Trading Technologies v. eSpeed: Documents Confidential Despite Public Use During Bench Trial

Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, 1079, 4088, 4120, 4811 & 5164, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. May 23, 2008) (Moran, Sen. J.).*

Judge Moran granted plaintiff Trading Technologies' (“TT”) motion for a protective order, but denied its request for its fees related to the motion. TT used two videos of third part Walter Brumfield's trading screen and a portion of one of Brumfield's daily trading records (collectively the “Evidence”) as evidence during the Court's inequitable conduct bench trial. Despite prior designation as “Attorneys' Eyes Only” pursuant to a protective order and having been sealed in the parties' previous filings, the Evidence was presented in open court without any protections. Additionally, it was designated on exhibit lists submitted in connection with the bench trial without any confidentiality designation.

The first business day after the bench trial, TT contacted defendant eSpeed to confirm that the Evidence was to be treated as confidential. But eSpeed, and the other defendants in the related cases, objected arguing that by using the Evidence at trial without any protections or designations, TT waived confidentiality.

The Court acknowledged a “strong presumption of public access to court proceedings and records . . . .” But noting that the presumption is not absolute and that the parties seeking disclosure here were defendants not the press or public, the Court held that the Evidence retained its confidential status for the following reasons:

  • The videos showing Brumfield's custom-designed computer screen configuration was a trade secret and its disclosure could harm Brumfield's competitive trading advantage;
  • TT's public disclosure of the Evidence was inadvertent as evidenced by the numerous times the Evidence was previously treated as confidential; and
  • To the extent the Court relied on the Evidence in its opinion (click here to read the Blog's post about the opinion), it did not do so in sufficient technical detail to disclose the confidential elements of the Evidence.

Additionally, the Court noted that while Brumfield's attorney did receive copies of the exhibit list showing the Evidence without confidentiality designations and TT had periodically represented Brumfield's interest throughout the case, neither Brumfield nor his counsel were in attendance to object when the Evidence was used during the bench trial. The Court does not specifically say whether or how these facts played into its decision. But the facts were included in the Court's description of the facts and, therefore, the Court appears to have considered them relevant.

Click here to read much more about this case in the Blog’s archives and click here for this opinion.

Is There a Fox in the Henhouse: Inhouse Counsel and Protective Orders

Autotech Techs. Ltd. Partnership v. Automationdirect.com, Inc. 237 F.RD. 405 (N.D. Ill. 2006). (Cole, Mag. J.).

In this impressively detailed opinion, Magistrate Judge Cole grants defendant's motion for a protective order limiting plaintiff's in-house counsel's access to sensitive customer information and communications.  The parties faced a common problem, they had agreed that customer information, including customer identities and communications, would be limited to attorneys' eyes only, but could not agree as to whether plaintiff's in-house counsel could access the information.  Plaintiff argued that its in-house counsel played a lead role in the case and, therefore, required access to the information.  Defendant argued that in-house counsel were corporate decision makers, in addition to counselors, and would not be able to separate the knowledge of defendant's customers they would be exposed to when performing business-related functions.

The Court first stated that it believed counsel's assurances that they would not violate the Court's protective order or their ethical obligations, noting that that was "the beginning and not the end of [the] analysis."  The Court held that:

. . . proper analysis requires a careful and comprehensive inquiry into in-house counsel's actual (not nominal) role in the affairs of the company, his association and relationship with those in the corporate hierarchy who are competitive decision makers, and any other factor that enhances the risk of inadvertent disclosure.  That risk must then be balanced against the harm that will result to the party employing in-house counsel from restrictions on the latter's access to the protected information.

The Court then performed a detailed analysis of plaintiff's counsel's responsibilities and place in plaintiff's corporate hierarchy.  The Court ultimately held that in-house counsel could not have access to customer information because of in-house counsel's central importance to plaintiff and because restricting access would not harm plaintiff's ability to litigate the case.