Chicago Litigation News: New Chicago Trial Blog

The Chicago Sun-Times has begun live blogging the R. Kelly trial in Cook County state court at its new blog the Kelly Chronicles.  As with the Chicago Tribune's Rezko trial blog, Rezko Gavel to Gavel, the Kelly Chronicles is not IP-related.  But regardless of the legal claims, trial blogs are a great way to get a non-legal perspective on a trial from start to finish.  Fortunately for Chicago-area litigators and litigants, the Chicago papers have begun actively live-blogging local trials which should provide a wealth of this kind of information. 

Live Northern District Trial Blog

The Chicago Tribune has set up a live blog, written by Bob Secter and Jeff Coen, of the government's criminal case against Tony Rezko.  The blog promises daily, "gavel-to-gavel" coverage of the Rezko trial -- click here for background on the case from the Tribune.  This case does not have an intellectual property angle that I am aware of, but it provides an excellent view of a trial as seen through the eyes of non-lawyers, a very important perspective for litigators.  Additionally, Judge St. Eve gets at least her share of IP cases -- click here for discussion of Judge St. Eve's opinions in the Blog's archives.*

Here is some of the Tribune's coverage of the voir dire from yesterday, largely performed by the Court:

Another potential juror, No. 475, teaches cooking classes, often on Fridays. St. Eve sounded as if she was ready to work with the cooking teacher to accommodate her schedule. "If we structured the trial so that it would go Mondays through Thursday and not have trial on Fridays, the days you have cooking classes, would that be good for you?" the judge asked.

Some of St. Eve's questions were more chatty than legal. The cooking teacher, for example, was asked what was on the menu at her next class. The answer: Beef Bourguignon and mashed potatoes.

Another juror was asked where she liked to go snowboarding. Still another was asked about her desire to learn Spanish. "Have you learned any words yet?" the judge asked.

"Just the bad things," the woman responded.

St. Eve also complimented No. 475 on an answer the prospective juror gave to a presubmitted question about whether people who contribute to a campaign should expect something in return. "A thank-you would be nice," the woman wrote.

I will keep an eye on the Tribune's blog and will highlight other especially interesting items from it.

*  Judge St. Eve also gets her share of high profile cases.  She must be tired of the publicity after having the Conrad Black trial and now the Rezko trial within twelve months of each other.

Court Says Case Will Not Be Resolved by Rule 12(b)(6)

Papa John's Int'l, Inc. v. Rezko, No. 04 C 3131, 2007 WL 1521472 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 2006) (Moran, J.).

Relying on its prior opinion, which included a detailed analysis of the Complaint and notice pleading standards (you can read discussion of that opinion in the Blog's archives), the Court denied defendants' various Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss plaintiff's trade secret and trademark infringement claims.  Defendants argued that plaintiff did not sufficiently which defendants were alleged to have performed the acts at issue.  But the Court reasoned that defendants had notice of plaintiff's claims and that notice is all the Federal Rules require.  The Court pointed out that it had "covered much of this same ground in much greater detail" in its prior opinion and cautioned that "this case will not go away for any defendant by a motion to dismiss . . . ."

Notice Pleading Standards and Personal Liability for Corporate Officers

Papa John's Int'l, Inc. v. Rezko, __ F. Supp.2d __, 2006 WL 1843121 (N.D. Ill. June 29, 2006) (Moran, J.).

In partially granting Rezko's Motion to Dismiss, Judge Moran looked at notice pleading standards across a variety of intellectual property and addressed the individual defendant's personal liability for the acts of his company.

Judge Moran agreed with defendants that the complaint lacked factual support for its trademark infringement claims (specifically failing to explain the likelihood of confusion), but found that the complaint met the notice standard, citing Judge Easterbrook's recent Seventh Circuit opinion (Simpson v. Nickel, __ F.3d __, 2006 WL 1585445 (7th Cir. 2006)) reaffirming that complaints should not be dismissed because they are conclusory and that complaints need only allege the "bare minimum facts" necessary for notice. Accordingly, it was enough that plaintiff alleged that defendants used plaintiff's marks and other confusingly similar marks to continue operating a pizza business. Plaintiff's conclusory statements that defendants continued selling pizza using ingredients not supplied, and therefore not quality-controlled, by plaintiff was also sufficient for plaintiff's trademark dilution claim.

Judge Moran dismissed plaintiff's copyright claim, however, because it only alleged that defendants "ma[de] unauthorized use" of the marks, without any explanation of what those uses were. This conclusory statement did not allow Judge Moran to determine whether plaintiff was alleging that defendants made derivative works from plaintiff's copyrighted materials, used ideas from the materials, which would not be an infringement, or just kept possession of copyrighted materials, which would be a contract claim.

On the final notice pleading issue, Judge Moran discussed in detail the tension between notice pleading and the Seventh Circuit's requirement that plaintiff must identify "concrete secrets" in trade secret misappropriation claims. The court found that plaintiff's "vague and conclusory" allegations of the misappropriation of plaintiff's "Papa John's System" were sufficient, although it noted that plaintiff would need to specifically identify the secrets at issue eventually and encourage plaintiff, in a footnote, to amend the complaint to further identify the secrets.

Finally, Judge Moran refused to dismiss the individual defendant from the case. Although corporate officers are generally not personally liable for the actions of their employers, in this case the individual defendant had signed contracts which, among other things, included the individual defendant's personal guarantee of the company's debts.