RRK v. Sears: Judge Adds Interest to Jury Award

RRK Holding Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 04 C 3944, Slip Op (N.D. Ill. May 27, 2007) (Coar, J.).

Judge Coar denied defendant Sears, Roebuck & Co.'s ("Sears") Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law and Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a) motion for a new trial or a remittitur. And the Court granted plaintiff RRK Holding Co.'s ("RRK") motion for pre-judgment and post-judgment interest. A jury previously returned a verdict finding Sears liable for breach of a nondisclosure agreement and misappropriation of RRK's trade secret related to its spiral saw – click here for much more on this case in the Blog's archives. The jury awarded RRK approximately $21M, including $11.6M in actual damages, $1.6M for unjust enrichment and $8M in punitive damages.

First, Sears argued that RRK offered insufficient evidence showing that Sears' alleged misappropriation caused RRK's damages. But the Court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. The fact that Sears's price for its spiral saw was lower than RRK's explained why customers purchased Sears's saws over RRK's, but the trade secret causation was shown by the fact that Sears sold the combination tool instead of selling the components separately.

Second, Sears argued that RRK's damages should be limited to the traditional “head start” period (an estimate of the time it would take for defendant to develop the trade secret on its own). But the Court held that Illinois law limits injunctive relief to a head start period, but not monetary relief.

Third, the Court held that RRK's damages expert was sufficiently credible and held that Sears had sufficient opportunity to challenge the expert's methodologies during cross examination.

Fourth, Sears argued that the jury's award was in error because it awarded damages based on the entire sales price of the spiral saws, instead of apportioning just that portion of the sales price related to RRK's trade secrets. But the Court held that a rational jury could have determined that the reason the spiral saw was a success was because of the trade secret and that, therefore, apportionment was not required.

Fifth, Sears argued that RRK's lost profits damages should have been cut-off when third party competitor Dremel entered the market with a competing spiral saw. But the Court held that it was unclear whether Dremel's tool was similar enough to RRK's trade secret to be a substitute for it.

The Court also held that the jury's award was not excessive. But the Court did find that the jury erred in by using the wrong figure from RRK's expert for actual lost profits. RRK also conceded that the jury used the wrong number. The Court, therefore, reduced the jury's actual damages award from $11.6M (the incorrect figure) to $11.2M (the correct figure).

Finally, the Court awarded RRK both pre-judgment and post-judgment interest. Pre-judgment interest, which is awarded on equitable grounds, was appropriate because of the intentional nature of trade secret misappropriation. Additionally, the Court held that pre-judgment interest was appropriate even though RRK was also awarded punitive damages. The Court did, however, suggest that had the punitive damages award been multiples of the actual damages, pre-judgment interest might not have been appropriate. Sears did not challenge RRK's motion for post-judgment interest.

The Court added $3.7M in pre-judgment interest to the $21M award and assessed post-judgment interest of $1,931.50 per day until the award was paid.

Breach of Contract Verdict Without Damages Award Not Inconsistent

Sunstar, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., No. 01 CV 736 & 5825, 2007 WL 2410069 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 2007) (Guzman, J.).

Judge Guzman denied defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 motion for a new trial and Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law and granted plaintiff’s motion for a permanent injunction, among other things assigning all trademarks at issue to plaintiff and enjoining defendants from using plaintiff’s trademarks. The Court held that the jury’s verdict of a breach of contract without a damages award was not inconsistent and, therefore, did not warrant a new trial. The jury was free to find that the contract was breached and to award nominal damages. But because plaintiff did not argue for nominal damages an award of no damages was warranted. Defendants also argued that the jury’s verdict was not supported by the evidence because plaintiff’s survey was not sufficient proof actual confusion. But the Court held that plaintiff’s breach-by-infringement claim only required proof of likely confusion. The jury could have considered the survey sufficient to prove likely confusion. Furthermore, plaintiff introduced fact evidence in addition to the survey which supported the jury’s findings, including the similarity of the marks at issue and the sale of similar products using the marks in the same areas as plaintiff’s trademarked products.

Finally, the Court enjoined defendants from, among other things using plaintiff’s trademarks and required that defendants assign any interest in the marks at issue to plaintiffs. Defendants argued that the Court could not require assignment of the marks to plaintiff because plaintiff never sought transfer of the marks in its complaint. But the Court held that plaintiff was seeking equitable relief that was appropriate in light of the jury’s verdict.

Jury's Alleged Inconsistencies and Errors Do Not Warrant New Trial or JMOL

Black & Decker Inc. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., No. 04 C 7955, 2007 WL 108412 (N.D. Ill. Jan 12, 2007) (St. Eve, J.).

Judge St. Eve denied defendant's motion for a new trial, altered judgment or judgment as a matter of law in this patent dispute (more on this case and the injunction in the Blog's archives).  Defendant first argued that the jury's infringement findings on various claim elements were not supported by the facts.  The Court denied each argument, citing facts that supported the jury's infringement findings.  Defendant also argued that the jury's verdict that claim 1 of USPN 6,788,925 (the "'925 patent") was valid while the almost identical claim 2 of the '925 patent was invalid was inconsistent.  Defendant sought an altered judgment or a new trial as a remedy.  The Court first noted that several Circuits would have waived this objection because defendant did not object to the alleged inconsistency when the jury rendered its verdict.  But because the Seventh Circuit has not directly ruled on the issue (the matter is governed by region-specific law because it is a procedural matter), the Court did not waive the objection.  The Court did, however, waive any arguments Defendant first made in its reply brief.  Having addressed the procedural posture of the arguments, the Court held that the jury's validity findings on the two claims was sufficiently supported.  Because the two claims, although substantially the same, had different elements, the Court held that a rational jury could have come to different validity conclusions for each claim and denied defendant's request for a new trial.