Chicago IP Attorney & Lawyer : R. David Donoghue : Chicago IP Litigation Blog

Integrated Cards, L.L.C. v. McKillip Industries, Inc., No. 06 C 2071, 2008 WL 3286981 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 8, 2008) (Kendall, J.).

Judge Kendall denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment of laches and equitable estoppel, and set a bench trial on the two defenses. Plaintiff charged defendant with infringing its patent covering a card (such as an ID card) integrated with a letter – Illinois attorneys get their ARDC cards in a similar form.

Defendant made and sold versions of the accused product for at least nine to ten years. Defendants argued that plaintiffs had actual constructive knowledge of the accused product beginning in 1998 or 1999, longer than the six years before the filing date required for a presumption of laches pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 282. That presumption would have shifted the burden of proof from defendants to plaintiffs.

Defendants alleged plaintiffs’ knowledge was based upon various conversations, working relationships and trade show attendance. But the Court held that plaintiffs raised material questions of fact as to each communication or trade show. The Court did, however, note that it had doubts about some of plaintiffs’ testimony explaining their lack of knowledge from trade shows. But on summary judgment, the Court would not make credibility determinations against plaintiffs, the non-moving party.

Because the Court did not grant summary judgment as to the presumption of laches, defendants retained the burden of proof. And the Court held that because of defendants’ burden and because the parties disputed whether defendants were prejudiced by plaintiffs’ alleged delay in filing suit, summary judgment was not appropriate.

The Court also denied summary judgment of equitable estoppel, relying upon its laches reasoning. And the Court set a bench trial on laches and inequitable conduct to be held before the liability trial.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

Fernandez Innovative Techs., LLC v. General Motors Corp., No. 07 C 1397, 2008 WL 2168843 (N.D. Ill. May 23, 2008) (Kendall, J.).

Judge Kendall construed the claims of plaintiff's U.S. Patent No. 6,963,899 related to vehicle telematics – systems like the accused products Onstar and Lexus Link. Construction of the two terms were of particular note:

Real Time

Through the claim construction hearing the parties agreed that "real time" meant continuous. But after the hearing, plaintiff filed a motion arguing that real-time meant "contemporaneous." The Court allowed defendants a responsive submission, and then adopted plaintiffs' construction because it comported with the intrinsic evidence and dictionary definitions better than defendants' construction did.

Selects and Downloads

The Court held that neither party's construction of "selects and downloads" was consistent with the agreed upon construction of related term "selects and sends." The Court, therefore, gave the parties fourteen days to meet and confer, and then either submit an agreed upon construction, or individual revised constructions.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

Matteo v. Rubin, No. 07 C 2536, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Dec. 3, 2007) (Kendall, J.).

Judge Kendall denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s copyright infringement and related state law claims. Plaintiff photographed defendant’s daughter’s wedding pursuant to a contract between plaintiff and defendant’s wife. Defendant was allegedly unsatisfied with plaintiff’s photographs and, therefore, allegedly created numerous website regarding plaintiff’s photographs including defamatory comments about both plaintiff and his photographs. The Court held that plaintiff stated a claim for copyright infringement because he pled that he owned copyrights in his photos and that defendant infringed those copyrights by posting the pictures on websites. Plaintiff was not required to plead that defendant received any economic benefit from his alleged infringement. Additionally, plaintiff did not have to register his copyright before defendant’s allegedly infringing acts. Finally, the Court held that defendant’s fair use defense was not grounds for dismissal. Fair use is a factual inquiry best resolved on summary judgment or at trial.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (1)
• Trackbacks

Krueger v. TradeGuider Sys., LLC, No. 07 C 6261, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Nov. 27, 2007) (Kendall, J.)*

Judge Kendall granted plaintiff Todd Krueger’s (“Krueger”) motion to remand this breach of Employment Agreement (“Agreement”) suit to Cook County Circuit Court. Krueger originally filed his Complaint in Cook County Circuit Court. Defendants (collectively “TradeGuider”) remanded the case to the Northern District, arguing that Krueger’s claim for breach of the Agreement, which governed his employment as TradeGuider’s CEO, was a federal copyright claim. TradeGuider reasoned that determining whether it had breached the Agreement required a determination of whether Krueger’s works were works for hire. The Court cited the Seventh Circuit’s narrow view of copyright preemption for contract claims – generally a contract involving copyrights is of a different scope than the copyrights because the contract is a private agreement between parties and a copyright is a right against the world. The alleged breach, therefore, was not essentially a copyright claim because it included rights beyond the copyright. Additionally, the Court reasoned that there was no evidence that suggested any copyright law would have to be interpreted to construe the contract or rule upon the alleged breach.

