Trading Technologies: Final Judgment Amended to Include Monetary Damages

Trading Techs. Int'l., Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2011) (Dow, J.).

Judge Dow amended the final judgment in this case to reflect the jury verdict and post-remittitur damages award of about $2.5M -- go to the Blog's archives for much more on this case and related cases. The Court also, after a de novo review, adopted Judge Schenkier's report and recommendation on the motion. Plaintiff Trading Technologies ("TT") sought to amend the Court's final judgment, entered by the late Judge Moran, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) or 60(a), to reflect the damages award, and sought its fees for bringing the instant motion. The Court held as follows:

  • While it may have been too late to amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e), the Court had discretion to amend pursuant to Rule 60(a) to correct an "oversight or omission." The record established that TT and defendants (collectively "eSpeed") understood that there was a money judgment. For example, eSpeed moved the Court to waive the supersedes bond normally required to appeal a case with money damages.
     
  • The Federal Circuit and the parties understood the appeal to be on all issues, not just injunctive relief. As such, eSpeed cannot argue that it held back arguments on appeal, that it might otherwise have made if eSpeed had known the appeal went beyond injunctive issues.
     
  • Whatever TT's reason for not seeking to correct the judgment with Judge Moran while the case was still pending before him, all parties understood that the judgment included the money damages.

Finally, the Court denied TT's request for it fees incurred bringing the motion. First, both parties should have sought to correct the judgment when it was entered. Second, TT's fee request was undermined by its unreasonable demand in the initial motion that eSpeed pay the money damages within five days.
 

Trading Technologies: Court Reconnect Altering Judgment to Reflect Jury Award

Trading Techs. Int'l, Inc. v. Speed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Sep. 8, 2010) (Schenkier, Mag. J.).

Judge Schenkier recommended denying plaintiff Trading Technologies' ("TT") motion to enforce the final judgment and for sanctions. The Court also recommended correcting the final judgment to reflect the jury verdict and the remitted damages award. A jury previously awarded TT $3.5M in damages and found defendant's infringement willful. The Court later overturned the willfulness finding and ordered a remittitur of damages to $2.5M, which TT accepted. The Court then granted a permanent injunction and entered a final judgment, but that judgment did not reflect the damages award.

Defendant argued that, despite the jury award and remittitur, there was no damages award because it was not reflected in the final judgment and after the Federal Circuit had decided to appeal it was too late to revise the final judgment.

The Court agreed that the first judgment should have included the award, but not that it was too late to fix it. The Court noted that the most likely explanation for the omission was "the fallibility of human beings (judges included)." The Court also noted that TT should have sought to correct the final judgment immediately. But despite the imprecise judgment, the Federal Circuit ruled upon several issues related to the jury verdict, although not the award itself. And neither TT nor defendants disputed the fact or the amount of the damages award. Based upon those facts, the Court recommended that revising the final judgment to reflect the award would merely "correct a clerical mistake or a mistake arising from oversight or omission" pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a). Finally, the Court recognized TT's frustration over not having received payment 34 months after the jury verdict and 6 months after the Federal Circuit's decision. But the Court recommended not awarding TT its fees because TT's failure to promptly get the judgment corrected was the only reason there was a delay in paying the judgment.

Post-Verdict Infringing Sales Exceptional, But Not Willful

Lexion Medical, LLC v. Northgate Techs., Inc., No. 04 C 5705, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. May 29, 2007).*

Judge Rosenbaum (a visiting judge, who is the Chief Judge for the District of Minnesota) granted in part plaintiff’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 60(a) motion to alter or amend the judgment, altering the judgment to include all post-verdict sales of infringing product. The court held a trial in October 2006 resulting in a jury verdict that defendants’ insufflator (a device that blows a powder, gas or vapor into a body cavity) infringed plaintiff’s patent, but that the infringement was not willful. The Court entered judgment in February 2007. Shortly after the judgment, defendant Northgate Technologies (“Northgate”) informed plaintiff that after the verdict, but before the judgment was entered, Northgate sold its remaining inventory. Plaintiff sought damages for the post-verdict sales and argued that the Court should find the post-verdict sales willful and declare the case exceptional. The Court held that the post-verdict sales infringed the patent, but that they were not willful because Northgate received an oral opinion of counsel prior to shipping any post-verdict product. The oral opinion was based upon three factors: 1) a belief that the jury’s verdict was unreasonable; 2) the fact that the Court had not yet entered a permanent injunction; and 3) Northgate’s post-trial arguments that were pending before the Court. The Court noted that the second factor could not support Northgate’s decision. But the remaining justifications were not “so flawed as to alert Northgate to reject [the oral opinion] as ‘obviously bad legal advice.”

But because Northgate’s decision to sell infringing product post-verdict “needlessly multiplied” the case, the Court held that the post-verdict sales were exception and awarded plaintiff’s attorneys fees and costs incurred by the post-verdict sales motion. Additionally, the Court entered a permanent injunction.

*You can read the opinion here.

Untimely Rule 59 Motion Considered Under Rule 60

Scholz Design Inc. v. Jaffe, __ F. Supp.2d __, 2007 WL 1276910 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2007) (Grady, J.).

Judge Grady treated plaintiff's untimely motion to reconsider as a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion to vacate judgment (Judge Grady's previous order is discussed in the Blog's archives) and denied the motion because it simply rehashed previously rejected arguments.  After a bench trial, the Court entered judgment on behalf of defendants because they had neither directly nor contributorily infringed plaintiff's copyrighted home design.  The Court held that, while defendants approved the design, any actual copying of the copyrighted design was done by defendants' architects without defendants knowledge.  In the instant motion, plaintiff argued that defendants infringed its copyrighted designs as a matter of law because the Court had deemed admitted -- for failure to respond to requests for admission -- that the interior and exterior designs of the house at issue were derivative works based upon plaintiff's design.  But the Court explained that the admission of infringement did not include an admission as to which parties committed the infringement.  As a result, the Court denied plaintiff's motion and allowed its prior judgment to stand.

Practice tip:  Read the Federal Rules and watch your filing deadlines.  Had plaintiff filed its motion within ten (10) days of entry of the Court's judgment, its motion could have been considered pursuant to the more lenient Rule 59 standards.  Although this case's outcome would likely have been the same, in other cases the application of the Rule 59 standard could be outcome-determinative.