Chicago IP Attorney & Lawyer : R. David Donoghue : Chicago IP Litigation Blog

Trading Techs. Int'l., Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).

Judge Moran denied plaintiff Trading Technologies' ("TT") motion to compel additional production from third party Chicago Mercantile Exchange ("CME").  TT served CME with a subpoena seeking, among other things, anything referring or relating to potential prior art to the patents at issue and communications between CME and any other entity regarding the patents at issue, including any joint defense agreement between CME and such parties.  After TT filed the motion to compel, CME produced thousands of pages, including what it stated were all documents in its possession regarding possible prior art.  Because all prior art documents had been produced, the Court denied TT's motion to compel additional prior art-related documents.

The Court also denied TT's motion to the extent it sought communications regarding the possible prior art.  First, the Court considered any communications CME might have had with defendants in the currently pending cases.  The Court referred to its May 1, 2007, order which required defendants to produce a list of all members in their joint defense agreement (that opinion and order, as well as numerous other opinions from this and its related cases, are in the Blog's archives).  The Court held that defendants' list would allow TT to discover whether CME was involved in a joint defense and that no further discovery from CME was necessary. 

Second, the Court considered CME's communications, including potential joint defense agreements, with any parties not involved in TT's pending suits.  The Court held that the common interest doctrine could attach to communications even before the filing of a suit, so long as the parties anticipated litigation.  Furthermore, the Court held that regardless of whether CME's communications with other third parties were part of a joint defense, they were not discoverable because they were "irrelevant" to this case.  The Court explained that while relevance is broadly defined, it does have boundaries and TT's motion ran "up against such a boundary."

*  Because Westlaw has not published this opinion yet, here is a copy of Judge Moran's original, signed opinion.

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Trading Techs. Int'l., Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 05 C 4120, (N.D. Ill. May 16, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).

Judge Moran granted in part and denied in part plaintiff Trading Technologies' ("TT") motion to compel additional production from defendants GL Consultants, Inc. and GL Trade SA (collectively "GL").  The Court required GL to update certain interrogatory responses and to produce documents based upon an earlier priority date that GL had argued for, as opposed to stopping at the later priorit date alleged by TT.  The Court also required GL to provide TT access to original source code and certain electronic archives, without regard to whether TT had provided GL similar access.  Finally, the Court denied TT's request to lower the confidentiality designation of the source code for GL's "GL Tradepad" software.  But what is most interesting about the Court's opinion is its reminder to the parties about how the Court expects them to conduct discovery:

At the outset, we reiterate some of the points regarding discovery that we have stressed throughout this complicated and contentious litigation. First, parties should err on the side of over-production; relevance should be argued sparingly. Second, counsel are officers of the court and their word is generally sufficient. Third, there will always be additional persons to interview, additional documents to discover, and alleged prior art to be found; we must, however, put an end to discovery at some point. . . . With such guidelines in mind, we address the current dispute.

* Because Westlaw has not published this opinion yet, here is a copy of Judge Moran's original, signed opinion.

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Trading Techs. Int'l., Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No 04 C 5312, 05 C 1079, 05 C 4088, 05 C 4120, 05 C 4811 & 05 C 5164, 2007 WL 1302765 (N.D. Ill. May 1, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).

Judge Moran granted in part and denied in part plaintiff Trading Technologies' ("TT") motion to compel production of defendants' communications between themselves (more on this case in the Blog's archives).  Defendants asserted claims of attorney-client and work product privileges regarding various communications and information exchanged as part of a joint defense agreement among, at least, the various defendants and DJ-plaintiff (collectively "defendants") in the patent suits regarding TT's patents.  The Court explained that the joint defense privilege protects communications and exchange of information between parties that have expressly decided to cooperate in a litigation -- with or without a written agreement.  The Court held that defendants had expressed a sufficient intent to cooperate in their respective litigations against TT and, therefore, held that defendants need not produce communications made in relation to their joint defense.  The Court required that defendants produce any written joint defense agreement or, in the absence of a written agreement, the identities of all members of the joint defense.  The Court further held that third parties need not be identified to the extent that their identities are protected as work product, but that third parties should be identified if defendants' communications with them are allegedly protected by attorney-client privilege.  The Court also required that defendants produce all prior art in their possession, regardless of how it was located.  And finally, the Court noted that "it must rely on the integrity of counsel to determine what is and is not privileged."  As a result, the Court required that defendants produce "any communications not protected by a legitimate privilege . . . ."

You can download the opinion here.

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Rowe Int'l. Corp. v. Ecast, Inc., __ F. Supp.2d __, 2007 WL 831772 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2007) (Kennelly, J.).

