Senate Confirms Edmond Chang as District Judge for the N.D. Illinois

The U.S. Senate has confirmed Edmond E. Chang as a district judge for the Northern District of Illinois.  Chang had served as an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Northern District of Illinois since 1999.  He was the Chief of Appeals for the Criminal Division for the last five years. He previously worked at Sidley Austin in Chicago, and served as a law clerk to Judge Marvin Aspen in the Northern District and Judge James Ryan on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit.  Judge Chang's confirmation leaves the Northern District with three vacancies on the bench.

Welcome to the Northern District bench Judge Chang.

Pricing and Warranty Agreement Provisions Were Not Trade Secret

MPC Containment Sys., Ltd. v. Moreland, No. 05 C 6973, 2008 WL 2875007 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 23, 2008) (Aspen, Sen. J.).*

Judge Aspen granted in part and denied in part defendants’ summary judgment motion regarding plaintiffs’ copyright, Lanham Act, trade secret and related state law claims.** Plaintiffs and defendants both design, manufacture and sell flexible fuel storage tanks. Corporate defendant MIL was formed by at least individual defendants John and Lawrence, both of whom previously worked for plaintiffs in various capacities and later worked for MIL in direct competition with plaintiffs over, at least, a United States Air Force contract.

Trade Secret Misappropriation

The Court held that plaintiffs’ pricing and warranty provisions were not trade secrets and, therefore, granted summary judgment in defendants’ favor. But the Court held that there was a question of fact as to whether plaintiffs’ tank designs were trade secrets. Additionally, the Court noted that the question of whether sufficient efforts were used to maintain secrecy of the alleged trade secrets was a question of fact for jurors in all, but the most extreme cases. Because plaintiffs identified several precautions taken to protect their trade secrets, the Court denied summary judgment. The fact that tank designs were provided to plaintiffs’ independent contractors without confidentiality did not warrant summary judgment for defendants. There are circumstances where independent contractors have independent, professional duties of confidentiality regardless of whether agreements were signed.

Copyright Infringement

Defendants argued that plaintiffs’ copyrighted fuel tank drawings were not original, as required for copyright ownership, because defendant John authored the drawings, not plaintiffs. The Court held that there was a question of fact as to the ownership because the parties disputed John’s employment status when he made the drawings. If John was an employee, plaintiffs owned the copyrights based upon the work for hire doctrine.

The Court also found a question of fact as to the degree of creativity employed in making plaintiffs’ drawings. A comparison of plaintiffs’ drawings and defendants’ drawings, which defendants alleged plaintiffs copied, left a question of fact as to whether plaintiffs’ drawings showed sufficient differences to rise to the level of creativity.

Compute Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”)

The Court granted defendants summary judgment as to CFAA § 1030(a)(4) because plaintiffs did not respond to defendants’ claims and, therefore, waived their defenses. But the Court found questions of fact as to the two other charged sections of the CFAA, §§ 1030 (a)(2)(c) and (a)(5). First, there was a question of fact as to whether defendant John was authorized to access the documents he allegedly misappropriated. While John may have received the documents at issue during the normal course of his employment with plaintiffs, there was a dispute as to whether John exceeded his authorization by allegedly breaching his duty of loyalty to plaintiffs.

Additionally, there was a question of fact as to whether John passively received all accused documents by email or “accessed” the documents pursuant to the CFAA actively by email or otherwise.

Illinois Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“IDTPA”)

The IDTPA only provides for injunctive relief, not monetary damages. As a result, the IDTPA only addresses ongoing harms. The Court, therefore, granted defendants’ summary judgment as to defendants’ past acts. The Court also explained that it would not grant an IDTPA injunction to eliminate an existing commercial advantage, as courts sometimes do in trade secrets cases.
 

 

*  Click here for more on this case in the Blog’s archives.

