Chicago IP Attorney & Lawyer : R. David Donoghue : Chicago IP Litigation Blog

Autotech Techs. Ltd. Partnership v. Automationdirect.com, Inc., No. 05 C 5488 2008 WL 783301 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2008) (Cole, Mag. J.).*

Judge Cole granted in part defendant Automationdirect.com's ("ADC") motion to compel additional records from plaintiff Autotech's database. The parties agreed that an ADC expert would be allowed to develop queries which Autotech would run on its database. After a dispute regarding how to produce the results of the search, the Court ordered production of the documents, which related to records of, among other things, customer confusion. Upon review of the records, ADC demanded that Autotech supplement them with information such as the date of the communication and the identity of the Autotech employees involved. Autotech eventually supplemented the documents with an index identifying, among other things, the identity of the Autotech employee involved in each communication, but not the dates of the communications. ADC moved to compel the production of all fields in Autotech's database for each entry identified by ADC's query. But Autotech countered that it had produced all fields generated by ADC's expert's query. Had the query generated all available fields, they, presumably, would have been produced them all. Because Autotech produced the information generated by ADC's search and supplemented that production with an index, sanctions were not warranted. But the Court did order production, at ADC's expense, of the dates of each communication. The Court also ordered the parties to meet and confer to determine how to produce the dates in a useful format.

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Autotech Techs. Ltd. Partnership v. Automationdirect.com, Inc., No. 05 C 5488, 2008 WL 783303 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2008) (Cole, Mag. J.).*

Judge Cole granted in part plaintiff Autotech's motion to compel communications between defendant Automationdirect.com, Inc. ("ADC") and any third party regarding ADC's competing C-More touch screen panel. The Court held that ADC need not produce documents related to source code for the C-More product. The Court previously denied Autotech's motion to amend its complaint adding claims related to that source code. But the Court held that ADC's third party communications could be relevant to show whether ADC has complied with its contractual obligation to use its best efforts to sell Autotech's product, or if its C-More sales efforts interfered with sales of Autotech's products. The Court also held that any communication evidencing customer confusion must be produced.

Practice Tip: Do not employ new arguments in reply briefs. The Court did not consider Autotech's reply brief because it changed the scope of its argument on reply. Autotech's opening brief sought ADC's third party communications with the exception of those regarding ADC's source code because claims regarding ADC's software were not in the case. But on reply, Autotech also sought the source code related communications.

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Autotech Techs. Ltd. Partnership v. Automationdirect.com, Inc. 237 F.RD. 405 (N.D. Ill. 2006). (Cole, Mag. J.).

In this impressively detailed opinion, Magistrate Judge Cole grants defendant's motion for a protective order limiting plaintiff's in-house counsel's access to sensitive customer information and communications.  The parties faced a common problem, they had agreed that customer information, including customer identities and communications, would be limited to attorneys' eyes only, but could not agree as to whether plaintiff's in-house counsel could access the information.  Plaintiff argued that its in-house counsel played a lead role in the case and, therefore, required access to the information.  Defendant argued that in-house counsel were corporate decision makers, in addition to counselors, and would not be able to separate the knowledge of defendant's customers they would be exposed to when performing business-related functions.

The Court first stated that it believed counsel's assurances that they would not violate the Court's protective order or their ethical obligations, noting that that was "the beginning and not the end of [the] analysis."  The Court held that:

. . . proper analysis requires a careful and comprehensive inquiry into in-house counsel's actual (not nominal) role in the affairs of the company, his association and relationship with those in the corporate hierarchy who are competitive decision makers, and any other factor that enhances the risk of inadvertent disclosure.  That risk must then be balanced against the harm that will result to the party employing in-house counsel from restrictions on the latter's access to the protected information.

The Court then performed a detailed analysis of plaintiff's counsel's responsibilities and place in plaintiff's corporate hierarchy.  The Court ultimately held that in-house counsel could not have access to customer information because of in-house counsel's central importance to plaintiff and because restricting access would not harm plaintiff's ability to litigate the case. 

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