Art Akiane LLC v. Art & Soulworks LLC, No. 19-cv-02952, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Sep. 16, 2021) (Chang, J.).

Judge Chang ruled on the parties’ choice of law dispute between Colorado and Illinois law in this intellectual property dispute.

Federal courts apply the forum’s choice of law rules. Illinois uses the forum’s law, unless

Peng v. The Partnerships and Unincorporated Assocs. Identified on Schedule “A,” No. 21 C 1344, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Sep. 14, 2021) (Dow, J.).

Judge Dow converted the previously entered Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) into a Preliminary Injunction (PI) against the challenging defendants in this design patent dispute involving wireless earphone headbands.

As an initial

H-D U.S.A., LLC v. The Partnerships and Unincorporated Assocs. Identified on Schedule “A,” No. 21 C 3581, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Sep. 24, 2021) (Alonso, J.).

Judge Alonso granted plaintiff Harley-Davidson’s motion for preliminary injunction against defendant Amarzon-Automotive Parts (“AAP”) for allegedly selling counterfeit aftermarket chrome LED fog light projectors using Harley-Davidson’s HARLEY-DAVIDSON and DAYMAKER

EnVerve, Inc. v. Unger Meat Co., No 11 C. 472, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Apr. 26, 2011) (Castillo, J.).
Judge Castillo denied plaintiff EnVerve’s motion for preliminary injunction in this copyright infringement action involving advertisements. The Court first held that EnVerve had only shown a minimal likelihood of success on the merits:
EnVerve’s arguments were “very conclusory” and that “brevity [was] fatal.”
There was a significant dispute regarding who owned the copyrights based upon a contract between the parties.
EnVerve’s evidence of copying was an unsupported conclusion that defendant use constituted copying.
EnVerve failed to address defendant’s best argument – that EnVerve’s claim sounded in contract, not copyright.
The Court also held that there was no irreparable harm:
Money damages were an adequate remedy and were readily calculable based upon the contract, EnVerve’s invoices and defendant’s payments.
EnVerve’s claims are reputational harm and defendant’s potential insolvency were too speculative to be considered irreparable harm.

Continue Reading “Conclusory” Arguments are Fatal to Preliminary Injunction

Peerless Indus., Inc. v. Crimson AV, LLC, No. 11 C 1768, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jun. 10, 2011) (Lefkow, J.).
Judge Lefkow denied plaintiff Peerless’ motion for a preliminary injunction in this patent and tortious interference case involving audio-visual mount equipment. Peerless had a manufacturing agreement with Sycamore Manufacturing (“Sycamore”) which was terminated no later than March 2010. The agreement included a non-compete clause that prevented Sycamore from selling the products it made for Peerless or any similar products, with a very broad definition of similarity. After the March 2010 termination and before the end of the non-compete term, in March 2011, Sycamore began selling similar products to defendant Crimson. The Court held that Peerless had “negligible” likelihood of success because the non-compete clause was likely unenforceable because it was broader than necessary to protect Peerless’ interests. The scope of similar products was far too broad. The scope should have been limited to substantially similar products. Additionally, the definition of similar products was “unworkably difficult to determine.”
Peerless also could not show irreparable harm. As an initial matter, the non-compete term had ended before the date this Opinion issued. An injunction barring Crimson from selling product the agreement now allowed it to sell would have improperly extended the term of the non-compete. Additionally, because the alleged unauthorized sales were complete, the damages were readily quantifiable.

Continue Reading Preliminary Injunction Not Warranted for Unenforceable Non-Compete Clause

Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter d/b/a myVidster.com, No. 10 C 6517, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jul. 27, 2011) (Grady, J.).
Judge Grady granted plaintiff Flava Works’ motion for a preliminary injunction in this copyright case involving adult movies, and ordered the parties to confer on language for the preliminary injunction. Defendants’ myVidster website is a “social video bookmarking” site which allows users to post or link to video content. When a user posts or links to the content, myVidster crawls the website hosting the video to gather data about the video, creates a thumbnail image of the video and embeds the video on the myVidster site.
Likelihood of Success
The Court held that there was a likelihood of success on at least Flava Works’ contributory copyright infringement claim. It could not be “seriously disputed” that third parties have directly infringed Flava Work’s works by posting video content on myVidster. And defendants knew or should have known about the infringement based upon Flava Works’ seven DMCA take down notices outlining instances of the infringement to defendants. In fact, the email exchanges surrounding the notices show that defendants were not cooperative in addressing the notices. And myVidster’s repeat infringer policy was the “epitome” of willful blindness. Furthermore, there was significant evidence that defendants encouraged the infringement. For example, myVidster encouraged sharing of video content without warning of potential copyright infringement issues.
Defendants were not protected by the DMCA’s safe harbor provision. A threshold requirement for safe harbor is that a party adopt and reasonably implement a policy providing for termination of users that are repeat infringers. Defendants policy did not require or directly provide for termination of repeat infringers. And defendants did not consider copyright infringement to be part of the defintion of “infringer.”
Irreparable Harm
Defendants failed to rebut the presumption of irreparable harm in copyright cases. Flava Works’ did not delay in bringing the suit and then the injunction motion. Prior to filing suit, Flava Works attempted to resolve the issue with several DMCA take down notices and the Court would not penalize Flava Works for attempting to avoid litigation.

