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Declaratory Judgment Claims re: Redesigned Product May be Brought in A Separate Suit

By R. David Donoghue on Posted in Federal Rules

R-Boc Reps., Inc. v. Minemyer, No. 11 C 8433, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. July 16, 2012) (Cole, Mag. J.).

Judge Cole denied declaratory judgment defendant Minemyer’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a) motion to dismiss declaratory judgment plaintiff R-Boc’s complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that its redesigned coupler did not infringe Minemyer’s patent.  Minemyer argued that R-Boc’s complaint was improper claim-splitting and that the claim should have been filed in Minemyer’s 2007 suit accusing R-Boc’s original coupler designs.  In February 2012, a jury held that R-Boc’s original coupler did not infringe. 

The Court noted the length of that case - five years and 527 docket entries - quoting the Federal Circuit:

“Patent litigations are among the longest, most time-consuming types of civil actions.  As of 2009, 384 patent cases had been pending in the district courts for three years or more.  Moreover, the costs of patent litigation are enormous with an average patent case costing upwards of $3 million for each side.”  Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Thermo-Ply, Inc., 629 F.3d 1374, 1376-77 (Fed.Cir. 2011)(citations omitted).

R-Boc’s claims were not claim-splitting.  While a patentholder must assert all claims from a single patent against a single product in one action, claims regarding a new product, need not be filed in the same suit involving an older version of that product.  R-Boc’s declaratory judgment claims regarding the new coupler would only have been compulsory in the earlier suit had that suit accused the new coupler of infringement.

Dismissal Without Prejudice Will Allow Both Parties to Reassert Unexhausted Claims

By R. David Donoghue on Posted in Federal Rules

ImageCube LLC v. MTS Sys. Corp., No. 04 C 7587, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Apr. 4, 2012) (Dow, J.).

 Judge Dow granted plaintiff ImageCube’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) motion to dismiss all claims without prejudice in this nearly eight year-old patent litigation involving alloyed and non-alloyed powders.  The Court previously granted summary judgment of non-infringement regarding the alloyed powders and certified its decision for immediate appeal.  After the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision, the parties attempted to settle the case and came close, but were not quite able to resolve their disputes.  As a result of that, ImageCube sought dismissal of all claims without prejudice so that it could reassert its non-alloyed powder claims at a later date, presumably if defendant MTS’s sales became more significant.  MTS opposed dismissal without prejudice, instead asking that all claims be dismissed with prejudice except for MTS’s claim for attorney’s fees pursuant to 35 U.S.C. Section 285. 

 The Court noted that it was in a “less advantageous position” than the parties to predict the future of their claims.  As a result, the Court dismissed all of the claims without prejudice.  That way the parties would be free to assert their claims should conditions warrant it, but the Court also noted that issue and claim preclusion would likely bar relitigation of previously decided claims.

Must Decide Form of Dismissal Before Considering Fees

By R. David Donoghue on Posted in Federal Rules

Zander v. Groh, No. 10 C 944, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Sep. 30, 2011) (Manning, J.).

Judge Manning mooted defendant Groh’s objections to the Magistrate Judge’s failure to award attorney’s fees for a voluntary dismissal in this copyright and trademark action. After a brief discovery period, plaintiff Zander moved pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 to amend its complaint deleting its copyright claim and adding a Lanham Act claim. The Magistrate Judge treated the deletion of the copyright claim as a Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) voluntary dismissal, dismissing the claim with prejudice. The Magistrate Judge did not award attorney’s fees for defending the copyright claim, however, to avoid chilling voluntary dismissals and the resulting reduction in legal fees for both sides.

The Court ordered further briefing to resolve whether the deletion of the copyright claim should be treated pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P 15 or 41.

In the interest of judicial economy, the Court reserved a decision regarding whether attorney’s fees were appropriate until the Court decided whether the dismissal was by amendment or as a Rule 41(a)(2) voluntary dismissal.

False Patent Marking Statute is Constitutional

By R. David Donoghue on Posted in Federal Rules

Luka v. The Proctor & Gamble Co., No. 10 C 2511 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2011) (Kennelly, J.).

Judge Kennelly granted certain defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiff’s false patent marking case for failure to sufficiently plead intent, and held that the statute was constitutional.  Note that this case was decided before President Obama signed the America Invents Act which removes expired patents from the false marking statute.

Proctor & Gamble

Plaintiff’s general allegations against defendant Procter & Gamble were insufficient, particularly in light of the license agreement requiring defendant Innovative to comply with the marking statute.

Innovative

Plaintiff sufficiently pled intent as to Innovative by attacking the P&G-Innovative license agreement. In that agreement, Innovative accepts the responsibility of complying with the marking statute.

Helen of Troy & Idelle

Plaintiff’s claims as to Helen of Troy and Idelle failed because they were the sort of generalized pleadings that BP Lubricants held insufficient.

Constitutionality

The Court held that § 292, the false marking statue was constitutional:

For these reasons, the Court agrees with the district court in the Pequignot case that "[a]though these mechanisms concededly do not rise to the same level of government control provided by the FCA, the FCA’s strict safeguards are not required because . . . § 292(b) represents a minimal intrusion onto Executive Branch power." Peguignot v. Solo Cup Co., 640 F. Supp. 2d 714, 728 (E.D. Va. 2009), vacated in part on other grounds, 608 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010).

Another Case Dismissing Hundreds of Doe Copyright Defendants as Improperly Joined

By R. David Donoghue on Posted in Federal Rules

Light Speed Media Corp. v. Does 1-1000, No. 10 C 5604, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2011) (Manning, J.).

Judge Manning dismissed without prejudice 999 of the 1,000 Doe defendants in this copyright infringement suit accusing unknown individuals of using BitTorrent to download copyrighted material without sufficient permissions. As in prior cases in the Northern District (click here for similar decisions), the Court held that the Doe defendants were not properly joined pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(A) because the use of a common internet service provider or network does not create sufficient commonality of action or transaction to warrant permissive joinder. The Court also held that joinder did not serve judicial interests or economy. A case with 1,000 Doe defendants could generate hundreds of factually dissimilar motions, just at the initial phase of the litigation.

The Court’s decision to sever was bolstered by its concerns about whether venue was proper. There was nothing to indicate that plaintiff or any Doe had contacts with Illinois. The Court, therefore, dismissed without prejudice each of the Does except the one individual who had been identified, although not yet named. Plaintiff was given seven days from the Order to notify the parties and their Internet Service Providers. Finally, the Court denied as premature the identified individual’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The motion was premature until the individual was actually named in the suit.

In Forma Pauperis Status Denied Without Full Proof of Need

By R. David Donoghue on Posted in Federal Rules

Kim v. The Earthgrains Co., No. 01 C 3895, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Mar. 9, 2011) (Cox, Mag. J.).

Judge Cox denied plaintiff’s application for in forma pauperis ("IFP") status during its Federal Circuit appeal. The Court previously granted plaintiff’s IFP motion, until questions were raised regarding plaintiff’s real estate holdings. At that point, the Court rescinded the IFP status – there is more on that decision and this case generally in the Blog’s archives. Because the Court continued to have similar concerns regarding plaintiff’s property holdings, the Court denied IFP status.

Congress Considers Changes to Rule 11 Sanctions

By R. David Donoghue on Posted in Federal Rules

Congress is currently considering revision Rule 11 sanctions, including:

  1. Removing the existing 21 day "safe harbor" provision which requires that you send your motion to the opposing party and give them 21 days to remedy the alleged Rule 11 violation before filing the motion with the Court; and
  2. Making an award of fees and costs related to a winning Rule 11 motion automatic, instead of discretionary.

The Federal Bar Association (of which I am a member) has published a call for comment that sets out both sides of the issue well.  It follows below.  I can understand the inclination to make fees and costs automatic, but the 21 day "safe harbor" serves a valuable gatekeeping role.  It avoid clogging the federal courts with Rule 11 motions that could be fixed with notice of the alleged deficiency.

Proposed Amendments in H.R. 966

The H.R. 966 bill would repeal amendments that the Judicial Conference of the United States proposed for adoption effective in 1993, thereby in part reinstating an earlier version of Rule 11 that had been in force between 1983 and 1993. It would also add a new provision for punitive monetary sanctions to be paid into court.

Under the bill, there would no longer be a “safe harbor” provision that allows an adverse party to withdraw or modify a challenged pleading or other paper before a sanctions motion can be filed or otherwise presented to the court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). That safe harbor clause was adopted effective in 1993.

The bill would also provide that sanctions awards would once again be mandatory, rather than discretionary, in cases where a court has found that a pleading or other paper was signed without adequate factual or legal grounds. Sanctions had been mandatory from 1983 to 1993. The bill would specify that, in addition to any other sanctions the court might impose, “the sanction shall consist of an order to pay to the party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation, including reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.”

In doing so, the bill would repeal the current provision in Rule 11(c)(2) that that fees and costs “may” be awarded “if warranted.” In place of that provision, the bill would further authorize punitive monetary awards, to be paid into the court, “if warranted for effective deterrence.”

Testimony Supporting and Opposing the H.R. 966 Bill

According to testimony on behalf of the National Federation of Independent Business and the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, the changes are necessary because frivolous lawsuits and staggering litigation costs are creating a climate of fear for America’s small businesses. In their view, the current “safe harbor” means that preparing a motion for sanctions may serve only to increase the costs for the moving party – which is, generally, the defendant. And even if a plaintiff does not withdraw his or her claims for relief, and even if the court finds them to be frivolous, the discretionary nature of the current sanctions provision means that the court may choose not to impose any sanction other than dismissing the case. These trade associations also believe that the current version of Rule 11 discourages judges from imposing sanctions for the purpose of compensating defendants for their attorney’s fees and costs.

In opposition to the H.R. 966 bill, a professor at the University of Houston Law Center has testified that the 1993 amendments of Rule 11 were adopted in the face of studies suggesting that the 1983 version of Rule 11 was deterring the filing of meritorious cases. Additionally, in practice, civil rights and employment discrimination plaintiffs were impacted the most severely under the earlier version of Rule 11 as adopted in 1983. Studies also showed that plaintiffs had been the targets of sanctions far more often than defendants, even though the terms of Rule 11 apply to all pleadings and other papers – including a defendant’s answer containing denials and affirmative defenses. Scholars and practitioners had noted that the 1983 version actually increased costs and delays by encouraging “the Rambo-like use of Rule 11 by too many lawyers,” and that the resulting increase in sanctions-oriented motions practice had led to a breakdown of civility and professionalism. This professor cited a 1991 study by the Federal Judicial Center, which revealed that few judges polled thought the then-current 1983 version of the rule was “very effective” in deterring groundless pleadings. In a 2005 survey of 278 district judges polled by the Federal Judicial Center, more than 80% of the judges said that “Rule 11 is needed and it is just right as it stands now.”

Call for Comment and Proposals from the Federal Litigation Bar

The Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Trial Practice seeks your comments. Comments may be submitted concerning any of the proposed revisions contained in the H.R. 966 bill; or concerning any other proposals to modify Rule 11; or concerning whether to retain the text of Rule 11 as currently in force. We also welcome any other proposals that are germane to the application or purposes of Rule 11. Upon request, we will handle any comment as confidential. Anonymous comments will also be accepted.

Rob Kohn and John McCarthy are co-chairs of the Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Trial Practice. Kohn is also the Secretary and Treasurer of the Federal Litigation Section; and McCarthy is Chapter President of the Southern District of New York chapter of the FBA. Kohn may be reached at rkohn@kohnlawgroup.com. McCarthy may be reached at jmccarthy@sgrlaw.com.

Patent Cases Consolidated and Stayed Pending Related Case

By R. David Donoghue on Posted in Federal Rules

GS Cleantech Corp. v. Big River Resources Galva, LLC, No. 10 C 990, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jul. 30, 2010) (Andersen, J.).

Judge Andersen reassigned this case so that it could be consolidated with a case before Judge Bucklo by the same plaintiff asserting the same patent accusing similar technologies. The Court also ordered that a stay awaiting resolution of a related District of Kansas case would apply to the consolidated case.

False Claims Act Does Not Bar Multiple False Marking Suits

By R. David Donoghue on Posted in Federal Rules

Simonian v. Hunter Fan Co., No. 10 C 1212, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jul. 8, 2010) (St. Eve, J.).

Judge St. Eve denied defendant Hunter Fan’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s false patent marking case. Hunter Fan argued that the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because approximately four hours before this suit was filed, another plaintiff filed a separate suit in the Northern District of Texas accusing Hunter Fan of the same alleged false patent marking. The False Claim Act did have a first-to-file provision, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5), but the provision expressly limited its application to False Claims Act cases. Because false patent marking is part of the Patent Act, not the False Claims Act, the first-to-file limitation was not applicable. 

In reply, Hunter Fan argued that 35 U.S.C. § 292 allowed for only a single claim, and that the reasoning of the False Claim Act’s first-to-file rule should have been applied to the false patent marking statute.  Hunter Fan, however, waived these arguments by failing to make them in its opening brief. 

Court Sua Sponte Dismisses Improperly Pled Affirmative Defenses

By R. David Donoghue on Posted in Federal Rules

Shop-Vac Corp. v. Alton Indus. Ltd Group, No. 10 C 1066, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jun. 7, 2010) (Shadur, J.).

Judge Shadur sua sponte dismissed several of plaintiff Shop-Vac’s affirmative defenses in response to defendant Alton’s counterclaims as inappropriate, citing the Court’s decision in State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. 276 (N.D. Ill. 2001). The Court dismissed one affirmative defense which was the equivalent of a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) challenge to the sufficiency of Alton’s counterclaims.

The Court also dismissed two affirmative defenses that were proper pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c), but were not pled with sufficient facts. Shop-Vac was given leave to reassert them with additional supporting facts. The Court also dismissed two affirmative defenses that contradicted allegations in the counterclaim. Shop-Vac put those issues in contention by denying the facts.  

Post-Default Letter Does Not Alter Judgment

By R. David Donoghue on Posted in Federal Rules

Be2, LLC v. Be2.net, No. 10 C 1650, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jul. 12, 2010) (Shadur, Sen., J.).

Judge Shadur denied the individual defendant’s letter request to alter the Court’s default judgment. The Court attached the letter to the opinion to avoid any concerns that the defendant’s communications were ex parte. And the Court left the judgment intact because the defendant’s explanation did not warrant alteration or vacatur of the judgment.

Attorney’s Fees Petition Must be Tailored to Resolved Claims

By R. David Donoghue on Posted in Federal Rules

Nova Design Build, Inc. v. Grace Hotels, LLC, No. 08 C 2855, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jun. 8, 2010) (Der-Yeghiayan, J.).

Judge Der-Yeghiayan granted defendant Grace Hotel’s motion for costs and denied without prejudice Grace Hotel’s motion for attorney’s fees. As an initial matter, the Court held that Grace Hotels was a prevailing party pursuant to both Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) (costs) and 17 U.S.C. § 505 (attorney’s fees). While the standards were different, Grace Hotels met both standards. Grace Hotels was granted summary judgment on plaintiff’s copyright infringement claim because plaintiffs did not have a valid copyright registration – click here for more on this opinion in the Blog’s archives. While the decision was jurisdictional and not substantive, Grace Hotel was a prevailing party because the Court’s ruling "effectively foreclosed" Plaintiff’s copyright claims. In other words, "Grace [Hotels] obtained more than just a moral victory on a minor jurisdictional point." Because Grace Hotels was a prevailing party, the Court awarded the reasonable costs Grace Hotels requested for court reporter fees pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) - $2,534.70. 

While Grace Hotels was also a prevailing party for purposes of § 505, the Court denied Grace Hotels attorney’s fees motion without prejudice. The fees did not appear reasonable. They were not limited to fees associated with defending the copyright claim. Grace Hotels was not entitled to fees for defending related state law claims which the Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over after resolving the federal copyright claim. Grace Hotels also sought fees for a separate case between the parties. The Court allowed Grace Hotels to file a renewal motion for attorney’s fees tailored to the recoverable fees.

Court Will Not Amend Summary Judgment Based Upon “New” Evidence

By R. David Donoghue on Posted in Federal Rules

Ho v. Taflove, No. 07 C 4305, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Apr. 9, 2010 (Bucklo, J.) 

Judge Bucklo denied plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration of the Court’s order granting defendants summary judgment as to plaintiffs’ Copyrights, Lanham Act and related state law claims in this dispute over whether defendants took plaintiffs’ mathematical model (the “Model”). As an initial matter, the Court noted that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for “motions to reconsider.” Rather, parties file either a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend judgment (within 28 days of the judgment) or a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment (within a "reasonable time”). The substance of the motion determines whether it is heard pursuant to Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). Plaintiffs’ motion was brought pursuant to Rule 60(b), but the Court treated it as a Rule 59(e) motion because it sought to alter the judgment, not for relief from it.

A Rule 59(e) motion requires newly discovered evidence or manifest errors of law. Plaintiffs’ motion as to their state law conversion, copyright and Lanham Act claims relied upon additional facts that were available during the initial briefing, but not raised at that time. The Court, therefore, did not consider the evidence and the plaintiffs’ arguments were denied.

As to the Court’s decision that the Model was not copyrightable as a mathematical formula pursuant to §102(b) of the Copyright Act, plaintiffs provided no convincing authority showing that it was copyrightable. And plaintiffs provided not even a single example of an alternate expression of the Model to satisfy the merger doctrine.

Bare Denials Not Sufficient to Reverse Default Judgment

By R. David Donoghue on Posted in Federal Rules

Lyons Partnership, L.P. v. Welle, No. 08 C 2909, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Feb. 22, 2010) (Grady, Sen. J.).

Jude Grady denied defendants’ motion to set aside the Court’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c) default judgment in this case alleging that defendants violated plaintiff’s intellectual property rights in children’s characters Hello Kitty, Bob the Builder and Thomas the Tank Engine, among others. While the defendants acted diligently after default was entered, they did not act diligently prior to the default. Defendants’ "cash flow" problems were not an excuse for failing to appear pro se. Additionally, the defendants did not identify a meritorious defense. Bare denials from defendants’ answer were not sufficient.

Plaintiff’s Firm That Previously Represented Defendant Not Disqualified

By R. David Donoghue on Posted in Federal Rules

Scala’s Original Beef & Sausage Co., LLC v. Alvarez d/b/a Michaelangelo Foods, No. 09 C 7353, Slip. Op. (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 2009) (Dow, J.).

Judge Dow denied defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s counsel. Plaintiff’s counsel’s firm represented the individual defendant and a prior company in a 2006 matter. But that case, a $15,000 contract dispute, ended after counsel spent less than 25 hours on the case. It was irrelevant that while counsel’s firm previously represented the individual defendant, counsel never personally represented the individual defendant. The Court, however, was unable to infer that counsel’s firm had received confidential information about the individual defendant’s finances. Further, the individual defendant’s businesses in the two cases were different. And the cases were remote in time and focused on different subject matter – a contract dispute in the earlier case, and contract and trademark issues regarding a new entity in the second. 

No Disqualification for Counsel’s Prior Meeting with Both Parties

By R. David Donoghue on Posted in Federal Rules

Mindy’s Restaurant, Inc. v. Watters, No. 08 C 5448, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2009) (Der-Yeghiayan, J.).

