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Tag Archives: 56.1

Lack of Local Rule 56.1 Support Prevents Summary Judgment

Posted in Local Rules, Summary Judgment

Panoramic Stock Images, Ltd. d/b/a Panoramic Images v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., No 12 C 10003, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Sep. 2, 2014) (Feinerman, J.).

Judge Feinerman granted in part plaintiff Panoramic’s partial summary judgment motion and denied defendant Wiley’s partial summary judgment motion as to Panoramic’s fraud and contributory copyright infringement claims in this copyright case regarding nine stock photographs.  The Court also set a trial date.

Wiley contends that Panoramic lacks the necessary evidence for its fraud claim proving that when Wiley said it wanted the photograph at issue for use in 15,000 volumes, it knew that it intended to use the photograph in more editions that that.  The Court, however, held that Panoramic offered evidence sufficient to infer the necessary intent.  Panoramic had documents showing that prior editions had been larger than 15,000 volumes and that Wiley was forecasting 30,000 volumes.  The Court also held that Panoramic put forth evidence that it was injured by the allegedly false statement beyond the scope of the copyright infringement because it was deprived of the licensing fee at the time of the license, beyond any award for copyright infringement.

The Court also denied Wiley summary judgment as to Panoramic’s contributory copyright infringement claim.  First, Wiley, in its reply, failed to respond to certain of Panoramic’s arguments.  So, the motion was denied on that ground alone.  Furthermore, the fact that Panoramic’s claim may be duplicative of its direct infringement claim was not fatal because parties are allowed to plead in the alternative.  The Court did, however, acknowledge that even if Panoramic succeeded at trial on both claims, it would not receive a double recovery.

The Court denied Wiley’s motion for summary judgment as to a statute of limitations for all claims before December 9.  But because the Seventh Circuit had approved the discovery rule and Panoramic had evidence that it did not know of Wiley’s alleged infringement until sometime in the three years before filing suit, the suit was not time barred.  And there was a dispute of fact as to whether Panoramic should reasonably have been aware of its claims when it learned of similar suits regarding the same issues.

The Court granted Panoramic that it owned valid copyrights in the images that it individually registered, as Wiley conceded.  But denied summary judgment as to images that were filed as part of compilations.  While the Court had previously held that a copyright owner held copyrights in the original components of its copyrighted compilations, the evidence Panoramic cited in its Local Rule 56.1 statement of facts, did not sufficiently support its ownership claims in these works.

The Court denied Panoramic summary judgment that Wiley exceeded the usage limits set forth in the parties agreements because Wiley had evidence suggesting a practice that allowed the parties to exceed those limits as part of the normal course of their business.

Because of the factual issues described above, summary judgment was not appropriate for either party as to Wiley’s affirmative defenses of statutes of limitations, implied license/course of dealing, and invalidity/unenforceability.

The Court denied Panoramic summary judgment as to Wiley’s lashes defense because it could not determine which were subject to a three year limitation on the record before the Court.

 

Lady Gaga’s “Judas” Does Not Infringe Copyright

Posted in Local Rules, Summary Judgment

Francescatti v. Germanotta p/k/a Lady Gaga, No. 11 C 5270, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. June 17, 2014) (Aspen, Sen. J.).

Judge Aspen granted defendants’ Fed. R Civ. P. 56 motion for summary judgment because no reasonable trier of fact could find defendant Lady Gaga’s song “Judas” substantially similar to plaintiff’s song “Juda.”

Local Rule 56.1

As an initial matter, the Court denied defendants’ motion to strike plaintiff’s responses to certain of defendant’s Local Rule 56.1 statements of fact because the Court did not rely upon any of them except one, which did not introduce new facts.  That allowed the Court to avoid the parties’ “labyrinth of disputes.”

Access

There was a question of fact as to whether defendants had access to plaintiff’s copyrighted song.  While there was a dispute about whether defendant Gaynor, who worked with plaintiff on her song, ever came into contact with Lady Gaga, there was no dispute that Gaynor worked on both songs in dispute.

Substantial Similarity

The Court granted summary judgment of no substantial similarity after recognizing that summary judgment of substantial similarity is generally disfavored.  The Court  then denied to apply the inverse ratio rule — requiring a higher standard of proof where evidence of access is relatively weak — because the Seventh Circuit explicitly decided not to endorse it.  The Court then provided an excellent primer on the substantial similarity law.

                                                a.         Expert Testimony

The Court held expert testimony was warranted in this case because:

  • The complexity of the music industry had increased significantly since the adoption of the subjective ordinary observer test.
  • The Lady Gaga song was created with a Digital Audio Workstation (“DAW”) which can create thousands of sounds.
  • The different music genres of the two songs also added to the complexity of the determination.

Although the Court allowed expert testimony and analyzed certain findings of the ordinary observer test, it was explicitly not using a higher standard of review than the ordinary observer test.

