Trial Counsel's Opinion - Related Documents Are Discoverable

Viskase v. World Pac, No. 09 C 5022, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 2010) (Bucklo, J.).

Judge Bucklo granted defendants' motion to reconsider, ordering production of the "Merritt Memo" previously held to be privileged because it included litigation counsel. The Court held that litigation counsel, before becoming litigation counsel, was the principal conduit to opinion counsel and his opinion was sought in connection with opinion counsel's analysis. The Court, however, held that no post-filing communications were discoverable in light of In re Seagate which provided post-filing protection where a preliminary injunction was denied. 

False Claims Act Does Not Bar Multiple False Marking Suits

Simonian v. Hunter Fan Co., No. 10 C 1212, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jul. 8, 2010) (St. Eve, J.).

Judge St. Eve denied defendant Hunter Fan's motion to dismiss plaintiff's false patent marking case. Hunter Fan argued that the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because approximately four hours before this suit was filed, another plaintiff filed a separate suit in the Northern District of Texas accusing Hunter Fan of the same alleged false patent marking. The False Claim Act did have a first-to-file provision, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5), but the provision expressly limited its application to False Claims Act cases. Because false patent marking is part of the Patent Act, not the False Claims Act, the first-to-file limitation was not applicable. 

In reply, Hunter Fan argued that 35 U.S.C. § 292 allowed for only a single claim, and that the reasoning of the False Claim Act's first-to-file rule should have been applied to the false patent marking statute.  Hunter Fan, however, waived these arguments by failing to make them in its opening brief. 

Affirmative Defense Struck for Insufficient Pleading

MPC Containment Sys., Ltd. v. Moreland, No. 05 C 6973, 2008 WL 1775501 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 2008) (Aspen, J.).*

Judge Aspen granted in part plaintiff MPC Containment's ("MPC") Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) motion to strike defendants' (collectively "Moreland") waiver and unclean hands defenses. The Court struck Moreland's unclean hands defense. Moreland alleged unclean hands based upon MPC’s allegedly fraudulent procurement of a patent related to the flexible tank technology at issue. But the Court held that Moreland failed to show that MPC's alleged fraud was somehow directed at Moreland. Furthermore, while the patented technology is related to the technology in suit, MPC's alleged misconduct in obtaining the patent had no connection to this suit.

The Court, however, allowed Moreland’s waiver defense. Moreland did not specifically plead that MPC voluntarily relinquished its rights to the claims in suit. But it was sufficient that voluntary relinquishment could be inferred from the pleadings.

Click here for more on this case in the Blog's archives.

Failure to Object at a Deposition Waives Privilege

Rowe Int'l. Corp. v. Ecast, Inc., __ F. Supp.2d __, 2007 WL 831772 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2007) (Kennelly, J.).

Judge Kennelly held that plaintiff Arachnid waived its privilege as to a limited scope of information and held that Arachnid's related uses of the information did not rise to the level of the crime-fraud exception, even if they may have been inequitable conduct.  Arachnid filed a motion seeking the return of three inadvertently produced, privileged "patent reports."  Defendants filed a cross-motion to compel production of privileged materials arguing that Arachnid waived the privilege as to the three documents and that the crime-fraud exception destroyed the privilege to the extent it was not waived.  The Court agreed that the patent reports were inadvertently produced, but still held the privilege was waived on a limited scope of information.  In 1999, a former Arachnid employee testified that he learned from Arachnid's attorneys that "the only way we would receive [one of] the patent[s-in-suit] was if we included that information."  While a former employee cannot waive the privilege, Arachnid's attorneys attended the deposition in question and failed to object to the question or the answer.  Additionally, Arachnid later turned the transcript over to the PTO during prosecution of a subsequent application and to defendants during production in the instant case.  These actions combined to waive the privilege as to the specific information discussed by the ex-employee, the inclusion of figure 2 in the patent.

The Court then held that the crime-fraud exception did not apply.  Defendants argued that Arachnid's counsel's statements to the PTO during examination that a prior art reference identified as Sidi was "fundamentally different" from the examined invention was fraudulent because the inadvertently disclosed patent reports showed that counsel believed the Sidi reference anticipated some or all of Arachnid's application.  But the Court held that hold attorney argument to that high a standard would chill legal representation.  For example, the Court noted that defendants' requested standard would prevent a criminal defense attorney from warning his client that he would surely be convicted, but then arguing to the jury that the government had not proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt.