O.A. Cargo, Inc. v. OA Cargo Chicago, No. 12 C 5763, Slip OP. (N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2014) (Zagel, J.).

Judge Zagel awarded damages in this Lanham Act case after he and Judge Conlon entered default judgment against the defendants.

Pursuant to its “considerable discretion” to award damages based upon a default judgment, the

Real-Time Reporters, P.C. v. Sonntag Reporting Servs., Ltd., No. 13 C 5348, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Der-Yeghiayan, J.).

Judge Der-Yeghiayan denied plaintiff Real-Time Reporters’ (“RTR”) preliminary injunction motion in this Lanham Act matter involving RTR’s REAL-TIME REPORTERS trademark.  Defendant Sontag Reporting Services (“SRS”) use of the name “Chicago-area Realtime Reporters” alleged infringed RTR’s REAL-TIME

Dental USA, Inc. v. McClellan, No. 13 C 260, Slip OP. (N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 2013) (Zagel, J.).

Judge Zagel granted in part plaintiff Dental USA’s motion for a temporary restraining order and injunction in this trademark and design patent infringement case.  Dental USA had a trademark for DENTAL USA, as well as POWER

Fujitsu Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., No. 09 C 4530, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Dec. 21, 2012) (Holderman, C.J.).

Judge Holderman granted defendants (collectively “Tellabs”) summary judgment that plaintiff Fujitsu Limited was not able to seek lost profits in this patent litigation.  Fujitsu, the patent holder, did not sell a covered product in the United

Sloan Valve Co. v. Zurn Indus., Inc., No. 10 C 204, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2012) (St. Eve, J.).

Judge St. Eve granted in part plaintiff Sloan’s fee petition based upon the Court’s finding that defendant Zurn had “continually refused to produce relevant documents despite prior court intervention and a clear obligation

7-Eleven, Inc. v. Spear, No. 10 C 6697, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2012) (Dow, J.).

 Judge Dow granted summary judgment to plaintiff 7-Eleven in this contract and Lanham Act case after defendants (collectively “Vianna”) failed to respond to 7-Eleven’s Local Rule 56.1 statements of fact or submit its own supplemental statements of

Gordon-Darby Sys., Inc. v. Applus Techs., Inc., No. 10 C 1863, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Dec. 23, 2010) (Zagel, J.).
Judge Zagel granted plaintiff’s motion to dismiss its patent infringement claims regarding vehicle emissions testing with prejudice and to dismiss defendants’ noninfringement, invalidity and unenforceability claims without prejudice. After the parties engaged in some discovery, plaintiff determined that it no longer wanted to pursue its claims and gave defendants a covenant not to sue. Based upon that covenant, the parties agreed that all of their claims should be dismissed, except for defendants’ inequitable conduct claims. Defendants argued that those claims were related to its 35 U.S.C. Section § 285 claim to make the case exceptional and award defendants their attorney’s fees. Citing the Federal Circuit’s decision in Monsanto Co. v. Bayer Bioscience N.V., 514 F.3d 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2008), the Court held that, although the Federal Circuit had not squarely decided the issue, the precedent was clear that the covenant divested the Court of subject matter jurisdiction over the inequitable conduct declamatory judgment claim.
The Court, however, retained independent jurisdiction over defendants’ Section § 285 claim to make the case exceptional and award defendants their attorney’s fees. And the Court acknowledged that it could consider unenforceability as part of the exceptional case analysis, which could trigger a holding that the patents in suit were unenforceable due to inequitable conduct.

Continue Reading Court Dismisses Case and Considers Unenforceability With Exceptional Case Motion

