Court Reconsiders Ruling re Patent Settlement Agreement

Balshe LLC v. Ross, No. 08 C 3256, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jul. 7, 2011) (Zagel, J.).

Judge Zagel granted in part defendants' motion to reconsider the Court's prior ruling regarding the parties' settlement agreement in this case regarding a patent to a system of pooling life insurance policies to create a predictable income stream. Pursuant to the agreement, defendants were to transfer their respective interests in the patent to newly-created, third party Institutional Pooled Benefits LLC ("IPB"). Defendants refused to transfer their rights, arguing that provisions of IPB's operating agreement were in tension with the agreement.

The Court held that, while the agreement did not require that defendants sign IPB's operating agreement, terms of the operating agreement did require defendants' signature. Those signatures, however, were mere formalities.

Defendants' argument that they did not agree to naming the Newco contemplated by the agreement IPB was no different than the argument in defendants' original papers and was, therefore, improper as a motion for reconsideration.

The Court denied defendants' request, in its reply brief, for additional relief. Defendants were limited to the relief sought in their motion to reconsider.

Normally, courts do not consider new evidence presented in a reply. But in light of the particular circumstances of this case, the Court considered defendants' new evidence offered in their reply.
 

Vendor's Patent License Covers Private Label Resellers

Illinois Computer Research, LLC v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., No. 10 C 4298, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jun. 29, 2011) (Zagel, J.).

Judge Zagel granted defendants (collectively "Best Buy") summary judgment that its Rocketfish sound cards were already licensed because they were designed and manufactured by license from Creative Products ("Creative") for Best Buy.

First, Best Buy's vendor Ectiva was an Affiliate of Creative. Best Buy's documents showed a clear relationship between the parties. The fact that Best Buy's evidence was only authenticated by counsel's declaration did not prevent considering the evidence for several reasons:

  1. FRE 902(3) allows the Court discretion to consider certain evidence that had not been finally authenticated.
     
  2. Plaintiff offered no evidence or even argument that the documents were fraudulent or otherwise amendable.
     
  3. Best Buy ultimately produced certified copies of the evidence.

The Court also held that the Rockefish sound cards were Creative products. The Court already held that Ectiva was an Affiliate of Creative, and plaintiff did not dispute that the soundcards were manufactured for Creative and its affiliates, including Ectiva.

Finally, Creative was not acting as a foundry for Best Buy. Best Buy's uncontroverted declarations established that Creative, not Best Buy, designed the soundcards.

Northern District of Illinois Patent Program Begins

The patent pilot program started this month in the Northern District and across the country.  The pilot program is a ten-year look at ways to handle patent cases more effectively.  The main component of the pilot program is judges in pilot districts, including the Northern District, self-selecting as patent judges.  Patent cases will continue to be randomly assigned to all Northern District judges.  But when a non-patent judge is assigned a patent case that judge will have thirty days to order reassignment of the case.  When reassignment is ordered, the case will be randomly reassigned to one of the patent judges.  There will also be patent-related education and programs offered for the patent judges across the country. 

One unanswered question about the pilot program remains:  If a non-patent judge was assigned a patent case less than thirty days before the program kicked off on September 19, can the non-patent judge order the patent case reassigned pursuant to the pilot program?  I have not seen it happen yet, but I suspect it could over the next week or two.

The Northern District issued the following list of judges who have self-selected as patent judges:

  • Chief Judge James F. Holderman
     
  • Judge Ruben Castillo
     
  • Judge John W. Darrah
     
  • Judge Gary S. Feinerman
     
  • Judge Virginia Kendall
     
  • Judge Matthew F. Kennelly
     
  • Judge Joan Humphrey Lefkow
     
  • Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer
     
  • Judge Amy J. St. Eve
     
  • Judge James B. Zagel

Mutual Non-Compliance With Local Rule 56.1 Avoids Procedural Grant or Denial

Healix Infusion Therapy, Inc. v. HHI Infusion Servs., Inc., No. 10 C 3772, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 2011) (Zagel, J.).

Judge Zagel denied plaintiff Healix's motion for summary judgment as to defendant HHI's alleged tortious interference and denied HHI's motion to dismiss Healix's tortious interference claim. The motion to dismiss was premised upon application of Washington law, but the Court held that Texas law applied and the claim was properly plead.

Regarding summary judgment, both parties "cried foul" as to the other's Local Rule 56.1 compliance. The Court held that both parties were correct. But in light of the mutual non-compliance, the Court considered the substance of the motion, instead of resolving it on procedural grounds. Additionally, the Court held that emails offered as evidence were admissible over a hearsay objection as business records pursuant to FRE 803(6). Finally, the Court held that there was a question of fact as to whether HHI's alleged interference was willful and intentional.
 

Allegations of Defendant's Acts as a Group Sufficient to Plead Copyright and Trademark Infringement

Healix Infusion Therapy, Inc. v. HHI Infusion Servs., Inc., No. 10 C 3772, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 2011) (Zagel, J.).

Judge Zagel granted in part defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff Healix Infusion Therapy's ("Healix") complaint, which included copyright infringement, trademark infringement and tortious interference claims, all related to the parties' competition for medical infusion services, as follows:

                                                                       Copyright

The Court dismissed Healix's claims for statutory damages on its copyright claims. The record showed that Healix filed for its copyright registrations after defendants began the alleged infringements, and more than three months after first publication. As a result, statutory damages were not recoverable. Healix could only receive actual damages. Furthermore, the Court denied Healix's request to amend its pleadings to include a demand for actual damages because Healix had already filed four complaints in the case and never sought actual damages.

                                                                       Trademark

Although sparse, Healix's trademark claims were sufficiently plead. Defendants argued that Healix had not pled use in commerce. But it was sufficient that Healix pled that Defendants displayed Healix's marks to the public and that Defendants allegedly copied Healix's marks with intent to use them in selling Defendants services to the consuming public.

