Chicago IP Attorney & Lawyer : R. David Donoghue : Chicago IP Litigation Blog

Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Johnson Controls Interiors LLC, No. 2007-1314-1467, Slip Op. (Fed. Cir. Feb. 19, 2008).

The Federal Circuit reversed Judge Moran’s construction of “binary code” and, therefore, reversed the limited preliminary injunction entered by the Northern District - click here and here for the Blog’s posts regarding the injunction. The Northern District construed “binary code” as a code represented by two values, but not necessarily a binary number – click here and here for the Blog’s posts regarding the Northern District’s claim and construction opinions. The Federal Circuit praised the Northern District’s claim construction analysis, but reversed the construction:

The district court commendably strove to follow this court’s rules for claim construction. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318-19. In this regard, the trial court weighed the intrinsic evidence along with the extrinsic evidence and properly sought to avoid importing a limitation from the specification into the claims. See id. Nonetheless, this court discerns that the ‘544 patent specification gives particular limiting meanings to the language in the claims.

The Federal Circuit held that “binary code” required a binary (or base two) number. Otherwise, any values would meet the limitation because all values, whether in base two, three, the more standard ten or any other, are represented by computers using two values – 1 and 0. Because the revised claim construction called into question the Northern District’s likelihood of success analysis, the Federal Circuit reversed the preliminary injunction.

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Brian Higgins's Maryland IP Law Blog post about the progeny of In re Seagate, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007), inspired me to do follow up posts identifying Northern District cases discussing recent major IP decisions.  The first looks at cases discussing eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S.Ct. 1837, 164 L.Ed.2d 641 (2006).  Here they are:*

• Black & Decker Inc. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., No. 04 C 7955, 2006 WL 3446144 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2006) (St. Eve, J.). -- Granting a permanent injunction in a case between competitors.
  
• Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Lear Corp., No. 05 C 3449, 2007 WL 1017751 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2007) (Moran, J.). -- Granting a preliminary injunction in a case between competitors and holding that in eBay the Supreme Court limited the automatic presumption of irreparable harm based upon infringement.

For further analysis of post-eBay decisions, check out my post about Michael Smith's analysis (click here) and my post discussing Ray Nimmer's thoughts on the potential for compulsory licensing regimes because of eBay (click here).

*  A brief note on methodology:  this was not a thorough study and does not include cases that granted or denied injunctions without discussion.  For a more comprehensive list of decisions nationwide (updated through the end of 2007) go to the Fire of Genius.

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Geneva Int’l Corp. v. Petrof, Spol, S.R.O., No. 07 C 4214, 2007 WL 4522621 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).

Judge Moran denied plaintiff Geneva International’s preliminary injunction motion and the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment on Geneva’s anticipatory breach of contract claim.* Geneva signed a variety of agreements with defendant Petrof making Geneva the exclusive U.S. distributor of Petrof’s pianos and the exclusive U.S. licensee of the “Petrof” trademark for use with Petrof’s pianos, through 2012. In 2007, Petrof gave Geneva the required six months notice to terminate the parties’ contract (but not their trademark license agreement which did not have the same termination provisions) and notified Geneva that Petrof planned to start selling its pianos using its trademark in the U.S.

Geneva sough a preliminary injunction to stop Petrof’s U.S. sales because Geneva continued to be the exclusive licensee of the Petrof trademark. But the Court held Geneva would not be irreparably harmed without the preliminary injunction. Geneva’s alleged irreparable harm — lost goodwill of its customers because Geneva would not be Petrof’s exclusive distributor — was caused by the contract, not breach of the trademark license. Petrof’s contract termination meant that Geneva could not be Petrof’s U.S. distributor, exclusive or otherwise. Because the alleged irreparable harm did not stem from the license at issue, the Court denied the injunction.

* Because they are not IP-specific, I will not fully address the contract issues. I will say that the disputes arose from the fact that the three agreements were signed on the same day, but did not all mention each other and had differing integration clauses, some mentioning the other agreements and some not. Practice tip: When drafting parallel agreements, make very clear how the agreements relate or that they do not.

