Chicago IP Attorney & Lawyer : R. David Donoghue : Chicago IP Litigation Blog

Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Montrose Wholesale Candies & Sundries, Inc., No. 03 C 5311 & 0844, 2008 WL 954161 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 8, 2008) (Cole, Mag. J.).

Judge Cole denied plaintiff's motion for inspection and seizure of assets in its trademark counterfeiting case. The Court previously entered judgment for plaintiff – click here for more about this case in the Blog's archives. Plaintiff brought this motion seeking to identify and seize cash, checks and other financial instruments to satisfy the judgment. The Court held that the motion essentially sought a search warrant directed by plaintiff and utilizing Federal Marshals:

The reality is that the motion is tantamount to a request for a search warrant for Lorillard to enter and search the home of Ray and Sandra Hazemi and the business premises of Montrose Wholesale Candies and Sundries, Inc. (which is owned by them) and for permission to seize any cash, checks or other negotiable instruments belonging to the Hazemis and Montrose and to seize or at least copy all of their financial and accounting records. Nothing in the Motion, itself, suggests that the search and seizure will be accomplished by anyone other than Lorillard. It is not until one looks at the Proposed Order granting the motion that there is even a motion of United States Marshals. But even then, it is Lorillard, through its counsel of record, who is to carry out the search and seizure. The Marshals are merely to accompany Lorillard.

The Court held that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not authorize search warrants. The Court further held that the request was not like a seizure of counterfeit goods, which was authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1)(A), because it sought a post-judgment search to satisfy a judgment.

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Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, Min. Order (N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2008) (Moran, Sen. J.).*

I have received several emails asking about the status of this case and, specifically, when the inequitable conduct portion of the case will be decided.  The post-trial inequitable conduct briefing appears to be complete -- if you want to read the briefs, they are largely available on Pacer.  So, unless the Court asks for further briefing or an additional hearing either of which seem unlikely, the Court will consider the evidence and the parties' post-trial papers, and then write an opinion deciding the inequitable conduct issues.  There is not any way to accurately predict when the opinion will issue.  The timing is governed by numerous factors, including the complexity of the case and the size of the Court's current docket. 

Additionally, the parties have filed other motions which the Court will also have to decide.  For example, Trading Technologies ("TT") filed a motion for a protective order sealing certain evidence that was produced as "Highly Confidential," but which was put into evidence and used without immediate restriction or objection, as to confidentiality, during the public trial.  I will keep you updated as the Court issues any decisions regarding inequitable conduct or any other issues in the case.

* Click here to read much more about this case in the Blog’s archives.

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Hickory Farms, Inc. v. SnackmastersSnackmasters, Inc., No. 05 C 4541, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Apr. 2, 2008) (Kennelly, J.).

Judge Kennelly awarded defendant approximately $350,000 in attorney's fees, costs and interest, based upon defendant's fee petition. The Court previously held that plaintiff's “Beef Stick” and “Turkey Stick” marks were generic and ordered their cancellation -- click here for more on this case in the Blog's archives. The Court also denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of the genericness decision and held that defendant had a right to its reasonable attorney's fees and costs because the case was exceptional. There were several noteworthy rulings in the opinion:

• The Court held that defendant was owned not just its fees from the litigation, but also from the related TTAB because the substantive work and research in the earlier TTAB proceeding formed the core of defendant's successful motion for summary judgment of genericness. It did not matter that defendant initiated the TTAB proceeding.

• The Court awarded defendant its attorney's fees for time spent searching the internet for third party uses of “Beef Stick” and “Turkey Stick.” Internet searching was not clerical work because review of each use of the marks required legal analysis. Furthermore, the Court relied on the fruits of that research in granting summary judgment.

• The Court denied attorney's fees for work related to the Seventh Circuit's mediation program. The Seventh Circuit appeal was a separate proceeding and, therefore, it was not appropriate for the Court to award fees for work done that did not further this case, as the work in the TTAB proceeding did.

• The Court held that an administrative charge of 4% of an attorney's billings was reasonable and awarded it as part of attorney's fees, as opposed to costs. Defendant's counsel used the 4% administrative charge as a standard billing practice, instead of tracking long-distance telephone, copying, faxing and other incidental charges for each client and case. The Court held that 4% was a modest amount and was an “appropriate device” for estimating fees without incurring substantial overhead for monitoring those fees precisely.

 

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Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Feb. 5, 2008) (Moran, Sen. J.).*

Judge Moran denied defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 motion for a new trial of damages on the condition that plaintiff Trading Technologies (“TT”) accepted a remittitur of defendant eSpeed’s portion of the damages. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict for TT and awarded $3.5M in compensatory damages, split $2M against defendant Ecco and $1.5M against defendant eSpeed. At trial, TT’s damages model was based upon a proposed reasonable royalty of between $.15 and $.25 per trade and a total of approximately 18M to 23M trades for a damages range of about $3.5M to $4.6M. TT argued that the apportionment of damages was irrelevant because the total award was within the argued range and because eSpeed purchased Ecco and, therefore, would be paying the full amount. But the Court noted that Ecco’s award would be paid from an escrow account set up for because of TT’s patent claims when eSpeed purchased Ecco. Additionally, eSpeed’s $1.5M judgment was well beyond the highest award that could be supported by TT’s evidence. The evidence showed that during the relevant time, eSpeed completed approximately 2.1M trades. Even at $.25 per trade, TT’s highest proposed royalty, the possible damages were only $539,468. The Court, therefore, offered TT a remittitur of $539,468 or a new trial on damages.

The Court also awarded TT prejudgment interest set at the average prime rate for the period compounded monthly, because TT collected license fees monthly.

* Click here to read much more about this case in the Blog’s archives and click here for a copy of this opinion.

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Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2008) (Moran, Sen. J.).*

Judge Moran denied defendants’ (collectively “eSpeed”) motion for judgment as a matter of law that plaintiff Trading Technologies’ (“TT”) patents were unenforceable because of patent misuse. TT’s open letter to the futures market was not patent misuse despite the facts that:

1. The letter requested a 2.5 cent fee for every transaction an exchange processed regardless of whether infringing software was used; and
   
2. The fees did not end when the patents expired. 

Had such a license been entered, it would have been per se patent misuse. But because no exchange ever accepted the offer or even entered serious negotiations with TT based upon the offer, there was no patent misuse.

Terms in certain license agreements that prevented licensees from using eSpeed software, regardless of whether the eSpeed software infringed, were improper. But the terms did not rise to the level of patent misuse because the effect of the clauses was not anti-competitive. The clauses were only in two of TT’s fifteen settlement agreements. And TT argued that the intent of the parties in the two agreements was only to restrict the use of infringing eSpeed products. Furthermore, the other thirteen agreements only restrict use of infringing software. 

Terms in the agreements requiring royalties on any trade for which licensed software could be used, as opposed to just those for which patented software was actually used, were not patent misuse. The agreements required only that royalties be paid on trades made using licensed products or any software when licensed and unlicensed software was linked such that either could be used to make the trade. If unlicensed software that was not linked to the licensed software was used, no royalty was due.

Finally, the provisions preventing licensees from assisting third parties to invalidate the TT patents were not patent misuse. Licensees that had not agreed to a consent judgment as part of a settlement were free to challenge the validity of the patents on their own. Furthermore, no licensee was prevented from participating in court-ordered invalidity proceedings or from assisting a government entity, such as the PTO, that was considering the validity of the patents.

* Click here to read much more about this case in the Blog’s archives and click here for a copy of the opinion.

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Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jan. 2, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).*

Judge Moran denied defendants’ (collectively “eSpeed”) motion for judgment as a matter of law that plaintiff Trading Technologies’ (“TT”) patent was invalid for indefiniteness based upon the claim term “single action of a user input device” (“Single Action”). The Court previously construed Single Action as “an action by a user within a short period of time that may comprise one or more clicks of a mouse button or other input device.” Before trial, the Court used the definition to exclude evidence regarding a Tokyo Stock Exchange (“TSE”) software package that required double clicking, entering a quantity and pressing “enter” – click here for the Blog’s discussion of that opinion.