                                                                  Tortious Interference

The Court took Defendants' motion to dismiss Healix's tortious interference claim under advisement, in favor of a fully briefed summary judgment motion on the issue that more fully set out the relevant facts.

The Court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss defendant Metro Infectious Disease Consultants ("Metro"). Defendants argued that Metro was never specifically accused to have committed any acts in the complaint. Instead, Healix defined as a single entity three defendants, including Metro. But the Court held that it was sufficient in this instance for Healix to group Metro with two other defendants and make all allegations against Metro as part of the defined entity.

Court Dismisses Case and Considers Unenforceability With Exceptional Case Motion

Gordon-Darby Sys., Inc. v. Applus Techs., Inc., No. 10 C 1863, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Dec. 23, 2010) (Zagel, J.).

Judge Zagel granted plaintiff's motion to dismiss its patent infringement claims regarding vehicle emissions testing with prejudice and to dismiss defendants' noninfringement, invalidity and unenforceability claims without prejudice. After the parties engaged in some discovery, plaintiff determined that it no longer wanted to pursue its claims and gave defendants a covenant not to sue. Based upon that covenant, the parties agreed that all of their claims should be dismissed, except for defendants' inequitable conduct claims. Defendants argued that those claims were related to its 35 U.S.C. Section § 285 claim to make the case exceptional and award defendants their attorney's fees. Citing the Federal Circuit's decision in Monsanto Co. v. Bayer Bioscience N.V., 514 F.3d 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2008), the Court held that, although the Federal Circuit had not squarely decided the issue, the precedent was clear that the covenant divested the Court of subject matter jurisdiction over the inequitable conduct declamatory judgment claim.

The Court, however, retained independent jurisdiction over defendants' Section § 285 claim to make the case exceptional and award defendants their attorney's fees. And the Court acknowledged that it could consider unenforceability as part of the exceptional case analysis, which could trigger a holding that the patents in suit were unenforceable due to inequitable conduct.
 

N.D. Illinois Judicial Panel: Judge Zagel

The Federal Bar Association - an excellent group that is worth joining (disclosure: I am a member) - recently held a panel of Northern District judges. Here are my notes regarding Judge Zagel's comments:

  • The most valuable cost control tool Judge Zagel has found is an early deposition, often of a 30(b)(6) designee, allowing for a second deposition later in the case. The early deposition tends to narrow discovery and case issues.
     
  • Clerks write first drafts of Judge Zagel's opinions, with one clerk taking even cases and the other taking odd numbered cases. Clerks can write first drafts because a majority of cases are inadequately prosecuted or defended and, therefore, do not result in motions that are difficult, close calls.
     
  • Judge Zagel writes 10-15% of his own opinions.
     
  • Judge Zagel does voir dire by himself. Counsel do not ask questions.
     

Defendant Waived Personal Jurisdiction by Its Actions, If Not Its Filings

Salud Natural Entrepreneur, Inc. v. Nutricento Internacional, Inc., No. 09 C 4417, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 2011) (Zagel, J.).

Judge Zagel denied defendant Azteca Products' ("Azteca") Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in this Lanham Act case. Azteca's officer, a non-lawyer, purported to file an answer on Azteca's behalf. Azteca then hired counsel who participated in Rule 26 scheduling conferences. Azteca's officer then filed a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss without counsel, which the Court struck because it was not filed by counsel, and a corporate entity cannot act pro se. The Court then entered a default judgment and an injunction against Azteca. Azteca hired counsel and asked through counsel that the default be vacated. The Court vacated the judgment and agreed to consider whether Azteca's personal jurisdiction arguments had been waived. Noting the "bizarre posture of the case, the Court held that Azteca had not preserved its jurisdiction arguments.

The answer did not waive Azteca's arguments because as a pro se filing it was treated as never having been filed. But counsel did participate in Rule 26(f) conferences, although he filed no notice of appearance, and offered no suggestion that Azteca would challenge jurisdiction during that time. Furthermore, jurisdiction was challenged for the first time more than thirty days after the other defendants settled based upon discussions that Azteca did not participate in. Regardless of the legal impact of Azteca's filings, by the time Azteca challenge jurisdiction, plaintiff had developed a "reasonable expectation" that Azteca would defend itself in Illinois.
 

Lack of Documentation Regarding Use at the Relevant Time Prevents Summary Judgment

Eazypower Corp. v. Jore Corp., No. 04 C 6372, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Oct. 20, 2010) (Zagel, J.).

Judge Zagel denied defendant Jore's ("Jore") motion for summary judgment of invalidity in this patent dispute regarding screwdrivers with flexible extension shafts. As a preliminary matter, plaintiff Eazypower repeatedly failed to comply with Local Rule 56.1 regarding statements of material fact. Despite that, the Court accepted Eazypower's additional facts and responses to Jore's statements of fact because Jore had sufficient opportunity to respond to them.

Jore argued that a particular screwdriver with a flexible extension shaft, the FB-19, was sold in the United States in the mid-1980s and was invalidating prior art. Eazypower did not dispute that the FB-19 taught each element of the identified patent claims. But Eazypower did dispute that the FB-19 was in fact prior art. First, Eazypower argued that Jore had not sufficiently corroborated its evidence that the FB-19 was sold in the United States in the mid-1980s. Jore's corroborating evidence - several third parties with knowledge - was sufficient. But there was evidence conflicting with Jore's position. An age analysis of the FB-19 packaging suggested that it had been built in the late 1970s or early 1980s, but it also showed traces of an adhesive that was not available in the mid-1980s. Additionally, Eazypower showed that relevant shipping records for the period did not show any sales or import of FB-19s. The Court, therefore, held that there was a question of material fact and denied summary judgment.
 

Court Tries Lanham Act Case on the Papers

RNA Corp. v. The Procter & Gamble Co., No. 08 C 5953, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2010) (Zagel, J.).

Judge Zagel held that defendant Procter & Gamble's ("P&G") intellectual property rights could not be held infringed based upon the available evidence and held that on the available record, the Court could not grant attorney's fees because a prevailing party could not be determined, in this Lanham Act case regarding P&G's alleged trademarks and trade dress in its Herbal Essence hydrating shampoos and conditioners. Through a series of settlement conferences, the parties agreed to the scope of a preliminary and then a permanent injunction, but were unable to determine money damages issues. The parties, therefore, agreed to submit the remaining issues to trial by the Court on the papers. The Court, therefore, ruled based upon the parties' written submissions. In my experience, this is a relatively unique way to resolve and especially to try a case in federal court. And it is an excellent example of how willing the Northern District bench tends to be to find cost-effective ways to resolve what are otherwise often prohibitively expensive intellectual property disputes.
 

Discovery Motion Denied for Failure to Meet and Confer

Healix Infusion Therapy, Inc. v. HHI Infusion Servs., Inc., No. 10 C 3772, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 2010) (Zagel, J.).

Judge Zagel denied plaintiff Healix's motion to compel and its motion for sanctions. The motion to compel was denied without substantive analysis for failing to meet and confer with defendant pursuant to Local Rule 37.2. The motion for contempt was denied because defendant had complied with the Court's general orders to produce documents and respond to subpoenas. Defendant did produce documents and respond to the subpoenas. Defendant did not violate those orders by refusing to produce specific documents while producing others.

Marking With Expired Patent Sufficient for Pleading Intent

Simonian v. Bunn-O-Matic Corp., No. 10 C 1203, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2010) (Zagel, J.).

Judge Zagel stayed plaintiff Simonian's false patent marking case pending the Federal Circuit's standing decision in Stauffer - which has since issued, holding that any person has standing without regard to injury in fact.

The Court also indicated that, once the stay was lifted, it would deny defendant's Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Simonian's complaint for failure to adequately plead intent to deceive pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Simonian pled that defendant knowingly marked its coffeemakers with expired patents. That was sufficient to meet the rebuttable presumption of intent as set out in Solo Cup. It did not matter that Simonian's claims were generic as evidenced by the use of nearly identical allegations in more than forty false patent marking cases Simonian had filed in the Northern District of Illinois.

Supreme Court Intellectual Property Preview at Chicago-Kent

 

Chicago Kent has an excellent program coming up on September 30, 2010 at 1:00pm. Kent has gathered a very impressive group of experts to kick off its inaugural Supreme Court Intellectual Property Review. The Northern District's own Judge Zagel will be a featured speaker.

The program promises to address the big IP decisions from last year's Supreme Court: American Needle, Inc. v. NFL, Bilski v. Kappos, and Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick. The event will also look at significant IP cases that await certiorari decisions, including Costco v. Omega, S.A., and Schwarzenegger v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n.

In addition to Judge Zagel, the impressive panel includes:

  • Donald Chisum, author of Chisum on Patents, Patent Law Digest and Chisum Patent Law Reference Guides;
  • Roy T. Englert, Jr., of Robbins, Russell, Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber LLP (counsel for Costco);
  • Randal C. Picker, Paul H. and Theo Leffmann Professor of Commercial Law at the University of Chicago Law School; and
  • Paul M. Smith of Jenner & Block LLP (counsel for Entertainment Merchants Association and Entertainment Software Association).

Other speakers include: 

  • Thomas C. Goldstein of Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP and publisher of SCOTUSblog;
  • Deborah Jones Merritt, John Deaver Drinko-Baker & Hostetler Chair in Law at Moritz College of Law, Ohio State University (court-appointed amicus in Reed Elsevier);
  • Jeffrey M. Carey, general counsel of American Needle, Inc.; and
  • Scott E. Gant of Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP.

The program is free of charge, but requires registration. Contact Patricia O’Neal at (312) 906-5128 or ipconference@kentlaw.edu for registration or more information.

 

Court Enters Judgment on Trademark Damages and Attorneys Fees in Accordian Case

Gabbanelli Accordions & Imports, L.L.C. v. Italo-Am. Accordion Mfg. Co., No. 02 C 4048, Slip. Op. (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2009) (Zagel, J.).

Judge Zagel entered judgment on behalf of plaintiffs in the amount of $151,200 in lost profits after the Seventh Circuit affirmed the Court's judgment.* The Court also held defendants jointly and severally liable for $147,576.12 in plaintiff's attorneys' fees.

* Click here for more on this case in the Blog's archives.

N.D. Illinois Local Patent Rules Will Drive Cases to Chicago

The most popular posts on the Blog during 2009, in terms of both views and reader questions, were those on the Local Patent Rules.  Because of high interest, I have plans for additional analysis this year.  This is the first of those posts.  In late 2009, I had an article published in Bloomberg Law discussing why the new Rules will drive patent cases to the Northern District of Illinois.  Bloomberg generously allowed me to post a pdf version of the story -- click here to download it -- and to repost it on the blog.  Here is the article:

The Northern District of Illinois enacted Local Patent Rules ("LPR" or "Rules") on October 1, 2009. The purpose of the Rules is to normalize patent litigation in the Northern District of Illinois and to streamline the patent litigation discovery process. See LPR, Preamble. The rules also make clear that the court does not intend to become a "rocket docket." In fact, the Rules create a schedule that would have cases ready for trial in a little over two years, although cases would not necessarily be tried at that time. That is at most a modest change from the court's average time to trial for all cases—about twenty-seven months, according to the most recent Federal Court Management Statistics.

The Northern District of Illinois did not intend that its new Rules would drive patent cases to Chicago, as has happened when other courts enacted local patent rules, such as the Eastern District of Texas. But despite its intentions, the Northern District of Illinois's plan to normalize patent litigation practice and streamline discovery will significantly increase patent filings in Chicago. To understand why the Rules will increase case filings, it is important to understand the process created by the Rules, and then look at the impact specific Rules will have for both patentholders and accused infringers.