*Click here for a copy of the opinion.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., No. 05 C 1171, 2007 WL 2875232 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 28, 2004) (Kendall, J.)

Judge Kendall granted plaintiff’s motion to dismiss its Lanham Act case with prejudice and awarded defendant its costs but not its fees pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). The Court held that attorney’s fees were not warranted because the case and its dismissal after substantial fact discovery were not exceptional. Plaintiff dismissed its case because of two significant events which plaintiff believed reduced its likelihood of success.

            First, during discovery Congress passed the Trademark Dilution Revision Act (“TDRA”)* which changed the definition of “famous” such that fame within a niche market was no longer sufficient for dilution. Plaintiff was not certain it could prove fame outside its market. Second, defendant changed the trade dress, and particularly the color scheme, of its accused SKIL line of power tools. Plaintiff believed that defendant’s new trade dress was less similar to plaintiff’s and, therefore, plaintiff’s case was more difficult to prove. The Court accepted plaintiff’s reasoning and, therefore, held that the case was not exceptional. The Court did, however, award costs, which plaintiff had originally agreed it would pay.

* For more on the TDRA, click here for the Seattle Trademark Lawyer’s coverage of the TDRA this week in honor of the TDRA’s first anniversary.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

PSN Illinois, LLC v. Ivoclar Vivadent, Inc., No. 04 C 7232, 2006 WL 3523760 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2006) (Kendall, J.).

Judge Kendall denied plaintiff's Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 motion for reconsideration of the Court's prior ruling (discussed in the Blog's archives) construing the claims of the patent at issue and granting summary judgment of noninfringement on behalf of defendant Ivoclar Vivadent, Inc. ("Ivoclar").  The Court denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration because it considered each of plaintiff's reconsideration arguments in its original Opinion granting summary judgment.  But the Court spent some time on one of plaintiff's claim construction arguments regarding a patent related to porcelain veneers.  On reconsideration, plaintiff argued for a different construction of "ready for mounting."  In its original papers plaintiff did not argue for the proposed construction, although it did propose it in its Local Rule 56.1 Additional Statement of Material Facts.  The Court held that because claim construction is a matter of law, proposed constructions are not material facts and, therefore, cannot be put in LR 56.1 statements.  The Court noted its obligation pursuant to LR 56.1 to disregard legal arguments and conclusions placed in statements of fact.  The Court did, however, go on to consider plaintiff's construction and explain why the Court's original construction was correct.

Practice tip:  Think carefully about what goes into your LR 56.1 statements of material fact.  Do not put arguments in your statements of fact. And by all means, do not put arguments in your statements of fact and then omit those arguments from your brief. The Court will disregard them, and you will be out of luck. 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

Cummins-Allison Corp. v. Glory Ltd., No. 02 C 7008 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 2007) (Posner, J.).

Judge Posner, sitting by designation, entered an order dismissing all claim and counterclaims without prejudice and terminating the case, on what appeared to be near the eve of trial.  The parties filed a Stipulated Dismissal earlier in the month.  No further settlement details were readily available. 

The Court's order ended what had been a fairly protracted patent dispute between the two parties centering around patents covering money-counting and bill-sorting devices.  You can read more about prior rulings from the Northern District case in the Blog's archives.  You can read about several opinions from the related Eastern District of Texas case here and here at Michael Smith's E.D. Texas Blog.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

Google, Inc. v. Central Mfg. Inc., No. 07 C 385, 2007 WL 789418 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2007) (Kendall, J.).

Judge Kendall denied third party Leo Stoller's motion to intervene pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 -- Stoller also filed a motion to interplead and various motions to suspend the proceedings for various reasons.  Plaintiff Google brought the instant suit alleging civil RICO violations based upon defendants' alleged scheme of falsely claiming trademark rights to extort money from legitimate trademark holders.  Defendants' opposed Google's application for its "Google" mark based upon allegedly fraudulent claims of common law rights in the mark in order to settle the dispute.  Stoller subsequently filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case, which was converted to Chapter 7.  The property of Stoller's estate included wholly-owned interests in defendants.  The Court denied Stoller's motion to intervene as of right because Stoller had no "direct, significant legally protectable" interest in the case.  To the extent Stoller was involved in the underlying actions, it was as an employee of one or more of the defendants and/or acting as defendants' representative, not in his individual capacity.  Similarly, the Court denied Stoller permissive intervention because of the Court's determination that adding Stoller would unduly delay the case.  The Court noted that the parties had entered a settlement contemplating Google's release of its monetary claims, contingent upon an entry of a permanent injunction and final judgment, a settlement the be "frustrate[d]" by Stoller's intervention.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

Abbott Labs. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., No. 05 C 6561, 2007 WL 625496 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 2007) (Kendall, J.).

Judge Kendall denied plaintiff's, Abbott, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss defendant's, Mylan, antitrust counterclaims.  Mylan alleged that two Abbott employees submitted declarations and/or testimony stating the weight and structure of certain oligomers related to the patented invention, despite their knowledge that the tests they relied upon were known to be incapable of measuring the oligomers at issue.  Mylan further alleged that based upon these fraudulent statements, the USPTO issued certain of the patents-in-suit which then prevented Mylan from entering the market with a generic version of Abbott's pharmaceutical Depakote.  Abbott relied upon a prior Northern District ruling against third party Torpharm which held that Abbott's conduct before the USPTO was not inequitable.  But the Court held that while that ruling prevented a sham litigation claim, it did not estop Mylan's inequitable conduct allegations because Mylan was not a party to the prior case and, therefore, had no opportunity to present its evidence and argument.  Additionally, the Court held that Mylan adequately alleged antitrust injury by stating that it prepared to enter the market with generic Depakote, but was prevented from doing so by Abbott's alleged inequitable conduct.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

Cummins-Allison Corp. v. Glory Ltd., No. 02 C 7008, 2007 WL 487564 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 12, 2007) (Kendall, J.).

Judge Kendall denied summary judgment of invalidity for defendant in this patent dispute (you can find the Court's prior claim construction ruling here).  Defendant argued that plaintiff's public use of money-counting machines embodying the patented inventions in banks more than one year before filing of the patent application invalidated the patents pursuant to 35 U.S.C. Section 102(b).  Defendant relied upon the testimony of several bank employees that the machines were beta-tested by banks in locations that bank patrons could see without signing any confidentiality agreements.  But plaintiff put forth evidence that defendant had taken steps to keep the use confidential and that, even if the use was public, it was only an experimental use which does not create a Section 102(b) bar.  Based on the conflicting evidence, the Court held that there were questions of material fact as to the patents' validity and, therefore, denied summary judgment.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

Microthin.com, Inc. v. Siliconezone USA, LLC, No. 06 C 1522, 2006 WL 3302825 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 2006) (Kendall, J.).

Judge Kendall held that plaintiff's patent claim did not give the Court supplemental jurisdiction over defendants' assault and battery, trespass, breach of contract and tortious interference counterclaims, even though the counterclaims were arguably related to plaintiff's patent infringement allegations.  The Court did, however, have diversity jurisdiction over the counterclaims.  After concluding it had jurisdiction, the Court dismissed the assault and battery counterclaims because there is no tort of assault against a corporation in Illinois.  The Court also dismissed the breach of contract claim, because plaintiff/counter-defendant was neither a party to the contract, nor an intended beneficiary. 

Defendant Siliconezone alleged that Siliconezone and plaintiff Microthin.com ("Microthin") both had booths at the March 2006 International Home and Housewares Show (the "Show").  According to Siliconezone, during the show Microthin employees repeatedly entered Siliconezone's booth and inspected Siliconezone's merchandise and prototypes.  Microthin's employees also allegedly made statements while in Siliconezone's booth and around Siliconezone's potential customers about Siliconezone's infringement of Microthin's patent rights.  These allegations formed the basis for the trespass, breach of contract and tortious interference claims. 

The allegedly breached contract was Microthin's contract with the Show for its booth space.  The contract required that Microthin not access other booths without authorization , not interfere with other vendors' legitimate activities and that Microthin be courteous to other vendors.  While Microthin may have violated each of those provisions, Siliconezone was not a party to the contract or its intended beneficiary, so Siliconezone had no breach of contract claim.

When Siliconezone's president Karyo attempted to discuss his issues regarding these actions with Microthin's founder, counter-defendant O'Malley, O'Malley allegedly bumped Karyo's chest, knocked him backward and yelled "You're ripping us off!  You're ripping off our patents."  These allegations make up the assault and battery counterclaim.  But because the claim was brought by Siliconezone, instead of by Karyo, the allegedly assaulted individual, it was dismissed.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

PSN Illinois, LLC v. Ivoclar Vivadent, Inc., No. 04 C 7232, 2006 WL 3523760 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2006) (Kendall, J.).

Judge Kendall granted defendant summary judgment of noninfringement, both literal and doctrine of equivalents.  Plaintiff alleged that Ivoclar's Empress veneer technique for making porcelain tooth veneers infringed plaintiff's patent.  The patent claimed a method for making porcelain veneers consisting of:  1) taking an impression of a tooth; 2) forming a "statue" of the tooth from the impression; 3) applying a "porcelain powder" to the statue to build a veneer restoration; 4) firing the veneer restoration on the statue; and 5) eroding the statue from the veneer restoration leaving a restoration "ready for mounting."  The Court construed each of the three terms in quotations and then held that no reasonable jury could find that defendant's Empress method produced a "ready for mounting" veneer.

 The Court construed a "ready for mounting" to require that a veneer be "ready to be fitted on and cemented to a patient's tooth."  Because the Empress method required substantial finishing after the veneer is removed from the statue and prior to being cemented to a tooth, the Empress method was held not to infringe the claim.

The Court also construed "statue" to be a "positive, substantially entire version of the tooth" and noted that "model" was a synonym of "statue."  Because the Empress method involved applying a substance including porcelain to a negative mold of a tooth, instead of a positive model or statue, the claim was not literally infringed.  But the Court found a question of fact as to whether the Empress method's combination of an original positive model of the tooth combined with the negative model used to form the veneer could infringe the claim pursuant to the doctrine of equivalents.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

Cummins-Allison Corp. v. Glory Ltd., __ F.Supp.2d __, 2006 WL 2931999 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 13, 2006) (Kendall, J.).

Judge Kendall performed a very thorough claim construction in this opinion, but what is most interesting about it is the procedural history.  The Court (with another judge presiding) initially construed the claims at issue in March 2005, without holding a Markman hearing.  Plaintiff then sought reconsideration regarding one of the patents at issue and defendant sought reconsideration regarding the other.  The Court ultimately granted both motions and held a Markman hearing, which is the basis of this opinion.   

While the initial claim constructions and those issued in this opinion were authored by two different judges, this is still the relatively rare case where the Court proves that claim construction is a matter of law which a court can continue to revisit throughout a proceeding. 

This opinion may also show the importance of a Markman hearing -- maybe with the additional information from the hearing reconsideration would not have been necessary.  Of course, the opinion may not suggest that, it is impossible to make that judgment without having both been involved in the case and having been privy to the Court's reasoning over time.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (1)
• Trackbacks

Connell v. KLN Steel Prods. Co., No. 04 C 194, 2006 WL 2661011 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 2006) (Kendall, J.)

Judge Kendall stayed this patent infringement suit and transferred the case to the Court of Federal Claims, for the Court of Federal Claims to determine whether the Navy consented to defendant's alleged infringement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1498(a).  Section 1498 provides that when the use or sale of a patented product is both for the government and with the government's "authorization and consent," a patent owner's sole infringement remedy is against the United States in the Court of Federal Claims.

The Court also found that the Navy, for whom the allegedly infringing metal bunk beds had been manufactured, was an indispensable party because the issue at hand was whether the Navy had expressly or impliedly authorized and consented to the infringement.  Because the Court found that it lacked jurisdiction over the Navy for patent infringement claims pursuant to Section 1498, the Court stayed the case and transferred it to the Court of Federal Claims.  The Court also noted that the Court of Federal Claims could either keep the case or remand it in whole or in part, after ruling upon the Section 1498 defense.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks