Chicago IP Attorney & Lawyer : R. David Donoghue : Chicago IP Litigation Blog

Heathcote Holdings Corp., Inc. v. Leapfrog Enters., Inc., No. 10 C 1471, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Dec. 27, 2010) (Coar, J.).

Judge Coar transferred plaintiff Heathcote's false patent marking case to the Northern District of California. Because Heathcote was a relator standing in the shoes of the federal government, Heathcote's chosen forum was given little deference. All of defendant's witnesses — party and non-party alike — were located in California. Additionally, the relevant evidence was located in defendant's California offices. And Heathcote was unlikely to have much relevant evidence. The Court, therefore, transferred the case.
 

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Chief Judge Holderman recently gave the annual State of the Court address, concluding that the Northern District continues to be an active, growing district court. Civil case filings were up 6.2% from 2008 to 2009, and the Northern District remains in the top 10% of district courts for median time to disposition – 6.2 months. 

The Court began 2009 with one vacant judgeship – created by Judge Filip's March 2008 resignation. The Court ended 2009 with from after Judges Bucklo, Coar and Gettleman took senior status. In February 2010, Judge Manning also took senior status. Judge Feinerman was confirmed last month, reducing the vacant seats by one, but there could be five vacancies again at the end of July when Judge Anderson retires. 

The magistrate bench was also active. Judges Ashman and Keys shifted to recalled status. Judges Finnegan, Gilbert and Kim joined the bench. 

Finally, the number of registered e-filers is up 18% to over 25,000. And the daily filing rate is up 15% to an average 867 documents per day. 

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General Kinematics Corp. v. Carrier Vibrating Equipment, No. 08 C 1264, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jul. 27, 2009) (Coar, J.).

Judge Coar construed the claims of declaratory judgment defendant's patent for a vibratory conveyor system.  The following constructions were particularly interesting:

• The Court noted that declaratory judgment plaintiff did not separately define the function and structure for the means plus function elements.  While there was no direct impact from the failure to define function and structure separately, the Court noted that the definitions did not assist its constructions.
   
• The structure of one means plus function element was not just a generic controller, but a controller as described in the specification and figures, as well as equivalents of them.

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James H. Anderson, Inc. v. Johnson, No. 08 C 6202, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jul 27, 2009) (Coar, J.).

Judge Coar granted defendants'  Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss plaintiff's copyright malpractice claim for lack of jurisdiction.  Plaintiff argued that the Court had jurisdiction over its state law malpractice claim based upon 28 U.S.C. Section 1338(a) which creates the federal court's exclusive jurisdiction over patent and copyright cases.  The Court held that it did not have jurisdiction based upon the copyright claim in the underlying action.  Federal jurisdiction requires not just a contested federal issue, but a substantial federal issue.  The underlying was not a substantial issue. Furthermore, the federal interest in regulating malpractice was outweighed by the state interest.  And the Court reasoned that copyright malpractice was different than patent malpractice.  Copyright cases are fact intensive and do not require legal analysis of the claims, as required in patent law.

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Chief Judge Holderman recently gave his annual State of the Northern District speech.  In a word, Judge Holderman said that the state of the District is "good."  Here are some of the highlights of the presentation (click here to read the Court's press release):

• Judge Gettleman intends to take senior status May 5 and Judge Coar intends to take senior status August 12.  Additionally, Magistrate Judge Ashman intends to retire later this year.
   
• Combined with the vacancy created when Judge Filip went to the Justice Department, when Judges Gettleman and Coar take senior status there will be three Article III and one magistrate vacancies on the Court.
   
• Civil filings were up 2.7% in 2008 over 2007.  And the Court resolves those disputes quickly.  The Northern District is in the top 10% of district court with its median time of 6.2 months to disposition.
   
• The Court is participating in a pilot program which allows jurors to fill out jury forms and get information about their service online.

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DeVry Inc. v. Univ. of Medicine & Health Sciences -- St. Kitts, No. 08 C 3280, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Feb. 3, 2009) (Coar, J.).

Judge Coar denied defendant's Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for trademark infringement or Lanham Act false designation and false representation. Plaintiffs own and operate the Ross University School of Medicine and are the owners of ROSS and ROSS UNIVERSITY marks.  Defendant marketed its medical school as "Founded by Dr. Robert Ross" and used at least one domain for email addresses including the word "ross." Defendant is not associated with or sponsored by plaintiffs' Ross University.

Defendant argued that its representations that its institution was founded by Dr. Ross and that Dr. Ross founded Ross University were fair uses constituting an impenetrable defense requiring dismissal. The Court, however, held that the defenses did not warrant dismissal for several reasons:

• Whether the use of Dr. Ross's name constituted the use of a mark or simply his name was a question of fact not appropriate for a decision on the pleadings;
   
• While the Seventh Circuit has not explicitly adopted a normative fair use defense, it was not clear that defendant's use of Dr. Ross's name met the criteria for the defense; 
   
• There was a question of fact as to whether defendant's repeated use of the name was more than reasonably necessary to identify the product; and
   
• There was a question of fact as to whether the use of the Ross name implied sponsorship or endorsement.

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Bajer Design & Marketing, Inc. v. Base4 Group, Inc., No. 08 C 02296, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill.  Nov. 12, 2008) (Coar, J.).

Judge Coar entered the parties consent judgment, holding that defendant Base4 infringed plaintiff Bajer Design's patents and trademarks, as well as granting judgment for Bajer Design as to its related state law claims.  The Court also awarded Bajer Design damages equal to slightly more than 20% of Base4's gross sales.  Finally, the Court permanently enjoined Base4 from making, using or selling the infringing product and from using Bajer Design's POP-UPS! and POP OPEN trademarks, absent a license from Bajer Design.

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Here are several stories that did not warrant a full post, or that were so well done by another blogger that there was no point in recreating the wheel:

• The Federal Circuit upheld Judge Coar's preliminary injunction in Abbott v. Sandoz, No. 05 C 5373 -- click here to read the Federal Circuit's opinion and here to read the Blog's prior posts on the case.  Dennis Crouch at Patently-O has a good post explaining the central issue of the case -- a defendant's burden of proof regarding invalidity in the likelihood of success analysis.  Judge Newman wrote the majority decision with Judge Gajarsa dissenting.  Crouch sees the case as a "good vehicle" for en banc review of the preliminary injunction standard.
   
