Chicago IP Attorney & Lawyer : R. David Donoghue : Chicago IP Litigation Blog

Judge Castillo dismissed some defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction (the wrong defendants) and denied defendant Strategic Commercial Solutions (“SCS”). Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Plaintiff Medline alleged that defendants violated its trademark and related federal and state laws by selling “Medline Savings” packages with telemarketers.

Personal Jurisdiction

The Court did not have personal jurisdiction over the Wong defendants. The Wong defendants, all individuals, did not direct any of their allegedly infringing and fraudulent calls to Illinois residents. Their only contacts with Illinois were calls to and from Illinois banks regarding processing payments and refunds. These secondary contacts were not sufficient to create personal jurisdiction.

SCS similarly did not have sufficient contacts with Illinois. But Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(K)(2) provided for national, and therefore, there was personal jurisdiction in Illinois because SCS argued it was not subject to jurisdiction in any U.S. state or territory.

Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Act

SCS argued that Medline could not bring its Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Act claim because it was not a “private person” that was “adversely affected” by the telemarketing as required by the Act. But the Court held that while Medline was not an aggrieved consumer, the alleged unfair use of Medline’s trademarks could have caused Medline the harm it alleged.

Trademark Infringement

The Court noted that it was not aware of a similar case in which a party was accused of trademark infringement for using marks in telemarketing. But SCS’s alleged use of Medline’s marks was a use in commerce.

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Shen Wei (USA), Inc. v. Ansell Healthcare Prods., Inc., No. 05 C 6003, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. May 29, 2008) (Guzman, J.).

Judge Guzman construed the disputed claim terms from plaintiff's patent for a skin-enhancing glove. The parties disputed two terms: dehydrated and dry. Defendants argued dehydrated meant removal of all water, while plaintiffs argued it meant removal of water, but not necessarily all water. Judge Holderman construed dehydrated as used in a related patent in an earlier suit between the parties, consistent with plaintiff's proposed construction.* Because Ansell advanced the same construction in the present suit that it lost in the earlier suit before Judge Holderman, the Court held that collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevented Ansell from arguing against plaintiff's construction. The Court also noted that Judge Holderman's construction was correct.

The Court construed "dry" in a similar fashion to mean removal of water, but not necessarily all water, based upon the prosecution history.

* I was involved in the briefing before Judge Holderman, but I am not involved in the current case.

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Shen-Wei (USA), Inc. v. Ansell Healthcare Prods., Inc., No. 05 C 6003, 2007 WL 2903184 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 28, 2007) (Guzman, J.).

Judge Guzman denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment of invalidity pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Defendant argued that plaintiffs sold medical gloves embodying the claims of their patent, U.S. Patent No. 6, 953,582 (the “’582 patent”), to a glove with a coating of a skin-soothing substance in July 1999, approximately two years before the ‘582 patent’s July 1, 2001 critical date. Furthermore, plaintiffs admitted that they sold patented gloves as early as July 1999 by failing to cite any contradictory evidence in their responses to defendant’s Local Rule 56.1 statement.

But plaintiffs argued that the ‘582 had a right to the filing date of its parent, U.S. Patent No. 6,274,154 (the “’154 patent”). The ‘154 patent only disclosed coating a glove with aloe vera. But plaintiffs argued that the ‘154 patent inherently disclosed skin-soothing substances other than aloe vera. Plaintiffs supported its arguments with testimony from the inventor and plaintiffs’ expert.

Because, among other reasons, defendant failed to support its denials of inherency with any facts, the Court deemed admitted, at least, structural inherency and inherency of theory. Because defendant admitted inherent disclosure, plaintiffs’ ‘582 patent had the critical date of its parent ‘154 patent – April 7, 1998. Plaintiffs’ admitted July 1999 sales of patented gloves, therefore, were not an on-sale bar.

Practice tip: When making or responding to Local Rule 56.1 statements, always support your statements or responses with evidence.

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Shen Wei (USA) Inc. v. Sempermed, Inc., No. 05 C 6004, 2007 WL 328846 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 30, 2007) (Guzman, J.).

Judge Guzman granted defendant leave to amend its answer adding inequitable conduct affirmative defenses and counterclaims alleging that plaintiffs failed to disclose their prior art sale of a medical glove embodying their invention, but not regarding the existence and sale of a third party's glove of which plaintiffs were allegedly aware.  The Court held that defendant's affirmative defense and counterclaim met the Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) standard with respect to plaintiffs' alleged sale of their own product more than one year before their priority date because, although defendant did identify the person who intended to deceive the USPTO, it was reasonable to conclude that the inventor was charged with the intent.  With regards to the sale of the third party, Ostar, glove defendant only alleged that plaintiffs generally knew of the glove and its materiality, but failed to disclose it.  Defendant did not plead with sufficient specificity:  who knew about the Ostar glove, what they knew, when they knew it, whether the failure to disclose was intentional or why the Ostar glove was material. 

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