TT argued that the phrases “one or more clicks” and “short period of time” in the Court’s construction were indefinite because they did not sufficiently delineate the scope of the term. The Court noted that it did not need absolute clarity to define a claim term and held that the Single Action was sufficiently definite. The Court reasoned that it had been able to construe the term based largely upon the specification. And neither “one or more clicks” nor “short period of time” rendered the claim indefinite because the phrases are part of the definition, not the claim language. 

 

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Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, Min. Orders (N.D. Ill. Jan. 3, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).*

In addition to the willfulness decision discussed earlier today (click here for the post) and the invalidity decision that I will blog about early next week, Judge Moran also issued two minute orders deciding several of the outstanding post-trial motions.  The Court denied defendant eSpeed's motion for a new trial and its combined motion for judgment as a matter of law that: 1) the claims are invalid because of anticipation, obviousness, prior sale; and 2) because the claims have a June 9, 2000 priority date they were not infringed.

There are still several pending motions, including various motions regarding damages and interest on the jury's award and eSpeed's motion for an evidentiary hearing regarding inequitable conduct.  I will keep you posted as those are decided.

*  Click here to read much more about this case in the Blog’s archives.

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Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jan. 3, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).*

Judge Moran granted defendants’ (collectively “eSpeed”) motion for judgment as a matter of law that their infringement was no willful. The Court instructed the jury using the objective recklessness standard from In re Seagate Techs., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007), but when the Court reviewed the totality of the circumstances it found no support for the willfulness verdict and, more specifically that plaintiff Trading Technologies (“TT”) had not met its burden of proving that there was an objectively high likelihood of infringement when eSpeed sold its infringing product, Futures View. When eSpeed launched Futures View, TT’s patent had not issued. And while eSpeed was aware of the application, knowledge of an application does not prove willfulness. Furthermore, TT produced no evidence of post-issuance willfulness. TT submitted two internal eSpeed emails, but both were sent before TT’s patent issued and the emails only suggested that eSpeed should mimic certain features of the TT software. And upon learning of TT’s issued patent, eSpeed immediately began a redesign of Futures View, resulting in new software products that the Court granted summary judgment of noninfringement. As a result of the redesign, the infringing Futures View was only on the market for five months after TT’s patent issued. 

TT also argued that eSpeed’s failure to make noninfringement arguments in preliminary injunction proceedings showed willfulness. But the Court held that eSpeed denied infringement in its answer and that there was no need to argue noninfringement of Future View in preliminary injunction proceedings because eSpeed was not selling Future View. There was no danger of an injunction over a product eSpeed was not selling. 

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Telewizja Polska USA, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., No. 04 C 3293, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Oct. 30, 2007) (Guzman, J.). 

Judge Guzman adopted Magistrate Judge Keys’s Report and Recommendation in its entirety, awarding plaintiff all of the approximately $800,000 in attorney’s fees and costs plaintiff sought pursuant to the fee-shifting provision in the parties’ agreement and Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d). At trial, plaintiff sought approximately $2.8M for its breach of contract claim and approximately $5.8M for its unjust enrichment claim – the claims were plead in the alternative. The jury awarded plaintiff approximately $1.4M on the breach of contract claim. The jury also awarded defendant $1 in compensatory damages and approximately $18,000 in punitive damages on defendant’s defamation counterclaim. Defendant argued that plaintiff was not the prevailing party, as required by Rule 54(d) and, therefore, should not be awarded its fees and costs or, at least, should be awarded a reduced amount.

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I have not been able to fulfill my promised additional coverage of the inequitable conduct portion of the Trading Technologies v. eSpeed case, but it is not my fault.*  The Court decided to consider eSpeed's inequitable conduct and patent misuse defenses on the papers.  The Court ordered a briefing schedule that will complete briefing by early December for eSpeed's inequitable conduct and patent misuse defenses , as well as eSpeed's post-trial motions regarding willfulness and damages remittitur and TT's motions for its attorneys' fees and costs.  The Court has scheduled a status conference for December 20th.  Perhaps the parties will have rulings by the end of the year.