• Ocean Tomo is holding its 8th IP auction at home in Chicago this Wednesday and Thursday.
   

• Michael Sadowitz at the MTTLR Blog has a great post (click here to read it) discussing one of the big post-eBay unknowns, who sets post-verdict damages when a permanent injunction is not issued, judges or juries.  Sadowitz looks at a string of Eastern District of Texas cases letting juries set post-verdict damages.  Sadowitz also notes that the few courts that have looked at the issue have split as to whether post-verdict damages can be severed from the damages portion of the trial. 
   
• Finally, having mastered all things drug and device related, the Drug & Device Law blog has moved into the patent realm, with some excellent analysis by their colleagues Kevin McDonald and Larry Rosenberg of Jones Day.  The post (click here to read it) discusses a recent Federal Circuit decision which held that cash payments made to settle Hatch-Waxman patent litigations do not violate antitrust laws, under certain conditions:

On October 15, 2008, the Federal Circuit joined the growing list of federal courts to hold that the use of cash payments to settle Hatch-Waxman patent litigation does not violate the antitrust laws as long as (1) the settlement excludes no more competition than would the patent itself and (2) the claim for patent infringement and/or validity is not a “sham,” that is, not “objectively baseless.” In In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, No. 08-1097, 2008 WL 4570669 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 15, 2008), a unanimous panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the summary judgment granted to Bayer by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, holding that Bayer’s settlement of patent litigation with a generic pharmaceutical manufacturer did not violate the antitrust laws.

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The Seventh Circuit instituted a Commission to study the implementation of the ABA Jury Project.  The Northern District was heavily represented on the Commission.  The following Northern District Judges were members of the Commission:  Bucklo, Brown, Coar, Darrah, Denlow, Der-Yeghiayan, Gottschall, Holderman, Kennelly, Lefkow, Moran, Schenkier, St. Eve, and Zagel.  The Commission recently published its report -- click here to read it.  The report describes a two phase analysis.  In the first phase, district judges tested the following seven ABA Principles:

1.       Twelve-Person Juries;

2.       Jury Selection Questionnaires;

3.       Preliminary Substantive Jury Instructions;

4.       Trial Time Limits;

5.       Juror Questions;

6.       Interim Trial Statements by Counsel; and

7.       Enhanced Jury Deliberations.

Other Principles, such as juror notebooks and allowing jurors to take notes, were already in such widespread use that they were not tested.  Click here for the Phase One Project manual detailing the principles, the rationales and authority behind them, and suggested procedures.  Phase One resulted in questionnaires from 22 participating federal trial judges, 74 participating attorneys and 303 jurors from 38 trials that used one or more of the seven Principles.  Based upon the analysis of Phase One results and questionnaires, the Commission focused Phase Two on the following four Principles:

1.       Juror Questions;

2.       Interim Trial Statements by Counsel;

3.       Twelve-Person Juries; and

4.       Preliminary Substantive Jury Instructions.

These Principles were chosen because of Phase One popularity (78% of jurors reported that being able to ask questions increased their satisfaction with the process) and because of a desire to study the Principles more.  Click here for the Phase Two manual.

In Phase Two, 108 jurors from 12 trials employing one or more of the Phase Two Principles filled out questionnaires.  In addition, 12 attorneys and 4 district judges that participated also filled out questionnaires.  The results are interesting, but more importantly create the opportunity to powerfully impact the trial system across the Seventh Circuit in ways that benefit all of the stakeholders in the trial process -- the litigants, the jurors, the judge and the judge's chambers, and the litigators.

All four of the Phase Two Principles showed significant benefits to the trial process.  83% of jurors reported an increased understanding of the facts when allowed to ask written questions through a judge -- the questions were reworded to meet evidentiary rules.  And 75% of judges and 65% of attorneys thought the questions benefited jurors.  Similarly, preliminary substantive jury instructions were found to improve trials by jurors (80%), judges (85%) and attorneys (70%).  And the same was true for interim statements to the jury -- jurors (80%) and judges (85%).  Finally, twelve-person juries were found not to harm efficiency, while increasing juror diversity.

Each of the four Phase Two Principles, as well as several of the additional three Phase One Principles deserve more attention and analysis.  So, over the next several weeks I will provide follow up posts discussing the findings of those Principles in greater detail.  I will start with the idea of juror questions, which I find particularly important, later this week or early next.

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Kelley v. Chicago Park District, No. 04 C 7715, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Sep. 29, 2007) (Coar, J.).

Judge Coar entered judgment for defendant the Chicago Park District (“CPD”) on plaintiff Chapman Kelley’s (“Kelley”) two Visual Artists Rights Act (“VARA) claims and for Kelley as to his implied breach of contract claim, after holding a bench trial.* Kelley brought this suit arguing that his work of art “Wildflower Works” (“WW”) was copyrightable as a sculpture pursuant to the Copyright Act and the VARA. Kelley originally installed his WW in Chicago’s Grant Park in 1984 pursuant to a permit from the City of Chicago. WW was an installation of wild flowers in two elliptical shapes surrounded by gravel — click here for pictures from Kelley's website — that Kelley replanted and tended each year. Chicago periodically renewed the permit until 1994, when Kelley continued his WW pursuant to an oral permit renewal. Then in 2004, Chicago fenced off WW, effectively destroying it. 

As an initial matter, the Court noted that there was a significant tension between the laws desire to define things, like what a sculpture is, and modern art:

There is a tension between the law and the evolution of ideas in modern or avant garde art; the former requires legislatures to taxonomize artistic creations, whereas the latter is occupied with expanding the definition of what we accept to be art. While Andy Warhol’s suggestion that “art is whatever you can get away with” is too nihilistic for the law to accommodate, neither should VARA be read so narrowly as to protect on the most revered work of the Old Masters. In other words, the “plain and ordinary” meanings of words describing modern art are still slippery.

