Chicago IP Attorney & Lawyer : R. David Donoghue : Chicago IP Litigation Blog

24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc. v. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp., No. 08 C 3853, 2008 WL 4671748 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2008).

Judge Lefkow granted defendants' Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss plaintiff 24 Hour Fitness's (“24”) trade secret misappropriation complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 24 alleged that defendant Bally Total Fitness (“Bally) and the individual defendant (“Defendant”) misappropriated 24's trade secrets when Defendant resigned his position as 24's COO and became Bally's CEO. But defendants argued that the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over 24's state law trade secret claims because there was no diversity of citizenship – both 24 and Defendant were California citizens. 24 argued that Defendant was, in fact, a citizen of Illinois because he worked at Bally's Illinois headquarters and because Defendant's contract with Bally required that he move to Illinois before the case was filed.

Looking at the totality of the circumstances, the Court held that Defendant remained a citizen of California, where he had lived while employed by 24. Defendant had put his California home for sale and did have a contract requiring that he become domiciled in Illinois, although the particulars of the contract were disputed. But the most significant factor in the analysis was that Defendant's family remained in California. And Defendant had not purchased or rented a home in Illinois or gotten an Illinois driver's license, bank account or voter registration card.

Finally, the Court denied 24's request to file an amended complaint adding a federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act claim. A complaint cannot be amended to create subject matter jurisdiction. The case, therefore, had to be dismissed.

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Republic Tobacco L.P. v. North Atlantic Trading Co., No. 06 C 2738, 2007 WL 1424093 (N.D. Ill. May 10, 2007) (Der-Yeghiayan, J.).*

Judge Der-Yeghiayan granted plaintiff/counter-defendant Republic Tobacco’s (“Republic”) motion for summary judgment on defendant/counter-plaintiff North Atlantic Trading’s (“North Atlantic”) counterclaims and granted North Atlantic’s motion for summary judgment as to each of Republic’s claims. Republic brought claims against North Atlantic for Lanham Act false advertising, violation of the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“IDTPA”) and other state law claims, all arising out of an allegedly “false and misleading” presentation entitled “Cigarette Paper Review” (“CPR”) which North Atlantic allegedly gave to various Republic customers. The CPR allegedly criticized Republic, saying among other things that Republic’s cigarette rolling papers were the same as North Atlantic’s and that Republic’s Chairman Donald Levin had “lied” about the composition of Republic’s cigarette papers. North Atlantic filed counterclaims alleging Lanham Act false advertising, violation of the IDTPA and other state law claims, all arising out of Republic’s alleged sales of orange cigarette papers similar in color and size to North Atlantic’s orange Zig-Zag papers, for the purpose of confusing or deceiving consumers.

Because Republic could not establish that the statements in the CPR were literally false, as opposed to just misleading, and because many of the statements were subject to innocent constructions, Republic could not prove its false advertising or IDTPA claims. 

Republic sought summary judgment of all of North Atlantic’s claims because, among other reasons, the license agreement governing North Atlantic’s use of the Zig-Zag marks and cigarette papers did not allow North Atlantic to bring its counterclaims. Republic argued that the licensor of the Zig-Zag marks, Bollore, had the right and duty to bring the suit and, if at all, North Atlantic could only bring the counterclaims after North Atlantic notified Bollore of the counterclaims and Bollore had decided not to file them. North Atlantic argued that Bollore was aware of the suit and had not attempted to stop North Atlantic from prosecuting its counterclaims, but provided no evidence that it ever provided Bollore notice of Republic’s alleged infringement, as required by the agreement. The agreement required that either party notify the other of any infringements, and provided Bollore sole discretion to prosecute infringements. North Atlantic was allowed to pursue infringers “which Bollore determines not to commence or diligently pursue . . . .” Because North Atlantic did not provide evidence to counter Republic’s Local Rule 56.1 statement of material fact that Bollore never gave North Atlantic consent to bring the counterclaims, the Court deemed that fact admitted. The Court, therefore, granted Republic summary judgment on North Atlantic’s counterclaims because Bollore never consented to North Atlantic’s filing of them, as required by the agreement. 

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