Practice tip:  In my experience, one of the dangers of doing inequitable conduct after the conclusion of the jury trial is that both the Court and the parties are exhausted and emotionally drained at the end of the jury trial (particularly after a multi-week trial like this one).  So, when it is time to try inequitable conduct, either the Court no longer wants the trial or the parties and the Court are so exhausted that they have trouble keeping their focus and energy level where it was for the jury trial despite the importance of the issues.  I do not know why the parties or the Court decided that inequitable conduct should be decided on the papers in this case.  But any time that inequitable conduct is to be tried after a jury trial, you run the risk that no live evidence will come in on inequitable conduct.

*  Click here to read much more about this case and Trading Technologies' ("TT") related cases in the Blog's archives

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Top Tobacco, L.P. v. North Atlantic Op. Co., No. 08 C 950, 2007 WL 2688452 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 6, 2007) (Kennelly, J.).

Judge Kennelly previously granted defendant summary judgment on all claims in this trademark infringement case regarding plaintiff’s “TOP and “Fresh-Top Canister” marks and awarded defendant’s attorneys’ fees pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).* The Court reduced the rates charged by defendant’s counsel Kirkland & Ellis’ summer associates from $185 to $125, more in line with paralegal rates. The Court acknowledged that Kirkland & Ellis’s attorneys showed skill “commensurate with its… high rates,”** but reduced Kirkland & Ellis’s rates because that skill did not result in the time savings (as required by the Seventh Circuit). Kirkland & Ellis billed roughly 30% more hours than plaintiff’s counsel. The Court, therefore, reduced Kirkland & Ellis’s rates to those charged by plaintiff’s counsel.

* Click here to read more about this case and related cases in the Blog’s archives.

** Having worked with Kirkland & Ellis’s lead counsel on this matter, Paul Garcia, I can confirm the Court’s praise.

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Sunstar, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., No. 01 CV 736 & 5825, 2007 WL 2410069 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 2007) (Guzman, J.).

Judge Guzman denied defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 motion for a new trial and Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law and granted plaintiff’s motion for a permanent injunction, among other things assigning all trademarks at issue to plaintiff and enjoining defendants from using plaintiff’s trademarks. The Court held that the jury’s verdict of a breach of contract without a damages award was not inconsistent and, therefore, did not warrant a new trial. The jury was free to find that the contract was breached and to award nominal damages. But because plaintiff did not argue for nominal damages an award of no damages was warranted. Defendants also argued that the jury’s verdict was not supported by the evidence because plaintiff’s survey was not sufficient proof actual confusion. But the Court held that plaintiff’s breach-by-infringement claim only required proof of likely confusion. The jury could have considered the survey sufficient to prove likely confusion. Furthermore, plaintiff introduced fact evidence in addition to the survey which supported the jury’s findings, including the similarity of the marks at issue and the sale of similar products using the marks in the same areas as plaintiff’s trademarked products.

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Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Chester Bros. Mach. Prods., Inc., No. 05 C 5002, 2007 WL 2278448 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 6, 2007) (Guzman, J.).

Judge Guzman granted in part plaintiff’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) motion to dismiss, dismissing the case with prejudice but awarding defendant’s costs. The Court also denied defendant’s motion for attorneys fees. After sending several cease and desist letters, plaintiff Illinois Tool Works (“ITW”) filed suit against Chester Brothers Machined Products (“Chester”) alleging that Chester infringed plaintiff’s trademark in the color orange used with pneumatic nailers and staplers. ITW amended its complaint after Chester served ITW with a Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 motion explaining that Chester did not sell pneumatic nailers. Chester answered the amended complaint and the case proceeded. But during discovery one of ITW’s customers began selling orange pneumatic nailers. As a result, ITW amended its trademark registration to exclude pneumatic nailers and filed the instant motion. The Court agreed to dismiss the claims with prejudice, but held that costs were justified because Chester had not engaged in litigation misconduct. The Court, however, denied defendant’s motion for attorneys fees because Chester never explicitly told ITW that it did not manufacture pneumatic nailers and because ITW’s claims survived Chester’s motion to dismiss.

