are ever not sure whether an allegation requires evidentiary support, err on the side of providing the support. I have never seen an argument lost because a party unnecessarily supported its factual allegations.

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Allen v. Destiny’s Child, No. 06 C 6606, Min. Order (N.D. Ill. Jul. 30, 2007) (Holderman, C.J.).*

Judge Holderman granted in part defendant Andrea Murray’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s copyright infringement and related state law tort claims.  Plaintiff alleges that defendants, including the musical group Destiny’s Child and its members, infringed plaintiffs’ copyrights in his song “Cater 2 U” by producing and selling Destiny’s Child’s song of the same name (watch the video of  Destiny’s Child’s version on their website).  The Court denied the motion as to plaintiff’s copyright infringement claims for the reasons set forth in a separate order of the same date (you can read more about it in the Blog’s archives). The Court dismissed with prejudice plaintiff’s misappropriation claim because plaintiff failed to prove that Illinois recognizes a misappropriation claim separate from the Illinois Trade Secret Act. Additionally, plaintiff failed to identify a difference between his misappropriation claim and his claims for breach of implied contract and copyright infringement. The Court also dismissed plaintiff’s fraudulent misrepresentation claim with prejudice because plaintiff failed to produce evidence beyond a broken promise that defendants intended fraud. 

Defendant also argued that plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract claims should be dismissed because the alleged breaches occurred in or before 2000, but plaintiff did not file his complaint until November 2006. But plaintiff pled that he did not become aware of the breaches until the November 2004 release of the Destiny’s Child album that included Cater 2 U. Because plaintiff’s complaint did not establish a statute of limitations defense, the Court allowed the claims. Additionally, the Court noted that defendant’s arguments regarding pleading requirements were based in Illinois, despite the fact that federal pleadings are controlled by federal law.

*  You can read a copy of the Minute Order here.

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Allen v. Destiny’s Child, No. 06 C 6606, Min. Order (N.D. Ill. Jul. 30, 2007) (Holderman, C.J.).*

Judge Holderman granted in part defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s copyright infringement claims. Plaintiff alleges that defendants, including the musical group Destiny’s Child and its members, infringed plaintiffs’ copyrights in his song “Cater 2 U” by producing and selling Destiny’s Child’s song of the same name (watch the video of  Destiny’s Child’s version on their website). The Court dismissed the infringement claims regarding the two copyrights that plaintiff did not own, but allowed the claims as to plaintiff’s other two copyrights. Plaintiff’s allegations that he owned the two copyrights, provided copies of his performances of the song to various defendants who relayed them to Destiny’s Child and that the Destiny’s Child song is musically and lyrically similar were sufficient to meet the new Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss standard set forth in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1969 (2007) (read more about the decision at the University of Chicago Faculty Blog). The Court did, however, dismiss claims against defendant McDonald’s. McDonald’s was only charged with having received financial gain from the infringement because it sponsored a Destiny’s Child tour during which the song was performed. The Court quoted upon Twombly in explaining its decision:

The court is not convinced that [plaintiff] has “nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.”

*  You can read a copy of the Minute Order here.

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Meyer Intellectual Props. Ltd. V. Bodum, Inc., No. 06 C 6329, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jul. 24, 2007) (Shadur, J.).*

Judge Shadur denied defendant’s motion to amend its answer adding an equitable estoppel defense. The Court noted that amendments were usually “generously” allowed, but defendant provided no justification for not including equitable estoppel in its original answer. Defendant argued that it required investigation to discover its equitable estoppel defense, but the Court noted that the information defendant relied upon was in defendant’s possession. So, there was no reason that defendant could not have conducted its investigation before filing its answer.

 

*  A copy of the Opinion is available here.

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Ace v. Marn, No. 06 C 5335, 2007 WL 1541747 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 2007) (St. Eve, J.).