Judge Der-Yeghiayan denied defendant’s motion to disqualify plaintiff’s counsel in this Lanham Act dispute regarding plaintiff’s Mindy’s Restaurant marks. Defendant previously was a licensee of plaintiff’s marks. During their licensing arrangement, the parties explored a potential joint venture. As part of that process, plaintiff and defendant jointly met with a member of plaintiff’s current law firm. Defendant contended that that meeting created an attorney-client relationship which disqualified plaintiff’s counsel from this case. But the Court held that even if the single meeting with both parties created an attorney-client relationship, there was only a “slight tangential relationship” between the current case and the prior potential joint venture. And the attorney involved could not have received confidential information. The attorney met with both parties together and never spoke to either party about the matter after the initial meeting. So any information defendant provided to the attorney was also provided to plaintiff. Finally, there was no evidence that the attorney or any member of plaintiff’s counsel’s firm would ever be called as an essential witness in the case.

Court Stays for Federal Circuit Appeal, Not for Reexams

By R. David Donoghue on Posted in Federal Rules

Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc., No. 08 C 2389, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Sep. 25, 2008) (Ashman, Mag. J.)

Judge Ashman granted defendants Fresenius’s motion for a stay pending the Federal Circuit appeal of an earlier case between the parties involving related, but not the same, hemodialysis patents. But the Court denied a stay pending an ex parte reexam of plaintiff’s related patents (the same as in the Federal Circuit appeal) and an inter partes reexam of the patents in suit. The reexam of the related patents had only uncertain and limited benefits to the Northern District. Because the patents under reexam were not the patents in suit, there could be no issue preclusion.  And any potential streamlining of the case the reexam might achieve was outweighed by the reexam’s potential for extreme delay.

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Does Following The Rules Matter?

By R. David Donoghue on Posted in Federal Rules

Yes! Following the rules, all of them, matters – federal and local, substantive and procedural, big and small. Regular readers will not be surprised by my answer. I have repeatedly reminded people, as do the Northern District judges (click here for examples of both), to comply with Local Rule 56.1.

But I also think it matters for more “minor” rules, such as the newly revised Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 & 26, which now require that counsel include an e-mail address along with a physical address and phone number (click here for my previous post on the December 1, 2007 Fed. R. Civ. P. amendments.)

My experience since December 1 is that most attorneys are not following the e-mail address requirement. It is unlikely that courts will sanction counsel for failure to provide an e-mail address, but to me, and I presume to at least some judges and clerks, it signals sloppy lawyering. It says that counsel is not staying current with changes in the profession. And it makes me wonder what else counsel is not current with. Have they explored the significant codification of electronic discovery rules from December 1, 2006? At least it is unprofessional, and at most it is an indication of a lack of knowledge of the current state of the law — a significant advantage to those of us that keep current.

Am I overreacting because these are "minor" rules that likely are not sanctionable? Comment to this post or send me an e-mail with your thoughts. I will post about whatever feedback I receive (without names, of course).

Federal Rules Require Email in Signature Blocks, But Not Email Service

By R. David Donoghue on Posted in Federal Rules

As promised last week, here are highlights of the substantive changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that went into effect last Saturday, December 1st:*

  • New Rule 5.2 Privacy Protection  This rule limits what personal information can be left in public pleadings without redaction, unless a court orders the information to be publicly filed. Public filings may only include:  the last four digits of a social security number, tax identification number or other financial account number; the year of a person’s birth; and the initials of known minors (not whole names). All other information must be redacted or left out of the papers.
  • Rule 11 Signing Pleadings  Signature blocks on all filings must now include an email address, in addition to counsel’s or a pro se party’s phone number and physical address. The comments to Rule 11 note that inclusion of an email address is a courtesy and is not an automatic consent to email service. For that, you still have to get a separate agreement with the opposing party.
  • Rule 26 Discovery  As with Rule 11, signature blocks on all discovery papers must now include an email address, in addition to counsel’s or a pro se party’s phone number and physical address. The comments to Rule 26 note that if a party lacks an email address, a physical address or a telephone number, the party need not supply the nonexistent information. So, at least Rule 26 does not require that counsel get email accounts.  But Rule 11 does not have the same exception, so arguably Rule 11 does require that counsel have email accounts.

