Chicago IP Attorney & Lawyer : R. David Donoghue : Chicago IP Litigation Blog

The Seventh Circuit instituted a Commission to study the implementation of the ABA Jury Project.  The Northern District was heavily represented on the Commission.  The following Northern District Judges were members of the Commission:  Bucklo, Brown, Coar, Darrah, Denlow, Der-Yeghiayan, Gottschall, Holderman, Kennelly, Lefkow, Moran, Schenkier, St. Eve, and Zagel.  The Commission recently published its report -- click here to read it.  The report describes a two phase analysis.  In the first phase, district judges tested the following seven ABA Principles:

1.       Twelve-Person Juries;

2.       Jury Selection Questionnaires;

3.       Preliminary Substantive Jury Instructions;

4.       Trial Time Limits;

5.       Juror Questions;

6.       Interim Trial Statements by Counsel; and

7.       Enhanced Jury Deliberations.

Other Principles, such as juror notebooks and allowing jurors to take notes, were already in such widespread use that they were not tested.  Click here for the Phase One Project manual detailing the principles, the rationales and authority behind them, and suggested procedures.  Phase One resulted in questionnaires from 22 participating federal trial judges, 74 participating attorneys and 303 jurors from 38 trials that used one or more of the seven Principles.  Based upon the analysis of Phase One results and questionnaires, the Commission focused Phase Two on the following four Principles:

1.       Juror Questions;

2.       Interim Trial Statements by Counsel;

3.       Twelve-Person Juries; and

4.       Preliminary Substantive Jury Instructions.

These Principles were chosen because of Phase One popularity (78% of jurors reported that being able to ask questions increased their satisfaction with the process) and because of a desire to study the Principles more.  Click here for the Phase Two manual.

In Phase Two, 108 jurors from 12 trials employing one or more of the Phase Two Principles filled out questionnaires.  In addition, 12 attorneys and 4 district judges that participated also filled out questionnaires.  The results are interesting, but more importantly create the opportunity to powerfully impact the trial system across the Seventh Circuit in ways that benefit all of the stakeholders in the trial process -- the litigants, the jurors, the judge and the judge's chambers, and the litigators.

All four of the Phase Two Principles showed significant benefits to the trial process.  83% of jurors reported an increased understanding of the facts when allowed to ask written questions through a judge -- the questions were reworded to meet evidentiary rules.  And 75% of judges and 65% of attorneys thought the questions benefited jurors.  Similarly, preliminary substantive jury instructions were found to improve trials by jurors (80%), judges (85%) and attorneys (70%).  And the same was true for interim statements to the jury -- jurors (80%) and judges (85%).  Finally, twelve-person juries were found not to harm efficiency, while increasing juror diversity.

Each of the four Phase Two Principles, as well as several of the additional three Phase One Principles deserve more attention and analysis.  So, over the next several weeks I will provide follow up posts discussing the findings of those Principles in greater detail.  I will start with the idea of juror questions, which I find particularly important, later this week or early next.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

Tuthill Corp. v. ArvinMeritor, Inc., No. 07 C 2758, 2008 WL 4200888 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 5, 2008) (Gottschall, J.)

Judge Gottschall denied declaratory judgment (“DJ”) defendant ArvinMeritor’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. ArvinMeritor sent DJ plaintiff Tuthill Corp. a letter alleging that Tuthill infringed a group of patents to recreational vehicle suspension systems (the “RV patents”). Tuthill responded that its product did not infringe, that the patents were invalid, and that the accused products were not in production yet. Tuthill alleged that the parties had continuing discussions regarding the RV patents. ArvinMeritor claimed that the discussions went dormant as to the RV patents after it received Tuthill’s letter. Tuthill filed this suit after its accused products were put on the market. The Court held that regardless of whether the discussions went dormant, Tuthill’s claim met the Supreme Court’s MedImmune standard, as defined in the Federal Circuit’s SanDisk opinion. And ArvinMeritor never dissolved the controversy by providing Tuthill a covenant not to sue.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

Little Tikes Co. v. Kid Station Toys, Ltd., No. 08 C 1935, 2008 WL 1805379 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 18, 2008) (Gottschall, J.).

Judge Gottschall denied plaintiff Little Tikes' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO") to prevent defendant Kid Station Toys, Ltd. ("Kid Station") from selling Kid Station electric toys using Little Tikes' trademarks. From 2003 until February 2008, the parties had a license agreement ("Agreement") pursuant to which Kid Station sold its electric toys using the Little Tikes trademarks. In February 2008, Little Tikes canceled the Agreement pursuant to a provision allowing it to do so for, among other reasons, unsafe toys. Kids Station allegedly had a toy cellphone recalled because it was a potential choking hazard. Kids Station disputed the validity of the termination and continued selling its toys using the Little Tikes trademarks.

The Court held that Little Tikes had shown sufficient likelihood of success on the merits. Its trademarks ownership was undisputed and its success regarding the validity of its Agreement termination was "better than negligible." Additionally, in the parties' Agreement, Kids Station stipulated to Little Tikes' irreparable harm.

But the Court held that Kid Station would be irreparably harmed by a TRO because it would not be able to meet its customer obligations, which would be a serious blow to its business. And, the Court held that Kid Station's irreparable harm from a TRO outweighed Little Tikes' irreparable harm without a TRO. While Kid Station may not be able to recover its customers, Little Tikes had already approved Kid Station's existing toys and could recover royalties for any sales. The Court, therefore, denied the TRO.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

Murata Mfg. Co., Ltd. v. Bel Fuse, Inc., No. 03 C 2934, Order (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 2008) (Gottschall, J.).*

Judge Gottschall denied plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion without prejudice for failure to comply with both Local Rule 56.1 and the Court’s Standing Order — the Standing Order further explained that each short, numbered statement of fact required by Local Rule 56.1 should contain one fact and no attorney argument. Despite Local Rule 56.1’s clear requirements and the Standing Order’s directive to strictly comply with Local Rule 56.1, the Court held that nearly one-third of plaintiff’s 145 statements of fact did not comply with the rules:

• Many were long;
  
• One contained no facts;
  
• Several focused on an expert’s methodology instead of his results; and
  
• The rest contained inferences, argument, or legal conclusions.

The Court explained that the case’s complexity required strict adherence to Local Rule 56.1:

The court simply does not possess the resources to comb through the parties’ statements of fact in an attempt to sift out usable fact from impermissible argument or inference. … The Standing Order and LR 56.1 are composed in plain English and their meaning is clear; the court properly expects experienced and sophisticated attorneys to adhere to them strictly, particularly given the complex and sophisticated nature of this litigation.

The Court, therefore, used its discretion to deny plaintiff’s summary judgment motion without prejudice for not complying with Local Rule 56.1 and the Standing Order.

Practice Tip: I write this tip frequently, but it merits repetition.** Strict compliance with Local Rule 56.1 is difficult, time consuming, and it goes against many lawyers’ natures to write facts devoid of argument. But strict compliance is the best, and maybe only, way to win, or defeat, summary judgment in the Northern District. And if you write your Rule 56 statements well, you make the Court’s job easier, which can only help your case.

*  Click here to read more about this case in the Blog’s archives and here for the order.

**  Click here to read about other Local Rule 56.1 opinions. 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

Murata Mfg. Co., Ltd. v. Bel Fuse, Inc., No. 03 C 2934, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 2008) (Gottschall, J.).*

Judge Gottschall granted plaintiffs’ motion to strike defendants’ allegedly new reverse doctrine of equivalents non-infringement argument, which defendants withdrew in response to plaintiffs’ motion. But the Court denied the motion as to all other allegedly new arguments and as to defendants’ supporting affidavits. The Court held that defendants’ non-infringement arguments were sufficiently set out in their timely expert reports.

The Court also held that defendants’ expert affidavits, submitted with their summary judgment response briefs, were proper. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) specifically permits use of affidavits as support for summary judgment arguments. And defendants’ expert affidavits met the requirements for expert affidavits:

• The experts supported their conclusions by showing their reasoning; and
• The methodology met Daubert standards.

Finally, it did not matter that discovery was closed and that plaintiffs, therefore, would not be able to test the affidavits in a deposition. Plaintiffs cited no authority for the proposition that post-discovery affidavits were not permitted.

*Click here for more on this case in the Blog’s archives.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

Junction Solutions, LLC v. MBS Dev., Inc., No. 06 C 1632, 2007 WL 4234091 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 20, 2007) (Gottschall, J.).*

Judge Gottschall dismissed defendant’s Lanham Act false representation and Consumer Fraud Act claims.** Both claims were based on letters allegedly sent by plaintiff to a third party containing false statements about defendant. The Court dismissed the Lanham Act claim because the allegedly false statements were not made in plaintiff’s marketing materials and were not about defendant’s products. Similarly, a letter to one third party was not the general commercial communication required by the Consumer Fraud Act.

* Click here for more on this case in the Blog’s archives.

** The Court also considered other non-IP claims.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

Junction Solutions, LLC v. MBS Dev., Inc., No. 06 C 1632, 2007 WL 4233995 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 20, 2007) (Gottschall, J.).*

Judge Gottschall denied defendant’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) motion to dismiss plaintiff’s trade secret misappropriation complaint based upon the parties’ prior settlement agreement and resulting dismissal with prejudice by the District of Colorado. While the alleged misappropriation was the same — defendant employees leaving plaintiff to start their own competing software company — the use of the trade secrets was different. In the Colorado case, defendants allegedly harmed plaintiff by starting a competitor using plaintiff’s trade secrets. In this case, the alleged harm was developing competing software, after the Colorado settlement and dismissal. Claim preclusion, therefore, did not apply. Issue preclusion did not apply because the Colorado court did not make any substantive final judgments. The settlement agreement could have barred plaintiff’s claim, but the agreement’s release expressly excluded claims arising after the agreement’s effective date.

* Click here for more on this case in the Blog’s archives.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

Tamburo v. Dworkin, No. 04 C 3317, 2007 WL 3046216 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 2007) (Gottschall, J.).

Judge Gottschall granted defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs sell a dog breeding and pedigree software program and sought, among other things, a declaratory judgment that certain allegedly factual information (date of birth, gender, parent’s names, titles, color, medical information, etc.) included in its pedigree database was not copyrightable and, therefore, could not be infringed by plaintiffs. Defendants either offer allegedly competing software or are dog breeders who use such software. The Court held that it lacked general or specific jurisdiction over each of the defendants. There was no general jurisdiction because plaintiffs identified, at most, minimal interactions with and sales to Illinois residents. And defendants various websites were not sufficiently targeted to Illinois to alone create general jurisdiction. The Court similarly found that it lacked specific jurisdiction. Of particular interest, the Court held that defendants’ posts to internet chat groups and message boards could not create specific jurisdictions. The posts allegedly accused plaintiffs of theft and trafficking in stolen goods, among other things. The Court held that, while the Seventh Circuit had not addressed the issue or expressly adopted the Zippo sliding scale analysis, posts to internet chat rooms and message boards would fall below passive websites, which make up the bottom of the Zippo scale. Defendants are not alleged to own the chat rooms or to use them to transact or target business within Illinois. The Court reasoned that a holding that specific jurisdiction was created by postings to chat rooms would make jurisdiction boundless because the chat rooms have no geographic restrictions.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

Trading Techs. Int'l., Inc. v. GL Consultants, No. 05 C 4120, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2007) (Gottschall, J.).*

Judge Gottschall denied defendant GL Trade SA's ("GL SA") motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, with leave to refile after completion of jurisdictional discovery.  GL SA is a French company located in Paris.  GL SA does not have an office or any assets in Illinois, but it does have a subsidiary, defendant GL Americas, Inc. ("GL Americas").  GL Americas maintains a regional office in Chicago.  The Court noted that despite three rounds of briefing on jurisdiction, neither party "provided anything of substance to the court."  Plaintiff Trading Technologies ("TT") treated GL SA's subsidiary GL Americas as GL SA, and had not submitted evidence of GL SA's specific contacts with Illinois.  GL SA submitted several declarations, but none sufficiently clarified that GL SA did not have minimum contacts with Illinois.  As a result, the Court held that it lacked sufficient evidence to rule upon the motion, and granted TT's motion for jurisdictional discovery.

After ruling on the motions, the Court offered its jurisdictional analysis as a "framework" for the issues the parties should address through the discovery process.  First, the Court pointed out that neither party had detailed GL SA's specific contacts with Illinois.  Neither party identified which software products were GL SA products and which were GL Americas products.  Furthermore, neither party identified any sales of GL SA or GL Americas products to Illinois consumers.  The Court noted that if none of the GL SA products at issue were sold in Illinois, the Court would not have specific jurisdiction over GL SA.  And if there were sales to Illinois consumers, discovery was still required to show whether GL SA had a purpose and intent to serve the Illinois market.  Finally, the Court noted that TT must make its case for the Court's jurisdiction over GL SA based upon GL SA's actions, without imputing GL America's actions or contacts to GL SA.

*More analysis of opinions from this case and the various related TT cases, can be found in the Blog's archives. 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

Junction Solutions, LLC v. MBS DEV, Inc., No. 06 C 1632, 2007 WL 114306 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 9, 2007) (Gottschall, J.).

Judge Gottschall denied defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's, Junction Solutions, trade secret and tortious interference case for lack of venue and denied plaintiff's motion to remand the case to Cook County Circuit Court, from where defendants removed the case.  Individual defendants, Jeffrey Ernest, Mitch Tucker and Kenneth Paul, were plaintiff's employees and helped it develop it its Junction Multi-Channel Distribution Software ("JMCD Software").  Shortly after developing the JMCD Software, the individual defendants left Junction Solutions and joined its competitor MBS DEV.  MBS DEV then began marketing software that competed with the JMCD Software.  Junction Solutions sued MBS DEV in the District of Colorado in 2004.  The parties eventually settled that case, a settlement which was also signed by the individual defendants.  In 2006, MBS partnered with Iteration2 and again began planning to market a software product very similar to the JMCD Software.  In response, plaintiff filed the instant suit in Cook County Circuit Court and defendants removed it to the Northern District.

Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff's claims arguing that the suit was governed by the prior case's Settlement Agreement which retained exclusive jurisdiction and venue in the District of Colorado.  The Court, however, held that Judge Figa's, the District of Colorado judge, ruling that the Northern District case did not arise from the Settlement Agreement collaterally estopped defendants' argument.  Because the District of Colorado was not the exclusive jurisdiction and because defendants had not argued there was any other issue with the Northern District's venue, the case was not dismissed.

The Court also dismissed plaintiff's motion to remand the case to Cook County Circuit Court arguing that the individual defendants' employment agreement required that any disputes be litigated in Cook County.  But the Court held that the various employment agreements were extinguished by the Settlement Agreement.  As a result, the Northern District was an acceptable venue.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

Murata Mfg. Co., Ltd. v. Bel Fuse Inc., __ F. Supp.2d __, 2006 WL 2176241 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 28, 2006) (Gottschall, J.).

This detailed claim construction ruling demonstrates several useful practice tips. First:  work with opposing counsel upfront to determine which terms are actually in dispute. The parties’s initial briefing sought construction of nineteen terms, but when the Court required supplemental briefs post-Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the parties limited their briefing to only seven terms. This highlights the value of sitting down with opposing counsel before claim construction to identify the terms that are actually disputed.  Of course, this requires two reasonable parties represented by reasonable counsel, but you are better off at least trying. It is embarrassing to counsel and expensive for the client to learn, upon receiving the opposing brief, that a term that you spent hours, dollars, and valuable pages briefing is not actually in dispute. And of course, it is frustrating for the Court.

Second:  make clear to the Court why you dispute a particular term, especially if the competing constructions are similar. The parties’s proposed definitions of “modular jack” appeared to the Court to have no material difference. If you argue for subtle variations in definitions, explain why the distinction matters. The Court will be more likely to spend time on the construction and will be less likely to gloss over a seemingly insignificant difference between the competing constructions. 

Finally, the Opinion also contains an interesting legal ruling. Defendant argued that the wire referenced in “wire on the printed board” must be a “printed” wire, as opposed to a “discrete” wire, because the preferred embodiments teach only printed wires. The Court, however, held that the wire could be either printed or discreet. The Court found that the specification did not exclude the use of discrete wires although it did not mention them. The Court noted that the specification states that the claimed invention includes variations of the preferred embodiments that would be known to those of ordinary skill in the art. And because the use of discrete wires was also known, the claim term was not limited to printed wires.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (1)
• Trackbacks