Court Allows One Reference to Defendants' Religion to Avoid Jury Bias

Posted on December 4, 2009 by R. David Donoghue

Lorilland Tobacco Co. v. Elston Self Service Wholesale Grocs., Inc., Case No. 03 C 4753, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2009) (Gottschall, J.).

Judge Gottschall ruled upon the parties’ motions in limine in this Lanham Act case regarding the alleged sale of counterfeit Newport cigarettes. Of particular interest, the Court denied in part plaintiff’s motion to exclude evidence of the religious belief of any party or witness. In order to ensure that “no anti-Muslim prejudice infect[ed] the jury’s deliberation," the Court allowed one defendant to state once that he was a Christian. The Court also noted that it would reconsider its order if plaintiff suggested a reasonable way for the Court to resolve the issue in voir dire.

The Court also agreed to read the jury a statement regarding the fact that the health of one defendant prevented his attendance at trial and that the jury should not hold his absence against him or consider it in their deliberations.

*  Click here for much more on this case in the Blog’s archives.

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Opinions Beyond Expert's Expertise Struck

Posted on June 17, 2008 by R. David Donoghue
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Elston Self Service Wholesale Groceries, Inc., No. 03 C 4753, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. May 13, 2008) (Ashman, Mag. J.).

Judge Ashman granted in part plaintiff Lorillard's motion to strike defendant Elston's expert report. Lorillard alleged that Elston, in violation of the Lanham Act and state law, knowingly bought and sold counterfeit Newport cigarettes. Elston offered an expert to opine on three general subjects: (1) customs and practices in the cigarette industry; (2) Elston's cigarette purchasing history; and (3) whether the prices of the allegedly counterfeit cigarettes would have made it obvious to Elston that the cigarettes were counterfeit.

The Court held that the expert's seven years in the cigarette industry and subsequent consulting were sufficient to qualifying him as an expert in the custom and practice of the industry. But the Court struck the remainder of the expert's opinions. His opinions regarding Elston's purchasing history were based solely on produced documents. And the jury could glean the same information from its review of the documents. The expert's opinions regarding Elston's subjective reaction to the price difference were struck because they were beyond both the expert's expertise and his personal knowledge.

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