Continue Reading Attempts to Resolve Dispute Do Not Prevent a Preliminary Injunction

Scala’s Original Beef & Sausage Co., LLC v. Alvarez d/b/a Michaelangelo Foods, No. 09 C 7353 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 22, 2009 (Dow, J).
Judge Dow denied plaintiff Scala’s motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) in this Lanham Act case regarding Scala’s and Scala’s Preferred marks for giardiniera.
Likelihood of Success
Scala’s made a “fairly strong showing” that defendants’ (collectively “Michaelangelo Foods”) labels using the marks were likely to cause consumer confusion. Scala’s also met its burden to show some likelihood of success that its trademark license to Michaelangelo Foods was terminable at will, even though the license lacked a termination provision. Finally, Scala’s showed some likelihood of success as to its argument that licensee estoppel barred Michaelangelo Foods’ challenges to Scala’s marks. The Court noted, however, that at the early stages of the litigation it appeared that Michaelangelo Foods might be able to overcome licensee estoppel upon equitable grounds.
Irreparable Harm
Irreparable harm is presumed in trademark cases, and Michaelangelo Foods did not challenge the presumption. Instead, Michaelangelo Foods argued that Scala’s harm was not sufficiently immediate because Scala’s was not selling competing products. But the fact that Scala’s did not make a product, did not eliminate the harm. Scala’s was harmed by not being able to control Michaelangelo Foods’ quality. Additionally, Scala’s was using the marks with other products.
But the Court noted that the facts of this case mitigated the strength of Scala’s irreparable harm. In particular, Scala’s licensed the marks at least in part because Scala’s was unable to consistently pay suppliers or deliver products to its customers. And Michaelangelo Foods took substantial steps to fix those relationships, thereby enhancing the marks’ value.
Balance of Harm
The Court held that Michaelangelo Foods would be harmed by a TRO. A TRO would allow the sale of existing inventory, but individual defendant invested a significant portion of his savings into the business and the business had relatively low profits. A TRO would, therefore, likely do substantial damage to Michaelangelo Foods’ finances. This financial harm combined with Michaelangelo Foods’ efforts to rebuild the marks and the business tipped the balance of harm in Michaelangelo Foods’ favor.
Conclusion
While it was a close call, the Court denied a TRO. In view of the importance of a decision to both parties, the Court set an expedited discovery, briefing and hearing schedule for Scala’s preliminary injunction motion.

Continue Reading Close Balance of Harms Prevents TRO, but Expedited Discovery Granted

Lettuce Entertain You Enters., Inc. v. Leila Sophia AR, LLC d/b/a Lettuce Mix, No. 09 C 2582, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jun. 8, 2009) (Lefkow, J.).
Judge Lefkow denied plaintiff Lettuce Entertain You Enterprises’ (“LEYE”) motion for a temporary restraining order against defendants’ use of a banner reading “Let us be!” flanked by images of lettuce heads (the “Banner”) on a building in which defendants plan to open a salad bar restaurant to be named “Lettuce mix.” LEYE filed this suit seeking the removal of a “Lettuce mix” sign (the “Sign”) defendants placed on the same building. As an effort at resolving the dispute, defendants replaced the Sign with the Banner. After the Banner appeared, LEYE made the instant motion for a temporary restraining order, arguing that the Banner infringes LEYE’s LETTUCE trademarks used in connection with LEYE’s operation of more than seventy restaurants throughout the Chicago area and nationwide. The Court held that LEYE did not meet its burden as to the first prong of the TRO analysis, LEYE’s likelihood of success on the merits, and, therefore, the Court did not consider the remaining two elements, whether an adequate remedy at law existed and whether LEYE would have been irreparably harmed if the injunction was not granted.
The Court held that defendants’ Banner was a fair use of LEYE’s trademarks and that, therefore, LEYE did not have a likelihood of success on the merits of its Lanham Act claims. Defendants were not using the Banner’s combination of the phrase “Let us be!” (which the parties agreed sounded like “Lettuce”) and the lettuce images as a service mark. “Lettuce mix” may have been a service mark, but “Let us be!” and the lettuce images were used to draw attention to this case and were meant to say “Hey, Lettuce Entertain You, leave us alone!” And the use of the “let us”/lettuce pun was intended to parody LEYE’s use of “lettuce” in place of “let us” throughout LEYE’s website and other materials. The Court explained that the Banner was not used to identify defendants’ services, but to make a statement of protest:
The [B]anner thus conveys a message from its authors, the proprietors of the unopened restaurant, to the owners of the LETTUCE marks, essentially saying, “Leave us alone!” Even if potential customers viewing the [B]anner do not know or learn of the dispute, it is clear at first glance that the banner is being used to communicate a message of protest.
The Court also noted that this decision had no bearing upon the question of whether defendants’ Lettuce mix restaurant name infringed LEYE’s LETTUCE marks.

Continue Reading Protest/Parody Use of Mark is Fair Use

Miyano Machinery USA, Inc. v. MiyanoHitec Mach., Inc., No. 08 C 526, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Sep. 5, 2008) (Kendall, J.)
Judge Kendall granted a preliminary injunction against defendants’ (collectively “MiyanoHitec”) continued use of plaintiff Miyano Machinery’s (“MMU”) MIYANO trademarks. MMU proved a sufficient likelihood of success on its trademark infringement claims. Despite the fact that Miyano was the surname of the individual defendants, it was protectible. While personal names are not generally protectible, MMU’s Miyano marks had acquired secondary meaning, making them protectible. And individual defendants originally consented to MMU registering the marks.
MMU’s “Winged M” mark was not abandoned when MMU changed the font of the Miyano name in the mark. And MMU showed a likelihood of confusion. MMU’s and MiyanoHitec’s marks were very similar and were used on similar products – lathes – that were to be sold in similar channels. MMU also offered evidence of a few acts of actual confusion. And the evidence showed that MiyanoHitec likely intended to benefit from the likely consumer confusion.
The Court also found that MMU would be irreparably harmed without an injunction because trademark infringement is presumed to create irreparable harm. In contrast, the injunction would cause MiyanoHitec minimal or no harm. MiyanoHitec had not sold any product yet, had previously used a different name, and was aware of MMU’s trademark claim before choosing its marks.
Finally, the public interest was served by preventing trademark infringement and the resulting consumer confusion. The Court, therefore, granted MMU a preliminary injunction against MiyanoHitec.

Continue Reading Trademark Preliminary Injunction Granted

Here are several stories that did not warrant a full post, or that were so well done by another blogger that there was no point in recreating the wheel:
The Federal Circuit upheld Judge Coar’s preliminary injunction in Abbott v. Sandoz, No. 05 C 5373 — click here to read the Federal Circuit’s opinion and here to read the Blog’s prior posts on the case. Dennis Crouch at Patently-O has a good post explaining the central issue of the case — a defendant’s burden of proof regarding invalidity in the likelihood of success analysis. Judge Newman wrote the majority decision with Judge Gajarsa dissenting. Crouch sees the case as a “good vehicle” for en banc review of the preliminary injunction standard.
Ocean Tomo is holding its 8th IP auction at home in Chicago this Wednesday and Thursday.
Michael Sadowitz at the MTTLR Blog has a great post (click here to read it) discussing one of the big post-eBay unknowns, who sets post-verdict damages when a permanent injunction is not issued, judges or juries. Sadowitz looks at a string of Eastern District of Texas cases letting juries set post-verdict damages. Sadowitz also notes that the few courts that have looked at the issue have split as to whether post-verdict damages can be severed from the damages portion of the trial.
Finally, having mastered all things drug and device related, the Drug & Device Law blog has moved into the patent realm, with some excellent analysis by their colleagues Kevin McDonald and Larry Rosenberg of Jones Day. The post (click here to read it) discusses a recent Federal Circuit decision which held that cash payments made to settle Hatch-Waxman patent litigations do not violate antitrust laws, under certain conditions:
On October 15, 2008, the Federal Circuit joined the growing list of federal courts to hold that the use of cash payments to settle Hatch-Waxman patent litigation does not violate the antitrust laws as long as (1) the settlement excludes no more competition than would the patent itself and (2) the claim for patent infringement and/or validity is not a “sham,” that is, not “objectively baseless.” In In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, No. 08-1097, 2008 WL 4570669 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 15, 2008), a unanimous panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the summary judgment granted to Bayer by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, holding that Bayer’s settlement of patent litigation with a generic pharmaceutical manufacturer did not violate the antitrust laws.

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