                                                b.         Extrinsic Test

The Court found the following similarities between the two songs:

  • Similar titles;
  • Both songs repeat in a monotone the similar words “Juda” or “Judas;” and
  • Limited similarities in the breakdowns.

                                                c.         Intrinsic Test

The Court did not consider expert testimony or plaintiff’s opinion (because she was a musician) because they were not ordinary observers.

The Court did not follow the filtration method, instead considering the similarity of each song’s expression before removing non-copyrightable elements from consideration, noting that the Seventh Circuit has said either method is acceptable.  The Court found an “utter lack of similarity”:

  • It took expert analysis for the Court to see plaintiff’s distinctions;
  • The songs do not have common lyrics;
  • The themes are different; and
  • They do not sound alike musically.

The Court, therefore, found the similarity of expression to be “totally lacking.”  The Court also held that the individual elements were either not similar or not protectable.

Trade Secret Claims Dismissed for Lack of Evidence of Unique, Non-Public Information

Posted in Summary Judgment

Spitz v. Proven Winners N. Am., LLC, No. 11 C 3997, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 2013) (Hart, Sen. J.).

Judge Hart granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment in this trade secret case involving alleged trade secrets identifying pet-friendly plants.  Plaintiff alleged that defendants used plaintiff’s trade secret identification of pet-friendly plants without paying the agreed upon $.02 per pet-friendly plant sold.  As an initial matter, the Court denied to strike either parties Local Rule 56.1 statements or responses.  Each party claimed that the other did not comply with various portions of Local Rule 56.1, but to the extent the Court was able to understand and use the statements, it would do so without striking any party’s statements.  The Court did, however, disregard extraneous facts included in plaintiff’s responses to defendants’ statements of fact, instead of in a Local Rule 56.1 additional statement of facts.

The Court held that plaintiff did not provide sufficient evidence that defendants’ association of a pet-friendly label with certain plants on its website came from plaintiffs’ trade secret information.  Instead, the evidence suggested that the information was publicly available.  The Court also granted defendants summary judgment as to plaintiff’s other non-IP contract and tort claims, but I will not detail those because they do not have significant IP implications.

Court Grants Summary Judgment Based Upon No Likelihood of Confusion

Posted in Local Rules, Summary Judgment

Hearthware, Inc. v. E. Mishan & Sons, Inc., No. 11 C 5233, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2012) (Nolan, J.).

Judge Nolan granted defendant E. Mishan & Sons (“EMS”) motion for summary judgment on plaintiff Hearthware’s copyright, Lanham Act and related state law claims related to EMS’s alleged copying of Hearthware’s Nu Wave halogen oven and its related trademarks and infomercial.  As an initial matter, the parties both failed to comply with the Local Rule 56.1 requirements for statements of fact and responses thereto, largely by failing to sufficiently support statements with citation to evidence. 

Copyright

While there were many similarities between the parties’ infomercials – two hosts hugging when they met, a chef knocking frozen food against a counter, and time-lapse photography of food cooking in the oven – for each allegedly copied element EMS offered proof of many infomercials before Hearthware’s that had the same elements.  So, to the extent there was copying or at least similarity, those commonalities were unprotectable scenes a faire.  And “threadbare” allegations of direct copying could not save the claim.

Trademark

There was no likelihood of confusion between Hearthware’s NUWAVE and EMS’s SUPER WAVE marks.  While both marks contain the term “wave” the marks are presented “entirely” differently.  For example, EMS focuses upon its connection to Sharper Image.  The similarities of the products – both halogen ovens – favored confusion, as did the fact that both parties sell their products nationally in similar locations.  Neither party addressed the degree of care exercised by consumers.  Hearthware’s mark was not strong in light of the sixteen other non-halogen ovens that have registered a mark with “wave” in it.  There was no evidence of actual confusion.  There was also no evidence that EMS was attempting to palm off its product as Hearthware’s.  Balancing the factors, the Court held that any finding of likelihood of confusion would be improperly based upon conjecture.  There was, therefore, no likelihood of confusion.

Without likelihood of confusion, summary judgment was warranted on all of Hearthware’s Lanham Act and related state law claims.

Copyright Act Preempts Misappropriation Claim

Posted in Local Rules

Morningware, Inc. v. Hearthware Home Prods., Inc., No. 09 C 4348, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Sep. 4, 2012) (St. Eve, J.).

Judge St. Eve granted in part plaintiff Morningware’s motion for summary judgment as to defendant Hearthware’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Lanham Act and related state law counterclaims. 

As an initial matter, the parties’ Local Rule 56.1 statements of fact were deficient in numerous ways: 

  • Many of both parties’ statements were not properly supported with admissible evidence or contained legal argument instead of factual statements.  Any such “facts” were not deemed true.
  • The parties appeared to copy and past portions of their briefs into their Local Rule 56.1 statements.  That practice was not helpful to the Court.

These deficiencies resulted in a “very brief” recitation of uncontested facts.

Lanham Act False Representation & False Advertising

There were questions of fact as to each of Morningware’s alleged false representations of fact, in particular whether certain statements were false or misleading.  As such, summary judgment was not proper.

Deceptive Trade Practices Act

Hearthware’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim was based upon the same conduct as in its Lanham Act claim.  As such, summary judgment was denied for the same reason.

Common Law Misappropriation

Hearthware’s common law misappropriation claim was based upon allegations that Morningware’s infomercial was designed to mimic Hearthware’s infomercial.  This claim was preempted by the Copyright Act.  The infomercial was copyrightable and the misappropriation claim amounted to a claim of copying, which is actionable pursuant to the Copyright Act.  The Court, therefore, granted Morningware summary judgment on this claim.

 

Local Rule 56.1 Failures Result in Disputed Facts

Posted in Local Rules

Morningware, Inc. v. Hearthware Home Prods., Inc., No. 09 C 4348, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2012) (St. Eve, J.).

Judge St. Eve denied plaintiff Morningware’s and defendant Hearthware’s cross-motion for summary judgment regarding Morningware’s Lanham Act, Deceptive Trade Practices Act and related state law claims in this Lanham Act and patent infringement case.  As an initial matter, the parties’ Local Rule 56.1 statements of fact were deficient in numerous ways:

  • Many of both parties’ statements were not properly supported with admissible evidence.  Any such “facts” were not deemed true, unless the opposing party admitted them.
  • Hearthware’s responses to Morningware’s statements of fact were not properly supported by evidence – a lack of knowledge, unlike in an answer to a complaint, is not sufficient.  Any of Morningware’s facts not properly contested were deemed admitted.
  • Both parties also failed to cite to the statements of fact in their summary judgment briefing.

The Court excluded the declaration of Hearthware’s expert witness because the witness was not properly disclosed by the expert deadline or otherwise during the years of discovery between the parties.  The fact that the expert was originally retained as a consultant does not remove the requirement that the consultant be properly disclosed if the consultant will be turned into a testifying expert.

The Court dismissed without prejudice a motion to strike Hearthware’s allegedly improper expert report regarding damages because it was irrelevant to the motions at issue. 

Lanham Act False Representation of Origin

There was no dispute that Morningware’s MORNINGWARE and HALO marks were protectable.  Morningware further offered evidence of the necessary likelihood of consumer confusions, but not enough to meet Morningware’s heavy burden to show evidence “so one-sided that there can be no doubt about how the questions should be answered.” 

Lanham Act Product Disparagement

The parties agreed that Hearthware’s advertisement stated “The Real NuWave® Oven Pro Why Buy an Imitation?  90-Day Gty”, but whether that was a false statement or misleading was a question of fact.  Morningware offered no evidence to prove Hearthware’s statement literally false.  Morningware argued that the statement was impliedly false.  Morningware relies upon a consumer survey for its proofs.  But Hearthware disputed the survey, creating a question of fact.  Furthermore, there was a question of fact as to whether the alleged false statement impacted consumers’ purchasing decisions. 

State Law Claims 

Because the parties agreed that the state law claims rose and fell with the Lanham Act claims, summary judgment was denied as to those claims as well.

Exceptional Case Finding Requires Additional Facts

Posted in Discovery, Local Rules, Summary Judgment, Trial

Bone Care Int’l., LLC v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., No. 08 C 1083, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2012) (Dow, J.).

Judge Dow held that plaintiff’s U.S. Patent No. 6,903,083 (the “’083 patent”) was invalid based upon a sale more than one year before the ‘083 patent’s filing date and denied defendants’ motion to find the case exceptional and award attorney’s fees, in this case related to vitamin D2.  As an initial matter, Judge Dow, although he would have been within his rights to do so, did not deem admitted facts that were not properly contested pursuant to Local Rule 56.1.  The Court did, however, explain that it would not consider improper denials.

The Court held that two sales by plaintiff more than one year before the filing date invalidated the ‘083 patent.  Plaintiffs argued that they were not in fact sales because while money changed hands, pursuant to a Supply Agreement, plaintiffs retained ownership of the goods.  But that argument “fail[ed] to get out of the gate.”  The Supply Agreement was for the manufacture of vitamin D2, for which hundreds of thousands of dollars were paid.

“[I]nference upon inference” favored finding the case exceptional and awarding defendants their attorney’s fees.  Plaintiffs lacked a plausible explanation for how they were unaware of the invalidating sales.  And instead of disclaiming the ‘083 patent and avoiding a large document production, plaintiffs continued asserting it.  But there remained a question of fact regarding what information plaintiffs’ executives had regarding the sales and when they had it.  The Court, therefore, allowed the parties to take further discovery on those issues before bringing the issue back to the Court. 

