Anonymous Bloggers Carry on Tradition of the Federalist Papers

There has been a lot of coverage of Troll Tracker's recently disclosed identity.* Troll Tracker ended his anonymity a few weeks ago and now faces a libel law suit along with his employer, Cisco, based upon statements he made about a case involving Cisco -- this is one of the many reasons I do not write about cases that my firm or I are involved in.

I did not intend to weigh in on this story because there was not much to add (see below for links to some of the best coverage). But then I read Joe Hosteny's March 2008 IP Today article – click here for the article -- about anonymous blogging and anonymous commenting. Hosteny is a partner in the Niro Scavone firm, a firm that was often a focus of Troll Tracker's posts. I have not always seen eye to eye with Hosteny in the courtroom, but I found his article both very good and thought provoking.

Hosteny raises real concerns about how the anger surrounding the non-practicing entity dispute has gotten out of hand. Death threats over patent litigation (even assuming they are idle threats) cannot be tolerated. These threats make me question whether the patent litigation bar is maintaining the levels of civility and sanity required by our professional standards.

Violent threats and, more broadly, incivility have no more place in the realm of legal blogs than in the legal system. But it does not follow that anonymous blogging and commenting are inherently bad – the issue is more complex than that. Lots of electrons have been spilled over the pros and cons of anonymous blogging – blog guru Kevin O'Keefe is no fan of anonymous blogging, whereas the anonymous editor of Blawg Review provides a great service to both the legal and the blogging communities with the weekly Blawg Review, despite his anonymity.

Anonymous blogging is not the problem. The problem is with anonymous bloggers who believe that anonymity allows them to comment on cases involving themselves or their clients , or to post threatening comments (Troll Tracker, of course, never posted any threats that I am aware of). If Troll Tracker had not blogged about his client's case and if he had stuck to the verifiable facts, he likely would not have gotten sued.

Similarly, anonymous commenting is not the problem if legal bloggers, including Troll Tracker, monitored and approved comments before** they went live, the death threats against Niro never would have been published. I moderate the comments to this Blog and, as a result, angry rants against a judge or an attorney (none have been violent) do not make it on the Blog. And that anonymity may have provided the writer with false courage. But I prevent that, and so can any blogger, by acting as a gatekeeper.

Hosteny argued that anonymity is cowardly and not in the tradition of the First Amendment because the Declaration of Independence was signed by the Continental Congress. But he leaves out that the Federalist Papers were signed with aliases. Anonymity can be useful in that it can provide courage to voice ideas that otherwise might not be interjected into public discourse. For that reason, I think there is a place for anonymous blogging and commenting, as long as anonymous bloggers do not use anonymity as an excuse to avoid the rules of our profession and of common sense.

As promised above, for more coverage of Troll Tracker and the defamation suit, see:

E.D. Texas Blog

IP Law360 (subscription required, but a very thorough history)

Patently O -- discussing a related federal suit filed in the District of Arkansas, including a link to the complaint.

Prior Art Blog -- detailing the history of the suit and here and here on other aspects of the story as well.

WSJ Law Blog

[Update]:  Blawg Review #151 at Lex Ferenda was just updated discussing this post.

* There are no Troll Tracker links because the site is currently either down or subscriber only.

**  Troll Tracker did remove violent and offensive comments, but only after they were posted and he became aware of them.


Injunctions Post-eBay

Brian Higgins's Maryland IP Law Blog post about the progeny of In re Seagate, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007), inspired me to do follow up posts identifying Northern District cases discussing recent major IP decisions.  The first looks at cases discussing eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S.Ct. 1837, 164 L.Ed.2d 641 (2006).  Here they are:*

For further analysis of post-eBay decisions, check out my post about Michael Smith's analysis (click here) and my post discussing Ray Nimmer's thoughts on the potential for compulsory licensing regimes because of eBay (click here).

*  A brief note on methodology:  this was not a thorough study and does not include cases that granted or denied injunctions without discussion.  For a more comprehensive list of decisions nationwide (updated through the end of 2007) go to the Fire of Genius.

Cummins-Allison & Glory Settle On Eve of Trial

Cummins-Allison Corp. v. Glory Ltd., No. 02 C 7008 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 2007) (Posner, J.).

Judge Posner, sitting by designation, entered an order dismissing all claim and counterclaims without prejudice and terminating the case, on what appeared to be near the eve of trial.  The parties filed a Stipulated Dismissal earlier in the month.  No further settlement details were readily available. 

The Court's order ended what had been a fairly protracted patent dispute between the two parties centering around patents covering money-counting and bill-sorting devices.  You can read more about prior rulings from the Northern District case in the Blog's archives.  You can read about several opinions from the related Eastern District of Texas case here and here at Michael Smith's E.D. Texas Blog.

Analyzing Permanent Injunctions Post-eBay

Following up on my recent post about Judge St. Eve's post-eBay permanent injunction opinion (the first in the Northern District), Michael Smith who writes the E.D. Texas Federal Court Blog has written a very interesting article analyzing the first nine district court permanent injunction decisions decided using the eBay standard.

You can download a PDF of the article from Michael's Blog here.  Although he wrote the article too early and, therefore, was not able to include Judge St. Eve's opinion, he draws some very interesting conclusions.  For example, he believes that the first nine cases suggest what many expected:  plaintiffs that manufacture products that compete with the defendant's infringing product get permanent injunctions, while plaintiffs that license their patents without manufacturing or selling competing products do not get permanent injunctions.  He also notes that one of the four plaintiffs in the E.D. Texas received permanent injunctive relief, while four of five plaintiffs outside the E.D. Texas received permanent injunctive relief.  Of course, the first nine permanent injunction opinions are not likely a large enough pool to draw strong conclusions, but the results certainly are interesting.  Here is a brief section of Michael's conclusion:

 

 

Of the nine substantive decisions discussed above, the plaintiff prevailed in one out of four in the Eastern District of Texas, but four out of five outside it. Why the geographic split? Because both of the concurrences in eBay were correct. Chief Justice Roberts was correct that “history informs current practice” in cases which, as Justice Kennedy wrote “bear substantial parallels to litigation the courts have confronted before.” Essentially the litigation outside the Eastern District of Texas follows the more traditional model of litigation between competitors in an industry and accordingly, the non-Eastern District of Texas cases present a win rate of 80% for a prevailing plaintiff on the merits. On the other hand the litigation in the Eastern District apparently more often presents cases where, as Justice Kennedy observed, the plaintiff was not a competitor, but rather a company seeking licensing revenues in return for the use of its invention. Accordingly, in these cases the requests for injunctions were denied, and, the plaintiff’s overall win rate is only 25%. This is perhaps an illustration that, as Justice Kennedy observed, trial courts are using their discretion to determine whether “past practice fits the circumstances of the case before them.”