Judge St. Eve granted in part and denied in part plaintiff/counterdefendant Ace Hardware Corp.'s ("Ace") Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss defendants/counter-plaintiffs' (collectively "Marn") counterclaims.  The Court denied the motion as to Marn's breach of contract claim and dismissed Marn's fraud and tortious interference claims.  Ace and Marn entered an agreement (the "Agreement") allowing Marn the right to use certain Ace trademarks and to purchase product for resale from Ace.  Marn alleged that Ace and its representatives breached the Agreement, made numerous misrepresentations leading up to the signing of the Agreement and failed to provide promised inventory.  Ace argued that Marn's breach of contract claim should be dismissed because it did not identify a specific provision of the Agreement that was breached, citing several Northern District cases.  But noted that each of Marn's cases came down before the Seventh Circuit's decision in Kolupa v. Roselle Park Dist., 438 F.3d 713, (7th Cir. 2006).  In Kolupa the Seventh Circuit explained the Rule 8(a)(2) requirements:

[i]t is enough to name the plaintiff and the defendant, state the nature of the grievance, and give a few tidbits (such as the date) that will let the defendant investigate. . . .  Any district judge (for that matter, any defendant) tempted to write "this complaint is deficient because it does not contain ..." should stop and think:  What rule of law requires a complaint to contain that allegation?  Any decision declaring "this complaint is deficient because it does not allege X" is a candidate for summary reversal, unless X is on the list in Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).

Kolupa at 714-15 (emphasis in original).  Based upon the Kolupa decision the Court held that Marn was not required to cite a specific breached section of the Agreement.

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Playboy Enters. Int'l., Inc. v. 3E Trading, LLC, No. 07 C 1111, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2007) (Shadur, J.).*

Judge Shadur struck defendant's answer sua sponte, with leave to file an amended answer.  Plaintiff Playboy Enterprises International ("Playboy") alleged in its Complaint that the parties entered a series of agreements (the "Agreements") pursuant to which defendant 3E Trading ("3E") was licensed to use various Playboy trademarks in connection with the sale of specifically defined categories of products -- for example money clips, lamps, glassware and bar accessories.  But Playboy contended that 3E continued selling the previously licensed products after the Agreements expired.  3E answered the Complaint (here is a copy of the Answer), as many defendants do, with numerous blanket denials and Fed. R. Civ. P 8(b) statements that 3E lacked sufficient knowledge or information to admit or deny the allegations.  The Court identified numerous paragraphs that it did not believe could be denied for lack of information with the good faith required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).  For example, the Court held that 3E must have had some knowledge by virtue of its entry into the Agreements as to at least some of the statements made in paragraphs 6 and 7 identifying certain marks allegedly owned by Playboy and the fact that the marks were valuable.  The Court did not identify all of the deficiencies it found, but warned that answers such as this one "tend to defeat the entire purpose of notice pleading."  The Court required, as noted above, that 3E amend its answer and required that 3E's counsel:  1) not charge 3E for amending the Answer; and 2) copy the Court on a letter to 3E explaining that they will not be charged for the amended Answer.

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Ortho-Tain, Inc. v. Rocky Mountain Orthodontics, Inc., No. 05 C 6656, 2007 WL 1238917 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 2007) (Leinenweber, J.).

Judge Leinenweber granted plaintiff's Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) motion to strike, dismissing without prejudice defendants' respective patent misuse affirmative defenses and all patent-related statements in defendants' counterclaims.  Plaintiff, Ortho-Tain ("OT"), sued Rocky Mountain Orthodontics ("RMO") and Planmeca Oy ("Planmeca") alleging that RMO breached the distributorship agreement between the OT and RMO.  Pursuant to the Agreement, OT manufactured dental appliances (allegedly covered by OT's patents) and RMO sold those appliances in France.  RMO allegedly breached the Agreement by sourcing equivalent dental appliances from Planmeca.  RMO counterclaimed for, among other things, declaratory judgment of noninfringement and unenforceability of OT's relevant United States patents.  The Court previously dismissed defendants' patent-related declaratory judgment counterclaims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  OT now argues that the Court should strike RMO's and Planmeca's respective patent misuse affirmative defenses because they are insufficient.  The Court first held that patent misuse was a proper affirmative defense, negating the first prong of a Rule 12(f) analysis. 

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Flentye v. Kathrein, __ F. Supp.2d __, 2007 WL 1175576 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 18, 2007) (Filip, J.).