 

The Rules

The Rules were drafted and revised after public comment by a committee comprised of practitioners representing a cross-section of the District's patent bar and four Northern District of Illinois judges: Chief Judge James F. Holderman, Judge Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge James B. Zagel, and Judge Amy J. St. Eve. The Rules were then enacted by the Northern District of Illinois judges.

The Rules require early discovery through substantial production obligations accompanying all parties' Initial Disclosures. The Rules also require parties to take early positions on the merits of their claims and defenses in the form of Initial Contentions, presumably based upon documents exchanged with Initial Disclosures. Finally, the Rules position claim construction at the end of fact discovery, and show a preference against summary judgment motions prior to claim construction.

Here is a more detailed look at the schedule and duties contemplated by the Rules:

Protective Order. A standard two-tier protective order is deemed entered when Initial Disclosures are served. LPR 1.4. Any party is free to seek modifications to the protective order. Id. The automatic entry of the order prevents discovery delays while parties negotiate a proposed protective order and reduces legal fees for the negotiation.

Initial Disclosures & Production. Two weeks after the accused infringer answers, or two weeks after the patentholder answers any counterclaims, the parties must exchange substantive, non-evasive Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a) Initial Disclosures. LPR 2.1. And along with the Initial Disclosures, the parties must exchange initial document production.

LPR 2.1(a) requires patentholders to produce all documents regarding: 1) any sale, offer for sale or use of the patented invention before filing; 2) design, reduction to practice, or invention of the patented technology generally; 3) all communications with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (the prosecution history) for the patents in suit and any patents from which they claim priority; and 4) ownership of the patent. LPR 2.1(b) requires that along with its Initial Disclosures, an accused infringer produce: 1) documents sufficient to show the operation and construction of each element of any product or process specifically accused in the Complaint; and 2) copies of all known prior art. Additionally, all parties are required to identify which documents, by Bates number, fall into each required production category. For cases in which there are lengthy lists of accused products, both the production and the identification of documents by categories could be a significant undertaking early in a case.

Initial Contentions. Two weeks after Initial Disclosures are served, parties claiming patent infringement serve Initial Infringement Contentions that will likely be substantive because the patentholder should have the accused infringer's Initial Disclosure document production. LPR 2.2. Two weeks after Initial Infringement Contentions are served, accused infringers serve Initial Non-infringement, Unenforceability and Invalidity Contentions. LPR 2.3. Along with these contentions, accused infringers must produce any additional documents relied upon including prior art and technical information. Two weeks later, patentholders must serve an Initial Response to Invalidity Contentions. LPR 2.5.

 

Final Contentions. Twenty-one weeks after Initial Infringement Contentions, parties claiming infringement serve Final Infringement Contentions, and accused infringers serve Final Unenforceability and Invalidity Contentions at the same time. LPR 3.1. Four weeks later, accused infringers serve Final Non-infringement Contentions and parties claiming patent infringement serve Final Enforceability and Validity Contentions (after the final contentions, leave of Court is required for any amendments). LPR 3.2. This gives the parties about four months to complete the bulk of their technical discovery and depositions.

Final Contentions are not amendable without a Court order upon a showing of good cause and an absence of unfair prejudice to the opposing party. LPR 3.4. In a comment, the court noted that its adoption of a new, unargued claim construction would be an example of good cause.

 

Deadline for Stays Pending Reexamination. No party can seek a stay pending reexamination after serving its Final Contentions. LPR 3.5. The Rule, however does not create a presumption for staying cases pending reexamination prior to the cutoff date. Id.

Claim Construction. The claim construction process begins two weeks after defendant's Final Invalidity Contentions are served with an exchange of terms and proposed constructions. LPR 4.1(a). Within seven days of exchanging terms, the parties must meet and confer to agree upon no more than ten terms for construction by the court. Presenting more than ten terms requires prior leave of court and requires a showing of good cause. LPR 4.1(b).

 

Claim Construction Briefing. Five weeks after exchanging terms, accused infringers file opening claim construction briefs along with a joint appendix by all parties including the patents in suit and their prosecution histories consecutively paginated. LPR 4.2(a)-(b). Parties claiming patent infringement have four weeks to file response briefs. LPR 4.2(c). Accused infringers have fourteen days to file a reply. LPR 4.2(d). Any party offering witness testimony must include a sworn declaration and promptly make the witness available for deposition. If witness testimony is included in a response brief, the reply deadline is extended by seven days.

After the reply brief is filed, the parties have seven days to file a joint claim construction chart setting out each claim term, the proposed constructions, and the parties' proposal for a claim construction hearing.

 

Claim Construction Hearing. The Rules contemplate a claim construction hearing four weeks after the reply brief, but the judge can decline a hearing. LPR 4.3. The lack of a hearing may be a reason to allow a sur-reply brief. Id. A judge also may decide not to accept a reply brief. The parties must exchange all exhibits, including demonstratives, at least three days before a claim construction hearing. Id.

 

Fact Discovery Close. Fact discovery closes six weeks after the claim construction rulings, which triggers expert discovery followed by a dispositive motion deadline. LPR 1.3. Fact discovery is also suspended from four weeks after the LPR 4.1(a) exchange of claim terms, until the Court enters a claim construction ruling. LPR 1.3. This leaves parties free to focus on claim construction briefing without dealing with discovery issues at the same time.

 

Expert Discovery. Three weeks after the close of fact discovery, parties must make their initial expert witness disclosures for non-claim construction issues on which they have the burden of proof. LPR 5.1(b). Five weeks later, rebuttal expert witness disclosures are due. LPR 5.1(c). Expert depositions must be finished five weeks later. LPR 5.2. Supplementation of expert reports after the LPR 5.1 deadlines is presumed prejudicial and is not allowed absent a showing that the material could not have been added or amended earlier and that there is no unfair prejudice. LPR 5.3.

