Chicago IP Attorney & Lawyer : R. David Donoghue : Chicago IP Litigation Blog

Jones Day v. BlockShopper.com, No. 08 C 4572 (N.D. Ill.) (Darrah, J.).

• Consumer Law & Policy Blog -- considering the merits of the claims.
   
• [UPDATE]:  Las Vegas Trademark Attorney -- pointing out that individuals could avoid being the subject of a Blockshopper story by purchasing through a trust.
   
• Legal Blog Watch -- questioning the PR ramifications of the suit.
   
• [UPDATE]:  MediaPost -- noting that Blockshopper's Florida stories also run in the South Florida Sun-Sentinel based on a deal with the Tribune company.
   
• Techdirt

While I generally save my commentary for the opinions, there is one point that needs to be made.  Many bloggers are using an alleged quote from Judge Darrah (I did not hear it and have not seen a transcript of the hearing, so cannot confirm it) warning Blockshopper that defending the suit would be very expensive.  Unless the comment was made in a hostile or aggressive manner, which I very much doubt and which has not been suggested in the posts I have seen, that is simply a statement of legal reality.  Defending federal intellectual property cases has become expensive, very expensive.  And defense costs are a factor in the calculus of every defendant's business decisions about  a law suit.

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Jones Day v. BlockShopper.com, No. 08 C 4572, Order (N.D. Ill. Aug. 18, 2008) (Darrah, J.).*

Judge Darrah entered the parties stipulated temporary restraining order ("TRO").  Plaintiff Jones Day sued defendants, BlockShopper.com and two individuals allegedly associated with the website, for allegedly using plaintiff’s service marks and linking to plaintiff’s website in at least two articles that discuss Chicago real estate transactions of plaintiff’s associates. Plaintiff claimed service mark infringement, Lanham Act false designation of origin, Lanham Act dilution, and state law deceptive trade practices and unfair competition and sought a TRO – click here for the Blog's earlier post on the case.

The Court entered the parties' stipulated TRO, ordering defendants not to:

1. Use reproductions or imitations of plaintiff's service mark;
    
2. Use any content from or link to plaintiff's website; or
    
3. reference plaintiff in its headlines.

Defendants were also ordered to remove any website content already on the site that would violate the TRO if written after its entry. 

As you would expect, other blogs and mainstream media have noticed the case.  At Legal Blog Watch, Robert J. Ambrogi just wrote about the dispute (click here), noting my post and discussing an article by Lynne Marek that will appear in next week's National Law Journal -- click here (subscription required).  According to the NLJ story, plaintiff asked only $10,000 to settle the case, but defendants rejected the offer, explaining:

Bending to the law firm's demands to stop coverage of the firm's lawyers would strangle the company's business model of using public records and publicly available Internet information, he said. Blockshopper, founded by former newspaper industry professionals, considers itself a next generation media outlet entitled to First Amendment protections just like any other news organization, he said.

Ambrogi sums up the issue at the heart of the dispute well:

In this age of electronically enhanced transparency, this whole dust-up reflects a sentiment I encounter time and again: "We like our public records to be public -- just not too public.

*  Click here for the Order.

 

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Jones Day v. BlockShopper.com, No. 08 C 4572 (N.D. Ill.) (Darrah, J.).

Plaintiff Jones Day sued defendants, BlockShopper.com and two individuals allegedly associated with the website, for allegedly using plaintiff’s service marks and linking to plaintiff’s website in at least two articles that allegedly discuss Chicago real estate transactions of plaintiff’s associates. Plaintiff claims service mark infringement, Lanham Act false designation of origin, Lanham Act dilution, and state law deceptive trade practices and unfair competition – click here for the complaint. Plaintiff also moved for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) – click here for the TRO motion. In addition to the use of its service marks, plaintiff alleged that defendants used pictures of plaintiff’s associates that appear to be identical to pictures on plaintiff’s website.

 

A January 2007 Chicago Tribune article described defendants’ website as one that provides details surrounding Chicago-area real estate transactions using a Cook County list of home sales and internet research, noting that subjects of some posts do not like the stories:

 

But BlockShopper goes beyond the basic who-what-and-how-much, revealing tantalizing tidbits such as what the parties do for a living and what the sellers originally paid for the property, plus satellite maps and even photos of the property and the parties.

 

The TRO hearing was noticed for Tuesday, August 19. I will keep you updated as decisions are issued.

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Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., No. 2007-1998, -1348 Slip. Op. (Fed. Cir. June 17, 2008).

The Federal Circuit affirmed Judge Darrah's award of defendant's/appellee's attorney's fees – click here to read the Blog's post about the inequitable conduct opinion. Judge Darrah previously held and the Federal Circuit previously affirmed that plaintiffs committed inequitable conduct by, among other things: (1) falsely claiming small entity status; (2) failing to disclose material prior art to the PTO; and (3) failing to disclose related litigation to the PTO. Judge Darrah then held that the case was exceptional based upon plaintiff's inequitable conduct, filing of a frivolous suit, and litigation misconduct. Because the case was exceptional, Judge Darrah awarded defendants their attorney's fees.

The Federal Circuit agreed with plaintiffs, holding that an inequitable conduct finding did not require a case be deemed exceptional. But the Court held that Judge Darrah's findings were supported by evidence and, therefore, were within his discretion.

Judge Newman dissented, stating:

The court today promotes unexceptional trial procedures and non-culpable prosecution errors into an "exceptional case" of such severity as to warrant the award of attorney fees. That is not what the status, or precedent, or policy contemplates. I respectfully dissent.

 

Check the following blogs for more on this opinion:

• Filewrapper
  
• Patently-O

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Judge Darrah is seeking  a law clerk to begin June 2, 2008 for an unspecified term.  Email your application to DarrahLawClerk_ILND <at> ilnd.uscourts.gov  Judge Darrah requests that you send a resume, law school transcript (but not undergraduate transcript), three reference letters and a writing sample, preferably a full document, not just an excerpt.  Also, do not call chambers about your application.

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Nordstrom Consulting, Inc. v. M&S Techs., Inc., No. 06 C 3234, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2008) (Darrah, J.).*

Judge Darrah granted in part and denied in part the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff and counter-defendant (collectively "NCI") developed visual eye chart software that defendants and counter-plaintiffs (collective "M&S") incorporated into their visual acuity system which was sold to ophthalmalic distributors and end users. For a period of time, the parties worked together, selling and servicing product and sharing office space. But eventually the relationship broke down and NCI began selling a competing system. The parties charged each other with various IP claims and related state law claims. Each of the IP-related claims is addressed below.

Copyright Infringement

The Court held that NCI was the sole owner of the copyright and that its principal Nordstrom was the sole author of the copyrighted software. M&S argued that its principal Marino contributed to the software. But the Court held that Nordstrom wrote the software and Marino only offered direction and ideas.

The Court granted M&S summary judgment for all copyrighted software sales during the terms of the parties' agreements, but not as to sales outside of the agreement dates. And the Court granted summary judgment of non-infringement as to M&S's new software package "Sports Vision Testing" ("SVT"). NCI argued that SVT was an infringing derivative work. But NSI failed to produce evidence or expert testimony refuting M&S's evidence that it created its SVT software independent of NCI's software using clean room procedures.

Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA")

NCI alleged that M&S violated the DMCA by circumventing protections on a computer containing the software code in order to aid an NCI licensee of the code. Because the code was accessed to aid a licensee, NCI could not show that the password had been bypassed for the purpose of infringing NCI's copyright. The Court, therefore, granted summary judgment for M&S. 

The Court also denied summary judgment as to M&S's claim that NCI violated the DMCA by accessing a portion of M&S's computer system for which NCI lacked authorization and passwords. Summary judgment was not appropriate because the parties disputed whether NCI accessed the computers and whether the accessed material was copyrighted.

Lanham Act

The Court denied M&S summary judgment on NCI's Lanham Act false advertising claim and its related state law claims. M&S argued that it had not made any statements likely to cause customer confusion. But NCI countered that M&S stated in advertising that it had used the same system for five years. NCI argued that the statement must be false because M&S switched to its new SVT software during that time. Because of these disputed facts, summary judgment was not appropriate.

Illinois Trade Secret Act

The parties agreed that prior to terminating their relationship, NCI took various information from M&S's offices and computers. But the parties disagreed as to whether M&S took reasonable measures to protect the information's confidentiality. The parties agreed that M&S password protected the information. But NCI argued passwords alone were not enough and suggested other protections that allegedly could and should have been employed. The Court held that password protection alone was not per se insufficient. But the Court required more information regarding M&S's actions and the feasibility of alternative protections before it could rule on summary judgment.

The Court also denied summary judgment as to M&S's claim that NCI violated the DMCA by accessing a portion of M&S's computer system for which NCI lacked authorization and passwords. Summary judgment was not appropriate because the parties disputed whether NCI accessed the computers and whether the accessed material was copyrighted.

Lanham Act

The Court denied M&S summary judgment on NCI's Lanham Act false advertising claim and its related state law claims. M&S argued that it had not made any statements likely to cause customer confusion. But NCI countered that M&S stated in advertising that it had used the same system for five years. NCI argued that the statement must be false because M&S switched to its new SVT software during that time. Because of these disputed facts, summary judgment was not appropriate.

Illinois Trade Secret Act

The parties agreed that prior to terminating their relationship, NCI took various information from M&S's offices and computers. But the parties disagreed as to whether M&S took reasonable measures to protect the information's confidentiality. The parties agreed that M&S password protected the information. But NCI argued passwords alone were not enough and suggested other protections that allegedly could and should have been employed. The Court held that password protection alone was not per se insufficient. But the Court required more information regarding M&S's actions and the feasibility of alternative protections before it could rule on summary judgment.

*  Click here to read more about this case in the Blog's archives.

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Dime Group Int’l, Inc. v. Soyuz-Victan USA, LLC, No. 07 C 4178, 2008 WL 450825 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2008) (Darrah, J.).

Judge Darrah stayed plaintiff’s trademark infringement-related claims pending international arbitration in Russia pursuant to Ukranian law, as required by the parties’ liquor distribution agreement. Plaintiff argued that the arbitration clause was prohibitively expensive, but the Court held plaintiff’s proof was not sufficient. Plaintiff failed to show it was financially incapable of bearing the arbitration costs. All plaintiff offered was that it had a $13,000 operating loss in 2006. But, that was balanced by plaintiff’s $7 million in sales and good credit rating. Additionally, if plaintiff prevails, defendants would bear all arbitration costs.

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U.S. Gypsum Co. v. 3M Innovative Props. Co., No. 07 C 6381, 2008 WL 514976 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2008) (Darrah, J.).

Judge Darrah granted defendants’ (collectively “3M”) Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) motion to dismiss for lack of venue. Plaintiff United States Gypsum (“Gypsum”) filed this action asserting its own patent and seeking declaratory judgments regarding 3M’s patents, all to low dust construction compounds. Shortly thereafter, 3M filed a corresponding suit in the District of Minnesota. Prior to filing their suits, the parties were in extended negotiations regarding cross-licensing of their patents. Pursuant to those negotiations, the parties entered a confidentiality agreement (“Agreement”) requiring that all disputes “arising from the subject matter of this Agreement shall be brought . . . exclusively in [D. Minn.]” Because the express subject matter of the Agreement was the patents in suit and because the Agreement, negotiated by sophisticated parties, set D. Minn. as the exclusive jurisdiction, the Court dismissed the case in favor of 3M’s action filed in the D. Minn.

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Eva’s Bridal Ltd. v. Halanick Enter., Inc., No. 07 C 1668, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 2008) (Darrah, J.).*

Judge Darrah denied plaintiff’s (collectively “Eva’s Bridal”) motion to dismiss defendants’ (collectively “Halanick”) counterclaims, including Halanick’s claim for declaratory judgment that Eva’s Bridal abandoned its Eva’s Bridal mark.** Halanick’s allegations that Eva’s Bridal caused its mark to lose significance by “destroy[ing]” its good name and failing to stop Halanick’s use of the mark after the parties’ business relationship ended were sufficient to state a claim.

* Click here for a copy of the opinion.

** Halanick had non-IP claims related to the business relationship between the parties, but they will not be addressed here.

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WMH Tool Group, Inc. v. Woodstock Int’l, Inc., No. 07 C 3885, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 2007) (Darrah, J.).*

Judge Darrah denied defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiff WMH Tool Group’s (“WMH”) Lanham Act dilution claim and its related Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (“Consumer Fraud Act”) claim. WMH registered a trade dress for the color white on its woodworking and metal working products, sold under its JET brand. WMH alleged that its white trade dress was both famous and exclusively associated with WHM’s tools. WMH further alleged that defendant Woodstock International (“Woodstock”) diluted WMH’s trade dress by selling woodworking and metal working tools in WMH’s distinctive white color under Woodstock’s Shop Fox brand. Similarly, WMH alleged that defendant Grizzly Industrial (“Grizzly”) diluted WMH’s trade dress by selling woodworking and metal working tools in WMH’s distinctive white color under Grizzly’s Grizzly or Grizzly Industrial brands. 

Defendants argued that WMH did not state a claim for dilution because the complaint did not specify the date when WMH’s trade dress became famous and that defendants’ allegedly infringing sales began after that date. But the Court held that notice pleading did not require that WMH plead specific dates. It was enough that WMH pled that the trade dress had become famous and that defendants' infringement of the trade dress occurred after the fame was acquired.

Defendants also argued that WMH lacked standing to bring a Consumer Fraud Act claim because WMH was not a “person” or a “consumer” pursuant to the Act.  But the Court held that 815 ILCS 505/1(1)(c) defined “persons” to include business entities, and that a plaintiff need not be an actual consumer to bring a claim pursuant to the Consumer Fraud Act.

* Click here for a copy of the opinion.

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Medallion Products, Inc. v. H.C.T.V., Inc., No. 06 C 2597, 2007 WL 3085913 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 18, 2007) (Darrah, J.).

Judge Darrah dismissed defendant Broadcast Arts Group (“BAG”) for lack of personal jurisdiction, but held that the Court had personal jurisdiction over defendant ICC, Woodridge Specialty Products Corp. and James Timlin (collectively “ICC Defendants”). Plaintiffs argued that BAG’s tortious acts against plaintiffs, all Illinois residents, created personal jurisdiction based upon the effects test doctrine. But the Court held that the alleged tortious acts against were not sufficient for jurisdiction because BAG was a Florida resident and all of its allegedly tortious acts were performed in Florida or Pennsylvania, at the request of non-Illinois residents. 

The alleged tortious acts of the ICC Defendants, however, did create personal jurisdiction pursuant to the effects test doctrine. The ICC Defendants allegedly entered an agreement to develop, market and sell a counterfeit pet-stain removal product that was packaged in bottles using plaintiff’s “Urine Gone” logo. The alleged acts and resulting injury would have occurred in Illinois.

The Court also held that plaintiffs met the Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 pleading standards as clarified in Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, ____ U.S. ____, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007). So, the Court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ state law claims.

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Steiner Indus., Inc. v. Auburn Mfg., Inc., No. 07 C 668, 2007 WL 1834176 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 22, 2007) (Darrah, J.).

Judge Darrah denied declaratory judgment defendant Auburn Manufacturing’s (“Auburn”) motion to dismiss. Auburn argued that plaintiff’s (collectively “DJ Plaintiffs”) suit improperly anticipated Auburn’s complaint which alleged Lanham Act claims of false designation and false advertising, as well as related state law claims. Auburn filed its complaint in the District of Maine within a week of DJ Plaintiffs’ filing. Auburn alleged that DJ Plaintiffs’ use of “FM Approved” and “Made in the USA” in their catalogs and website advertising in connection with their welding blankets constituted false designation and false advertising. DJ Plaintiffs were aware of the allegations before they filed suit because, as part of an ongoing negotiation with plaintiffs, Auburn had provided plaintiffs a copy of its complaint. The Court acknowledged its discretion to dismiss the case in favor of Auburn’s later filed complaint, but did not dismiss the case. The two cases mirrored each other, so either could resolve the parties’ dispute. And because both cases were filed in federal courts, there was no concern that the DJ case would cause friction between federal and state courts. The deciding issue was whether the Maine Court could offer a full remedy. DJ Plaintiffs had a motion to transfer or dismiss pending before the Maine Court. In that motion, DJ Plaintiffs argued that the Maine Court lacked personal jurisdiction over two of the three DJ Plaintiffs – Steiner Industries, Inc. and Lab Safety Supply, Inc. DJ Plaintiffs, therefore, asked the Maine Court to transfer the case to the Northern District of Illinois or to dismiss the case.  The Court held that if the Maine Court transferred the case to the Northern District or dismissed Steiner and Lab Safety for lack of jurisdiction, those factors would weigh in favor of maintaining the DJ action. If, however, the Maine Court denied DJ Plaintiffs’ motion and held that it had jurisdiction over all DJ Plaintiffs, then the Main Court could more effectively decide the dispute than the Northern District. The Court, therefore, denied the motion to dismiss with leave to refile if the Maine Court finds it has jurisdiction over all DJ Plaintiffs and does not transfer the case to the Northern District.

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Murphy v. Murphy, No. 04 C 3496, 2007 WL 551576 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 15, 2007) (Darrah, J.).

Judge Darrah granted defendants summary judgment of noninfringement of plaintiff’s copyright. Plaintiff, a documentary filmmaker, filmed several residents of Chicago Housing Authority Projects. Plaintiff copyrighted his documentary film and, in early 1998, sent it to Oprah Winfrey at Harpo Productions. He requested that Winfrey and Harpo air his documentary on the Oprah Winfrey Show and that they forward it to a list of people in the film industry, several of whom are named defendants. Winfrey never responded to plaintiff and his documentary was never aired on her show. Shortly thereafter, defendants’ animated program, “The PJs” – telling the story of several fictional characters living in an urban housing project – aired on the Fox network. Plaintiff alleged that the defendants collectively infringed his copyrighted documentary by using scenes from it, as well as unique features of several of plaintiff’s subjects to make their characters.

The Court granted summary judgment for defendants for several reasons. First, after reviewing the evidence, including a comparison of clips from each work, the Court held that no reasonable jury could find that plaintiff’s documentary is substantially similar to The PJs. Plaintiff’s movie is a series of interviews of people, while The PJs is an animated program telling fictional stories using fictional characters. And to the extent that any similarities existed, they were in non-copyrightable elements of the video. For example, the Court noted that plaintiff could not hold a copyright in someone else’s appearance or how a building looks.

Second, plaintiff had not established that defendants had access to plaintiff’s film. Plaintiff only provided his film to Winfrey via Harpo Studios and plaintiff provided no evidence that she or anyone at Harpo had sent the film to any third party. Additionally, Harpo Studios never aired the film and plaintiff could not even provide any evidence proving that Winfrey or Harpo Studios had actually received the film.

Third, defendants presented uncontradicted evidence that they conceived of the characters and concept of The PJs before plaintiff sent his film to Winfrey and Harpo Studios. While The PJs began airing on Fox in 1999, defendants submitted evidence that they had drafted characters and plots for The PJs by December 1997.

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Judge Darrah, after finding each of the eleven patents-in-suit unenforceable for inequitable conduct, held that the suit was exceptional based upon the inequitable conduct, the filing of several frivolous claims which were previously dismissed and misconduct at trial, providing the Court the discretion to award attorney's fees.  The court also did a detailed analysis of defendants' Bill of Costs and awarded defendants some or all of their requested costs for service of process, court reporters, witnesses and experts, among others.  Of note, the Court held that expert fees, including the expert's hourly rates, were recoverable for time spent on expert reports, deposition and related preparation, and other time spent in responding to discovery, but not for time spent attending other expert depositions in the case.

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Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., __ F. Supp.2d __, 2006 WL 1891807, (N.D. Ill. July 5, 2006) (Darrah, J.).

After a six-day inequitable conduct bench trial, Judge Darrah held each of the eleven patents-in-suit unenforceable based upon the pro se plaintiff/inventor’s inequitable conduct before the Patent & Trademark Office (“PTO”). Plaintiff’s inequitable conduct included: submitting misleading affidavits to the PTO; improperly claiming small entity status; falsely claiming priority dates to avoid prior art; failing to disclose related litigation during prosecution; and failing to disclose material prior art to the PTO during prosecution. The Court, however, refused to hold that all patents related to the patents-in-suit were unenforceable under the unclean hands doctrine.

This opinion provides a detailed primer on the many types of misconduct that an applicant may commit before the PTO.  It also serves as a cautionary tale for inventors considering prosecuting patent applications pro se.

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