Judge Filip denied defendants' motions to dismiss, except as to plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, because Illinois law does not allow punitives for IIED.  Plaintiffs (collectively "Flentye") promoted apartment rental services , including some properties owned by Flentye, using their family name, Flentye.  Defendants competed with Flentye promoting similar apartments, some of which were owned by defendant Kathrein LLC.  Flentye brought suit against defendants alleging violations of the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act ("ACPA"), Lanham Act unfair competition and related state law claims.  Flentye alleges that defendants lost a dispute before the UDRP and were forced to return certain domain names to Flentye, including timflentye.com, flentye.com and flentyeproperties.com.  Flentye alleged that defendants then registered new domain name timflentye-not.com and used it to direct traffic to defendants' competing websites.  Flentye also alleged that defendants improperly used the term "Flentye" in its meta tags (key words embedded into a site's source code to director search engines to the site) to direct users seeking information regarding Flentye to defendants sites. 

Defendants first argued that Flentye failed to plead its veil-piercing claims and that, therefore, corporate defendant Kathrein LLC should be dismissed because there were not sufficient allegations against it without a veil-piercing theory.  But the Court held that notice pleading was sufficient for a veil-piercing argument and that Flentye met the notice standard.  It was sufficient that Flentye pled that individual defendant Kathrein  created defendant Kathrein LLC "for the sole purpose of holding title to local real estate through which [Kathrein] operates Lee Street Management" and that in the caption Kathrein LLC was identified as "d/b/a Lee Street Management."  The Court noted that while these allegations might not be sufficient to prove that the veil was pierced, they were sufficient for Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) notice pleading.  The Court also noted that a claim of corporate veil-piercing did not require Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) heightened pleading.

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Fast Food Gourmet, Inc. v. Little Lady Foods, Inc., No. 05 C 6022, 2007 WL 1175577 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 2007) (Aspen, J.).

Judge Aspen denied defendant Little Lady Foods, Inc.'s ("LLF") Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiff Fast Food Gourmet, Inc.'s ("FFGI") breach of contract claim.  FFGI alleged that FFGI entered a "co-packing" relationship with LLF, essentially that LLF was to manufacture FFGI's product.  Based upon that relationship, FFGI provided LLF with its various trade secrets relating to producing "a unique stone hearth oven thin crust frozen pizza."  In addition to its formulas, recipes, methods and techniques, FFGI also provided LLF its equipment.  FFGI alleged that, in addition to making pizzas for FFGI, LLG worked with defendant Kraft Foods Global, Inc. ("Kraft") to develop a line of pizzas using FFGI's trade secrets, with substantially the same crusts as the FFGI pizzas.  FFGI brought claims for misappropriation of trade secrets against both defendants, breach of contract against LLF and unjust enrichment against Kraft.  LLF sought to dismiss FFGI's breach of contract claim to the extent it was based upon allegations that the agreement was breached by production of pizzas for Kraft with crusts nearly identical to FFGI's crusts.  LLF first argued that the agreement could not be breached because the agreement prohibits LLF from producing "pizzas with specification which are identical or . . . substantially identical to" the FFGI pizzas.  Because FFGI only pled that the crusts were identical or substantially identical, LLF argued the claim should be dismissed.  But the Court held that FFGI was only required to provide notice pleading of claims, not facts.  Because FFGI identified the parties, stated the nature of its dispute and provided "a few tidbits" LLF was sufficiently on notice.

LLF also argued that the claim should be dismissed because the FFGI and Kraft pizzas are substantially different because Kraft's sauce and/or toppings are very different than FFGI's.  But the Court refused to make factual determinations in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and denied LLF's motion.

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Abbott Labs. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., No. 05 C 6561, 2007 WL 625496 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 2007) (Kendall, J.).

Judge Kendall denied plaintiff's, Abbott, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss defendant's, Mylan, antitrust counterclaims.  Mylan alleged that two Abbott employees submitted declarations and/or testimony stating the weight and structure of certain oligomers related to the patented invention, despite their knowledge that the tests they relied upon were known to be incapable of measuring the oligomers at issue.  Mylan further alleged that based upon these fraudulent statements, the USPTO issued certain of the patents-in-suit which then prevented Mylan from entering the market with a generic version of Abbott's pharmaceutical Depakote.  Abbott relied upon a prior Northern District ruling against third party Torpharm which held that Abbott's conduct before the USPTO was not inequitable.  But the Court held that while that ruling prevented a sham litigation claim, it did not estop Mylan's inequitable conduct allegations because Mylan was not a party to the prior case and, therefore, had no opportunity to present its evidence and argument.  Additionally, the Court held that Mylan adequately alleged antitrust injury by stating that it prepared to enter the market with generic Depakote, but was prevented from doing so by Abbott's alleged inequitable conduct.

