Chicago IP Attorney & Lawyer : R. David Donoghue : Chicago IP Litigation Blog

Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Johnson Controls Interiors LLC, No. 2007-1314-1467, Slip Op. (Fed. Cir. Feb. 19, 2008).

The Federal Circuit reversed Judge Moran’s construction of “binary code” and, therefore, reversed the limited preliminary injunction entered by the Northern District - click here and here for the Blog’s posts regarding the injunction. The Northern District construed “binary code” as a code represented by two values, but not necessarily a binary number – click here and here for the Blog’s posts regarding the Northern District’s claim and construction opinions. The Federal Circuit praised the Northern District’s claim construction analysis, but reversed the construction:

The district court commendably strove to follow this court’s rules for claim construction. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318-19. In this regard, the trial court weighed the intrinsic evidence along with the extrinsic evidence and properly sought to avoid importing a limitation from the specification into the claims. See id. Nonetheless, this court discerns that the ‘544 patent specification gives particular limiting meanings to the language in the claims.

The Federal Circuit held that “binary code” required a binary (or base two) number. Otherwise, any values would meet the limitation because all values, whether in base two, three, the more standard ten or any other, are represented by computers using two values – 1 and 0. Because the revised claim construction called into question the Northern District’s likelihood of success analysis, the Federal Circuit reversed the preliminary injunction.

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Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Lear Corp., No. 05 C 3449, 2007 WL 1238908 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 2007) (Moran, J.).

Judge Moran denied defendant Lear's motion to stay the Court's preliminary injunction pending appeal to the Federal Circuit,* but did allow third party General Motors ("GM") to intervene of right and modified the PI to limit harm to defendant and GM.  In a March 30, 2007 opinion and order, the Court granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, preventing defendant from marketing and selling its garage door opener transmitters based upon the Court's prior claim constructions (these opinions are available in the Blog's archives).  The Court held that Lear could not show a likelihood of success on the merits, in part because the Court's "Markman decision and subsequent reconsideration dealt an enormous blow to [Lear's] case."  The Court acknowledged that while plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm without the PI, both Lear and GM could suffer irreparable harm because of the PI.  In order to resolve the irreparable harm issue, the Court revised the PI to exempt Lear's sales to GM.  Because GM was Lear's only client and because the exemption allowed GM to continue sourcing Lear's product  the revised PI would remove harm to GM and substantially reduce Lear's harm.  While Lear would not be able to add new customers, it would not have to idle its related workers and factories because Lear would not lose any customers.  Because the removal of GM sales from the PI substantially limits Lear's potential harm, the Court denied Lear's motion, supported by GM, to increase the bond from $10,000,000 to $50,000,000.

While GM was not a party to the suit, the Court, in a footnote, allowed GM to intervene of right pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) for the limited purposes of arguing for an exemption from the PI or a stay of it and to seek a higher injunction bond. 

*  Lear has already appealed the PI and the claim construction decision.

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Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Lear Corp., No. 05 C 3449, 2007 WL 1017751 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2007) (Moran, J.).

Judge Moran granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, preventing defendant from marketing and selling its garage door opener transmitters.  Relying upon its two prior claim construction decisions (which can be found in the Blog's archives), the Court first determined that plaintiffs had proven a likelihood of success on its infringement claims.  Then the Court considered plaintiffs' irreparable harm claims.  The Court denied plaintiffs' argument that its showing of a strong likelihood of success creates a presumption of irreparable harm.  Citing eBay, Inc.  v. Merc Exchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006), the Court held that the Supreme Court limited the automatic presumption of irreparable harm based upon infringement.  Instead, the Court determined that plaintiffs' had shown that they were irreparably harmed because defendant's sales had eroded its prices and strained its customer relations.

Because defendants entered no declarations or affidavits detailing its loss of revenue, sales or good will should a preliminary injunction be entered, the Court ruled that the balance of hardships tipped in plaintiffs' favor based upon its irreparable harm evidence.  Finally, the Court noted that there is a public interest in protecting valid patents.  Based upon these findings, the Court issued a preliminary injunction and required plaintiffs to post a $10,000,000 bond pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 (c).

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Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Lear Corp., No. 05 C 3449, 2007 WL 551579 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2007) (Moran, J.).

Judge Moran granted in part defendant's motion for reconsideration regarding the Court's construction of "binary code."  In its prior claim construction opinion -- discussed here -- the Court defined "binary code" and "trinary code generator," among other terms.  In its discussion of its "binary code" construction, the Court explained that the claims do not limit binary code to a binary number and, therefore, the term encompasses "other numerical and character languages, including trinary code."  Defendant argued that binary code could not be defined as trinary code and that, therefore, the Court should modify its construction to make clear that trinary code cannot be part of binary code.  The Court agreed with defendant that binary code cannot encompass trinary code and, therefore, clarified its explanatory sentence.  The Court explained that binary code could not include trinary code, but that it could include trinary numbers.  But because the Court's actual construction did not mention trinary code, it declined to revise the construction.

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