The Court held that WW was a sculpture, or three dimensional art work, based upon Kelley’s manipulation of the flowers, metal and gravel used to form the contours and colors of WW. Similarly, while WW was not just two dimensional, it was also a painting because it “corral[ed] the variegation of wildflowers in bloom into pleasing oval swatches . . . .”

Although WW was a sculpture and a painting, it was not protectable pursuant to the Copyright Act and, therefore, pursuant to VARA because it is also an excluded type of authorship, a system. Section 102(b) specifically excludes systems, along with ideas, procedures and processes from copyright protection. Kelley had described WW as a “vegetative management system.” (emphasis added in the Court’s opinion). Additionally, WW was not copyrightable because Kelley did not prove that it was an original work of authorship. The Court held that it was not clear what about WW was original. And the Court would not assume that Kelley was “the first person to ever conceive of and express an arrangement of growing wildflowers in [an] ellipse-shaped enclosed area . . . .”

WW would not have been protected pursuant to VARA even if it were copyrightable because WW was a site-specific work. Because the Seventh Circuit had not decided whether VARA protected site-specific works, the Court adopted the First Circuit’s reasoning that VARA does not protect site-specific works.  Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128 (1^st Cir. 2006). The Court held that WW’s placement in Grant Park was integral to Kelley’s art. For example, even air vents from the parking garage below WW were specifically worked into WW as an artistic element helping to show the juxtaposition of wildlife and city life.

The Court did, however, hold that CPD created an implied contract when a Parks Commissioner assured Kelley that he did not need to seek additional permits to maintain his work. As such, CPD was obligated, not to maintain WW, but to give Kelley at least ninety days notice of any change in WW and allow Kelley to remove his wildflowers should he choose to do so. Because Kelley was not given notice, CPD breached the implied contract. Because, however, Kelley did not sufficiently prove his damages – the cost of the flowers less Kelley’s cost to remove them after he would have received notice. The Court, therefore, awarded Kelley nominal damages of $1.

According to a press release from Kelley, he was happy about the implications of the Court’s opinions for other artists, but disappointed with the nominal damages:

This ruling redefines legally what can be fine art, what it can be made of and that artists themselves make these decisions. However, regarding the nominal consideration amount that I received of $1.00, it reminds me of the 1878 case of Whistler Vs. Ruskin, in which the plaintiff received a sum total of one shilling for his moral victory.

For more on this case and the Court’s decision click here for a Chicago Sun-Times article by Andrew Herrmann.

* Click here for more on this case in the Blog’s archives.

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Mullen v. Society of Stage Directors & Choreographers, No. 06 C 6818 (N.D. Ill.) (Coar, J.).

Judge Coar dismissed this case based upon the parties' settlement in late 2007.*  Plaintiffs were the various production heads of the Chicago production of the musical “Urinetown!” (“Chicago Production”). The Chicago Production was performed pursuant to a license from Blue Dog Entertainment, LLC. Despite that license, plaintiffs each received a cease and desist letter from counsel for defendants (the heads of production of the Broadway Urinetown! production (“Broadway Production”) and their unions USA and the Society of Stage Directors & Choreographers (“SSDC”). The letter warned that plaintiffs willfully copied copyrighted aspects of the Broadway Production and attempted to pass off the Chicago Production as the award-winning Broadway Production. Defendants also held a press conference during which they publicly stated that the plaintiffs “plagiarized” the Broadway Production. Plaintiffs responded by filing suit seeking declaratory judgments that the Chicago Production did not infringe any of plaintiffs’ copyrights and that it was not Lanham Act passing off. And based upon the press conference, plaintiffs included a defamation claim.

The lesson for producers is clear.  Obtaining production rights from a publisher (such as Samuel French, Tams-Witmark, Rodgers & Hammerstein, etc.), does NOT include the right to copy all or part of the broadway, off-broadway or other original production.  It is incumbent on producers to either (a) obtain such rights separately, or (b) re-imagine the show and create a new, original production from the ground up.

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Judge Coar denied defendant Sears, Roebuck & Co.'s ("Sears") Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law and Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a) motion for a new trial or a remittitur. And the Court granted plaintiff RRK Holding Co.'s ("RRK") motion for pre-judgment and post-judgment interest. A jury previously returned a verdict finding Sears liable for breach of a nondisclosure agreement and misappropriation of RRK's trade secret related to its spiral saw – click here for much more on this case in the Blog's archives. The jury awarded RRK approximately $21M, including $11.6M in actual damages, $1.6M for unjust enrichment and $8M in punitive damages.

First, Sears argued that RRK offered insufficient evidence showing that Sears' alleged misappropriation caused RRK's damages. But the Court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. The fact that Sears's price for its spiral saw was lower than RRK's explained why customers purchased Sears's saws over RRK's, but the trade secret causation was shown by the fact that Sears sold the combination tool instead of selling the components separately.

Second, Sears argued that RRK's damages should be limited to the traditional “head start” period (an estimate of the time it would take for defendant to develop the trade secret on its own). But the Court held that Illinois law limits injunctive relief to a head start period, but not monetary relief.

Third, the Court held that RRK's damages expert was sufficiently credible and held that Sears had sufficient opportunity to challenge the expert's methodologies during cross examination.

Fourth, Sears argued that the jury's award was in error because it awarded damages based on the entire sales price of the spiral saws, instead of apportioning just that portion of the sales price related to RRK's trade secrets. But the Court held that a rational jury could have determined that the reason the spiral saw was a success was because of the trade secret and that, therefore, apportionment was not required.

Fifth, Sears argued that RRK's lost profits damages should have been cut-off when third party competitor Dremel entered the market with a competing spiral saw. But the Court held that it was unclear whether Dremel's tool was similar enough to RRK's trade secret to be a substitute for it.

The Court also held that the jury's award was not excessive. But the Court did find that the jury erred in by using the wrong figure from RRK's expert for actual lost profits. RRK also conceded that the jury used the wrong number. The Court, therefore, reduced the jury's actual damages award from $11.6M (the incorrect figure) to $11.2M (the correct figure).

Finally, the Court awarded RRK both pre-judgment and post-judgment interest. Pre-judgment interest, which is awarded on equitable grounds, was appropriate because of the intentional nature of trade secret misappropriation. Additionally, the Court held that pre-judgment interest was appropriate even though RRK was also awarded punitive damages. The Court did, however, suggest that had the punitive damages award been multiples of the actual damages, pre-judgment interest might not have been appropriate. Sears did not challenge RRK's motion for post-judgment interest.

The Court added $3.7M in pre-judgment interest to the $21M award and assessed post-judgment interest of $1,931.50 per day until the award was paid.

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The Northern District of Illinois and Chicago's Federal Bar Association chapter are hosting their Ninth Annual Awards for Excellence in Pro Bono and Public Interest Service awards program this Tuesday, May 13 beginning at 3:30 pm in the James Benton Parsons Memorial Courtroom (2525) of the Dirksen United States Courthouse at 219 South Dearborn Street. The program is open to everyone and is free of charge.

The keynote speaker will be William Neukom, the President of the ABA and partner in K&L Gates.  Prior to his private practice, Neukom was executive vice president of Law and Corporate Affairs for
Microsoft, where he managed Microsoft’s legal, government affairs and philanthropic
activities.

Seven “Awards for Excellence in Pro Bono and Public Interest Service” and one “Special
Recognition Award for Public Interest Service” will be presented to the following Chicago-area lawyers for their pro bono and public interest work before the Northern District:

• Sara C. Arroyo and Rosa M. Tumialán, of Dykema Gossett PLLC (presented by the Judge Coar);
  
• Anthony J. Masciopinto, of Kulwin, Masciopinto & Kulwin, LLP (presented by Judge Manning);
  
• Myron Mackoff, of Richardson & Mackoff (presented by the Chief Judge Holderman and Magistrate Judge Valdez);
  
• Joshua D. Lee and Amy M. Rubenstein, of Schiff Hardin LLP (presented by the
  Judge Brown);
  
• Catherine Caporusso and Margot Klein, of the Federal District Court's Self-Help Assistance Program (presented by Judge Hibbler);
  
• David A. Gordon, Michael B. Nadler, and Kristen R. Seeger, of Sidley Austin LLP (presented
  by Magistrate Judge Schenkier);
  
• Lisa R. Kane, of Lisa Kane & Associates, PC (presented by Chief Judge Holderman); and
  
• Richard J. Gonzales, Clinical Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent (presented by Chief Judge Holderman).

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The Northern District has posted the Seventh Circuit's new proposed pattern jury instructions for patent cases on its website -- click here for a copy.  The instructions include all of the recent revisions to the patent laws, including KSR and Seagate. The Seventh Circuit requested comments on the instructions be sent to:

Chief Judge Robert L. Miller, Jr.
robert_miller@innd.uscourts.gov
325 Robert A. Grant Federal Building
204 S. Main St.
South Bend, IN 46601

Comments will be accepted until April 1st.  Also, below is my list of IP jury instructions by Northern District judge, I am sure we will start to see some new ones soon in light of the turbulent 18 months patent law has had:

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Brian Higgins's Maryland IP Law Blog post about the progeny of In re Seagate, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007), inspired me to do follow up posts identifying Northern District cases discussing recent major IP decisions -- click here for my post on injunctions after eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S.Ct. 1837, 164 L.Ed.2d 641 (2006).  There have been a number of obviousness decisions in the Northern District since KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., __ U.S. __, 127 S.Ct. 1727 (2007).  Here they are:*

• Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 05 C 5373, 2007 WL 1549498 (N.D. Ill. May 24, 2007) (Coar, J.). -- Holding that the Court's pre-KSR analysis need not be reconsidered in light of KSR because an element was missing from the prior art, regardless of what standard was used.
  
• Herman Miller, Inc. v. Teknion Corp., No. 05 C 2761, 2007 WL 2230042 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 30, 2007) (Gettleman, J.). -- Noting that, in light of KSR, plaintiff issued a statement of non-liability and certain patents were removed from the suit.
  

• Lexion Medical, LLC v. Northgate Techs., Inc., No. 04 C 5705, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jun. 8, 2007). -- Holding that the pre-KSR jury's decision would not have changed if given a KSR obviousness instruction.

These opinions suggest that KSR is not changing obviousness law in the Northern District much.  I suspect that is not true.  Once we have a larger sample of cases, including more where the initial analysis was not done pre-KSR, we will see more patents held invalid based upon obviousness.

*  A brief note on methodology:  this was not a thorough study and does not include cases that granted or denied injunctions without discussion.  For a more complete list of post-KSR decisions nationwide, go to the Fire of Genius.

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Brian Higgins at the Maryland IP Law Blog posted an analysis of significant willfulness decisions post-In re Seagate, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) -- click here for the post and click here for a subsequent post discussing Se-Kure Controls, Inc. v. Diam USA, Inc., No. 06 C 4857, 2008 WL 169029 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 17, 2008) (Cox, Mag. J.).  Of the eleven decisions Higgins identified, three were Northern District decisions and one was a Federal Circuit decision analyzing a Northern District case.  Here are my posts on the Northern District decisions:

• Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 05 C 5373, 2007 WL 4287503 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2007) (Coar, J.).
  
• Se-Kure Controls, Inc v. Diam USA, Inc.
  
• Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jan. 3, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).
  

As you can infer from the relatively small number of cases identified by Higgins, there remains a lot of law to be written about Seagate before the standard is well settled.  I suspect that within 18-24 months there will be a relatively large body of law, including numerous Federal Circuit decisions exploring the new standard's outlines.  Until then, patent litigants will face a degree of uncertainty regarding willfulness.  Of course, defendants will generally be glad to have some uncertainty in exchange for plaintiffs's higher willfulness hurdle.

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Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 05 C 5373, 2007 WL 4287503 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2007) (Coar, J.).*

Judge Coar granted defendant Sandoz’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss or in the alternative Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, dismissing plaintiff Abbott’s willfulness claims Abbott alleged that Sandoz willfully infringed Abbott’s patent related to an extended release antibiotic (clarithromycin, an erythromycin derivative which Abbott markets as Biaxin XL). At the time Sandoz entered the market with its generic version of Biaxin XL, the Federal Circuit had issued an opinion based upon an interlocutory appeal of a temporary restraining order, which included statements that Abbott’s patent was susceptible to invalidity and unenforceability argument. The Court held that Sandoz’s reliance on that opinion, regardless of the limited record it was based upon or its non-final nature was objectively reasonable, well above the In re Seagate objective recklessness standard.