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After Hours Formalwear, Inc. v. Tuxedos, Inc., No. 06 C 2460, 2007 WL 404005 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 2007) (Guzman, J.).

Judge Guzman denied plaintiff's Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss certain of defendants' tortious interference and antitrust claims.  Plaintiff, After Hours Formalwear ("AHF"), controls at least 50% of Chicago's formalwear market.  AHF acquired a group of formalwear stores operating under the mark "Modern Tuxedo" and converted them to its AHF mark.  Shortly thereafter, defendants, including Tuxedos, Inc., (collectively "Tuxedos") renamed its stores, "Formally Modern Tuxedo."  This renaming led to AHF's suit against Tuxedos for trademark infringement and unfair competition.  Tuxedos responded with counterclaims alleging tortious interference of various kinds, and both federal and state antitrust violations.  Basically, Tuxedos alleged that AHF was using baseless trademark infringement claims to harass Tuxedos' customers and push Tuxedos out of the market.

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Shen Wei (USA) Inc. v. Sempermed, Inc., No. 05 C 6004, 2007 WL 328846 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 30, 2007) (Guzman, J.).

Judge Guzman granted defendant leave to amend its answer adding inequitable conduct affirmative defenses and counterclaims alleging that plaintiffs failed to disclose their prior art sale of a medical glove embodying their invention, but not regarding the existence and sale of a third party's glove of which plaintiffs were allegedly aware.  The Court held that defendant's affirmative defense and counterclaim met the Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) standard with respect to plaintiffs' alleged sale of their own product more than one year before their priority date because, although defendant did identify the person who intended to deceive the USPTO, it was reasonable to conclude that the inventor was charged with the intent.  With regards to the sale of the third party, Ostar, glove defendant only alleged that plaintiffs generally knew of the glove and its materiality, but failed to disclose it.  Defendant did not plead with sufficient specificity:  who knew about the Ostar glove, what they knew, when they knew it, whether the failure to disclose was intentional or why the Ostar glove was material. 

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Microthin.com, Inc. v. Siliconezone USA, LLC, No. 06 C 1522, 2006 WL 3302825 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 2006) (Kendall, J.).

Judge Kendall held that plaintiff's patent claim did not give the Court supplemental jurisdiction over defendants' assault and battery, trespass, breach of contract and tortious interference counterclaims, even though the counterclaims were arguably related to plaintiff's patent infringement allegations.  The Court did, however, have diversity jurisdiction over the counterclaims.  After concluding it had jurisdiction, the Court dismissed the assault and battery counterclaims because there is no tort of assault against a corporation in Illinois.  The Court also dismissed the breach of contract claim, because plaintiff/counter-defendant was neither a party to the contract, nor an intended beneficiary. 

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QSRSoft, Inc. v. Restaurant Tech., Inc., No. 06 C 2734, 2006 WL 3196928 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 2, 2006) (Der-Yeghiayan, J.).

In this trade secret and copyright dispute, Judge Der-Yeghiayan granted the individual defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's conversion claim because it was preempted by plaintiff's Illinois Trade Secrets Act claim.  The Court, however, denied the remainder of the motion.  The remainder of the challenged the sufficiency of the pleadings generally, as well as each count specifically.  The individual defendants argued that each of the counts was not sufficiently plead because plaintiff failed to specifically identify each defendant by name, instead they were collectively referred to in the allegations as "defendants."  The Court held that the general references to the "defendants" were more than sufficient to put defendants on notice of the alleged acts.

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Huthwaite, Inc. v. Randstad General Partner (US), L.L.C., No. 06 C 1548, 2006 WL 3065470 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2006) (Lefkow, J.).