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American Fam. Mut. Ins., Co. v. Roth, No. 05 C 3839, 2007 W LL377335 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 2007) (Cole, Mag. J.).

Judge Cole recommended that plaintiff’s motion be granted in part requiring defendants to comply with the Court’s preliminary injunction and holding defendants in contempt for failing to comply with the Counts TRO and PI. The Court first explained that no injunction could be a general prohibition against using trade secrets. Rather, an injunction – whether temporary, preliminary or permanent – must include specific recitals limiting defendants’ actions or requiring that actions be performed. The Court then analyzed whether defendants’ actions or inactions violated specific provisions of the TRO and the PI issued by the Court. The Court reported that defendants had retained possession of plaintiff’s customer list and defendants failed to provide a list of their customer contacts with sufficient detail. The Court, therefore, recommended that defendants be held in contempt for failing to comply with the TRO and the PI.

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Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 05 C 5373, 2007 WL 1549498 (N.D. Ill. May 24, 2007) (Coar, J.).

Judge Coar denied defendant Sandoz, Inc.'s ("Sandoz") motion to stay the Court's preliminary injunction pending appeal to the Federal Circuit pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(c).  The Court previously granted plaintiff Abbott's motion for a preliminary injunction (you can read more about that decision and related cases in the Blog's archives).  The PI enjoined defendant Sandoz from selling a generic version of Abbott's patented extended release antibiotic (clarithromycin, an erythromycin derivative which Abbott markets as Biaxin XL).  Sandoz argued that the PI should be stayed pending appeal because of conflicting Federal Circuit law regarding the Court's claim construction and because of the Supreme Court's KSR decision. 

First, Sandoz argued that two different Federal Circuit panels had issued differing rulings construing the claims at issue.  Judge Coar rejected this argument because the construction relied upon in the PI ruling was the Federal Circuit's second, broader claim construction.  The Court explained that the "only rational assumption" was that the second panel was aware of the constructions in the first, but relied upon something different in the record or identified a fact missed by the first panel.  Further, the Court predicted that the Federal Circuit would not retreat from its second opinion to its first, prior opinion.

Second, the Court held that the KSR decision did not change its analysis of Sandoz's likelihood of success on its obviousness argument.  The Court provided a detailed explanation of KSR and its reasoning, but differentiated the current case because the Court held that one of the limitations in the Abbott claims did not exist in Sandoz's cited combination of prior art references.  Because the references did not disclose one of the elements of the claims, whether or not the Court used a strict application of the Federal Circuit's teaching, suggestion or motivation test did not change the outcome of its analysis.  Both the Federal Circuit's and the Supreme Court's standards required that all elements be disclosed by the combined prior art references.

Finally, the Court held that Sandoz had not provided sufficient evidence that it would be irreparably harmed.  Sandoz argued that if it could not enter the market at the same time as other generics, which are not subject to PI's, pharmacists would be reluctant to later restock their shelves with Sandoz's generic version of the drug.  But the Court reasoned that the lure of generics is their prices, not their brand recognition, so Sandoz should have no trouble re-entering the market at a later date should it prevail.

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Bucciarelli-Tieger v. Victory Records, Inc., No. 06 C 4258, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).

Judge Moran granted plaintiffs a preliminary injunction preventing defendants from interfering with plaintiffs' right to record new music with producers or record labels of plaintiffs' choice.  The Court also denied defendants an opposing preliminary injunction that would have prevented plaintiffs from recording new music with anyone other than defendants.  Plaintiffs are members of an Ohio-based band called Hawthorne Heights (collectively "HH") -- in addition to clicking on "Hawthorne Heights" to go to the band's website, you can also read about them on Wikipedia, listen to them online or see them live June 12th in Urbana, Illinois's Canopy Club.  HH entered into a contract (the "Agreement") with defendants to produce and promote four albums.  The first album was created and promoted seemingly without incident, but just before release of the second album the relationship soured.  HH sent defendants a letter which purported to terminate the Agreement and listed several ways that defendants had allegedly harmed HH.  This suit arose from that dispute.  Plaintiffs allege breach of contract, as well as copyright and trademark infringement for promotions and sales after the date of HH's letter allegedly terminating the Agreement and related state law claims.  In a prior opinion (discussed in the Blog's archives), the Court held that the Agreement was not exclusive because it did not contain any exclusivity provisions, which left HH free to record other songs or records with another company during the life of the Agreement.  Based upon the Court's ruling, HH moved the Court for a preliminary injunction confirming that defendants could not interfere with any of HH's efforts to record new music with a third party.  Defendants cross-moved to prevent HH from working with anyone but defendants.  The Court held that HH showed a likelihood of success on the merits based upon the Court's prior ruling that the Agreement was not exclusive.  Similarly, the Court held that defendants did not show a likelihood of success in light of the same ruling.  Because defendants had no likelihood of success, their motion for a PI was denied.  Defendants argued that HH could not base a motion for preliminary injunction upon claims for declaratory relief, but the Court held that numerous courts had granted preliminary injunctive relief based upon claims for declaratory judgment.

The Court found that HH would suffer irreparable harm without an injunction.  The parties agreed that bands have a short shelf-life and because without an injunction HH would not be allowed to record new music with parties of its choice in the immediate future, HH would be irreparably harmed without an injunction.  The Court also held that despite the non-exclusivity of the Agreement, HH was obligated to produce records with defendants in a timely fashion. HH would be required to record the agreed-upon number of albums with defendants "within a reasonable time."

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CertainTeed Corp. v. Williams, __ F. Supp.2d __, 2007 WL 1297165 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 3, 2007) (Holderman, C.J.).

Pursuant to a remand and forthwith mandate from the Seventh Circuit, Chief Judge Holderman preliminarily enjoined defendant, Williams, from continued employment by plaintiff's competitor, IKO Industries, Inc. ("IKO"), based upon a non-compete agreement ("Agreement") defendant signed with his previous employer, CertainTeed Corp. ("CT").  But the Court made clear that the preliminary injunction violated defendants' right to due process and violated the Erie doctrine.  When Williams began working for CT, he signed the Agreement which required, among other things, that for one year after working for CT, Williams not perform work:  (i) regarding any product, process or service that is competitive with or similar to any product, process or service Williams was involved with at CT; or (ii) regarding any product, process or service of CT's for which Williams had access to CT's confidential information during his employment.  After leaving CT's employ, Williams took a position with IKO.  Based upon that employment, CT sued Williams and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent Williams's continued employment by IKO.

In its original analysis, applying Pennsylvania law per the Agreement, the Court struck clause (i) as an unreasonable restraint upon Williams ability to earn a living.  The Court then held a hearing on CT's motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent Williams' continued employment by IKO.  After prehearing discovery, CT conceded that it had no evidence that Williams used CT's confidential information while working for IKO.  The Court, therefore, denied CT's motion for a preliminary injunction without hearing Williams's defense.  The Court found that CT had not shown a likelihood of proving that Williams violated the Agreement.  The Court held that Williams could work for IKO "as long as he complies with the . . . Agreement . . . ."

CT appealed the Court's ruling to the Seventh Circuit, which held that the Agreement would be violated if a former employee was "tempted" to use CT's trade secrets, even if the former employee had not used them.  Based upon that analysis, the Seventh Circuit remanded the case to the Northern District and required that a preliminary injunction be entered.

The Court entered the preliminary injunction as required by the Seventh Circuit.  The Court also provided a detailed explanation of how the injunction violated Williams's due process rights by granting an injunction against him without giving Williams the opportunity to present evidence in his defense. 

Additionally, the Court explained that the Seventh Circuit violated the Erie doctrine by extending beyond the rulings of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on the issue of non-compete agreements without citing any case law to support its view of how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would decide the issue.

Finally, the Court explained that it had no choice, but to enter the injunction:

Regardless of the Seventh Circuit's mandated due process deficiency and the Seventh Circuit's prediction regarding the way the Supreme court of Pennsylvania would have decided the outcome, this court is powerless to do anything but abide by the Seventh Circuit's remand order and mandate.

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Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 07 C 1721, Slip op. (N.D. Ill. May 3, 2007) (Anderson, J.).

Judge Anderson denied plaintiffs'  motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent defendants Sandoz, Inc. ("Sandoz") and Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd. ("Teva") from selling a generic version of plaintiff Abbott Laboratories' ("Abbott") antibiotic cefdinir, which it markets using the name Omnicef.  Plaintiffs' original patent, U.S. Patent No. 4,559,334 (the "'334 patent"), covering a form of cefdinir expired on Sunday, May 6, 2007 at 10:59 p.m. CDT.  Plaintiffs' second patent, U.S. Patent No. 4,935,507 (the "'507 patent"), covering a crystalline cefdinir, does not expire until December 4, 2011.  Plaintiffs argued that Sandoz's and Teva's respective formulations of cefdinir (the "accused products"), which the parties agree can be classified as cefdinir monohydrate, infringed the '507 patent and, therefore, sales of the accused products should be enjoined.  The Court, with agreement of the parties, adopted a prior claim construction from Judge Payne of the E.D. Virginia for purposes of the PI determination.  Using Judge Payne's construction, the Court held that the accused products did not likely infringe the '507 patent.  First, cefdinir monohydrate only displayed four of the seven peaks in an x-ray diffraction pattern that the '507 patent identified as indicative of crystalline cefdinir within the +/-.1 degree margin of error that the Court determined was the proper construction of the '507 patent's "about" qualifier.  Second, the Court held that "trace" amounts of crystalline cefdinir that were allegedly in the accused products in addition to the cefdinir monohydrate did not likely amount to literal infringement.

The Court also held that plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of proving infringement pursuant to the doctrine of equivalents.  First, the Court discounted plaintiffs' expert's allegation of equivalents because he did not support his opinions with "empirical or substantive evidence."  Second, the Court denied plaintiffs' argument that Sandoz's and Teva's statements that the accused products were bioequivalent to crystalline cefdinir in their ANDAs was proof of infringement.  The court noted that if bioequivalency were infringement, there could never be generics during a patent's life.

Because Sandoz's ANDA was previously approved by the U.S. Food & Drug Administration (the "FDA"), the Court's ruling meant that Sandoz was free to sell its generic beginning Sunday, May 6 at 11:00 p.m. CDT.  Teva's ANDA had not been approved, however, so it must wait until the FDA acts upon its ANDA.  You can find the Chicago Tribune's brief coverage of the decision in last weekend's Midwest Briefs.

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Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Lear Corp., No. 05 C 3449, 2007 WL 1238908 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 2007) (Moran, J.).

Judge Moran denied defendant Lear's motion to stay the Court's preliminary injunction pending appeal to the Federal Circuit,* but did allow third party General Motors ("GM") to intervene of right and modified the PI to limit harm to defendant and GM.  In a March 30, 2007 opinion and order, the Court granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, preventing defendant from marketing and selling its garage door opener transmitters based upon the Court's prior claim constructions (these opinions are available in the Blog's archives).  The Court held that Lear could not show a likelihood of success on the merits, in part because the Court's "Markman decision and subsequent reconsideration dealt an enormous blow to [Lear's] case."  The Court acknowledged that while plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm without the PI, both Lear and GM could suffer irreparable harm because of the PI.  In order to resolve the irreparable harm issue, the Court revised the PI to exempt Lear's sales to GM.  Because GM was Lear's only client and because the exemption allowed GM to continue sourcing Lear's product  the revised PI would remove harm to GM and substantially reduce Lear's harm.  While Lear would not be able to add new customers, it would not have to idle its related workers and factories because Lear would not lose any customers.  Because the removal of GM sales from the PI substantially limits Lear's potential harm, the Court denied Lear's motion, supported by GM, to increase the bond from $10,000,000 to $50,000,000.

While GM was not a party to the suit, the Court, in a footnote, allowed GM to intervene of right pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) for the limited purposes of arguing for an exemption from the PI or a stay of it and to seek a higher injunction bond. 

*  Lear has already appealed the PI and the claim construction decision.

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Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 05 C 5373, 2006 WL 1141635 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 2007) (Coar, J.).

Judge Coar granted plaintiff Abbott's motion for a preliminary injunction, after having previously denied it a TRO.*  The PI enjoined defendant Sandoz from selling a generic version of Abbott's patented extended release antibiotic (clarithromycin, an erythromycin derivative which Abbott markets as Biaxin XL).  The Court held that Sandoz had shown a substantial likelihood of materiality and Abbott's intent to deceive the PTO  based upon Abbott's failure to disclose certain taste perversion data during prosecution.  But because Abbott abandoned the claims to which the taste perversion data was relevant of its own accord, the Court did not find the patent preliminarily unenforceable.  The Court explained its reasoning as follows:

Redemption is one of the core principles of the American ethos.  Thus in addition to being contrary to the spirit of Scribbs, Kimberly-Clark and the Code of Federal Regulation, it seems wholly inequitable to hold a patent to be invalid for fraudulent conduct in the prosecution of a claim that was withdrawn before actual prosecution had even begun.

The Court then made detailed, initial claim construction rulings and, based upon them, found a substantial likelihood of infringement.  The Court also considered Sandoz's invalidity arguments, but held that Sandoz had not proved a likelihood of success regarding its invalidity arguments.  The Court also held that the balance of hardships tipped in Abbott's favor because allowing Sandoz's generic product to remain in the market would necessarily take market share from Abbott.

In addition to its preliminary injunction stopping future product sales, the Court also required that Sandoz recall all of its existing product, so long as an adequate bond was set.

*  You can read more about the Federal Circuit decision in which the Federal Circuit overturned the Court's grant of a PI in a related case in the Blog's archives.  You can also read another take on this case at the Orange Book Blog.

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Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Lear Corp., No. 05 C 3449, 2007 WL 1017751 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2007) (Moran, J.).

Judge Moran granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, preventing defendant from marketing and selling its garage door opener transmitters.  Relying upon its two prior claim construction decisions (which can be found in the Blog's archives), the Court first determined that plaintiffs had proven a likelihood of success on its infringement claims.  Then the Court considered plaintiffs' irreparable harm claims.  The Court denied plaintiffs' argument that its showing of a strong likelihood of success creates a presumption of irreparable harm.  Citing eBay, Inc.  v. Merc Exchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006), the Court held that the Supreme Court limited the automatic presumption of irreparable harm based upon infringement.  Instead, the Court determined that plaintiffs' had shown that they were irreparably harmed because defendant's sales had eroded its prices and strained its customer relations.

Because defendants entered no declarations or affidavits detailing its loss of revenue, sales or good will should a preliminary injunction be entered, the Court ruled that the balance of hardships tipped in plaintiffs' favor based upon its irreparable harm evidence.  Finally, the Court noted that there is a public interest in protecting valid patents.  Based upon these findings, the Court issued a preliminary injunction and required plaintiffs to post a $10,000,000 bond pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 (c).

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Chicago Tribune Co. v. Fox News Network LLC, No. 07 C 0865, 2007 WL 1052508 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 4, 2007) (Bucklo, J.).*

Judge Bucklo denied plaintiff Chicago Tribune's ("Tribune") motion for a preliminary injunction.  The Tribune sought an injunction which would have required defendant Fox News Networks ("Fox") to change the name of its "Redeye" late-night television news program based upon alleged infringement of the Tribune's Redeye mark related to its Redeye newspaper.  The Court held that the Tribune had only shown a "possibility" that it would prevail on the merits.  The Court found that the Tribune's Redeye mark was at least suggestive and, therefore a strong mark.  And the Court held that while the marks did not visually resemble each other, the Tribune proved a likelihood that the marks were aurally identical.  But the evidence did not favor the Tribune on either of the other two "most important" factors in deciding likelihood of confusion:  defendant's intent and actual confusion.  No evidence showed that Fox "passed off" its program as coming from the Tribune, so the issue of Fox's intent favored Fox.  As to actual confusion, the Tribune put forth a witness that testified that he suffered "momentary actual confusion" when he first learned of Fox's Redeye program, but that it was cleared up almost immediately by someone he was talking with about the program.  Additionally, the witness did not have cable television, so could not watch the show.  While initial confusion can be sufficient to show actual confusion, the Court disregarded the witnesses testimony because he admitted that he was a consumer of neither the Tribune's nor Fox's products. 

Having determined that the Tribune had shown a "possibility" of success on the merits, the Court balanced the possibility against the potential harm to the public and to Fox.  Fox presented evidence that it could not change the name of its program only in Chicago and would have to change it nationwide at great expense.  While the Court was not persuaded by Fox's assessment of the monetary cost of changing the program's name, the Court held that changing the name would have been difficult for a show that had obtained a national audience and denied the preliminary injunction.  The Court did, however, note that additional evidence might show that the relevant public is likely to confuse the Tribune's Redeye mark with Fox's Redeye program.  As a result, the Court ordered expedited discovery and set a quick trial date -- August 6, 2007.

If you would like to read the opinion, which is very thorough and interesting, you can find it here.

*  The Blog reported the filing of this suit in this prior post.

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SMC Corp., Ltd. v. Lockjaw, LLC, __ F. Supp.2d __, 2007 WL 983850 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 3, 2007) (Castillo, J.).

Judge Castillo granted plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, enjoining defendants from breaching the parties' agreement, unless plaintiff acted in a manner triggering the agreement's termination provision, and from contacting plaintiff's customers for any purpose without plaintiff's consent.  Plaintiff was the exclusive distributor of defendants' patented Lockjaw pliers in certain Western European countries.  For about eighteen months, plaintiff's distributed defendants' pliers without incident.  But then defendants altered payment terms, which was their right if they followed certain procedures.  Plaintiff alleges that defendants did not follow those procedures and based on this dispute the relationship appears to have broken down.  Shortly after defendants altered the payment terms, plaintiff filed this suit seeking, among other things, a declaratory judgment that the agreement is binding and enforceable, and that defendants breached the agreement.  Plaintiff also sought an injunction to prevent the defendants from terminating the agreement and/or contacting plaintiff's customers.  Relying upon the UCC, the Court found that plaintiff had a likelihood of success on the merits based upon, among other things, the fact that its brief (and cured) nonpayment for two shipments likely did not constitute a breach of the agreement.

The Court also held that plaintiff would likely suffer irreparable harm without an injunction.  Plaintiff's goodwill would be damaged by loss of customers and harm to plaintiff's reputation.  Plaintiff's potential loss of goodwill tipped the balance of harms in its favor.  The Court also held that the public interest was served when courts enforce valid contracts.  As a result, the Court granted a preliminary injunction against defendants.

But in order insure defendants against an erroneous injunction, the Court ordered plaintiff to post a $500,000 bond to protect defendants' potential lost profits, should plaintiff lose or fail to pay for any orders placed with defendants.  The Court also required that plaintiff provide defendants with letters of credit to prove its ability to pay defendants.

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American Fam. Mutual Insur. Co. v. Roth, No. 05 C 3839, 2007 WL 63983 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 2007) (Cole, Mag. J.).

Judge Cole recommended denying defendants' motion to modify Judge Guzman's preliminary injunction for lack of jurisdiction.  Judge Guzman, following Judge Cole's recommendation, issued a preliminary injunction to prevent defendants from using a list of confidential information regarding plaintiff's policy holders.  Defendants ultimately appealed the preliminary injunction and then filed a motion to clarify seeking modifications to the injunction  equivalent to what they were asking to be overturned on appeal.  After an exhaustive analysis of the procedural rules, the Court recommended denying the motion to modify for lack of jurisdiction because once defendants appealed the injunction, the district court loses jurisdiction over the appealed issues.

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Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., No. 06-1101, __ F.3d __ (Fed. Cir. 2007).

While this is not a Northern District case, it is relevant to the Blog because it is an appeal of a Northern District case and because it confirms Judge Coar's ruling (discussed here) that a preliminary injunction holding lacked preclusive effect in the related case Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 05 C 5373, 2006 WL 3718025 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 2006).  In this patent dispute plaintiff, Abbott Laboratories ("Abbott"), alleged that defendant's, Andrx Pharmacueticals ("Andrx") sale of a generic form of Abbott's patented extended release antibiotic (clarithromycin, an erythromycin derivative) which Abbott markets as Biaxin XL.  The Northern District held that Abbott had established a likelihood of success on the merits of its infringement claim and that Andrx had not established a likelihood that the patent would be held invalid.  As a result of those holdings, the Northern District issued a preliminary injunction.  In its appeal, Andrx argued that Abbott was precluded from obtaining a preliminary injunction because the Federal Circuit overturned a previous Northern District preliminary injunction for Abbott against another generic antibiotic producer Teva Pharmaceuticals ("Teva").  In that case, the Federal Circuit held that Teva raised a substantial question as to the validity of the claims at issue, sufficient to call Abbott's likelihood of success on the merits into question. 

The Federal Circuit, applying Seventh Circuit law, held that preliminary injunctions would be given preclusive effect only in the "rare instances" that the injunction raised an "insuperable obstacle" to plaintiff's success on the merits.  Because the Court did not find an insuperable obstacle to Abbott's success on the merits, the denial of a preliminary injunction against Teva had no preclusive effect in this case.  As a result, the Federal Circuit upheld the Northern District's preliminary injunction.

The Federal Circuit's reasoning appears to square with Judge Coar's reasoning in the Sandoz case.  In Sandoz, the Court held that preliminary relief holdings have no preclusive effect because they are made on an incomplete record, "inherently tentative" and based upon only "an estimate of the likelihood of success."  Despite the fact that the Federal Circuit's denial of the preliminary injunction lacked preclusive effect, however, the Court ultimately refused to reach a holding inconsistent with the Federal Circuit's without a "substantial showing" on a more complete record.  So, although the Court denied the TRO, it appeared to remain open to a preliminary injunction based upon a more complete record.

You can find more on the Federal Circuit's Andrx case at Patently-O and the Patent Docs.

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Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 05 C 5373, 2006 WL 3718025 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 2006) (Coar, J.).

Judge Coar denied plaintiff's, Abbott Laboratories ("Abbott"), motion for a temporary restraining order ("TRO") to prevent defendant, Sandoz, Inc. ("Sandoz"), from selling a generic version of Abbott's patented extended release antibiotic (clarithromycin, an erythromycin derivative which Abbott markets as Biaxin XL).  The Court had entered a TRO and, ultimately, a preliminary injunction preventing another party, Teva Pharmaceuticals ("Teva"), from selling a generic version of plaintiff's patented extended release antibiotic, but the Federal Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction.  The Federal Circuit held that Teva raised a substantial question as to the validity of the claims at issue, sufficient to call Abbott's likelihood of success on the merits into question. 

In the instant case, Sandoz argued that the Federal Circuit's prior ruling that there was a question regarding the validity of the claims-at-issue precluded any preliminary injunctive relief.  The Court held that rulings on preliminary relief have no preclusive effect because they are made on an incomplete record, "inherently tentative" and based upon only "an estimate of the likelihood of success."  Despite that ruling, however, the Court noted that "the practical effect of [the Federal Circuit's] holding still militates towards the denial of the TRO in the instant case."  The Court refused to reach a holding inconsistent with the Federal Circuit's without a "substantial showing" on a more complete record.  So, although the Court denied the TRO, it appears to have kept an open mind about a preliminary injunction based upon a more complete record.

*For another take on this case, check out the Orange Book Blog.

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