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Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Montrose Wholesale Candies & Sundries, Inc., No. 03 C 5311 & 03 C 4844, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jul. 27, 2007) (Cole, J.).*

Judge Cole recommended granting plaintiff Lorillard Tobacco’s (“Lorillard”) petition for attorneys fees, but reduced the requested fees by about $80,000. Lorillard received a default judgment against defendants in 2006 and, as a result, brought this petition seeking its fees and costs. The Court’s opinion is an excellent guide for anyone preparing a fee petition. The Court refused to consider Lorillard’s costs because although Lorillard submitted a list of costs, it did not total the costs or discuss them in its petition and supporting declaration. Next, the Court accepted most of the costs for the four attorneys whose billing rates were explained in the supporting declaration, but denies any fees for the other nineteen people whose fees were not explained in the declaration. The Court notes that these nineteen people could be partners, associates or paralegals, but the Court cannot assess the reasonableness of their rates or billed activities without knowing their roles. And even for the four, the Court notes that it would have preferred some explanation of each attorney’s experience in past Lanham Act cases, in order to judge whether the attorneys’ billing rates were commensurate with their experience. 

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Lexion Medical, LLC v. Northgate Techs., Inc., No. 04 C 5705, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jun. 8, 2007).*

Judge Rosenbaum (a visiting judge, who is the Chief Judge for the District of Minnesota) denied defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) for relief from the Court’s judgment.  The Court held a trial in October 2006 resulting in a jury verdict that defendants’ insufflator (a device that blows a powder, gas or vapor into a body cavity) infringed plaintiff’s patent (you can read more about the case in the Blog’s archives). In their motion, defendants argued that the Supreme Court’s April 2007 obviousness decision, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., __ U.S. __, 127 S.Ct. 1727 (2007), dramatically changed obviousness law and conflicted with the jury instructions which “nullif[ied] the jury verdict.” Defendants moved the Court to invalidate two claims of the patent in suit or to order a new trial on obviousness. But the Court held that even under the KSR standard, the jury’s verdict was fully supported by evidence at trial. Because a corrected instruction would not have changed the result, the erroneous instruction was harmless.

*You can read the opinion here.

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Lexion Medical, LLC v. Northgate Techs., Inc., No. 04 C 5705, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. May 29, 2007).*

Judge Rosenbaum (a visiting judge, who is the Chief Judge for the District of Minnesota) granted in part plaintiff’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 60(a) motion to alter or amend the judgment, altering the judgment to include all post-verdict sales of infringing product. The court held a trial in October 2006 resulting in a jury verdict that defendants’ insufflator (a device that blows a powder, gas or vapor into a body cavity) infringed plaintiff’s patent, but that the infringement was not willful. The Court entered judgment in February 2007. Shortly after the judgment, defendant Northgate Technologies (“Northgate”) informed plaintiff that after the verdict, but before the judgment was entered, Northgate sold its remaining inventory. Plaintiff sought damages for the post-verdict sales and argued that the Court should find the post-verdict sales willful and declare the case exceptional. The Court held that the post-verdict sales infringed the patent, but that they were not willful because Northgate received an oral opinion of counsel prior to shipping any post-verdict product. The oral opinion was based upon three factors: 1) a belief that the jury’s verdict was unreasonable; 2) the fact that the Court had not yet entered a permanent injunction; and 3) Northgate’s post-trial arguments that were pending before the Court. The Court noted that the second factor could not support Northgate’s decision. But the remaining justifications were not “so flawed as to alert Northgate to reject [the oral opinion] as ‘obviously bad legal advice.”

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Scholz Design Inc. v. Jaffe, __ F. Supp.2d __, 2007 WL 1276910 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2007) (Grady, J.).

Judge Grady treated plaintiff's untimely motion to reconsider as a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion to vacate judgment (Judge Grady's previous order is discussed in the Blog's archives) and denied the motion because it simply rehashed previously rejected arguments.  After a bench trial, the Court entered judgment on behalf of defendants because they had neither directly nor contributorily infringed plaintiff's copyrighted home design.  The Court held that, while defendants approved the design, any actual copying of the copyrighted design was done by defendants' architects without defendants knowledge.  In the instant motion, plaintiff argued that defendants infringed its copyrighted designs as a matter of law because the Court had deemed admitted -- for failure to respond to requests for admission -- that the interior and exterior designs of the house at issue were derivative works based upon plaintiff's design.  But the Court explained that the admission of infringement did not include an admission as to which parties committed the infringement.  As a result, the Court denied plaintiff's motion and allowed its prior judgment to stand.

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Top Tobacco, L.P. v. North Atl. Operating Co., No. 06 C 950, 2007 WL 118527 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 2007) (Kennelly, J.).

Judge Kennelly granted defendants' motion for attorneys' fees and granted in part their bill of costs.  In January, Judge the Court granted summary judgment for defendants on plaintiff's trademark, unfair competition and dilution claims (read more about that decision in the Blog's archives).  The Court ruled that no reasonable jury could find that consumers were confused between plaintiffs' TOP mark and defendants' "Fresh-Top Canister" mark.  Defendants then filed the instant bill of costs and motion for attorneys' fees arguing that the case was exceptional.  The Court held the case exceptional for three reasons.  First, the Court found that plaintiffs' infringement and dilution claims were "exceptionally weak" stating that "a simple look at the canisters as they appeared on store shelves shows the virtual impossibility that consumers would be confused . . . ."  The Court disregarded plaintiffs' purported evidence of actual confusion, which it presented for the first time in its response to the motion for attorneys' fees.  Second, plaintiffs argued before the PTO that other "top" marks in the tobacco classification were narrow.  But before the Court plaintiffs took the "diametrically opposite" position, arguing that their TOP mark should enjoy broad protection.  Third, the Court found defendant Top Tobacco's chairman Donald Levin's testimony that the two products looked identical because they were both cans of tobacco "absurd."  The Court analogized Levin's argument to the position that all the books on library shelves are identical because they are all books, without regard to their titles, jacket designs or colors.

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Ty, Inc v. Softbelly's, Inc., No. 00 C 5230, 2007 WL 734394 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 6, 2007) (Lefkow, J.).

Judge Lefkow granted plaintiff's, Ty, motion to make the case exception and grant it attorneys' fees and expenses.  A jury previously returned a verdict against defendant, Softbelly's, for violations of the Lanham Act and common law unfair competition.  The Court held that the case was exceptional because "Softbelly's made an aggressive, uncounseled, and persistent endeavor to trade on the success and reputation of Ty's marks."

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Black & Decker Inc. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., No. 04 C 7955, 2006 WL 3883286 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 2006) (St. Eve, J.).*

Judge St. Eve granted judgment as a matter of law for plaintiff, holding that the jury's findings of invalidity and obviousness were not supported by legally sufficient evidence.  At trial, defendant introduced an article describing a prior art radio as 102(b) prior art using its expert.  But the expert testified that one of the claim elements was missing.  Defendant argued that pictures of the radio that were not used in the article, showed the device.  But the Court held that defendant could not piece together the article, testimony and pictures to prove that the article disclosed all elements of the claimed invention.  The jury's obviousness finding was not supported by legally sufficient evidence because defendant did not present clear and convincing evidence of a motivation to combine its obviousness prior art references.

* You can find much more on this case in the Blog's archives.

 

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Judge Darrah, after finding each of the eleven patents-in-suit unenforceable for inequitable conduct, held that the suit was exceptional based upon the inequitable conduct, the filing of several frivolous claims which were previously dismissed and misconduct at trial, providing the Court the discretion to award attorney's fees.  The court also did a detailed analysis of defendants' Bill of Costs and awarded defendants some or all of their requested costs for service of process, court reporters, witnesses and experts, among others.  Of note, the Court held that expert fees, including the expert's hourly rates, were recoverable for time spent on expert reports, deposition and related preparation, and other time spent in responding to discovery, but not for time spent attending other expert depositions in the case.

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Black & Decker Inc. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., No. 04 C 7955, 2007 WL 108412 (N.D. Ill. Jan 12, 2007) (St. Eve, J.).

Judge St. Eve denied defendant's motion for a new trial, altered judgment or judgment as a matter of law in this patent dispute (more on this case and the injunction in the Blog's archives).  Defendant first argued that the jury's infringement findings on various claim elements were not supported by the facts.  The Court denied each argument, citing facts that supported the jury's infringement findings.  Defendant also argued that the jury's verdict that claim 1 of USPN 6,788,925 (the "'925 patent") was valid while the almost identical claim 2 of the '925 patent was invalid was inconsistent.  Defendant sought an altered judgment or a new trial as a remedy.  The Court first noted that several Circuits would have waived this objection because defendant did not object to the alleged inconsistency when the jury rendered its verdict.  But because the Seventh Circuit has not directly ruled on the issue (the matter is governed by region-specific law because it is a procedural matter), the Court did not waive the objection.  The Court did, however, waive any arguments Defendant first made in its reply brief.  Having addressed the procedural posture of the arguments, the Court held that the jury's validity findings on the two claims was sufficiently supported.  Because the two claims, although substantially the same, had different elements, the Court held that a rational jury could have come to different validity conclusions for each claim and denied defendant's request for a new trial. 

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Black & Decker Inc. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., No. 04 C 7955, 2006 WL 3883286 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 2006) (St. Eve, J.).*

Judge St. Eve denied defendant's motion for vacature of a lost profits award and for a new trial.  First, defendant argued that the jury's finding that it induced infringement could not stand because it shipped the product at issue with an AC power cord (non-infringing) and a battery (infringing), but plaintiff had not shown that each individual sale of a product resulted in an infringing use.  Prior to trial defendant argued that plaintiff must show a one-to-one correspondence between each unit sold and a customer's direct infringement citing Chiuminatta concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 1 Fed. Appx. 879 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (unpublished op.).  The Court denied that argument.  In its post-trial motion, defendant argued that proof of sales is not sufficient for an award of induced infringement citing Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2006).  But the Court distinguished Golden Blount because the issue in that case was that some product was returned to the alleged infringer before being assembled into an infringing product, which may or may not have been sold.  There was no induced infringement because the product at issue may never have been sold.  In the instant case, the Court held that the product with the infringing configuration had been sold and, therefore, upheld the jury's finding of induced infringement.

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Black & Decker Inc. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., No. 04 C 7955, 2006 WL 3783006 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 22, 2006) (St. Eve, J.).

Having already denied plaintiff summary judgment on defendant's inequitable conduct defense (here) and increased damages 50% and awarded prejudgment interest compounded monthly (here), the Court denied defendant's motions for judgment as a matter of law, to alter the willfulness judgment and for a new trial.  The Court's denial of these sort of post-trial motions is far from surprising, in light of the substantial burdens that must be overcome to win them.  Of special note, defendant argued that the jury's willfulness determination was not valid because the evidence relied upon was defendant's knowledge of a competing product that it believed to constitute patented technology, not defendant's knowledge of the specific patents that were infringed.  The Court held that the relevant inquiry is the infringer's knowledge of the existence of patent rights, not specific patents.

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Black & Decker Inc. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., No. 04 C 7955, 2006 WL 3359349 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 20, 2006) (St. Eve, J.).

In this post-trial opinion, Judge St. Eve denies plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees, enhances the jury's damages award by 50% pursuant to 35 USC Section 284 and awards plaintiff prejudgment interest compounded monthly.  Despite the jury's willfulness finding the Court held that attorney's fees were not warranted because defendant's advocacy was consistently professional and the substantive positions it argued were largely meritorious.

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