Pricing and Warranty Agreement Provisions Were Not Trade Secret

MPC Containment Sys., Ltd. v. Moreland, No. 05 C 6973, 2008 WL 2875007 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 23, 2008) (Aspen, Sen. J.).*

Judge Aspen granted in part and denied in part defendants’ summary judgment motion regarding plaintiffs’ copyright, Lanham Act, trade secret and related state law claims.** Plaintiffs and defendants both design, manufacture and sell flexible fuel storage tanks. Corporate defendant MIL was formed by at least individual defendants John and Lawrence, both of whom previously worked for plaintiffs in various capacities and later worked for MIL in direct competition with plaintiffs over, at least, a United States Air Force contract.

Trade Secret Misappropriation

The Court held that plaintiffs’ pricing and warranty provisions were not trade secrets and, therefore, granted summary judgment in defendants’ favor. But the Court held that there was a question of fact as to whether plaintiffs’ tank designs were trade secrets. Additionally, the Court noted that the question of whether sufficient efforts were used to maintain secrecy of the alleged trade secrets was a question of fact for jurors in all, but the most extreme cases. Because plaintiffs identified several precautions taken to protect their trade secrets, the Court denied summary judgment. The fact that tank designs were provided to plaintiffs’ independent contractors without confidentiality did not warrant summary judgment for defendants. There are circumstances where independent contractors have independent, professional duties of confidentiality regardless of whether agreements were signed.

Copyright Infringement

Defendants argued that plaintiffs’ copyrighted fuel tank drawings were not original, as required for copyright ownership, because defendant John authored the drawings, not plaintiffs. The Court held that there was a question of fact as to the ownership because the parties disputed John’s employment status when he made the drawings. If John was an employee, plaintiffs owned the copyrights based upon the work for hire doctrine.

The Court also found a question of fact as to the degree of creativity employed in making plaintiffs’ drawings. A comparison of plaintiffs’ drawings and defendants’ drawings, which defendants alleged plaintiffs copied, left a question of fact as to whether plaintiffs’ drawings showed sufficient differences to rise to the level of creativity.

Compute Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”)

The Court granted defendants summary judgment as to CFAA § 1030(a)(4) because plaintiffs did not respond to defendants’ claims and, therefore, waived their defenses. But the Court found questions of fact as to the two other charged sections of the CFAA, §§ 1030 (a)(2)(c) and (a)(5). First, there was a question of fact as to whether defendant John was authorized to access the documents he allegedly misappropriated. While John may have received the documents at issue during the normal course of his employment with plaintiffs, there was a dispute as to whether John exceeded his authorization by allegedly breaching his duty of loyalty to plaintiffs.

Additionally, there was a question of fact as to whether John passively received all accused documents by email or “accessed” the documents pursuant to the CFAA actively by email or otherwise.

Illinois Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“IDTPA”)

The IDTPA only provides for injunctive relief, not monetary damages. As a result, the IDTPA only addresses ongoing harms. The Court, therefore, granted defendants’ summary judgment as to defendants’ past acts. The Court also explained that it would not grant an IDTPA injunction to eliminate an existing commercial advantage, as courts sometimes do in trade secrets cases.
 

 

*  Click here for more on this case in the Blog’s archives.

**  This post does not cover some of the non-IP specific state law claims.

Affirmative Defense Struck for Insufficient Pleading

MPC Containment Sys., Ltd. v. Moreland, No. 05 C 6973, 2008 WL 1775501 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 2008) (Aspen, J.).*

Judge Aspen granted in part plaintiff MPC Containment's ("MPC") Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) motion to strike defendants' (collectively "Moreland") waiver and unclean hands defenses. The Court struck Moreland's unclean hands defense. Moreland alleged unclean hands based upon MPC’s allegedly fraudulent procurement of a patent related to the flexible tank technology at issue. But the Court held that Moreland failed to show that MPC's alleged fraud was somehow directed at Moreland. Furthermore, while the patented technology is related to the technology in suit, MPC's alleged misconduct in obtaining the patent had no connection to this suit.

The Court, however, allowed Moreland’s waiver defense. Moreland did not specifically plead that MPC voluntarily relinquished its rights to the claims in suit. But it was sufficient that voluntary relinquishment could be inferred from the pleadings.

Click here for more on this case in the Blog's archives.

Rule 9(b) Heightened Pleading - "Information and Belief" is Not Enough

MPC Containment Sys., Ltd. v. Moreland, No. 05 C 6973, 2006 WL 2331148 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2006) (Aspen, J.).

Judge Aspen granted defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiff’s Lanham Act unfair competition claim for failure to meet the Rule 9(b) heightened pleading requirements.  Plaintiff’s bare allegation that the individual defendants made misrepresentations to a single customer did not satisfy Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirements. 

Plaintiff failed to allege when the misrepresentations were made, alleging only that they were made during the individual defendants’s employment with plaintiff, a period of at least twenty years. The Court also held that plaintiff failed to allege that the communications were “commercial advertising or promotion,” as required by the Lanham Act § 43(a)(1)(B), because plaintiff never stated how the misrepresentations were communicated. Finally, the Court warned in a footnote that “allegations based ‘on information and belief’ generally do not satisfy the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b).”