Court Denies Summary Judgment in Favor of Bench Trial

Bone Care, Int'l v. Pen Tech Pharm., No. 08 C 1083, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2011) (Dow, J.).

Judge Dow denied defendants' (collectively "Pentech") motion for summary judgment of invalidity for lack of enablement and written description. The Court also denied plaintiff Bone Care International's cross-motion for summary judgment that the patent-in-suit was enabled by its specification, in this patent case involving methods of treating hyperparathyroidism that is secondary to end-stage renal disease. The parties finished briefing their cross-motions weeks before a bench trial began, including the issues in the motion. And by the time of the opinion, the parties had filed extensive post-trial briefing -- the Court allowed briefs up to 280 pages in length. As such and in light of its coming opinion ruling on all factual issues, the Court did not provide a detailed analysis of its reasoning. Instead, it focused on one of the most common hurdles to summary judgment, the battle of the experts. The parties' experts set forth competing views of the facts and circumstances on the case. Because both parties relied upon those experts to make their cases, summary judgment was not proper.

The Court, however, did commit to resolve the issues as part of its written trial decision.

Sales to Sixteen Illinois Dentists Creates Jurisdiction

Dental Arts Lab. V. Studio 360, The Dental Lab, LLC, No. 10 CV 4535, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Nov. 23, 2010) (Dow, J.).

Judge Dow denied defendant's Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) motion to dismiss this Lanham Act dispute regarding plaintiff's 360 Dental Laboratories mark. Defendant was a Nevada entity which had sold product to sixteen Illinois dentists, making up 1.2% of defendant's gross revenue, and maintained a website that used the mark and offered defendant's products for sale. Plaintiff only argued that the Court had specific, not general jurisdiction. While defendant's contacts were minimal - sixteen customers and 1.2% of revenues - they involved the alleged tortious acts at issue. The sales, therefore, were sufficient minimum contacts to create specific jurisdiction. Although the Illinois sales were allegedly de minimus, each sale was allegedly a tortious act and the Court could have had jurisdiction based upon even one of the sales. Because defendant's venue arguments mirrored its jurisdiction arguments, venue was also proper.
 

Court has Personal Jurisdiction, but Venue is Improper

Moran Indus., Inc. v. Higdon, No. 07 C 6092, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill., Jul. 26, 2008) (Guzman, J.).

Judge Guzman held that the Court had personal jurisdiction over the defendants, but dismissed plaintiff’s trademark and breach of contract case for improper venue. Defendants, various franchisees of plaintiff, were all residents of and operated their franchises in various combinations of Indiana, Kentucky and Tennessee. Each relevant franchise agreement had a forum selection clause consenting to jurisdiction in the Northern District. But the Court held that the clause was permissive, allowing defendants to challenge personal jurisdiction. While defendants were not Illinois residents, their numerous contacts with plaintiff — sending plaintiff royalty payments and reports to Illinois and attending training in Illinois, among others — created personal jurisdiction.

 

While defendants were subject to personal jurisdiction in Illinois, the Court held that the Northern District was not the proper venue. A substantial part of the harm alleged occurred not in Illinois, but in Indiana, Kentucky and Tennessee. Those were the states where defendants allegedly failed to make payments, not Illinois. The Courts, therefore, dismissed the case.