Chicago IP Attorney & Lawyer : R. David Donoghue : Chicago IP Litigation Blog

OFA Royalties LLC v. Apne, No. 10 C 4237, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jun. 17, 2011) (Dow, J.).

Judge Dow awarded plaintiffs (collectively "Quizno's") their attorney's fees of approximately $28k in this franchise and trademark case involving Quizno's restaurants. The Court held that the parties' franchise agreement required that a defaulting party pay the attorney's fees of the other party. Because Quizno's won its preliminary injunction motion and later won a final judgment against defendants, the agreement required that defendants pay Quizno's attorney's fees. And the Court awarded Quizno's its full fees request because defendants did not contest Quizno's motion for fees or its specific fees.
 

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Rosenthal Collins Group, LLC v. Trading Techs. Int'l, Inc., No. 05 C 4088, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 2011) (Coleman, J.).*

Judge Coleman granted defendant/counter-plaintiff Trading Technologies' ("TT") motion for evidentiary sanctions and default judgment.  Judge Moran previously dismissed plaintiff/counter-defendant Rosenthal Collins Group's ("RCG") motion for summary judgment regarding the alleged prior art Buist trading program for discovery abuse, ordered RCG to produce additional documents and things related to the Buist program, and ordered RCG to pay certain of TT's attorney's -- click here for the Blog's post on that decision.  Initially, the Court the severity of a default judgment as a sanction, calling it "extreme," and noted that the Seventh Circuit required a showing of willfulness, bad faith or fault by a preponderance of the evidence in order to justify dismissing a case.

The Court held that the high standard was met in this case, for at least the following reasons:

• During his deposition, Buist admitted modifying and overwriting source code in 2006 that he and by extension RCG held out as having been created in 1998 or 1999.  And in the face of clear evidence of these facts, RCG continued to deny them, even calling the claims "libelous," "audacious," and "Oliver Stone-esque."
   
• Buist later admitted "wiping" or erasing six of seven zip disks that originally contained the relevant source code and that were later produced by RCG because they allegedly contained the code.  The seventh was also wiped, although there was a dispute regarding whether Buist or others had access to it when it was wiped.  But the Court held that it was "impossible to believe that it is merely coincidence that the seventh disk happened to be wiped on May 2, 2006, which just happened to be the same day that TT was scheduled to inspect it."
   
• There was evidence that "virtually every piece of media ordered produced by the Court in May 2007 and July 2008 was wiped, altered, or destroyed after those orders were entered . . . ." (emphasis in original).
   
• Even if RCG and its counsel had no knowledge of the destruction of the evidence, the destruction might have been avoided if RCG had timely complied with the Court's orders to produce the materials.  And regardless, RCG and its counsel should have preserved the evidence by taking custody of it.
   
• Buist was RCG's agent and, therefore, RCG was bound by Buist's behavior and actions.

Based upon these determinations, the Court found clear and convincing evidence that "RCG, and its counsel, acted in bad faith and with willful disregard for the rules of discovery and this Court's orders."  And because a monetary sanction alone was not sufficient, the Court entered a default judgment in favor of TT and dismissed RCG's complaint and struck its defenses to TT's counterclaim.  The Court also fined RCG $1,000,000 for "egregious conduct before the Court" and ordered RCG's counsel to pay TT the attorney's fees and costs related to TT's motion for default judgment.

*  I have a few earlier opinions from the Trading Technologies cases, but this one was significant enough that I moved it up.  Click here for more on the case in the Blog's archives.

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Callprod, Inc. v. GN Netcome, Inc., No. 06 C 4961, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Nov. 1, 2010) (Kendall, J.).

Judge Kendall granted in part plaintiff Callprod's motion to stay determination regarding attorney's fees pending appeal of the underlying patent issues and the Court's determination as to whether the case was exceptional. The Court held that the Court's and the parties' resources were best preserved if all proceedings regarding attorney's fees were stayed until the Federal Circuit ruled on Callprod's appeal of the Court's grant of summary judgment of noninfringement. The Court, however, ordered Callprod to respond to defendants' bill of costs.
 

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Trading Techs. Int'l, Inc. v. Speed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Sep. 8, 2010) (Schenkier, Mag. J.).

Judge Schenkier recommended denying plaintiff Trading Technologies' ("TT") motion to enforce the final judgment and for sanctions. The Court also recommended correcting the final judgment to reflect the jury verdict and the remitted damages award. A jury previously awarded TT $3.5M in damages and found defendant's infringement willful. The Court later overturned the willfulness finding and ordered a remittitur of damages to $2.5M, which TT accepted. The Court then granted a permanent injunction and entered a final judgment, but that judgment did not reflect the damages award.

Defendant argued that, despite the jury award and remittitur, there was no damages award because it was not reflected in the final judgment and after the Federal Circuit had decided to appeal it was too late to revise the final judgment.

The Court agreed that the first judgment should have included the award, but not that it was too late to fix it. The Court noted that the most likely explanation for the omission was "the fallibility of human beings (judges included)." The Court also noted that TT should have sought to correct the final judgment immediately. But despite the imprecise judgment, the Federal Circuit ruled upon several issues related to the jury verdict, although not the award itself. And neither TT nor defendants disputed the fact or the amount of the damages award. Based upon those facts, the Court recommended that revising the final judgment to reflect the award would merely "correct a clerical mistake or a mistake arising from oversight or omission" pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a). Finally, the Court recognized TT's frustration over not having received payment 34 months after the jury verdict and 6 months after the Federal Circuit's decision. But the Court recommended not awarding TT its fees because TT's failure to promptly get the judgment corrected was the only reason there was a delay in paying the judgment.

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Nova Design Build, Inc. v. Grace Hotels, LLC, No. 08 C 2855, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jun. 8, 2010) (Der-Yeghiayan, J.).

Judge Der-Yeghiayan granted defendant Grace Hotel's motion for costs and denied without prejudice Grace Hotel's motion for attorney's fees. As an initial matter, the Court held that Grace Hotels was a prevailing party pursuant to both Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) (costs) and 17 U.S.C. § 505 (attorney's fees). While the standards were different, Grace Hotels met both standards. Grace Hotels was granted summary judgment on plaintiff's copyright infringement claim because plaintiffs did not have a valid copyright registration – click here for more on this opinion in the Blog's archives. While the decision was jurisdictional and not substantive, Grace Hotel was a prevailing party because the Court's ruling "effectively foreclosed" Plaintiff's copyright claims. In other words, "Grace [Hotels] obtained more than just a moral victory on a minor jurisdictional point." Because Grace Hotels was a prevailing party, the Court awarded the reasonable costs Grace Hotels requested for court reporter fees pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) - $2,534.70. 

While Grace Hotels was also a prevailing party for purposes of § 505, the Court denied Grace Hotels attorney's fees motion without prejudice. The fees did not appear reasonable. They were not limited to fees associated with defending the copyright claim. Grace Hotels was not entitled to fees for defending related state law claims which the Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over after resolving the federal copyright claim. Grace Hotels also sought fees for a separate case between the parties. The Court allowed Grace Hotels to file a renewal motion for attorney's fees tailored to the recoverable fees.

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UTStarcom, Inc. v. Starent Networks, Corp., No. 07 C 2582, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Apr. 13, 2009) (Bobrick, Ret. J. & Special Master).

Special Master Bobrick, a retired judge, awarded defendant Starent its attorneys fees  related to Starent's efforts to get complete interrogatory responses from plaintiff UTStarcom.  In an earlier opinion (click here for the Blog's related post), the Court denied Starent's request to dismiss plaintiff's trade secret misappropriation claim as a sanction for UTStarcom's incomplete responses, but awarded attorneys fees.  Of particular interest, the Special Master held that block billing was not inappropriate and that block billed entries could be recovered.  Additionally, based in part on UTStarcom's failure to provide its rates as part of a reasonableness analysis, the Special Master held that Starent's rates were not unreasonable, although they may have been more than standard local rates.  The Court also noted that patent cases required special expertise which often commands a premium.  The Special Master did, however, reduce the rates of Starent's law students whom the Special Master noted were neither lawyers nor paralegals.  Finally, the Special Master reduced by one-third the bills for certain time that was added to Starent's Bill of Costs late.

