Sloan Valve Co. v. Zurn Indus., Inc., No. 10 C 204, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2012) (St. Eve, J.).
Judge St. Eve granted in part plaintiff Sloan’s fee petition based upon the Court’s finding that defendant Zurn had “continually refused to produce relevant documents despite prior court intervention and a clear obligation to do so . . . .” Here are the highlights:
- Sloan’s counsel’s rates were reasonable, based in part upon the fact that Sloan paid the rates without expectation of indemnification or contribution by any third party. The rates were between $550 and $735 for partners, $455 to $530 for senior counsel and $310 to $370 for associates.
- Sloan’s 121 hours spent on a motion for sanctions, although it was more complex than the average motion, was not reasonable. The Court awarded all of the fees for the two most junior attorneys and 20% of the senior attorneys’ fees, citing duplicative and excessive work being done, for a total of approximately $39,000.
- The Court applied the same 80% reduction for senior attorney time spent on Sloan’s renewed motion for sanctions, resulting in a fee award of approximately $51,000.
- The Court struck the most senior attorney’s time for Sloan’s reply brief in support of the renewed motion for sanction resulting in an award of approximately $26,500.
- The Court cut the most senior attorney’s time by 50% for Sloan’s preparation of its response to Zurn’s supplemental submission. The Court reasoned that many of the tasks could have been performed by a more junior attorney.
The Court’s total award was approximately $140,000.
Sloan Valve Co. v. Zurn Indus., Inc., No. 10 C 204, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Apr. 12, 2012) (St. Eve, J.).
Judge St. Eve granted in part plaintiff Sloan’s motion to strike defendant Zurn’s “late asserted” invalidity defense, to compel discovery and for sanctions in this patent case involving dual mode flush valves.
Worn Zurn Flush Valve
Sloan seeks production of information regarding certain worn Zurn flush valves. While the worn valves may have been created for litigation, the work product doctrine would not cover the valves themselves or factual data regarding their fabrication and testing. Furthermore, Zurn lost any work product protection to the factual information by claiming that the worn Zurn flush valves invalidate the patent in suit. The Court, therefore, ordered Zurn to produce the worn valves, all non-privileged, factual information about them and a detailed privilege log. The Court also ordered a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition on the worn valve and that Zurn pay the costs and reasonable attorney’s fees of the deposition, the motion to compel and one Sloan attorney to attend the deposition because of Zurn’s continued refusal to produce the documents and answer deposition questions.
Community Center Worn Valve
A “plethora of rules” including LPR 2.1(b), 2.3 and 3.2 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e), required Zurn to produce information regarding its Community Center Worn Valve invalidity defense before it did – after serving Zurn’s Final Invalidity Contentions. And the Community Center and Zurn worn valves were similar, but different. As such, it was a “close call” whether to allow Zurn to use the Community Center defense. The Court allowed Zurn to use its defense, but sanctioned Zurn requiring Zurn to pay Sloan’s reasonable attorney’s fees and costs for any necessary Community Center Worn Valve-related discovery.
Sloan Valve Co. v. Zurn Indus., Inc., No. 10 C 204, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Apr. 1, 2012) (St. Eve, J.).
Judge St. Eve granted in part defendants’ (collectively “Zurn”) Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiff Sloan Valve’s (“Sloan”) inequitable conduct counterclaims and denied Zurn its request for attorneys’ fees and costs in this patent dispute involving valves. But to the extent the Court dismissed the counterclaims, it was without prejudice to replead using facts learned during discovery. Sloan was not prejudiced by the amendment because Sloan was on notice of the facts gleaned during the two year discovery period.
The Court acknowledged the inequitable conduct pleading requirements set forth in Exergen, and noted that they were not changed by the heightened proofs required by Therasense. The Court also held that at the pleading stage, Zurn need not show that its alleged “intent to deceive is the single most likely explanation for non-disclosure.” Zurn need only allege facts from which intent may be reasonably inferred.
With respect to Counterclaim III, Sloan waived its argument regarding identity and intent, by failing to challenge them in its first motion to dismiss Zurn’s original Counterclaim III, which was substantively the same as this amended counterclaim. But even if Sloan had not waived its arguments, Zurn could have met Rule 9(b) pleading standards by amending to add information learned during discovery.
And while the Court’s original pre-Therasense ruling on Zurn’s materiality pleading was based upon the “reasonable examiner” standard, Zurn’s pleadings also met Therasense’s “but for” materiality test. Zurn pled that but for Sloan’s counsel’s statements during prosecution regarding the size of a plunge and a bushing passage taught by the prior art, at least Claim 1 would not have been allowed.
While Counterclaim IV was not adequately pled, Zurn was given leave to replead. Zurn’s counterclaim did not identify who withheld the prior art, but Zurn had since identified the individuals during discovery. Zurn’s materiality pleading was also deficient, but Zurn was granted leave to replead with information learned during discovery. And Zurn was similarly granted leave to amend its intent allegations.