Chicago IP Attorney & Lawyer : R. David Donoghue : Chicago IP Litigation Blog

Minemyer v. B-Roc Reps., Inc., No. 07 C 1763, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2009) (Cole, Mag. J.)*

Judge Cole granted summary judgment of invalidity based upon the §102(b) on-sale bar and denied summary judgment as to invalidity based upon §102(b) public use and obviousness.

                                                             Priority Date

Plaintiff argued that its pipe coupler patent was entitled to the priority date of its provisional application because the provisional application disclosed in the drawings the tapered threads at issue, although they were not described in the specification. The Court held that figures showing tapered threads would be sufficient, but that the figures did not show tapered threads. Plaintiff alleged that enlargements of the figures showed a 1% taper. But the Court held that the original drawing did not “convey” the tapered threads with "reasonable clarity.” Even the enlargement showed “no true tapers.” Because the provisional application did not disclose the taper, the patent’s priority date was its filing date.

                                                             On-Sale Bar

The Court held that plaintiff admitted he offered the patented couplers for sale more than one year before the filing date, also known as the critical date. Plaintiff also admitted both in interrogatory responses and at deposition that his invention had been reduced to practice at the time of the offer.  Plaintiff claimed that the use was experimental, but the court held that the claim was not properly supported by evidence in plaintiff’s Local Rule 56.1 statement of material facts.

                                                             Public Use Bar

The Court denied summary judgment based upon the public use bar. The alleged prior art device was asserted against other claims in defendants’ invalidity contentions, but not against the claim at issue, claim 12. Furthermore, the evidence of the alleged prior art coupler was provided by a witness that was not disclosed in defendants’ Rule 26 disclosures or their interrogatory responses. He was first identified in a subpoena at the end of fact discovery.

                                                             Obviousness

Defendant’s obviousness arguments were based upon the same prior art as the public use bar prior art. So, summary judgment was not appropriate for similar reasons. Additionally, defendants arguments were cursory and did not even cite case law.

*  Click here for more on this case in the Blog's archives.

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Shen-Wei (USA), Inc. v. Ansell Healthcare Prods., Inc., No. 05 C 6003, 2007 WL 2903184 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 28, 2007) (Guzman, J.).

Judge Guzman denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment of invalidity pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Defendant argued that plaintiffs sold medical gloves embodying the claims of their patent, U.S. Patent No. 6, 953,582 (the “’582 patent”), to a glove with a coating of a skin-soothing substance in July 1999, approximately two years before the ‘582 patent’s July 1, 2001 critical date. Furthermore, plaintiffs admitted that they sold patented gloves as early as July 1999 by failing to cite any contradictory evidence in their responses to defendant’s Local Rule 56.1 statement.

But plaintiffs argued that the ‘582 had a right to the filing date of its parent, U.S. Patent No. 6,274,154 (the “’154 patent”). The ‘154 patent only disclosed coating a glove with aloe vera. But plaintiffs argued that the ‘154 patent inherently disclosed skin-soothing substances other than aloe vera. Plaintiffs supported its arguments with testimony from the inventor and plaintiffs’ expert.

Because, among other reasons, defendant failed to support its denials of inherency with any facts, the Court deemed admitted, at least, structural inherency and inherency of theory. Because defendant admitted inherent disclosure, plaintiffs’ ‘582 patent had the critical date of its parent ‘154 patent – April 7, 1998. Plaintiffs’ admitted July 1999 sales of patented gloves, therefore, were not an on-sale bar.

Practice tip: When making or responding to Local Rule 56.1 statements, always support your statements or responses with evidence.

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Trading Technologies Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).*

Judge Moran granted in part plaintiff Trading Technologies’ (“TT”) motion for summary judgment regarding prior use and denied defendant eSpeed’s cross motion for summary judgment. TT argued for a March 2, 1999 critical date (one year before the March 2, 2000 filing of TT’s related provisional application). eSpeed argued that the provisional application did not fully describe the patented invention and that, therefore, the critical date was June 9, 1999 (one year before filing of TT’s parent application). The Court held that whether the provision application met the written description requirements was a question of fact for the jury. The Court, therefore, determined this summary judgment motion in the alternative, either if the jury found a March 2 or a June 9 critical date. eSpeed argued that various uses of TT’s software before March 2 constituted public use because trades were either completely or partially performed to test the software. But the Court held that this use of the software was only experimental and done solely for the purpose of making sure the software functioned properly. The trades that were initiated during the testing were canceled prior to completion, except in several discreet incidents where the users testified that they had intended to cancel the trades but forgot. eSpeed also argued that the software was reduced to practice before March 2. But the Court held that the software was not reduced to practice until March 2 based upon the developers’ testimony that they did not believe the software was fully functioning and were still testing it prior to March 2. The Court, therefore, granted TT summary judgment for pre-March 2 use of the software. 

The Court held that the March 2 to June 9 alleged use was a question of fact for the jury. eSpeed’s email, video and trading record evidence for the March 2 to June 9 period might constitute public use, but a question of fact remained.

Trial started in this case the week of September 10. Expect to see several more opinions in this case and its related cases (there are two weighty summary judgment opinions still in my queue, as well as several other smaller opinions and orders). Additionally, I have some other obligations, but am planning to blog some of the trial. Stay tuned.

*You can read much more about this case and related cases in the Blog's archives.

http://www.chicagoiplitigation.com/tags/trading-technologies/

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