Pro Se Defendant Granted Leeway re: Local Rule 56.1

Posted in Summary Judgment

Turina v. Crawley, No. 10 C 4292, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Feb. 16, 2012) (Darrah, J.).

Judge Darrah granted pro se defendant summary judgment as to plaintiff’s copyright claims and dismissed plaintiff’s remaining state law claims for lack of jurisdiction.  As an initial matter, the Court treated those portions of defendant’s response that disputed facts in plaintiff’s Local Rule 56.1 statement of facts as a Local Rule 56.1 response, but treated other, uncontested facts as admitted.  Plaintiff failed to offer any proof of her copyright registration or her application for registration.  But the Court took judicial notice of plaintiff’s registered copyright that the Court found on the Copyright Office website.

Having found that plaintiff had a registered copyright, the Court turned to defendant’s allegedly infringing use.  Plaintiff, however, offered no evidence of defendant’s unauthorized use.  Plaintiff hired defendant to edit her manuscript and defendant did so.  Because defendant’s use was related to editing the manuscript, there was no infringing use.  And as the Court lacked diversity jurisdiction over the state law claims, the Court dismissed them without prejudice to refile them in state court.

Facts Shoe-Horned into Local Rule 56.1 Responses are Disregarded

Posted in Summary Judgment

Only the First, Ltd. v. Seiko Epson Corp., No. 07 C 1333, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Sep. 30, 2011) (Dow, J.).

Judge Dow granted defendants summary judgment of invalidity based upon several prior art references in this patent case involving color combinations for a printing system. As an initial matter, the Court excluded the following for failure to comply with Local Rule 56.1: 

  •  Legal conclusions or unsupported statements of fact;

  • Denials without proper factual support were deemed admitted;

  • Any additional facts in a brief, but not in a Rule 56.1 statement as supplemental statements; and

  • Facts shoe-horned into Rule 56.1 responses.

Of particular note:

  • The Court denied plaintiff’s motion to strike defendant’s supplemental expert declaration. While the reports included new opinions, plaintiffs were not prejudiced because the declarations were served during discovery and before the depositions of the experts.

  •  While the Court could have stopped its analysis after the first piece of art invalidated the remaining claims, the Court analyzed each piece of art for the sake of completeness.

Summary Judgment Granted Based Upon Failure to Comply With Rule 56.1

Posted in Local Rules

International Tax Advisors, Inc. v. Tax Law Assocs., LLC, No. 08 C 2222, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Feb. 15, 2011) (Valdez, Mag. J.)

Judge Valdez denied plaintiffs’ (collectively "ITA") motion for summary judgment, and granted defendants’ (collectively "TLA") motion for summary judgment as to ITA’s copyright claim, and chose not to retain supplemental jurisdiction over ITA’s remaining state law claims. While ITA may have had evidence to support its copyright claim, it did not properly cite to that evidence via its Local Rule 56.1 statement of uncontested material facts. And to the extent ITA cited directly to evidence it did so generally by description, without exhibit numbers or specific page cites.

The Court granted TLA summary judgment of noninfringement because ITA did not properly cite to facts in its Local Rule 56.1 statement showing a question of material fact.

The Court also granted TLA summary judgment as to ITA’s RICO claim because ITA only alleged one of the required two predicate acts. 

Finally, the Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims.

N. D. Illinois 2011 Patent Trends

Posted in Local Rules

Several significant trends are developing as I read this year’s N. D Illinois patent decisions. The trends are largely, although not all, Chicago-specific. And they appear to be largely influenced by the not-so-new Local Patent Rules.

  1. Faster Settlement Times. Patent cases are settling faster. While the economy may still be playing a role, I believe that the LPR 2 initial contentions are driving early settlements. When parties take them seriously and make their best early cases, it is causing opponents to reconsider their positions and driving earlier settlements. Maybe more importantly, armed with more substantive analysis up-front, parties are talking more and more settlement discussions lead to more settlements. No doubt this is one of the impacts that the Court expected when it developed the LPR 2 initial contentions.
  2. False Patent Marking is Dying. In early 2010, the Northern District was among the top three districts for false patent marking filings, in particular those cases brought by marking trolls (non-competitors in the defendant’s industry). Unlike the Eastern District of Texas (which applied Rule 8 notice pleading to the intent requirement), the Northern District was split with many judges applying Rule 9 heightened pleading and a few applying Rule 8 notice pleading. That slowed the flow of cases to a degree, but what seems to have finished them is a combination of the Federal Circuit’s BP Lubricants decision (requiring Rule 9(b) pleading for the intent requirement) and a decision this spring holding that corporate intent was not recognized in the Seventh Circuit, so the required intent must be shown in at least one employee, officer or agent of the corporation.
  3. LR 56.1 Summary Judgment Decisions are on the Decline. There seem to be fewer decisions granting or denying summary judgment for failure to comply with the Local Rule 56.1 requirements for statements of material facts. Having tracked five years worth of intellectual property summary judgment decisions chastising parties for failure to comply with Local Rule 56.1, I cannot imagine that there is a trend toward strict compliance with Local Rule 56.1. Furthermore, this does not appear to be true in the trademark, copyright or trade secret realms. So, my suspicion is that this trend is really about fewer summary judgment decisions. And there are fewer summary judgment decisions for at least two reasons: 1) earlier settlement which avoids summary judgment motions; and 2) the Local Patent Rule 6.1 comment that judges have discretion to delay "early" summary judgment motions until the end of the discovery and the LPR 1.1 authority to delay motions raising claim construction issues until after the claim construction opinion issues.

Mutual Non-Compliance With Local Rule 56.1 Avoids Procedural Grant or Denial

Posted in Local Rules

Healix Infusion Therapy, Inc. v. HHI Infusion Servs., Inc., No. 10 C 3772, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 2011) (Zagel, J.).

Judge Zagel denied plaintiff Healix’s motion for summary judgment as to defendant HHI’s alleged tortious interference and denied HHI’s motion to dismiss Healix’s tortious interference claim. The motion to dismiss was premised upon application of Washington law, but the Court held that Texas law applied and the claim was properly plead.

Regarding summary judgment, both parties "cried foul" as to the other’s Local Rule 56.1 compliance. The Court held that both parties were correct. But in light of the mutual non-compliance, the Court considered the substance of the motion, instead of resolving it on procedural grounds. Additionally, the Court held that emails offered as evidence were admissible over a hearsay objection as business records pursuant to FRE 803(6). Finally, the Court held that there was a question of fact as to whether HHI’s alleged interference was willful and intentional.

Lack of Documentation Regarding Use at the Relevant Time Prevents Summary Judgment

Posted in Summary Judgment

Eazypower Corp. v. Jore Corp., No. 04 C 6372, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Oct. 20, 2010) (Zagel, J.).

Judge Zagel denied defendant Jore’s ("Jore") motion for summary judgment of invalidity in this patent dispute regarding screwdrivers with flexible extension shafts. As a preliminary matter, plaintiff Eazypower repeatedly failed to comply with Local Rule 56.1 regarding statements of material fact. Despite that, the Court accepted Eazypower’s additional facts and responses to Jore’s statements of fact because Jore had sufficient opportunity to respond to them.

Jore argued that a particular screwdriver with a flexible extension shaft, the FB-19, was sold in the United States in the mid-1980s and was invalidating prior art. Eazypower did not dispute that the FB-19 taught each element of the identified patent claims. But Eazypower did dispute that the FB-19 was in fact prior art. First, Eazypower argued that Jore had not sufficiently corroborated its evidence that the FB-19 was sold in the United States in the mid-1980s. Jore’s corroborating evidence – several third parties with knowledge – was sufficient. But there was evidence conflicting with Jore’s position. An age analysis of the FB-19 packaging suggested that it had been built in the late 1970s or early 1980s, but it also showed traces of an adhesive that was not available in the mid-1980s. Additionally, Eazypower showed that relevant shipping records for the period did not show any sales or import of FB-19s. The Court, therefore, held that there was a question of material fact and denied summary judgment.

Northern District of Illinois Practice Tips Nos. 11-15

Posted in Legal News

This is the third installment of my twenty five tips for Northern District of Illinois litigation practice, with a focus on IP litigation. The tips are gleaned from my practice in the Northern District, my time as a law clerk for the Hon. Gordon J. Quist in the Western District of Michigan, and my reading of all of the Northern District of Illinois intellectual property opinions over the last four years. As you read them, let me know if you come up with others. I will be glad to include them as I go. Here are tips eleven through fifteen:

11.  Respect Twombly / Iqbal pleading standards.  The Northern District is no different than the rest of the country’s district courts — patent infringement requirements have not changed from the form in the Federal Rules. But that is not necessarily the case for Lanham Act, copyright or trade secret claims. There are numerous decisions dismissing, often with leave to amend, these more fact-specific intellectual property claims. And even in the patent context plaintiffs benefit from pleading with more particularlity. The more detail a defendant has the more information they should disclose about their accused products or systems as part of their Local Patent Rule 2.1(b) initial disclosure document production requirements. That means that the plaintiff will have more material with which to prepare its Local Patent Rule 2.2 intial infringement contentions. Finally, regardless of the type of claim, many and perhaps most judges rely upon Twombly / Iqbal to require more than a bare recitation of the elements of affirmative defenses. So, it is especially important to add some facts to your affirmative defenses.

12.  Prepare Local Rule 56.1 statements with care.  This is probably the most frequent Local Rule hang up in Northern District of Illinois opinions. It is critical that movants meet the Local Rule 56.1 requirements, among others, a numbered statement of undisputed material facts supported by admissible evidence. If the facts are not supported or if they are legal conclusions, judges routinely strike or disregard them.