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UTStarcom, Inc. v. Starent Networks, Corp., No. 07 C 2582, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jan. 22, 2009) (Bobrick, Ret. J. & Special Master).

Special Master Bobrick, a retired judge, denied defendant Starent's motion to dismiss plaintiff UTSI's trade secret misappropriation claim for repeatedly deficient interrogatory responses related to the claim.  Over the course of a year, UTSI served six responses to the interrogatories at issue based upon various requests by Starent and orders by the Special Master.  After the sixth set of responses, Starent agreed that the answers were sufficient.  Starent, however, requested dismissal of the claim based upon UTStarcom's repeated failure to provide a substantive answer.  UTStarcom responded that dismissal was a drastic remedy that was not warranted because had provided substantive answers and because Starent had not been prejudiced by the delay.  UTStarcom even suggested other remedies like exclusion of late produced evidence.  The Special Master held that it was a close case and that either outcome would be defensible.  The Court however, denied Starent's motion to dismiss but did award attorney's fees for the filing of Starent's motion.

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Rosenthal Collins Group, LLC v. Trading Techs. Int'l, Inc., No. 05 C 4088, Min. Order (N.D. Ill. Feb. 2, 2009) (Moran, Sen. J.).*

In this pair of entries, Judge Moran denied plaintiff Trading Technologies' motions for fees and costs related to a discovery motion and referred another fees motion to Magistrate Judge Schenkier.  In the first entry, the Court noted that it was time to end "unnecessary [discovery] battles" in the case and that it might not be as forgiving with the next fees motion.  In the other entry, the Court transferred a fees motion to Judge Schenkier, but questioned how "a single discovery dispute could blossom into a claim for over $300,000.

*  Click here to read much more about this case and the related cases in the Blog's archives.

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Welsh v. Big Ten Conf., Inc., No. 08 C 1342, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 2008) (Gottschall, J.).

Judge Gottschall granted defendant the Big Ten Conference's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, but denied the Big Ten's motion for its attorney's fees. Plaintiff claimed that it presented the Big Ten with a trade secret business plan for a Big Ten television network named the "Big Ten Network." The Big Ten allegedly told plaintiff it was not interested and then several years later started the Big Ten Network using plaintiff's trade secrets, including the Big Ten Network name. Plaintiff claimed that the Big Ten violated § 38 of the Lanham Act by filing a false declaration with the PTO stating that the Big Ten had the sole right to use the Big Ten Network mark in commerce. Plaintiff argued that the Big Ten should have disclosed plaintiff's trade secret rights in the mark. But the Court held that even if plaintiff could establish trade secret rights, the Seventh Circuit had held that it was "far from clear" whether trade secret claims fall within the scope of § 38, which is directed to statements about ownership, as opposed to statements about use in commerce. Additionally, the Court held that plaintiff's alleged development of the name did not necessarily grant plaintiff any rights in the trademark. Trademark rights are granted based upon use, not discovery or invention. And inclusion in a business plan is not a "use in commerce." Having dismissed plaintiff's federal claim and noting that the parties were not diverse, the Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims and dismissed the case.

The Court denied the Big Ten's request for its fees. First, the case was resolved on a motion to dismiss filed two months after the complaint and while plaintiff's arguments lost, the theory had not been "squarely rejected by the Seventh Circuit." As such, plaintiff's suit could not be deemed "oppressive" as is required for an award of fees.

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Hyundai Construc. Equip. U.S.A., Inc. v. Chris Johnson Equip., Inc., No. 06 C 3238, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Oct 21, 2008) (Leinenweber, Sen. J.).

Judge Leinenweber, having previously granted plaintiff summary judgment of Lanham Act unfair competition and deceptive trade practices,* enjoined defendant's continued sale of gray market goods and use of plaintiffs' trademarks and awarded plaintiffs damages and costs.  The Court awarded plaintiffs defendant's profits from sales of gray market construction equipment (equipment made abroad for sale abroad that was imported to the United States without authority for resale), but the Court held that awarding plaintiffs a multiple of defendant's actual damages would be inappropriately punitive.  Additionally, the Court gave defendant an opportunity to prove its costs before entering a final damages amount. 