Plaintiff, a corporate sales training services provider, contacted defendant, an employment services provider, to discuss improving defendant's sales training offerings.  Plaintiff told defendant that it knew defendant's current training materials incorporated techniques from plaintiff's copyrighted books -- "SPIN Selling" and "Major Account Sales Strategy" -- but assured defendant that it would not file a copyright infringement suit.  As discussions between the parties progressed, plaintiff asked to review defendant's training materials and promised defendant that it would not bring a copyright suit if the materials contained plaintiff's copyrighted information.   Defendant ultimately gave plaintiff its training materials, but only after signing a nondisclosure agreement requiring that the documents not be used for, among other things, filing a copyright infringement suit.  Two days after receiving defendant's documents, plaintiff filed a copyright infringement suit.  In response, defendant filed fraud and breach of contract counterclaims alleging that plaintiff was engaged in a broad scheme to leverage its copyrights be gaining the trust of potential infringers through marketing discussions and that the suit breached the nondisclosure agreement between the parties.

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Conditioned Ocular Enhancement, Inc. v. Bonaventura, 05 C 3153, 2006 WL 2982140 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 2006) (Zagel, J.).

Judge Zagel held that Illinois's absolute litigation privilege, which protects communications leading up to a litigation, did not protect a patentholder's cease and desist letters because, in addition to federal preemption issues, the Illinois privilege is limited to defamation and false light claims.  Plaintiff alleged that defendant was practicing its patented vision training services.  In addition to filing suit, plaintiff also sent certain of defendant's customers cease and desist letters warning that defendant was unlawfully using plaintiff's patented vision training methods.  Defendant filed several Lanham Act and tortious interference counterclaims alleging that plaintiff's cease and desist letters were sent in bad faith.

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Nordstrom Consulting, Inc. v. M&S Techs., Inc., No. 06 C 3234, 2006 WL 2931677 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2006) (Darrah, J.).

Judge Darrah held that plaintiff plead sufficient allegations to meet the pleading requirements to include the individual defendants, Marino and Butler who were both employees of the corporate defendant, M&S Technologies ("M&S").  Plaintiff alleged that Marino and Bulter, acting on M&S's behalf, broke into plaintiff's computer, bypassed its digital security system and then downloaded, copied and distributed plaintiff's copyrighted software.  Based on these allegations plaintiff alleged copyright infringement, violation of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, unfair competition and other common law claims.

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Gail Green Licensing & Design Ltd. v. Accord, Inc., No. 05 C 5303, 2006 WL 2873202 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 2006) (St. Eve, J.).

Judge St. Eve dismissed plaintiffs's Lanham Act false advertising claim, but refused to dismiss plaintiffs's breach of contract claim, among others.  Both claims are based upon defendants's receipt of plaintiffs's copyrighted designs for pet clothing and accessories pursuant to a Non-Disclosure and Confidentiality Agreement (the "NDA") and defendants's subsequent alleged sale of  goods based upon plaintiffs's copyrighted designs.

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DeVore Family Partnership LLP v. McDougal Littell, No. 06 C 3484, 2006 WL 2861116 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2006) (Conlon, J.).

Judge Conlon refused to dismiss or strike plaintiff's claim for defendants' profits from sales of a textbook which allegedly included plaintiff's copyrighted photograph.  Plaintiff alleged that it licensed defendants to include plaintiff's photograph of the Himalaya Mountains in a run of no more than 40,000 textbooks, but that defendants made almost 1.5 million copies of the book.  Plaintiff sought, among other things, defendants' profits from the allegedly infringing textbooks.

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Kennelsource, Inc. v. Barking Hound Village, LLC, No. 05 C 1788, 2006 WL 2578975 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 5, 2006) (Grady, J.)

Judge Grady dismissed plaintiff's complaint with prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction.  Plaintiff alleged that defendants, several Georgia and Texas entities and individuals, worked together or at each other's direction to steal plaintiff's pet-care business management software and to infringe plaintiff's copyrights for the software.

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MPC Containment Sys., Ltd. v. Moreland, No. 05 C 6973, 2006 WL 2331148 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2006) (Aspen, J.).

Judge Aspen granted defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiff’s Lanham Act unfair competition claim for failure to meet the Rule 9(b) heightened pleading requirements.  Plaintiff’s bare allegation that the individual defendants made misrepresentations to a single customer did not satisfy Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirements.