Chicago IP Attorney & Lawyer : R. David Donoghue : Chicago IP Litigation Blog

Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Feb. 5, 2008) (Moran, Sen. J.).*

Judge Moran denied defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 motion for a new trial of damages on the condition that plaintiff Trading Technologies (“TT”) accepted a remittitur of defendant eSpeed’s portion of the damages. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict for TT and awarded $3.5M in compensatory damages, split $2M against defendant Ecco and $1.5M against defendant eSpeed. At trial, TT’s damages model was based upon a proposed reasonable royalty of between $.15 and $.25 per trade and a total of approximately 18M to 23M trades for a damages range of about $3.5M to $4.6M. TT argued that the apportionment of damages was irrelevant because the total award was within the argued range and because eSpeed purchased Ecco and, therefore, would be paying the full amount. But the Court noted that Ecco’s award would be paid from an escrow account set up for because of TT’s patent claims when eSpeed purchased Ecco. Additionally, eSpeed’s $1.5M judgment was well beyond the highest award that could be supported by TT’s evidence. The evidence showed that during the relevant time, eSpeed completed approximately 2.1M trades. Even at $.25 per trade, TT’s highest proposed royalty, the possible damages were only $539,468. The Court, therefore, offered TT a remittitur of $539,468 or a new trial on damages.

The Court also awarded TT prejudgment interest set at the average prime rate for the period compounded monthly, because TT collected license fees monthly.

* Click here to read much more about this case in the Blog’s archives and click here for a copy of this opinion.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

Sunstar, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., No. 01 CV 736 & 5825, 2007 WL 2410069 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 2007) (Guzman, J.).

Judge Guzman denied defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 motion for a new trial and Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law and granted plaintiff’s motion for a permanent injunction, among other things assigning all trademarks at issue to plaintiff and enjoining defendants from using plaintiff’s trademarks. The Court held that the jury’s verdict of a breach of contract without a damages award was not inconsistent and, therefore, did not warrant a new trial. The jury was free to find that the contract was breached and to award nominal damages. But because plaintiff did not argue for nominal damages an award of no damages was warranted. Defendants also argued that the jury’s verdict was not supported by the evidence because plaintiff’s survey was not sufficient proof actual confusion. But the Court held that plaintiff’s breach-by-infringement claim only required proof of likely confusion. The jury could have considered the survey sufficient to prove likely confusion. Furthermore, plaintiff introduced fact evidence in addition to the survey which supported the jury’s findings, including the similarity of the marks at issue and the sale of similar products using the marks in the same areas as plaintiff’s trademarked products.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

PSN Illinois, LLC v. Ivoclar Vivadent, Inc., No. 04 C 7232, 2006 WL 3523760 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2006) (Kendall, J.).

Judge Kendall denied plaintiff's Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 motion for reconsideration of the Court's prior ruling (discussed in the Blog's archives) construing the claims of the patent at issue and granting summary judgment of noninfringement on behalf of defendant Ivoclar Vivadent, Inc. ("Ivoclar").  The Court denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration because it considered each of plaintiff's reconsideration arguments in its original Opinion granting summary judgment.  But the Court spent some time on one of plaintiff's claim construction arguments regarding a patent related to porcelain veneers.  On reconsideration, plaintiff argued for a different construction of "ready for mounting."  In its original papers plaintiff did not argue for the proposed construction, although it did propose it in its Local Rule 56.1 Additional Statement of Material Facts.  The Court held that because claim construction is a matter of law, proposed constructions are not material facts and, therefore, cannot be put in LR 56.1 statements.  The Court noted its obligation pursuant to LR 56.1 to disregard legal arguments and conclusions placed in statements of fact.  The Court did, however, go on to consider plaintiff's construction and explain why the Court's original construction was correct.

Practice tip:  Think carefully about what goes into your LR 56.1 statements of material fact.  Do not put arguments in your statements of fact. And by all means, do not put arguments in your statements of fact and then omit those arguments from your brief. The Court will disregard them, and you will be out of luck. 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks