RRK v. Sears: Judge Adds Interest to Jury Award

RRK Holding Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 04 C 3944, Slip Op (N.D. Ill. May 27, 2007) (Coar, J.).

Judge Coar denied defendant Sears, Roebuck & Co.'s ("Sears") Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law and Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a) motion for a new trial or a remittitur. And the Court granted plaintiff RRK Holding Co.'s ("RRK") motion for pre-judgment and post-judgment interest. A jury previously returned a verdict finding Sears liable for breach of a nondisclosure agreement and misappropriation of RRK's trade secret related to its spiral saw – click here for much more on this case in the Blog's archives. The jury awarded RRK approximately $21M, including $11.6M in actual damages, $1.6M for unjust enrichment and $8M in punitive damages.

First, Sears argued that RRK offered insufficient evidence showing that Sears' alleged misappropriation caused RRK's damages. But the Court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. The fact that Sears's price for its spiral saw was lower than RRK's explained why customers purchased Sears's saws over RRK's, but the trade secret causation was shown by the fact that Sears sold the combination tool instead of selling the components separately.

Second, Sears argued that RRK's damages should be limited to the traditional “head start” period (an estimate of the time it would take for defendant to develop the trade secret on its own). But the Court held that Illinois law limits injunctive relief to a head start period, but not monetary relief.

Third, the Court held that RRK's damages expert was sufficiently credible and held that Sears had sufficient opportunity to challenge the expert's methodologies during cross examination.

Fourth, Sears argued that the jury's award was in error because it awarded damages based on the entire sales price of the spiral saws, instead of apportioning just that portion of the sales price related to RRK's trade secrets. But the Court held that a rational jury could have determined that the reason the spiral saw was a success was because of the trade secret and that, therefore, apportionment was not required.

Fifth, Sears argued that RRK's lost profits damages should have been cut-off when third party competitor Dremel entered the market with a competing spiral saw. But the Court held that it was unclear whether Dremel's tool was similar enough to RRK's trade secret to be a substitute for it.

The Court also held that the jury's award was not excessive. But the Court did find that the jury erred in by using the wrong figure from RRK's expert for actual lost profits. RRK also conceded that the jury used the wrong number. The Court, therefore, reduced the jury's actual damages award from $11.6M (the incorrect figure) to $11.2M (the correct figure).

Finally, the Court awarded RRK both pre-judgment and post-judgment interest. Pre-judgment interest, which is awarded on equitable grounds, was appropriate because of the intentional nature of trade secret misappropriation. Additionally, the Court held that pre-judgment interest was appropriate even though RRK was also awarded punitive damages. The Court did, however, suggest that had the punitive damages award been multiples of the actual damages, pre-judgment interest might not have been appropriate. Sears did not challenge RRK's motion for post-judgment interest.

The Court added $3.7M in pre-judgment interest to the $21M award and assessed post-judgment interest of $1,931.50 per day until the award was paid.

Jury's Award Is Supported By The Evidence

Black & Decker Inc. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., No. 04 C 7955, 2006 WL 3883286 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 2006) (St. Eve, J.).*

Judge St. Eve denied defendant's motion for vacature of a lost profits award and for a new trial.  First, defendant argued that the jury's finding that it induced infringement could not stand because it shipped the product at issue with an AC power cord (non-infringing) and a battery (infringing), but plaintiff had not shown that each individual sale of a product resulted in an infringing use.  Prior to trial defendant argued that plaintiff must show a one-to-one correspondence between each unit sold and a customer's direct infringement citing Chiuminatta concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 1 Fed. Appx. 879 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (unpublished op.).  The Court denied that argument.  In its post-trial motion, defendant argued that proof of sales is not sufficient for an award of induced infringement citing Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2006).  But the Court distinguished Golden Blount because the issue in that case was that some product was returned to the alleged infringer before being assembled into an infringing product, which may or may not have been sold.  There was no induced infringement because the product at issue may never have been sold.  In the instant case, the Court held that the product with the infringing configuration had been sold and, therefore, upheld the jury's finding of induced infringement.

Defendant also argued that the trial evidence overwhelmingly supported the conclusion that the product was "almost always" used in a non-infringing way (with an AC power cord instead of a battery) and that, therefore, the jury's award should be vacated and a new trial ordered.  But the Court held that its inquiry was whether the jury was presented with "a legally sufficient amount of evidence from which it could reasonably derive its verdict," not whether defendant's conclusion was supported.  The Court held that there was a legally sufficient amount of evidence.  Each infringing product was shipped with an instruction manual and video demonstrating the infringing use.

*There is much more analysis of various opinions from this case in the Blog's archives.  Does anyone feel like this is becoming Black & Decker v. Robert Bosch week at the Blog?  There is only one other opinion from the case in my queue and then we will be on to other cases.