Trading Technologies v. eSpeed: Ambiguous Term Not Indefinite Because it can be Construed

Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jan. 2, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).*

Judge Moran denied defendants’ (collectively “eSpeed”) motion for judgment as a matter of law that plaintiff Trading Technologies’ (“TT”) patent was invalid for indefiniteness based upon the claim term “single action of a user input device” (“Single Action”). The Court previously construed Single Action as “an action by a user within a short period of time that may comprise one or more clicks of a mouse button or other input device.” Before trial, the Court used the definition to exclude evidence regarding a Tokyo Stock Exchange (“TSE”) software package that required double clicking, entering a quantity and pressing “enter” – click here for the Blog’s discussion of that opinion.

TT argued that the phrases “one or more clicks” and “short period of time” in the Court’s construction were indefinite because they did not sufficiently delineate the scope of the term. The Court noted that it did not need absolute clarity to define a claim term and held that the Single Action was sufficiently definite. The Court reasoned that it had been able to construe the term based largely upon the specification. And neither “one or more clicks” nor “short period of time” rendered the claim indefinite because the phrases are part of the definition, not the claim language. 

 

Additionally, the terms were designed to be less than precise because Single Action is defined from the perspective of the individual user, not objectively for all users. The Court gave the example that an experienced trader might set a double click as two clicks occurring within .3 seconds of each other – which would be a Single Action – while a novice trader might set a double click as any two clicks within one second of each other – which would be a Single Action for the novice, but not the experienced trader. Creating a more fixed definition based on an average user would import limitations into the claim.

Finally, the fact that the Court was able to determine that the TSE software did not require only a Single Action further proved that Single Action was sufficiently definite.

Click here to read much more about this case in the Blog’s archives and click here for a copy of this opinion.

Deliberate Vagueness and a "Somewhat Misleading" Motion Warrant Denial of the Motion, But Not Dismissal

Rosenthal Collins Group, LLC v. Trading Techs. Int'l, Inc., No. 05 C 4088, 2007 WL 844610 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 14, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).*

Judge Moran denied in part and granted in part declaratory judgment defendant Trading Technologies' ("TT") Rule 37 motion for sanctions.  The Court held that declaratory judgment plaintiff Rosenthal Collins Group's ("RCG") motion for summary judgment of invalidity was "somewhat misleading" and possibly "disingenuous," but refused to dismiss the case.  Instead the Court struck the declaration underlying RCG's motion, denied RCG's summary judgment motion with leave to refile a motion "supported by proper evidence" and awarded TT its costs and attorneys fees associated with the Rule 37 motion, as well as its software expert's fees.  RCG filed a summary judgment motion arguing that TT's patents covering "double click" methods for executing an electronic trade were anticipated by the alleged prior art system "Wit DSM" as embodied in a software package RCG presented to the Court and TT on a laptop and claimed was essentially the software as it is existed more than one year prior to TT's patent filing.  TT's software expert identified that several lines of code had been added to the software by RCG's declarant, and that the added code performed certain functionalities required for anticipation.  When RCG's declarant was deposed, he stated that he had not written the "double click" portion of the original code and could not be sure that it was in the alleged prior art version of the WIT DSM.  These facts did not warrant dismissal of the case or barring of any evidence because RCG and its declarant had not made any false statements, although they had made deliberately vague statements.  Furthermore, while RCG did not identify that the software package included added code which the Court found disturbing, it did include a comparison program on the laptop it provided to TT and the Court which would have identified the added code.

This case involves the several of the same patents as the other TT case before Judge Moran.