Trial. Cases should be trial ready approximately two years after the filing of the complaint. This would be slightly faster than the Northern District of Illinois's average time to trial of twenty seven months. But the Rules do not require that trial occur at that time, just that the case is ready for trial.

The Rules Will Drive Patent Cases to Chicago

While the Northern District has made clear that it is not transforming itself into a "rocket docket" like the District of Virginia or the Western District of Wisconsin, the newly enacted Rules will significantly increase patent litigation filings in Chicago. The cases will not proceed to trial faster than the Northern District's average for Eastern all cases of slightly more than twenty-seven months, but the path to trial will be significantly different as described above. The changes are even-handed, with Rules benefiting patentholders being largely offset by the Rules that benefit accused infringers. One might expect even-handed Rules to have little impact on filings, but in this case patentholders will conclude that the Rules provide enough value to overcome the Rules that benefit accused infringers. The Rules, therefore, will draw patent cases to the Northern District. Here are the particular elements of the Rules that will attract patent plaintiffs to the Northern District, along with an analysis of how the Rules nevertheless also benefit accused infringers.

 

1. Substantive Initial Disclosures & Document Production.

LPR 2.1 requires that parties exchange significant discovery along with their Initial Disclosures. In particular, accused infringers must produce documents sufficient to show how all specifically accused products or processes operate. LPR. 2.1(b). This early document production, which is generally contemplated by Rule 26 but almost never done in practice, will be a major draw for patentholders. The ability to get immediate technical information in discovery, without the expense of serving document requests, is significant. It allows patentholders to have information before preparing their Initial Infringement Contentions. Patentholders will also get a preview of invalidity defenses and patentholders receive all of this information early in the case, before they incur significant discovery costs.

But while LPR 2.1 will attract patent plaintiffs, it also benefits accused infringers. As described above, patentholders must make an initial document production as well, and their obligation is more significant. LPR 2.1(a). Additionally, as with accused infringers, patentholders must identify which documents correspond to each of the four categories. Having this early information will allow accused infringers to evaluate their defenses early in the case and prepare for early dispositive motions such as motions challenging ownership or validity based upon a bar date. And the documents will allow accused infringers to update affirmative defenses or add counterclaims before there could be any prejudice.

Finally, the accused infringers' production obligation regarding its products is only triggered if the patentholder specifically identifies the accused products in its complaint. This will strongly encourage plaintiffs to identify the accused products in the complaint. A standard which comports with the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standards and will lead to more focused patent litigations. R. David Donoghue, The Uneven Application of Twombly in Patent Cases: An argument for Leveling the Playing Field, 8 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. 1.1 (2008).

2. Defendant opens and closes Markman briefing.

Most Districts either have two rounds of concurrent claim construction briefing or a traditional opening-response-reply schedule with the patentholder opening and replying. Significantly, the Rules provide for a single set of briefs, with the accused infringer—not the patentholder—submitting the initial and final briefs. The court reasoned that this briefing schedule provided the best, most coherent set of papers because a patentholder's opening brief often argues for "ordinary" meanings of most terms without specific proposed definitions. Then after the accused infringer offers constructions in its response, the patentholder offers detailed constructions of those terms for the first time on reply. That scenario either leaves the accused infringer without a chance to answer the patentholder's constructions on the papers, or it requires a sur-reply. Similarly, concurrent briefing results in the parties arguing past each other, generating briefs that do not fully crystallize the issues for the court. Writing first and last, of course, benefits the accused infringer. But the patentholder saves money by only writing one brief and can make any follow up arguments during a hearing or seek a sur-reply if the court does not hold a hearing.

 

3. Late Claim Construction briefing.

The final major draw for patentholders is the late claim construction proceedings. In addition to cost savings in the briefing process, claim construction is set during the end of a floating fact discovery period that is scheduled to end forty-five days after the court rules on claim construction. Maintaining pre-claim construction uncertainty through most of discovery benefits patentholders. Furthermore, the Rules make clear that a judge can disregard early dispositive motions that would require claim construction before the claim construction contemplated by the Rules. LPR 1.1. So, patentholders may face fewer early summary judgment motions.

 

Conclusion

The Northern District of Illinois's Local Patent Rules are evenhanded, benefiting both patentholders and accused infringers. But the specific benefits afforded patentholders will drive patentholders to file in the Northern District of Illinois over other courts, some that may have faster times to trial.

 

R. David Donoghue is a litigation partner in Holland & Knight's Intellectual Property Group focusing on patent disputes. His practice spans diverse technology areas including cellular telephony, computer software, internet technologies, pharmaceuticals, automotive technologies, television production equipment, nutritional supplements, and numerous medical devices. He also has extensive intellectual property licensing experience. Mr. Donoghue was previously with Delphi, the world's largest automotive supplier, where he was a founding member of Delphi's Technology Licensing and Litigation group. Additionally, Mr. Donoghue founded and authors the Chicago IP Litigation Blog where he analyzes intellectual property cases in the Northern District of Illinois (www.chicagoiplitigation.com). He can be reached by phone at 312.578.6553 or by email at david.donoghue@hklaw.com.

© 2009 Bloomberg Finance L.P. All rights reserved. Originally published by Bloomberg Finance L.P in the Vol. 3, No. 48 edition of the Bloomberg Law Reports – Intellectual Property. Reprinted with permission. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not represent those of Bloomberg Finance L.P. Bloomberg Law Reports® is a registered trademark and service mark of Bloomberg Finance L.P.

 

IP News Shorts

Here are several stories that I have been wanting to blog about, but have not been able to get to because of the new Local Patent Rules, my webinar on reducing IP litigation costs (I was glad to see that so many of you attended and found the presentation valuable) and pressing client matters:

  • Judge Zagel was interviewed by Metropolitan Corporate Counsel.  He discussed how his docket has been impacted by the recession and  noted, among other things, that parties have been much more interested in and willing to agree to staying cases or slow discovery -- click here to read the story.  He also briefly discusses discovery of electronically stored information.
     
  • Seattle Trademark Lawyer Michael Atkins has an excellent series of posts on the US Olympic Committee's enforcement of the Olympic marks, to which it has almost absolute rights based upon federal law -- click here, here, here, here and here.  I had planned to write about these issues myself early this week while Chicago enjoyed winning the 2016 Summer Olympics, but as you all likely know by now that is not quite how the vote went.

Same Patent Not Enough for Reassignment of Plaintiff's Suits to One Judge

Bajer Design & Marketing Inc. v. Ware Mfg. Inc., No. 09 C 1425, Min. Order (N.D. Ill. Jun 11, 2009) (Kendall, J.).

Judge Kendall denied plaintiff Bajer's motion to reassign its second filed patent infringement suit pending before Judge Zagel asserting the patent in suit to Judge Kendall pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 42 and Local Rule 40.4. The cases met two of the four Rule 40.4(b) requirements for reassignment because both cases were pending in the Northern District and because both cases were at similar stages with defendants having just answered, such that reassignment would not slow progress of the first case. The Court also noted that a single Markman proceeding and set of claim constructions was a benefit of reassignment. But the potential for a uniform claim construction was outweighed by the fact that defendants' accused products and, therefore, noninfringement positions were significantly different. Based upon the differing noninfringement positions and other possible differences in the parties defenses, the Court held that reassignment would not achieve the required substantial savings of judicial time and effort.

Product Sales Including Infringing Product is Evidence of Commercial Success

Krippelz v. Ford Motor Co., No. 98 C 2361, Min. Order (N.D. Ill. Dec. 5, 2008) (Zagel, J.).

Judge Zagel ruled upon various motions in limine.  Of particular interest, the Court denied defendants motion for reconsideration of the Court's grant of summary judgment of infringement.  The Court held that the evidence defendant used to create a material question of fact was inadmissible.  And while the motion could be construed to include new arguments, they were too late to overcome summary judgment.

The Court also granted plaintiff's motion to preclude defendant's evidence of noninfringing alternatives because plaintiff was only seeking a reasonable royalty, not lost profits.  Finally, the Court denied defendant's motion to exclude evidence of defendant's vehicle sales as evidence of commercial excess.  While it is unlikely that anyone purchased a vehicle because of the infringing puddle lamp, the fact that defendant used the lamps in its vehicles and sold a "fair number" is evidence of commercial success.

Seventh Circuit American Jury Project

The Seventh Circuit instituted a Commission to study the implementation of the ABA Jury Project.  The Northern District was heavily represented on the Commission.  The following Northern District Judges were members of the Commission:  Bucklo, Brown, Coar, Darrah, Denlow, Der-Yeghiayan, Gottschall, Holderman, Kennelly, Lefkow, Moran, Schenkier, St. Eve, and Zagel.  The Commission recently published its report -- click here to read it.  The report describes a two phase analysis.  In the first phase, district judges tested the following seven ABA Principles:

1.       Twelve-Person Juries;

 

2.       Jury Selection Questionnaires;

 

3.       Preliminary Substantive Jury Instructions;

 

4.       Trial Time Limits;

 

5.       Juror Questions;

 

6.       Interim Trial Statements by Counsel; and

 

7.       Enhanced Jury Deliberations.

Other Principles, such as juror notebooks and allowing jurors to take notes, were already in such widespread use that they were not tested.  Click here for the Phase One Project manual detailing the principles, the rationales and authority behind them, and suggested procedures.  Phase One resulted in questionnaires from 22 participating federal trial judges, 74 participating attorneys and 303 jurors from 38 trials that used one or more of the seven Principles.  Based upon the analysis of Phase One results and questionnaires, the Commission focused Phase Two on the following four Principles:

1.       Juror Questions;

 

2.       Interim Trial Statements by Counsel;

 

3.       Twelve-Person Juries; and

 

4.       Preliminary Substantive Jury Instructions.

These Principles were chosen because of Phase One popularity (78% of jurors reported that being able to ask questions increased their satisfaction with the process) and because of a desire to study the Principles more.  Click here for the Phase Two manual.

In Phase Two, 108 jurors from 12 trials employing one or more of the Phase Two Principles filled out questionnaires.  In addition, 12 attorneys and 4 district judges that participated also filled out questionnaires.  The results are interesting, but more importantly create the opportunity to powerfully impact the trial system across the Seventh Circuit in ways that benefit all of the stakeholders in the trial process -- the litigants, the jurors, the judge and the judge's chambers, and the litigators.

All four of the Phase Two Principles showed significant benefits to the trial process.  83% of jurors reported an increased understanding of the facts when allowed to ask written questions through a judge -- the questions were reworded to meet evidentiary rules.  And 75% of judges and 65% of attorneys thought the questions benefited jurors.  Similarly, preliminary substantive jury instructions were found to improve trials by jurors (80%), judges (85%) and attorneys (70%).  And the same was true for interim statements to the jury -- jurors (80%) and judges (85%).  Finally, twelve-person juries were found not to harm efficiency, while increasing juror diversity.

Each of the four Phase Two Principles, as well as several of the additional three Phase One Principles deserve more attention and analysis.  So, over the next several weeks I will provide follow up posts discussing the findings of those Principles in greater detail.  I will start with the idea of juror questions, which I find particularly important, later this week or early next.

Motion to Transfer Filed 11 Months After the Complaint is Denied

BorgWarner, Inc. v. Hilite Int’l., Inc., No. 07 C 3339, 2008 WL 3849908 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 14, 2008) (Zagel, J.)

Judge Zagel denied defendant Hilite’s 23 U.S.C. §1404(a) motion to transfer. Plaintiff BorgWarner filed this patent infringement suit over variable camshaft timing (“VCT”) in June 2007. Hilite answered and counterclaimed in March 2008. Five days after answering, Hilite filed a suit in the District of Delaware alleging that BorgWarner infringed Hilite’s VCT patent. Hilite reasoned that its VCT case was related to a prior Delaware patent case filed by BorgWarner on the patent currently at issue in the Northern District, and, therefore, by the transitive property this suit and BorgWarner’s closed Delaware case were related.

While the Seventh Circuit does not strictly follow the first-to-file rule, its use was warranted in this case. BorgWarner’s choice of forum deserved some deference. And the Northern District, while equivalent to Delaware in terms of time to trial, was significantly faster for average disposition without court actions – 6.2 months in the Northern District to 12.5 months in Delaware. Convenience factors were neutral, and therefore weighed in favor of keeping the case in the Northern District.

Jepson Claim Language Creates Presumption of a Limiting Preamble

Eazypower Corp. v. Jore Corp., No. 04 C 6372, 2008 WL 3849921 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 14, 2008) (Zagel, J.)

Judge Zagel construed the claims of plaintiff Eazypower’s patent to a portable screwdriver with a flexible shaft. Of particular interest, the Court held that despite Eazypower’s Jepson claim format, its preamble was not limiting. 

Jepson claiming is a drafting style – common in Europe, but relatively rare in the United States – in which the prior art is described in the preamble and the claimed improvements over the prior art are described in the body of the claim. The Court acknowledged that Jepson claims carry a rebuttable presumption that the claim’s preamble is limiting. But the Court held that the Eazypower rebutted the presumption in this case. The claim’s preamble, therefore, was not limiting. First, the Court relied upon two 2003 Northern District opinions, by Judges Guzman and St. Eve, holding that the preambles of the claims at issue overcame the presumption and were not limiting. While these opinions were not controlling, the Court found them well-reasoned and persuasive. The Court explained that the preambles were not limiting because they were “not necessary to give life to the claims,” citing Judge Guzman’s decision. Eazypower v. Vermont Am. Corp., No. 01 C 3252, 2003 WL 1720024, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2003).

Claim Construed Using Ordinary Meanings

ACCO Brands USA LLC v. SecuComputer, Inc., Nos. 03 C 1820, 06 C 7102, 07 C 0591, 2008 WL 2566863 (N.D. Ill., Jun. 25, 2008) (Zagel, J.).

Judge Zagel construed the claims of plaintiff’s patents to security locks for portable electronics, like laptops. The Court held that all term, but one had ordinary meanings that were not altered by the intrinsic evidence. Of particular note, the Court held that “about” had an ordinary meaning of “approximately.” The Court denied one defendant’s effort to limit “about” to within machining tolerances of dimensions set forth in a preferred embodiment.

Section 230 Gives Filtering ISPs Absolute Immunity

e360Insight, LLC v. Comcast Corp., No. 08 C 340, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Apr. 10, 2008) (Zagel, J.).

Judge Zagel granted defendant Comcast judgment on the pleadings, dismissing plaintiff e360Insight’s ("e360") Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, First Amendment, and related state law claims. e360, an Internet marketer and accused email spammer, alleged that Comcast harmed e360 by unjustifiably blocking all or most of e360’s emails from Comcast’s customer email accounts. Comcast stopped e360's emails with filtering software that identified and stopped emails from e360 addresses.

Comcast argued that the Good Samaritan clause of the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2), provided Comcast absolute immunity from e360's claims because Comcast voluntarily filtered e360's emails to restrict access to what Comcast believed was objectionable content. The Court held that the Good Samaritan clause provided absolute immunity for ISPs that filtered for objectionable material. The Court also held that Judge St. Eve's and the Seventh Circuit's recent Chicago Lawyers' Committee v. Craigslist opinions – click here for more on those cases – were not applicable. Those opinions limited the clause's protection for ISPs that chose not to filter. Because Comcast filtered, it enjoyed absolute protection. The Court also held that e360's compliance with Congress's spam prevention laws, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701-13 (Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003 ("CAN-SPAM") was irrelevant. Regardless of compliance with CAN-SPAM, the Good Samaritan clause still allowed the ISP to make a good faith judgment that e360's emails were objectionable. And e360 did not sufficiently plead Comcast's lack of good faith in determining that the emails were objectionable.

Eric Goldman at the Technology & Marketing Law Blog has a good post on this case and several other district court cases considering § 230(c) defenses. – click here for his post.

Judge Filip's Cases Reassigned

While Judge Filip heads to Washington as Deputy Attorney General, the Northern District has reassigned his cases — click here for the Executive Committee’s Order. At least the following IP cases have been reassigned:

Judge Andersen

1:07-cv-05666             Dicam, Inc. v. United States Cellular

Judge Dow

1:07-cv-02883             Kids Hope USA, Inc. v. Kids Hope United

Judge Kennelly

1:06-cv-05611             Liquid Dynamics Corporation v. Vaughn Co.

Judge Zagel

1:07-cv-03339             Borg Warner Inc. et al. v. Hilite International, Inc. et al.

Non-Participation Leads to Admission of Jurisdiction & a Judgment

Gabbanelli Accordions & Imports, L.L.C. v. Italo-Am. Accordion Mfg. Co. et al., No. 02 C 4048, 2008 WL 351860 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 2008) (Zagel, J.)*

Judge Zagel granted plaintiff summary judgment of trademark and trade dress infringement regarding plaintiff’s “wildly colorful” and “heavily ornamental” accordions. The Court awarded plaintiff approximately $500,000 in damages, attorneys fees and costs. Defendants – Italian entities that sold accordions in the United States – chose not to participate in the case. Instead, they filed an Italian case after this case was filed, but before defendants were served pursuant to the Hague Convention. The Court previously stayed a portion of the case pending the outcome of the Italian case, but noted that the stay may have been a mistake. Years after filing, the Italian case had not been resolved and defendants failed to participate in the U.S. proceeding based upon a belief that the Italian proceeding controlled. For example, defendants admitted personal jurisdiction when they failed to respond to jurisdictional Requests for Admission and instead of filing a motion to dismiss, defendants sent the Court an unsupported letter listing their complaints with the case and the Court’s jurisdiction over them. By failing to participate in discovery and not following the Court’s rules, defendants preempted whatever ability they might have had to make their case.

Practice tip: Participate and play by the rules. Even if you cannot or will not afford counsel, you must answer discovery, respond to motions and appear when required to. Failing to participate will not insulate you from judgment.

Click here for more on this case in the Blog’s archives.

Eolas v. Microsoft Trial Starts Next Week: A Call for Guest Bloggers

Eolas Tech. Inc.v. Microsoft Corp., No. 99 C 626 (N.D. Ill.) (Pallmeyer, J.).

The second Eolas v. Microsoft trial starts Monday, July 30.  The first trial, held before Judge Zagel, was about as close to a media frenzy as patent cases get.  I would love to live blog some or all of the trial.  But I cannot do it because my wife, Laura Donoghue, is a member of Microsoft's trial team.  However, if one of the Blog's readers wants to guest blog about the trial, send me an email and we can work something out.  If I do not get a guest blogger for the trial, I will post links to news coverage of the case without any commentary, for obvious reasons.

Ownership is a Copyright Prerequisite

DJ Photog. v. Wibert, Inc., No. 06 C 2215, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jul. 11, 2007) (Zagel, J.).*

Judge Zagel dismissed plaintiff's copyright infringement claim, held that its quantum meruit claim was preempted by the Copyright Act and, therefore, entered judgment in the case in favor of defendants.  Plaintiff DJ Photography argued that defendants infringed its copyrights in pictures of a burial vault and mourners at a graveside service.  But in their Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Undisputed Facts, defendants stated that the copyrights asserted were both registered by an individual, Donald Johnson, not DJ Photography.  Because DJ Photography did not dispute that Johnson owned the copyrights, the Court held that DJ Photography could not prove ownership of the copyrights and, because it did not own the copyrights, DJ Photography lacked standing to bring the suit.  The Court also held that the quantum meruit claim was preempted by the Copyright Act.

* Because the opinion has not been published electronically, you can read a copy of it here.

Court Chews on Idea of Importing Claim Limitation from the Specification

Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA LLC, No. 04 C 346, 2007 WL 1468630 (N.D. Ill. May 18, 2007) (Zagel, J.).

Judge Zagel construed the claims of the parties' patents, each to chewing gum containing physiological cooling agents.  The Court first construed "menthol" and "physiological cooling agent," but of particular interest was the Court's construction of "N-ethyl-p-methane-3-carboxamide."  Plaintiff/counter-defendant Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co.'s ("Wrigley") argued that the term in defendant/counter-plaintiff Cadbury Adams USA LLC's ("Cadbury") patent should be required to be at least 30% of the cooling composition of the gum based upon alleged disclaimers in the specification, as well as alleged judicial and prosecution history estoppel.  The Court stated that it was a very close issue, but held that the term was not required to make up at least 30% of the cooling composition.  The specification language relied upon by Wrigley was in the preferred embodiment and, therefore, should not be read into the claims.  And while Cadbury may have disclaimed using less than 30% of N-ethyl-p-methane-3-carboxamide in the cooling compound during both the prosecution of other patents and judicial proceedings regarding those patents, the patents had no direct relation to the patent in suit and, therefore, estoppel could not apply. 

Italian Contract Dispute Does Not Remove Court's Jurisdiction Over the Related Trademark Infringement Suit

Gabbanelli Accordions & Imports, L.L.C. v. Italo-Am. Accordion Manufacturing Co., No. 02 C 4048, 2007 WL 465423 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 6, 2007) (Zagel, J.).

Judge Zagel held that the Court had jurisdiction over plaintiff's trademark infringement action and ordered defendant to respond to plaintiff's summary judgment motion on the merits of the case.  In October 2002, the Court stayed the case pending resolution of contractual disputes related to ownership of the marks at issue in an Italian court.  The Court lifted the stay in May 2005.  Plaintiff distributed defendant's accordions in the United States.  In 1997, Plaintiff registered the mark at issue, which defendant claims to own.  While the contract at issue in the Italian court may play a role in determining ownership of the mark, the Court held that if plaintiff can prove ownership of the mark prior to the Agreement, then the Court can exercise jurisdiction and resolve the trademark infringement dispute.

Absolute Litigation Privilege Does Not Protect Patent Litigants

Conditioned Ocular Enhancement, Inc. v. Bonaventura, 05 C 3153, 2006 WL 2982140 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 2006) (Zagel, J.).

Judge Zagel held that Illinois's absolute litigation privilege, which protects communications leading up to a litigation, did not protect a patentholder's cease and desist letters because, in addition to federal preemption issues, the Illinois privilege is limited to defamation and false light claims.  Plaintiff alleged that defendant was practicing its patented vision training services.  In addition to filing suit, plaintiff also sent certain of defendant's customers cease and desist letters warning that defendant was unlawfully using plaintiff's patented vision training methods.  Defendant filed several Lanham Act and tortious interference counterclaims alleging that plaintiff's cease and desist letters were sent in bad faith.

In addition to its absolute litigation privilege argument, plaintiff also sought dismissal of the counterclaims arguing that its patent was presumed valid and that it had a right to enforce it.  But because the counterclaims alleged that the letters were sent in bad faith, the Court denied the motion to dismiss.  Parties have a right to enforce their patents, but not to use false statements in doing so.

Judge Zagel's opinion also provides a good road map for which Lanham Act and tortious interference claims require Rule 9(b) heightened pleading.