* This is only a summary of the substantive changes that I found most interesting or important. It is not a detailed explanation of all substantive changes.  For example, I did not explain the changes to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 regarding summonses. If you want detailed advice regarding the Federal Rules, please consult your attorney or dig in to your copy of the Federal Rules.

Happy Anniversary Electronic Data Discovery Rules!

By R. David Donoghue on Posted in Federal Rules

Tomorrow is the first anniversary of the “new” electronic data discovery (“EDD”) rules.* In fact, the EDD rules were not new, they were intended to be a codification of the basic rules already in use by the various district courts. Despite that, a study conducted by LexisNexis at the October Association of Corporate Counsel 2007 Annual Meeting in Chicago found that corporate counsel continue to struggle with implementation of the rules and confusion about what the EDD rules required. For example, 70% of respondents believed that electronic files had to be produced in their native formats. In fact, you simply must work with opposing counsel to decide what format to produce the files in, either their native formats or some chosen standard format. This confusion should not have surprised anyone. Even in IP circles, lawyers rarely fully understand a company’s IT infrastructure and the IT people rarely understand the legal process. This disconnect can be very dangerous when it comes to meeting EDD obligations.

If your company is still struggling with the EDD rules or, worse, avoiding them completely, you can solve your problems with some relatively simple actions. First, take a breath, open your copy of the Federal Rules and read them thoughtfully and then set up a meeting with the head of your company’s IT infrastructure, the head of your company’s legal department or litigation staff and an outside counsel with EDD experience. Working together, come up with a general plan for gathering and preserving the appropriate information as cases arise. Pay special attention to how your plan fits with the company’s overall data retention policies (yes, your company should have data retention policies and the policy should be followed carefully) and how to suspend any periodic or automatic data removal when a litigation hold needs to be instituted. Once you have a plan, meet periodically to update it and to ensure that it is being followed. If you are prepared for EDD, it is an excellent litigation tool. If you are not, it is a potential disaster.

For more on EDD, check out these blogs:

Alextronic Discovery

Dennis Kennedy

EDD Update

E-Discovery Team

E-discovery 2.0

Electronic Discovery Blog

Electronic Discovery Law (another LexBlog blog)

Ride the Lightning

Sound Evidence

Hat tip to the EDD Blog Online via Legal Blog Watch for identifying the LexisNexis survey..

* Tomorrow is also the date that the next set of changes to the Federal Rules becomes effective. Fortunately, these changes are largely focused on making the rules more readable instead of adding or changing obligations. But once you are prepared for the EDD rules, you should still turn back to your copy of the Federal Rules and read through the revisions.  Look for a blog post next week highlighting some of the substantive changes.

Court Cannot Amend Its Final Order

By R. David Donoghue on Posted in Federal Rules

Sitrick v. Freehand Sys., Inc., No. 02 C 1568, 2007 WL 2298362 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2007) (Guzman, J.).

Judge Guzman denied plaintiff’s motion to amend the Court’s final order dismissing plaintiff’s patent infringement case with prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1). Plaintiff sought to amend the order to include the terms of the parties’ settlement agreement because in Lynch v. SamataMason, Inc., 279 F.3d 487, 489 (7th Cir. 2006), the Seventh Circuit held that a court only maintains ancillary jurisdiction to enforce settlement agreements if the dismissal order contains (not just by incorporation) the terms of the agreement. But the Court denied the motion for two reasons. First, the Court’s original order was a nullity because it was issued after the parties filed their unconditional stipulation of dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1) which immediately ended the Court’s jurisdiction. Second, because the amendment was not clerical, sought within one year of entry of the order or otherwise justified, Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 prevented the Court from amending the order.