13.  Respond to Local Rule 56.1 statements with evidence.  Far too often, parties respond to Local Rule 56.1 statements without evidence. Those responses are almost always deemed admissions. Without admissibile evidence to counter statements of fact they are almost always admitted.

14.  Watch your judge’s webpage.  Each judge maintains the equivalents of standing orders on their webpage, often in multiple places and links across the page. It is critical that you read them at the beginning of your case and that you recheck them regularly. At a minimum, check them before you file anything with the Court. I find that the website instructions change with much greater frequency than the old, paper standing orders did. And while judges try to make it easy to see what they change, if you are not looking you will miss it.

15.  Always file notices of motion.  In some districts, notices of motions are not required or even discouraged. In the Northern District of Illinois, they are required of every motion. If you fail to file one, you will likely hear from the Clerk’s office. Also, make sure to file the notice after the motion, not before. If you file the notice before the motion, you will generally have to refile it.

Summary Judgment Denied for Failure to Comply With Rule 56.1 Statement of Facts

Posted in Legal News

Eva’s Bridal Ltd. v. Halanick Enterprises, Inc., No. 07 C 1668, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. May 19, 2010) (Darrrah, J.).

Judge Darrah granted in part defendants’ and denied plaintiffs’ summary judgment motions in this Lanham Act case over the use of the name "Eva’s Bridal." The Court granted defendants’ summary judgment as to plaintiffs’ trademark infringement claim because plaintiffs presented no evidence that they federally registered the "Eva’s Bridal" trademark.

Plaintiffs’ Lanham Act unfair competition and trademark dilution claims did not require a federally registered trademark. But because the mark was not registered, plaintiffs had the burden of proving ownership of the mark.  Plaintiffs created at least a question of fact as to ownership with evidence that plaintiffs’ business was a continuation of the original use of the mark. And because the mark was based upon a first name and not a last name the mark was not necessarily descriptive. The Court, therefore, held there was a question of fact as to whether the mark was descriptive. 

Defendants agreed that plaintiffs abandoned the mark by licensing it without maintaining any quality control. Plaintiffs, however, presented sufficient evidence of control to create a question of fact.

Defendants’ argument that plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of confusion was not relevant to a dilution analysis. And defendants’ argument that the Eva’s Bridal mark was not famous failed because it was not developed. Defendants’ argument was a single sentence without elaboration or support.

There was also a question of fact as to defendants’ laches and acquiescence claims. Plaintiffs cited evidence that during the alleged delay the parties engaged in various negotiations and defendants made various payments.

Finally, the Court denied plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion. Plaintiffs failed to comply with Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) requiring a statement of uncontested material facts supported by admissible evidence. Plaintiffs’ statements were largely taken verbatim from its amended complaint, were largely irrelevant to the summary judgment issues and were largely not supported by cites to the record. The Court, therefore, denied plaintiffs’ motion without analyzing it on the merits. 

Patent Disclosure Includes the Specification and the Drawings

Posted in Legal News

Minemyer v. B-Roc Reps., Inc., No. 07 C 1763, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2009) (Cole, Mag. J.)*

Judge Cole granted summary judgment of invalidity based upon the §102(b) on-sale bar and denied summary judgment as to invalidity based upon §102(b) public use and obviousness.

                                                             Priority Date

Plaintiff argued that its pipe coupler patent was entitled to the priority date of its provisional application because the provisional application disclosed in the drawings the tapered threads at issue, although they were not described in the specification. The Court held that figures showing tapered threads would be sufficient, but that the figures did not show tapered threads. Plaintiff alleged that enlargements of the figures showed a 1% taper. But the Court held that the original drawing did not “convey” the tapered threads with "reasonable clarity.” Even the enlargement showed “no true tapers.” Because the provisional application did not disclose the taper, the patent’s priority date was its filing date.

                                                             On-Sale Bar

The Court held that plaintiff admitted he offered the patented couplers for sale more than one year before the filing date, also known as the critical date. Plaintiff also admitted both in interrogatory responses and at deposition that his invention had been reduced to practice at the time of the offer.  Plaintiff claimed that the use was experimental, but the court held that the claim was not properly supported by evidence in plaintiff’s Local Rule 56.1 statement of material facts.

                                                             Public Use Bar

The Court denied summary judgment based upon the public use bar. The alleged prior art device was asserted against other claims in defendants’ invalidity contentions, but not against the claim at issue, claim 12. Furthermore, the evidence of the alleged prior art coupler was provided by a witness that was not disclosed in defendants’ Rule 26 disclosures or their interrogatory responses. He was first identified in a subpoena at the end of fact discovery.

                                                             Obviousness

Defendant’s obviousness arguments were based upon the same prior art as the public use bar prior art. So, summary judgment was not appropriate for similar reasons. Additionally, defendants arguments were cursory and did not even cite case law.

Click here for more on this case in the Blog’s archives.