Judge Kennelly held that plaintiff Arachnid waived its privilege as to a limited scope of information and held that Arachnid's related uses of the information did not rise to the level of the crime-fraud exception, even if they may have been inequitable conduct.  Arachnid filed a motion seeking the return of three inadvertently produced, privileged "patent reports."  Defendants filed a cross-motion to compel production of privileged materials arguing that Arachnid waived the privilege as to the three documents and that the crime-fraud exception destroyed the privilege to the extent it was not waived.  The Court agreed that the patent reports were inadvertently produced, but still held the privilege was waived on a limited scope of information.  In 1999, a former Arachnid employee testified that he learned from Arachnid's attorneys that "the only way we would receive [one of] the patent[s-in-suit] was if we included that information."  While a former employee cannot waive the privilege, Arachnid's attorneys attended the deposition in question and failed to object to the question or the answer.  Additionally, Arachnid later turned the transcript over to the PTO during prosecution of a subsequent application and to defendants during production in the instant case.  These actions combined to waive the privilege as to the specific information discussed by the ex-employee, the inclusion of figure 2 in the patent.

The Court then held that the crime-fraud exception did not apply.  Defendants argued that Arachnid's counsel's statements to the PTO during examination that a prior art reference identified as Sidi was "fundamentally different" from the examined invention was fraudulent because the inadvertently disclosed patent reports showed that counsel believed the Sidi reference anticipated some or all of Arachnid's application.  But the Court held that hold attorney argument to that high a standard would chill legal representation.  For example, the Court noted that defendants' requested standard would prevent a criminal defense attorney from warning his client that he would surely be convicted, but then arguing to the jury that the government had not proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

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Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharms., Inc., No. 05 C 1490, 2007 WL 551551 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2007) (Brown, Mag. J.).*

The Court denied defendant's motion to compel production of attorney-client privileged documents pursuant to the crime-fraud exception.  Defendant argued that plaintiff's failure to disclose full results from two studies with conflicting results (for and against the applications' claims) to the USPTO, both of which were material to the claims, was both inequitable conduct and fraud.  The studies were conducted during the pendency of one application and prior to two others.  Additionally, three of the named inventors co-authored a journal article detailing the results.  And during her deposition, prosecution counsel admitted being aware of the studies during prosecution of the applications.  The Court held that the evidence warranted in camera review of selected documents from plaintiff's privilege log to determine whether there was evidence of intent.  But after its review, the Court found no direct evidence of intent to defraud the USPTO.  The Court noted that "[n]one of the documents . . . contained a 'smoking gun' or anything close to it."  Furthermore, while intent can be inferred based upon circumstantial evidence, there most be more evidence than failure to disclose to support the inference. 

* You can see more on this case, in particular, various preliminary injunction opinions here and here.

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Beck Sys., Inc. v. ManageSoft Corp., No. 05 C 2036, 2006 WL 2037356 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2006) (Schenkier, Mag. J.).

In considering the scope of attorney-client privilege and work product waivers stemming from defendant ManageSoft’s reliance on an opinion of counsel, Magistrate Judge Schenkier undertook a detailed analysis of the Federal Circuit’s recent In re Echostar Communications, 448 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2006), decision and how it changes the Northern District of Illinois’ previous ruling on the issue in Beneficial Franchise Co., Inc. v. Bank One N.A., 205 F.R.D. 212 (N.D. Ill. 2001).

In Echostar, the Federal Circuit held that reliance on an opinion waives attorney-client privilege with respect to all communications relating to the subject matter. This means that even if you use in-house counsel to provide the opinion, which Echostar did, privilege is waived for all communications with any counsel, including trial counsel, on the subject.  The Court considered the following three categories of work product, holding that the first and third categories are waived when relying on an opinion, but that the second is not waived: 1) documents embodying a communication between the attorney and client regarding the subject matter; 2) documents analyzing law, facts or strategy and reflecting the attorney’s impressions which were not given to the client; and 3) documents discussing an attorney-client communication concerning the subject matter which were not themselves sent to or from the client. The Federal Circuit also held that the waivers continue for communications after the litigation was filed. For a more detailed analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Echostar decision, visit Patently-O.

Magistrate Judge Schenkier noted that the Beneficial decision is largely in line with Echostar because Beneficial held that waiver continues after litigation is initiated and that waiver extends beyond opinion counsel to all communications with any counsel regarding the waived subject matter. But the Court found that Echostar modified the Beneficial analysis in one area – the scope of work product waiver. The two opinions agree that category one documents are waived, but differ slightly on the other two categories. Beneficial required protection of category two documents if they contradicted the disclosed opinions of counsel. But Echostar does not require waiver and production with respect to any category two document, narrowing the waiver as contemplated by Beneficial. Similarly, Beneficial only waived work product protection for category three documents if they contradicted the disclosed opinions of counsel. But Echostar holds that waiver applies to all category three documents, broadening the Beneficial waiver.

A final procedural point may be very important to litigators currently dealing with this issue, but which will shortly become moot. The Court, of course, ordered ManageSoft to review its documents and privilege log and to produce any documents in waived categories. The Court also, however, required that plaintiff return to ManageSoft any category two documents which ManageSoft might have originally produced under the Beneficial ruling, holding that such documents were inadvertently produced and did not constitute waiver.

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