* Click here for more on this case and related cases.

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Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 05 C 5373, 2007 WL 4287501 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2007) (Coar, J.).*

Judge Coar construed the claims of plaintiff Abbott’s patent related to an extended release antibiotic (clarithromycin, an erythromycin derivative which Abbott markets as Biaxin XL), denied defendant Sandoz’s motion for summary judgment of noninfringement and granted Abbott summary judgment regarding anticipation, obviousness and inequitable conduct.  Of particular interest, the Court held that the use of Markush group language – “selected from the group consisting of” – in the specification did not necessarily limit the construction of claim terms. The Court also noted that materiality of a reference in an inequitable conduct analysis was determined from the perspective of a reasonable examiner, not the patentee.

* Click here for more on this case and related cases.

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Here is some recent Northern District news:

• Judge Coar recently updated his case management procedures (click here to read them) to state that pursuant to Local Rule 5.2(e), parties are no longer to provide courtesy copies of electronically filed papers to Judge Coar's chambers, except for papers pertaining to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 or Local Rule 56.1 (summary judgment papers).
  
• Magistrate Judges Brown (Eastern Division -- Chicago) and Mahoney (Western Division -- Rockford) are both up for reappointment in early 2008.  Pursuant to federal law, the Court has established a citizen's panel to consider their reappointments.  Members of the bar, as well as the general public, are requested to forward comments regarding the reappointments no later than January 18, 2008, to:

Magistrate Judge Advisory Panel
c/o Mr. Michael W. Dobbins
Clerk of Court
U.S. District Court
219 South Dearborn St. -- Rm. 2050
Chicago, IL 60604

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RRK Holding Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 04 C 3944, Min. Order (N.D. Ill. Sep. 10, 2007) (Coar, J.).*

Judge Coar denied the parties’ damages motions in limine.* First, the Court held that defendant Sears, Roebuck & Co. (“Sears”) could have its damages expert Catherine Lawton testify regarding her analysis of a hypothetical September 2001 negotiation between the parties. Plaintiff RRK Holding (“RRK”) argued that the misappropriation began in March 2000, not when Sears began selling its product in September 2001. As a result, Sears contended that Lawton’s September 2001 hypothetical negotiation should not be allowed into evidence. But the Court held that the timing of the misappropriation was a question of fact for the jury and, therefore, allowed Lawton’s testimony.

Second, the Court held that Sears could introduce the 2003 sale of some of RRK’s assets for $17M as part of Sears’s damages case. The Court held that the value of the sale was relevant to RRK’s alleged injury based upon the alleged misappropriation.

Third, the Court held that RRK could introduce damages calculations including periods beyond the “head start” period (the time it would have taken for Sears to reverse engineer RRK’s combination tool). The head start period was disputed, preventing the Court from fixing a time for the period, and any alleged harm would be resolved by a jury instruction explaining how the jury should calculate damages relative to the head start period.

Finally, the Court denied RRK’s motion for sanctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927. RRK argued that Sears’s March 2007 production, two years after fact discovery closed, of documents dated 1999 was “unreasonable and vexatious” and should be sanctioned. But the Court held that Sears’s explanation that the documents were found when it replaced its litigation counsel and new counsel ran additional searches rendered the delay “negligen[t] and reckless[],” but not in bad faith. The Court, therefore, did not impose sanctions.

* Click here for a copy of the opinion and click here for more about this case in the Blog's archives.

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Kelley v. Chicago Park District, No. 04 C 7715, Slip Op. (N.D.Ill. Sep. 14, 2007) (Coar, J.).

Judge Coar ordered the parties to submit further briefing regarding whether plaintiff Chapman Kelley’s (“Kelley”) work of art “Wildflower Works” (“WW”) was copyrightable as a sculpture pursuant to the Copyright Act and the Visual Artists Rights Act (“VARA”). Kelley originally installed his WW in Chicago’s Grant Park in 1984 pursuant to a permit from the City of Chicago. WW was an installation of wild flowers in two elliptical shapes surrounded by gravel — click here for pictures from Kelley's website — that Kelley replanted and tended each year. Chicago periodically renewed the permit until 1994, when Kelley continued his WW pursuant to an oral permit renewal. Then in 2004, Chicago fenced off WW, effectively destroying it. Kelley then brought this suit alleging copyright infringement, violation of VARA and various state law claims.

The Court considered various issues relating to jurisdiction and the validity of the alleged oral permit renewal. But the Court held that it lacked sufficient information to resolve the issue of whether WW was protectable as a sculpture pursuant to the Copyright Act and VARA. The Court struggled with whether a growing, evolving planting of flowers could be considered a sculpture using common dictionary definition. But the Court also acknowledged the artistic value of arranging flowers and plants, which precluded a holding that WW was per se not a sculpture:

to do so would ignore such exquisite examples of living art as topiaries, which are created by clipping and trimming living plants, usually bushes, into exotic shapes.

This is an interesting issue. I appreciate the value of flower arrangements and the beauty of WW specifically, but calling a collection of spontaneously growing, changing plants a sculpture does not fit the traditional definition anymore than calling a football game (a particular arrangement of spontaneously moving living things) a sculpture does. It may be more akin to a choreographed ballet, but flowers cannot follow a pre-set script.

Update: The Court held a two-day bench trial in late September. A minute order indicated that the Court issued preliminary findings at the conclusion of the trial (which appear to have been favorable to Kelley based upon various accounts suggesting that Kelley won the trial), but then ordered the parties to: 1) brief certain issues (presumably including whether WW was copyrightable or otherwise protected by VARA); and 2) provide the Court with proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Those filings were delayed by settlement efforts which appear to have fallen through. The requested briefing is now set to be completed in mid-January with the Court’s decision to follow without further hearing. I will keep you posted on the outcome. But if you want more information on the case before early 2008, click here for the Final Pretrial Order which gives a sense of the disputed issues and the CV’s of the experts.

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RRK Holding Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 04 C 3944, 2007 WL 495254 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 14, 2007) (Coar, J.).

As promised last week, the jury instructions are now available -- click here for a copy.  Additionally, although the verdict form is not available electronically, the Court's minute order (click here for a copy) gave some additional detail.  The jury found for plaintiff RRK on each of eleven counts and awarded damages as follows:

Damages Award

RRK's Actual Losses	$11,664,105
Sears's Unjust Enrichment	$1,688,136
Punitive Damages	$8,011,344
Total Damages	$21,363,585

For more on this case, click here for the Blog's archives.

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RRK Holding Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 04 C 3944, 2007 WL 495254 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 14, 2007) (Coar, J.).

The Chicago Sun-Times is reporting that a jury returned a $21.5M verdict, including $8M in punitive damages, Monday for plaintiff RRK Holding Co. ("RRK") in its Illinois Trade Secret Act ("ITSA") suit against defendant Sears, Roebuck & Co. ("Sears").  RRK alleged that, pursuant to a nondisclosure agreement, it disclosed to Sears its plans for a next generation “combination tool” which consisted of a rotary saw, also called a spiral saw, which could be converted into a plunge router. But after negotiations broke down over price, Sears allegedly took RRK's plans and used them to make Sears's Craftsman "All-in-One" tool.  Sears has said it will appeal the verdict.  The Court's docket has not been updated yet with a verdict form or jury instructions, but I will post them when they become available, likely next week.

For more on this case, click here for the Blog's archives.

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Mullen v. Society of Stage Directors & Choreographers, No. 06 C 6818, 2007 WL 2892654 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 30, 2007) (Coar, J.).

Judge Coar granted in part defendant United Scenic Artists’ (“USA”) Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment (“DJ”) claims and denied all defendants’ motions seeking dismissal of plaintiffs’ defamation claim. Plaintiffs are the various production heads of the Chicago production of the musical “Urinetown!” (“Chicago Production”). The Chicago Production was performed pursuant to a license from Blue Dog Entertainment, LLC. But despite that license, plaintiffs each received a cease and desist letter from counsel for defendants (the heads of production of the Broadway Urinetown! production (“Broadway Production”) and their unions USA and the Society of Stage Directors & Choreographers (“SSDC”). The letter warned that plaintiffs willfully copied copyrighted aspects of the Broadway Production and attempted to pass off the Chicago Production as the award-winning Broadway Production. Defendants demanded an accounting of revenues from the Chicago Production in order to calculate damages. Defendants also held a press conference during which they publicly stated that the plaintiffs “plagiarized” the Broadway Production. Plaintiffs responded by filing suit seeking declaratory judgments that the Chicago Production did not infringe any of plaintiffs’ copyrights and that it was not Lanham Act passing off. And based upon the press conference, plaintiffs included a defamation claim.

The Court dismissed plaintiffs’ copyright infringement DJ claim against USA because USA held no copyrights related to Urinetown! or the Broadway Production. So, USA could not have filed a copyright infringement action against plaintiffs. The Court also dismissed plaintiffs’ Lanham Act DJ claim against USA. While USA may have been able to show the generalized harm necessary for prudential standing based upon the alleged harm to its members who produced the Broadway Production, it could not show the specific injury required for Article III standing, because that alleged injury was to its members not USA.

The Court, however, denied the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings regarding plaintiffs’ defamation claim. First, defamation claims do not trigger the Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) heightened pleading standards because they do not involve fraud or mistake. Second, defendants’ alleged wrongful accusation that plaintiffs plagiarized the Broadway Production is defamation per se because originality and integrity are core values of theatre:

It is beyond doubt that statements consisting of false accusations of plagiarism against professionals in industries where the measure of the quality of work centers on creativity, originality and integrity (i.e. – authors, journalists, artists, thespians, publishers, producers and directors of fine arts productions, etc.) are capable of imputing such persons lack ability or otherwise prejudice such persons in their professions.

Furthermore, the Court held that it was “absurd” to argue that “plagiarism” had an innocent meaning:

[Plagiarism] is not capable of any meaning that would not impugn Plaintiffs’ ability or not prejudice them in their profession.

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Minemyer v. R-Boc Reps., Inc., No. 07 C 1763, 2007 WL 2461666 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 2007) (Coar, J.).

Judge Coar denied individual defendant Timothy Grimsley’s (“Grimsley”) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Grimsley argued that all of his involvement in allegedly infringing plaintiff’s patented couplers was undertaken within the scope of his employment for defendant Dura-Line and, therefore, was protected by the fiduciary shield doctrine. But the Court disagreed. The parties provided conflicting evidence regarding whether Grimsley was an officer of Dura-Line and Grimsley’s level of control over Dura-Line’s coupler business. Additionally, the parties provided conflicting evidence regarding whether Grimsley was aware that Dura-Line’s couplers infringed plaintiff’s patents, but continued to market and sell them despite that knowledge, acts which would go beyond the scope of his employment because of his knowledge of their illegality. The Court, therefore, held that based on the current evidence the fiduciary shield doctrine was not available to Grimsley. But the Court acknowledged that further evidence may reverse that analysis and allowed Grimsley to refile his motion should discovery present that additional evidence.

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Central Mfg., Inc. v. George Brett, __ F.3d __, Slip Op. (7th Cir. Jul. 9, 2007).

The Seventh Circuit upheld Judge Coar's cancellation of plaintiff's "Stealth" mark for use with baseball bats.  The result is not that surprising in light of the fact that plaintiff had not been able to provide any evidence that it used the Stealth mark for baseball bats prior to defendant, and Hall of Famer, George Brett's and his company Brett Brothers Sports International's first sale of a Stealth bat in 1999 (plaintiff filed a mark application for Stealth in connection with baseball bats in 2001).  Additionally, according to the Seventh Circuit plaintiff is controlled by Leo Stoller who is, according to the Seventh Circuit, a "hyperactive trademark litigator."  The Seventh Circuit also discussed the frivolous nature of most of Stoller's cases:

In fact, Stoller's cases have generally proven so frivolous and wasteful of court resources that since this appeal was filed the Northern District of Illinois has enjoined him or any of his companies from filing any new civil action in the district's courts without first obtaining the court's permission.