Patent & Procedure News

Posted in Legal News

Here are a few stories you do not want to miss:

  • The Wisconsin Law Journal has an article based upon a Northern District of Illinois case in which a summary judgment decision hinged upon a failure to substantively answer one of the other party’s Local Rule 56.1 statements of material fact.  In that case, a procedural objection was made, but no substantive answer was given.  So, when the objection was denied, the fact was deemed admitted.  This is a point I have made often:  follow Local Rule 56.1 closely and carefully.
  • The Blog of the Legal Times reported that in a recent interview the Federal Circuit’s Chief Judge Michel suggested that the next nominees to the Federal Circuit should have the following backgrounds:  a patent-experienced district judge; a trial lawyer with patent experience; or a chief corporate lawyer with patent experience.

Employee Owes Current Employer Duty of Loyalty

Posted in Summary Judgment

Single Source, Inc. v. Harvey, No. 07 C 1201, 2008 WL 927902 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 7, 2008) (Der-Yeghiayan, J.).

Judge Der-Yeghiayan denied defendants’ summary judgment motion. Defendant Harvey was employed by plaintiff Single Source (“SS”) as, among other things, its Sales Director. When Harvey was promoted to the Sales Director position he signed a confidentiality agreement which required that Harvey maintain the secrecy of SS’s trade secrets and only use them for SS’s benefit. SS alleged that Harvey became disgruntled and took a position with defendant Food Marketing Concepts (“FMC”). Before giving SS notice and leaving SS’s employ, Harvey allegedly solicited SS’s customers for FMC and used an SS expense account to pursue customers for FMC. Defendants argued that because Harvey was not an SS officer or director he did not owe SS a duty of loyalty. The Court, however, held that an employee owes it employer a duty not to compete with the employer or solicit the employer’s customers before terminating the employment. The Court also held that the parties’ competing evidence regarding whether Harvey had actually solicited SS’s customers prior to ending his employment with SS created a material question of fact.

Practice Tip: You must respond to Local Rule 56.1 statements of material facts. The Court noted that defendants did not respond to SS’s statement of additional facts. Because of that, the Court deemed each additional material fact admitted. The Court did not identify whether its decision turned on any of these admitted facts, but it is easy to imagine the circumstance in which the case could have turned on an inadvertently admitted fact.

Summary Judgment for Failure to Comply with Local Rule 56.1

Posted in Legal News

FM Indus., Inc. v. Citicorp Credit Servs., Inc., No. 07 C 1794, 2008 WL 717792 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 2008) (Conlon, J.).

Judge Conlon granted Citicorp defendants and denied defendant Gelfand summary judgment of copyright infringement. Plaintiff FM Industries ("FMI") alleged that Gelfand infringed FMI’s copyright in its TUCANS debt-collection software by continuing to use it after Gelfand’s license expired. Gelfand argued that FMI could not prove ownership of the copyright because it could not produce the written assignment. But the Court held that FMI’s deposition testimony was sufficient to create a material question of fact and, therefore, denied summary judgment.

Citicorp was accused of encouraging and inducing its outside attorneys to use the TUCANS software after their licenses expired. But at least in part because FMI failed to respond to Citicorp’s Local Rule 56.1 statements or to submit its own responsive statements of fact, the Court accepted as true Citicorp’s evidence that it told its outside attorneys to stop using TUCANS before licenses expired and that Citicorp was unaware that the attorneys continued using TUCANS.

Practice Tip: I cannot say it enough: you must strictly comply with Local Rule 56.1. Click here to read about other opinions considering Local Rule 56.1

Summary Judgment Denied for Failure to Comply with LR 56.1

Posted in Local Rules

Murata Mfg. Co., Ltd. v. Bel Fuse, Inc., No. 03 C 2934, Order (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 2008) (Gottschall, J.).*

Judge Gottschall denied plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion without prejudice for failure to comply with both Local Rule 56.1 and the Court’s Standing Order — the Standing Order further explained that each short, numbered statement of fact required by Local Rule 56.1 should contain one fact and no attorney argument. Despite Local Rule 56.1’s clear requirements and the Standing Order’s directive to strictly comply with Local Rule 56.1, the Court held that nearly one-third of plaintiff’s 145 statements of fact did not comply with the rules:

  • Many were long;
  • One contained no facts;
  • Several focused on an expert’s methodology instead of his results; and
  • The rest contained inferences, argument, or legal conclusions.

The Court explained that the case’s complexity required strict adherence to Local Rule 56.1:

The court simply does not possess the resources to comb through the parties’ statements of fact in an attempt to sift out usable fact from impermissible argument or inference. … The Standing Order and LR 56.1 are composed in plain English and their meaning is clear; the court properly expects experienced and sophisticated attorneys to adhere to them strictly, particularly given the complex and sophisticated nature of this litigation.

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Northern District News

Posted in Legal News

Here is some recent Northern District news:

  • Judge Coar recently updated his case management procedures (click here to read them) to state that pursuant to Local Rule 5.2(e), parties are no longer to provide courtesy copies of electronically filed papers to Judge Coar’s chambers, except for papers pertaining to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 or Local Rule 56.1 (summary judgment papers).
  • Magistrate Judges Brown (Eastern Division — Chicago) and Mahoney (Western Division — Rockford) are both up for reappointment in early 2008.  Pursuant to federal law, the Court has established a citizen’s panel to consider their reappointments.  Members of the bar, as well as the general public, are requested to forward comments regarding the reappointments no later than January 18, 2008, to:

Magistrate Judge Advisory Panel

c/o Mr. Michael W. Dobbins

Clerk of Court

U.S. District Court

219 South Dearborn St. — Rm. 2050

Chicago, IL 60604

Unwritten LR 56.1: Evidentiary Support is Not Just for Summary Judgment

Posted in Pleading Requirements

Gencor Pacific, Inc. v. Federal Labs., Corp., No. 07 C 168, 2007 WL 2298367 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2007) (Guzman, J.).

Judge Guzman granted defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) motion to dismiss for lack of venue. Plaintiff Gencor Pacific (“Gencor”) and defendant Federal Laboratories (“Fedlabs”) both distribute products including caralluma powder. Gencor alleged that Fedlabs infringed Gencor’s copyrights, engaged in unfair competition and other related state law claims by using various Gencor studies and literature to promote Fedlabs’s products. Gencor also alleged that Fedlabs’s Chairman defendant Jeffery Taub left a defamatory voicemail message for an Illinois-based Gencor distributor. Because defendants are all New York residents, venue was only proper in the Northern District if a substantial part of the events at issue occurred in Illinois. Gencor argued that the Illinois voicemail and various Fedlabs mailings to Illinois residents including the copyrighted studies constituted a substantial part of the events at issue. In support of its contentions, Gencor submitted only a transcript of the alleged voicemail. Gencor did not submit any mailings that had been sent to Northern District residents or a declaration stating that the voicemail had been received at a Northern District telephone number. The Court held that Gencor’s unsupported “bare allegations” did not meet Gencor’s burden of proving that venue was proper.

Practice tip: You must support factual allegations with evidence. Local Rule 56.1 forces parties to follow this advice for summary judgment motions (although many fail to follow the rule). But the requirement, although unwritten, is no less important for other motions. If you are ever not sure whether an allegation requires evidentiary support, err on the side of providing the support. I have never seen an argument lost because a party unnecessarily supported its factual allegations.

Ownership is a Copyright Prerequisite

Posted in Legal News

DJ Photog. v. Wibert, Inc., No. 06 C 2215, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jul. 11, 2007) (Zagel, J.).*

Judge Zagel dismissed plaintiff’s copyright infringement claim, held that its quantum meruit claim was preempted by the Copyright Act and, therefore, entered judgment in the case in favor of defendants.  Plaintiff DJ Photography argued that defendants infringed its copyrights in pictures of a burial vault and mourners at a graveside service.  But in their Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Undisputed Facts, defendants stated that the copyrights asserted were both registered by an individual, Donald Johnson, not DJ Photography.  Because DJ Photography did not dispute that Johnson owned the copyrights, the Court held that DJ Photography could not prove ownership of the copyrights and, because it did not own the copyrights, DJ Photography lacked standing to bring the suit.  The Court also held that the quantum meruit claim was preempted by the Copyright Act.

* Because the opinion has not been published electronically, you can read a copy of it here.

Parties’ Claims Go Up in Smoke For Lack of Literal Falsity

Posted in Legal News

Republic Tobacco L.P. v. North Atlantic Trading Co., No. 06 C 2738, 2007 WL 1424093 (N.D. Ill. May 10, 2007) (Der-Yeghiayan, J.).*

Judge Der-Yeghiayan granted plaintiff/counter-defendant Republic Tobacco’s (“Republic”) motion for summary judgment on defendant/counter-plaintiff North Atlantic Trading’s (“North Atlantic”) counterclaims and granted North Atlantic’s motion for summary judgment as to each of Republic’s claims. Republic brought claims against North Atlantic for Lanham Act false advertising, violation of the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“IDTPA”) and other state law claims, all arising out of an allegedly “false and misleading” presentation entitled “Cigarette Paper Review” (“CPR”) which North Atlantic allegedly gave to various Republic customers. The CPR allegedly criticized Republic, saying among other things that Republic’s cigarette rolling papers were the same as North Atlantic’s and that Republic’s Chairman Donald Levin had “lied” about the composition of Republic’s cigarette papers. North Atlantic filed counterclaims alleging Lanham Act false advertising, violation of the IDTPA and other state law claims, all arising out of Republic’s alleged sales of orange cigarette papers similar in color and size to North Atlantic’s orange Zig-Zag papers, for the purpose of confusing or deceiving consumers.

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