The Court also entered a permanent injunction.  The Court, however, denied plaintiffs' request that defendant have to provide plaintiffs and the Court a report proving defendants' compliance with the injunction.  Such a requirement was unduly burdensome.

Finally, the Court awarded plaintiffs their costs, but held attorney's fees were not appropriate because the case was not exceptional.  Among other reasons the case was not exceptional, the Court noted evidence that defendants "apparent pains" to warn customers that defendants' products lacked a warranty and came from overseas.  And the Court held that no actual confusion had yet been proven.

*  Click here for the prior decision in the Blog's archives.

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Vito & Nick’s, Inc. v. Barraco., No. 05 C 2764, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Oct. 10, 2008) (Nolan, Mag. J.)

Judge Nolan granted defendants’ motion for litigation costs, but denied defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees. Plaintiff sued defendants alleging trademark infringement, Lanham Act unfair competition, Illinois Deceptive Trade Practices and related state law claims based upon a dispute over sibling’s competing use of the name of a family business. After initiation of the suit, the parties engaged in extensive settlement negotiations resulting in a framework for settlement. But plaintiff was unable to come up with funds necessary for the settlement and then lost its counsel. Because plaintiff was unable to find replacement counsel, and because corporations cannot appear pro se, plaintiff’s case was eventually dismissed for want of prosecution.

The Court held that plaintiff’s conduct resulting in dismissal did not constitute bad faith warranting an award for attorney’s fees. Plaintiff actively participated in the case and settlement negotiations, until it was unable to come up with the funds required, and lost its counsel. Furthermore, the Court had not had occasion to review the viability of plaintiff’s claim and, therefore, a bad faith finding could not be based upon the viability of the claims.

The Court did, however, award defendants their costs as prevailing parties pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1), as follows:

• Costs of serving the summons and subpoenas;
   
• Court reporter, videographer, and transcript fees (transcripts were limited to $3.30 per page and did include indexes, minuscripts or other attorney convenience features);
   
• Witness fees; and
   
• Copy costs (limited to $.10 - $.20 per page).

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Hyperquest, Inc. v. N’Site Solutions, Inc., No. 08 C 483, 2008 WL 3978310 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 2008) (Shadur, Sen. J.)

Judge Shadur continued defendants’ motion for fees as a prevailing party in this copyright case pursuant to 17 U.S.C. §505, after previously requiring additional briefing as to the reasonableness of defendants’ requested fees – click here to read about that opinion in the Blog’s archives. Defendants collectively requested approximately $260K in fees. The Court dismissed plaintiff’s argument that defendants did not offer proof that defendants had paid their counsels’ fees. But the Court set a hearing to discuss an appropriate award, noting that plaintiff’s counsel’s fees, approximately $110K, were a more appropriate sum, with some adjustment for the fact that there were two defendants.

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Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., No. 2007-1998, -1348 Slip. Op. (Fed. Cir. June 17, 2008).

The Federal Circuit affirmed Judge Darrah's award of defendant's/appellee's attorney's fees – click here to read the Blog's post about the inequitable conduct opinion. Judge Darrah previously held and the Federal Circuit previously affirmed that plaintiffs committed inequitable conduct by, among other things: (1) falsely claiming small entity status; (2) failing to disclose material prior art to the PTO; and (3) failing to disclose related litigation to the PTO. Judge Darrah then held that the case was exceptional based upon plaintiff's inequitable conduct, filing of a frivolous suit, and litigation misconduct. Because the case was exceptional, Judge Darrah awarded defendants their attorney's fees.

The Federal Circuit agreed with plaintiffs, holding that an inequitable conduct finding did not require a case be deemed exceptional. But the Court held that Judge Darrah's findings were supported by evidence and, therefore, were within his discretion.

Judge Newman dissented, stating:

The court today promotes unexceptional trial procedures and non-culpable prosecution errors into an "exceptional case" of such severity as to warrant the award of attorney fees. That is not what the status, or precedent, or policy contemplates. I respectfully dissent.

Check the following blogs for more on this opinion:

• Filewrapper
  
• Patently-O

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