 Stoller has appealed the Executive Committee's injunction, and the Executive Committee has already denied Stoller's first request to file a new case in the Northern District.

But the result is not what is most interesting about the Seventh Circuit's opinion.**  What is most interesting, is that the opinion is written in a manner that makes it sufficiently interesting and understandable for non-lawyers to read.  First, it starts with a two page discussion of George Brett's famous "Pine Tar Incident," in which a Brett home run that was the go-ahead run for his Kansas City Royals was canceled and the game lost for the Royals when Yankees manager Billy Martin pointed out to the umpire that Brett's bat had pine tar extending more than 18 inches, against Major League Baseball's rules.  The Seventh Circuit even cites YouTube clips (which have since been removed at the MLB's request) of broadcasts of the game.  And at page 13 of the opinion, the Seventh Circuit takes the rare, bold step of using an exclamation point in explaining that Central's actions in filing suit were "oppressive" and, therefore, warranted awarding attorneys fees and costs:

Central's actions qualify on all counts!

I am generally not a fan of the exclamation point in legal writing, but used in moderation it can be both effective and powerful.  And it creates an informality that makes the opinion more accessible to those without legal training, which Blog readers know I think is very important.

* You can read a copy of the opinion here and more about plaintiff's other Northern District cases in the Blog's archives.

** You can read more about the substance of the case and the baseball connection (including the fact that MLB took had the YouTube clips cited by the Seventh Circuit taken down) at the FileWrapper, the TTABlog, the Technology Law Update, and the Technology & Marketing Law Blog.

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Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 05 C 5373, 2007 WL 1549498 (N.D. Ill. May 24, 2007) (Coar, J.).

Judge Coar denied defendant Sandoz, Inc.'s ("Sandoz") motion to stay the Court's preliminary injunction pending appeal to the Federal Circuit pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(c).  The Court previously granted plaintiff Abbott's motion for a preliminary injunction (you can read more about that decision and related cases in the Blog's archives).  The PI enjoined defendant Sandoz from selling a generic version of Abbott's patented extended release antibiotic (clarithromycin, an erythromycin derivative which Abbott markets as Biaxin XL).  Sandoz argued that the PI should be stayed pending appeal because of conflicting Federal Circuit law regarding the Court's claim construction and because of the Supreme Court's KSR decision. 

First, Sandoz argued that two different Federal Circuit panels had issued differing rulings construing the claims at issue.  Judge Coar rejected this argument because the construction relied upon in the PI ruling was the Federal Circuit's second, broader claim construction.  The Court explained that the "only rational assumption" was that the second panel was aware of the constructions in the first, but relied upon something different in the record or identified a fact missed by the first panel.  Further, the Court predicted that the Federal Circuit would not retreat from its second opinion to its first, prior opinion.

Second, the Court held that the KSR decision did not change its analysis of Sandoz's likelihood of success on its obviousness argument.  The Court provided a detailed explanation of KSR and its reasoning, but differentiated the current case because the Court held that one of the limitations in the Abbott claims did not exist in Sandoz's cited combination of prior art references.  Because the references did not disclose one of the elements of the claims, whether or not the Court used a strict application of the Federal Circuit's teaching, suggestion or motivation test did not change the outcome of its analysis.  Both the Federal Circuit's and the Supreme Court's standards required that all elements be disclosed by the combined prior art references.

Finally, the Court held that Sandoz had not provided sufficient evidence that it would be irreparably harmed.  Sandoz argued that if it could not enter the market at the same time as other generics, which are not subject to PI's, pharmacists would be reluctant to later restock their shelves with Sandoz's generic version of the drug.  But the Court reasoned that the lure of generics is their prices, not their brand recognition, so Sandoz should have no trouble re-entering the market at a later date should it prevail.

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Stafford Trading, Inc. v. Lovely, No. 05 C 4868, 2007 WL 1512417 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 2007) (Coar, J.).

Judge Coar granted in part declaratory judgment plaintiffs' (collectively "Stafford") motion to dismiss and denied Stafford's summary judgment motion.  The Court dismissed defendants' fraud and unjust enrichment counterclaims after holding that they were preempted by the Illinois Trade Secret Act.  The Court also dismissed defendants' fraudulent concealment.  The material fact that Stafford allegedly failed to disclose was the opinion that Stafford owned the RIVAS electronic options trading platform outright.  But the Court held that an allegedly withheld opinion could not support a fraudulent concealment claim.

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Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 05 C 5373, 2006 WL 1141635 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 2007) (Coar, J.).

Judge Coar granted plaintiff Abbott's motion for a preliminary injunction, after having previously denied it a TRO.*  The PI enjoined defendant Sandoz from selling a generic version of Abbott's patented extended release antibiotic (clarithromycin, an erythromycin derivative which Abbott markets as Biaxin XL).  The Court held that Sandoz had shown a substantial likelihood of materiality and Abbott's intent to deceive the PTO  based upon Abbott's failure to disclose certain taste perversion data during prosecution.  But because Abbott abandoned the claims to which the taste perversion data was relevant of its own accord, the Court did not find the patent preliminarily unenforceable.  The Court explained its reasoning as follows:

Redemption is one of the core principles of the American ethos.  Thus in addition to being contrary to the spirit of Scribbs, Kimberly-Clark and the Code of Federal Regulation, it seems wholly inequitable to hold a patent to be invalid for fraudulent conduct in the prosecution of a claim that was withdrawn before actual prosecution had even begun.

The Court then made detailed, initial claim construction rulings and, based upon them, found a substantial likelihood of infringement.  The Court also considered Sandoz's invalidity arguments, but held that Sandoz had not proved a likelihood of success regarding its invalidity arguments.  The Court also held that the balance of hardships tipped in Abbott's favor because allowing Sandoz's generic product to remain in the market would necessarily take market share from Abbott.

In addition to its preliminary injunction stopping future product sales, the Court also required that Sandoz recall all of its existing product, so long as an adequate bond was set.

*  You can read more about the Federal Circuit decision in which the Federal Circuit overturned the Court's grant of a PI in a related case in the Blog's archives.  You can also read another take on this case at the Orange Book Blog.

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RRK Holding Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 04 C 3944, 2007 WL 495254 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 14, 2007) (Coar, J.).

The Court held that there was at least a question of fact as to whether the combination tool was maintained as a trade secret because: 1) plaintiff only disclosed the idea to defendant after receiving verbal assurances of confidentiality followed by a nondisclosure agreement; 2) plaintiff marked documents regarding the combination tool confidential; and 3) plaintiff presented evidence that both plaintiff’s and defendant’s combination tools enjoyed substantial sales upon their respective introductions to the market.

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Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., No. 06-1101, __ F.3d __ (Fed. Cir. 2007).

While this is not a Northern District case, it is relevant to the Blog because it is an appeal of a Northern District case and because it confirms Judge Coar's ruling (discussed here) that a preliminary injunction holding lacked preclusive effect in the related case Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 05 C 5373, 2006 WL 3718025 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 2006).  In this patent dispute plaintiff, Abbott Laboratories ("Abbott"), alleged that defendant's, Andrx Pharmacueticals ("Andrx") sale of a generic form of Abbott's patented extended release antibiotic (clarithromycin, an erythromycin derivative) which Abbott markets as Biaxin XL.  The Northern District held that Abbott had established a likelihood of success on the merits of its infringement claim and that Andrx had not established a likelihood that the patent would be held invalid.  As a result of those holdings, the Northern District issued a preliminary injunction.  In its appeal, Andrx argued that Abbott was precluded from obtaining a preliminary injunction because the Federal Circuit overturned a previous Northern District preliminary injunction for Abbott against another generic antibiotic producer Teva Pharmaceuticals ("Teva").  In that case, the Federal Circuit held that Teva raised a substantial question as to the validity of the claims at issue, sufficient to call Abbott's likelihood of success on the merits into question. 

The Federal Circuit, applying Seventh Circuit law, held that preliminary injunctions would be given preclusive effect only in the "rare instances" that the injunction raised an "insuperable obstacle" to plaintiff's success on the merits.  Because the Court did not find an insuperable obstacle to Abbott's success on the merits, the denial of a preliminary injunction against Teva had no preclusive effect in this case.  As a result, the Federal Circuit upheld the Northern District's preliminary injunction.

The Federal Circuit's reasoning appears to square with Judge Coar's reasoning in the Sandoz case.  In Sandoz, the Court held that preliminary relief holdings have no preclusive effect because they are made on an incomplete record, "inherently tentative" and based upon only "an estimate of the likelihood of success."  Despite the fact that the Federal Circuit's denial of the preliminary injunction lacked preclusive effect, however, the Court ultimately refused to reach a holding inconsistent with the Federal Circuit's without a "substantial showing" on a more complete record.  So, although the Court denied the TRO, it appeared to remain open to a preliminary injunction based upon a more complete record.

You can find more on the Federal Circuit's Andrx case at Patently-O and the Patent Docs.

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Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 05 C 5373, 2006 WL 3718025 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 2006) (Coar, J.).

Judge Coar denied plaintiff's, Abbott Laboratories ("Abbott"), motion for a temporary restraining order ("TRO") to prevent defendant, Sandoz, Inc. ("Sandoz"), from selling a generic version of Abbott's patented extended release antibiotic (clarithromycin, an erythromycin derivative which Abbott markets as Biaxin XL).  The Court had entered a TRO and, ultimately, a preliminary injunction preventing another party, Teva Pharmaceuticals ("Teva"), from selling a generic version of plaintiff's patented extended release antibiotic, but the Federal Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction.  The Federal Circuit held that Teva raised a substantial question as to the validity of the claims at issue, sufficient to call Abbott's likelihood of success on the merits into question. 

In the instant case, Sandoz argued that the Federal Circuit's prior ruling that there was a question regarding the validity of the claims-at-issue precluded any preliminary injunctive relief.  The Court held that rulings on preliminary relief have no preclusive effect because they are made on an incomplete record, "inherently tentative" and based upon only "an estimate of the likelihood of success."  Despite that ruling, however, the Court noted that "the practical effect of [the Federal Circuit's] holding still militates towards the denial of the TRO in the instant case."  The Court refused to reach a holding inconsistent with the Federal Circuit's without a "substantial showing" on a more complete record.  So, although the Court denied the TRO, it appears to have kept an open mind about a preliminary injunction based upon a more complete record.

*For another take on this case, check out the Orange Book Blog.

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Judges Bucklo, Coar, Gettleman, Kennelly and Lefkow are instituting a joint trial call in 2007 (the N.D. Ill.'s statement about it is here).  Each judge is contributing cases to the call, apparently at the judge's discretion.  The cases in the call will be tried in order by one of the five judges, although not necessarily the judge originally assigned the case.  Each trial is expected to last no longer than five days and the attorneys and parties for a case on the call are expected to be ready for trial, including producing witnesses, on 48 hours notice.  I suspect that the five day trial limit will remove the typical patent case, although plenty of trade secret, trademark and copyright cases could end up on the joint call.  The judges on the call also intend to use suggestions from the Seventh Circuit Bar Association Jury Project Commission to speed the trials (more on the Commission's recommendations here).

This practice will make the Northern District, at least for some cases assigned to the participating judges, more like the Eastern District of Virginia, which randomly assigns judges to each new motion or trial throughout a proceeding.  It may also make it harder to delay a trial, turning up the heat on pre-voir dire settlement negotiations.

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Crafting proposed jury instructions is one of the first steps when preparing for trial.  And one of the first steps in drafting those instructions is looking for pattern or sample instructions that the court has previously used or endorsed.  In order to help speed that process, I am adding a new Blog feature.  I have gathered the jury instructions that each of the Northern District judges identify on their respective  web pages as either form or model instructions.  Most have general civil instructions and a few have specific sample instructions for various types of IP suits.

This list should save you time when you are looking for model instructions, but I would like to make it even more useful. If you have a set of instructions used in a Northern District IP case send them to me and I will add those instructions to the list (either anonymously or with credit to the sender, at the sender's discretion). 

So, send me your jury instructions -- chicagoiplitigation@yahoo.com -- and the name of the judge that presided over the trial.  As I receive new instructions, I will add them to this post.  If I get a large response, I will do additional posts on the instructions or create a separate page where you can access the files.

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