**  This post does not cover some of the non-IP specific state law claims.

Counterfeiting Statutory Damages are up to $1M/Trademark

Lorillard v. Montrose Wholesale Candies & Sundries, Inc., No. 03 C 5311 & 4844, 2008 WL 1775512 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 2008) (Aspen, J.).

Judge Aspen adopted Magistrate Judge Cole's Report and Recommendation, denying defendants' Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion to alter the Court's judgment against defendants – click here to read more about that Report and click here to read more about this case in the Blog's archives. The Court awarded plaintiff Lorillard $2.5M in statutory damages for defendants’ sales of counterfeit cigarettes using Lorillard's trademarks. Defendants objected to, among other things, a statutory damages award in excess of $1M. Defendants argued that 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)(2) only allowed $1M in statutory damages per type of goods sold. Because this case only involved one type of goods, cigarettes, defendants argued statutory damages could not exceed $1M. But the Court held that the limitation was $1M per counterfeit mark per type of good. Because Lorillard alleged five counterfeit marks were used, the statutory damages limit was $5M. 

Differing Pizza Sauce and Toppings Are Questions of Fact, Not Ripe for Rule 12(b)(6)

Fast Food Gourmet, Inc. v. Little Lady Foods, Inc., No. 05 C 6022, 2007 WL 1175577 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 2007) (Aspen, J.).

Judge Aspen denied defendant Little Lady Foods, Inc.'s ("LLF") Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiff Fast Food Gourmet, Inc.'s ("FFGI") breach of contract claim.  FFGI alleged that FFGI entered a "co-packing" relationship with LLF, essentially that LLF was to manufacture FFGI's product.  Based upon that relationship, FFGI provided LLF with its various trade secrets relating to producing "a unique stone hearth oven thin crust frozen pizza."  In addition to its formulas, recipes, methods and techniques, FFGI also provided LLF its equipment.  FFGI alleged that, in addition to making pizzas for FFGI, LLG worked with defendant Kraft Foods Global, Inc. ("Kraft") to develop a line of pizzas using FFGI's trade secrets, with substantially the same crusts as the FFGI pizzas.  FFGI brought claims for misappropriation of trade secrets against both defendants, breach of contract against LLF and unjust enrichment against Kraft.  LLF sought to dismiss FFGI's breach of contract claim to the extent it was based upon allegations that the agreement was breached by production of pizzas for Kraft with crusts nearly identical to FFGI's crusts.  LLF first argued that the agreement could not be breached because the agreement prohibits LLF from producing "pizzas with specification which are identical or . . . substantially identical to" the FFGI pizzas.  Because FFGI only pled that the crusts were identical or substantially identical, LLF argued the claim should be dismissed.  But the Court held that FFGI was only required to provide notice pleading of claims, not facts.  Because FFGI identified the parties, stated the nature of its dispute and provided "a few tidbits" LLF was sufficiently on notice.

LLF also argued that the claim should be dismissed because the FFGI and Kraft pizzas are substantially different because Kraft's sauce and/or toppings are very different than FFGI's.  But the Court refused to make factual determinations in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and denied LLF's motion.

Rule 9(b) Heightened Pleading - "Information and Belief" is Not Enough

MPC Containment Sys., Ltd. v. Moreland, No. 05 C 6973, 2006 WL 2331148 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2006) (Aspen, J.).

Judge Aspen granted defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiff’s Lanham Act unfair competition claim for failure to meet the Rule 9(b) heightened pleading requirements.  Plaintiff’s bare allegation that the individual defendants made misrepresentations to a single customer did not satisfy Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirements. 

Plaintiff failed to allege when the misrepresentations were made, alleging only that they were made during the individual defendants’s employment with plaintiff, a period of at least twenty years. The Court also held that plaintiff failed to allege that the communications were “commercial advertising or promotion,” as required by the Lanham Act § 43(a)(1)(B), because plaintiff never stated how the misrepresentations were communicated. Finally, the Court warned in a footnote that “allegations based ‘on information and belief’ generally do not satisfy the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b).”