Post-Appeal Addition of Allegation Does Not Warrant Mandamus

By R. David Donoghue on Posted in Federal Rules

In re AD-II Eng’ing., Inc., Misc. Docket No. 07-852, Slip Op. (Fed. Cir. May 29, 2007).*

The Federal Circuit denied defendant AD-II Engineering’s (“AD-II”) writ of mandamus seeking to prevent Judge Gettleman from considering plaintiff SRAM Corp.’s (“SRAM”) motion to amend its complaint to add infringement allegations on a new claim and related summary judgment motion as to infringement of that claim. SRAM sued AD-II alleging infringement of SRAM’s patent for a system of shifting bicycle gears that prevents overshifting. The Northern District Court previously construed the claims of the claim initially asserted by SRAM, found the patent claim valid and entered judgment in favor of SRAM and an injunction against AD-II, a subset of these decisions are set out at SRAM Corp. v. AD-II Eng’ing, Inc., 326 F. Supp.2d 903 (N.D. Ill. 2005). On AD-II’s appeal of that decision, the Federal Circuit overturned the claim construction and, therefore, vacated the final judgments on validity and infringement – SRAM Corp., 465 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2006). On remand, SRAM sought to amend its complaint asserting an additional claim and moved for summary judgment of infringement of the claim to be added. At a hearing on SRAM’s motions, the Northern District Court noted that there were problems with SRAM’s late effort to amend its complaint and add infringement allegations, but set a briefing schedule for SRAM’s summary judgment motion. AD-II then filed this writ of mandamus. The Federal Circuit refused to prevent briefing of SRAM’s summary judgment motion, reasoning that AD-II’s writ was premature because the Northern District Court had not yet decided whether to allow SRAM to assert its additional claim. 

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Interlocutory Motions for Reconsideration are Brought Pursuant to FRCP 54(b)

By R. David Donoghue on Posted in Federal Rules

Varitalk, LLC v. Lahoti, No. 07 C 1771, 2007 WL 1576127 (N.D. Ill. May 30, 2007) (Conlon, J.).

Judge Conlon denied defendant Dave Lahoti’s (“Lahoti”) Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for reconsideration of the Court’s previous opinion denying Lahoti’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue and forum non conveniens (you can read more about the previous decision in the Blog’s archives). Lahoti, a California resident, operated a website from California using the domain name www.veritalk.com. Lahoti’s site was an internet portal which allowed visitors to his site to click through links to buy various products or services. The Court held that Lahoti’s website fell in the gray area between active websites (which create specific jurisdiction) and passive websites (which do not create specific jurisdiction). But the portal’s interactive and commercial nature combined with plaintiff Varitalk’s evidence that some consumers were confused and erroneously visited Lahoti’s website created personal jurisdiction. Lahoti argued for reconsideration because he contends that his website did not link to businesses located in or doing business in Illinois, and that a third party puts the content on his website. The Court denied both of these arguments, explaining that Varitalk had put presented evidence that Lahoti’s website included links to business with substantial Illinois operations and that whether Lahoti or an agent of his placed the content on his website did not change the Court’s analysis. But the Court’s procedural analysis may be the most useful part of this case for litigators. The Court notes that Lahoti styled his motion as a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for reconsideration, but that it is actually a Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) motion. Rule 60(b) is for reconsideration of final judgments, where as Rule 54(b) is for interlocutory decisions. A denial of a motion to dismiss is necessarily interlocutory.

Late Requested 56(f) Cannot Save Summary Judgment

By R. David Donoghue on Posted in Federal Rules

Hickory Farms, Inc. v. Snackmasters, Inc., No. 05 C 4541, 2007 WL 1576124 (N.D. Ill. May 29, 2007) (Kennelly, J.).

Judge Kennelly denied plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the Court’s decision that plaintiff’s "Beef Stick" and "Turkey Stick" marks were generic and the Court’s cancellation of the Beef Stick mark (you can read more about that opinion in the Blog’s archives). The Court denied plaintiff’s argument that it should be given more time, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) to conduct a survey to show that the marks are not generic. But the Court reasoned that plaintiff was free to conduct such a survey in the fourteen months of discovery leading up to defendant’s summary judgment motion. Furthermore, in its responsive briefing plaintiff specifically stated that plaintiff would “not seek to delay the briefing of this matter with its own survey at this time.” Instead, plaintiff suggested that it would conduct a survey if the Court denied defendant’s summary judgment motion. The Court held that after these statements, plaintiff’s current request to perform a survey was almost “frivolous.”

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