The following is an article I wrote with my Holland & Knight colleague Ben Stern outlining the Federal Circuit’s Uniloc decision striking down the 25% rule for patent damages.
On January 4, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that the so-called “25 percent rule of thumb” analysis long used by damages experts in patent cases to calculate a “reasonable royalty” is “fundamentally flawed.” Uniloc v. Microsoft (Fed. Cir. 2011). The Federal Circuit held that because the 25 percent rule merely applies a general theory that is untethered to the facts of a case, “[e]vidence relying on the 25 percent rule of thumb is thus inadmissible under Daubert and the Federal Rules of Evidence.” Slip op. at 41. The full decision can be found online.
Striking down the 25 percent rule has important implications for patent damages in both existing and future patent litigation. As a result, the Uniloc decision is critical for every company that faces any current or potential risk of patent litigation.
Background
The 25 percent rule of thumb has long been a “starting point” of a reasonable royalty analysis. The rule – which the Federal Circuit observed has “met its share of criticism” – is based on the idea that, in a hypothetical negotiation, a licensee generally agrees to pay the patentee a royalty rate equivalent to 25 percent of the licensees’ expected profits on products that incorporate the intellectual property at issue in the case.
In this case, the plaintiff, Uniloc, sued Microsoft, alleging that a certain feature of Microsoft’s Word XP, Word 2003 and Windows XP infringed Uniloc’s patent. The jury agreed and awarded Uniloc $388 million in damages (which was less than the approximately $564 million that Uniloc’s expert opined it was due, based upon the 25 percent rule). These damages represented a “reasonable royalty” that Uniloc and Microsoft would have hypothetically agreed upon at the time the infringement began. Following the jury verdict, the district court granted Microsoft’s motion for a judgment as a matter of law of noninfringement, thereby effectively nullifying the jury’s damage award.
The Appeal
On appeal, the Federal Circuit first observed that the “admissibility of the 25 percent rule has never been squarely presented to this court” but acknowledged that it has “passively tolerated” the rule’s use over the years. After first reviewing the standards for the admissibility of expert opinions, the Federal Circuit concluded that U.S. Supreme Court precedent requires experts to “justify the application of a general theory to the facts of the case.” Slip op. at 43. If an expert cannot do so, then the proffered theory is inadmissible. Id. Given that the 25 percent rule, according to the Federal Circuit, is based on generalized empirical evidence about licenses, the Court concluded that the rule is nothing more than “an abstract and theoretical construct that … does not say anything about a particular hypothetical negotiation or reasonable royalty involving any particular technology, industry or party.” Slip op. at 45. Furthermore, it “is of no moment” that the 25 percent rule is merely a “starting point” for a reasonable royalty analysis; damages experts used the rule as a baseline and then applied other case-specific factors to adjust the rate up or down. According to the Court, “[b]eginning from a fundamentally flawed premise and adjusting it based on legitimate considerations specific to the case nevertheless results in a fundamentally flawed conclusion.” Slip op. at 46. Because Uniloc’s expert’s damages opinion (which was based on the 25 percent rule) was unrelated to the facts of the case, it was “arbitrary, unreliable, and irrelevant.” Slip op. at 47.
Thus, the Federal Circuit held that Microsoft is entitled to a new trial on damages. Because the Federal Circuit also reversed the district court’s post-trial finding of noninfringement, ordering a new trial on damages means that Uniloc may yet obtain a damage award in the case.
Implications of the Decision
The implications of the Uniloc decision on damages analysis for patent cases are tremendous. Because most patentees seek “reasonable royalties” (rather than lost profits, the other general mode of analysis), damages opinions, up until now, often began with the 25 percent rule of thumb and then “adjusted” the royalty rate up or down in light of the facts of the case.
Now that the 25 percent rule has been repudiated, the future promises to bring new and creative modes of analysis to arrive at a “reasonable royalty” in patent cases, which will likely result in new disputes about the admissibility of damages opinions.

Continue Reading Patent Damages 25% Rule is Dead

Chamberlain Group v. The Lear Corp., No. 05 C 3449, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jul. 13, 2010) (St. Eve, J.).
Judge St. Eve granted in part plaintiff Chamberlain’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1) motion for a protective order in this patent case involving garage door opening systems. The Court denied a protective order as to defendant Lear’s request for Chamberlain’s financial information. While Chamberlain claimed the sales information was not relevant because Chamberlain did not seek lost profit damages, Chamberlain’s interrogatory response said it did seek lost profit damages. Additionally, the financial information was relevant as it was reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence related to Chamberlain’s commercial success and its lost profits.
The Court granted a protective order as to discovery related to Chamberlain’s new garage-door-opening algorithm. Chamberlain had not sold a product embodying the algorithm. So, it was irrelevant to a reasonable royalty calculation which looked to a hypothetical negotiation when infringement began. Furthermore, the algorithm was not relevant to an obviousness analysis. Finally, Chamberlain’s decision to produce more information related to the same algorithm did not make the algorithm relevant.
The Court also entered a protective order preventing further deposition of a Chamberlain employee. The employee had already been deposed twice – once for two hours and once for a full day. To the extent Lear wanted to depose the employee about the new algorithm, the Court had already determined it was irrelevant. And despite repeated warnings to stop, Lear had already repeatedly questioned the employee about the algorithm.

Continue Reading New Algorithm Not Relevant to Hypothetical Reasonable Royalty Calculation

Von Holdt v. A-1 Tool Corp., No. 04 C 4123, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2010) (Manning, J.).
Judge Manning granted defendants (collectively “A-1 Tool”) summary judgment as to plaintiff’s (collectively “Plas-Tool”) patent claims based upon a lack of notice and as to the plaintiff’s Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) claims, and chose not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. A-1 Tool sought summary judgment of a lack of pre-suit notice of the alleged patent infringement. The issue was dispositive because Plas-Tool’s patent expired before the suit was filed. So, pre-suit-notice – actual or constructive – was required in order for Plas-Tool to have any damages.
Plas-Tool’s general statements that they would sue A-1 Tool if it ever infringed Plas-Tool’s patents did not create actual notice. And the alleged patent knowledge of Plas-Tool’s former employee who joined A-1 Tool could not be imputed to A-1 Tool for purposes of actual notice. A-1 Tool’s burden was to make an evidentiary showing that could lead a reasonable person to find that Plas-Tool complied with the marking requirements by marking substantially all of Plas-Tool’s relevant product. Plas-Tool did not meet its burden of proof. Plas-Tool’s only evidence of marking compliance was testimony from Plas-Tool’s 30(b)(6) witness. The witness testified that Plas-Tool’s policy was to mark its products, but had no recollection of what specifically was marked. And the Court held that evidence of a company policy to mark without any other evidence of marking compliance was insufficient to overcome summary judgment. Beyond the 30(b)(6) testimony, Plas-Tool’s only marking evidence was having sent a customer two molds including patent markings. But when the molds were returned, one of them had the patent marking covered up, suggesting the product was made from the mold had not been marked. The Court, therefore, granted A-1 Tool summary judgment on Plas-Tool’s patent claims for lack of notice.
The Court also granted A-1 Tool summary judgment on Plas-Tool’s CFAA claim. Plas-Tool alleged that its former employee improperly accessed and damaged CAD files related to the patented products. But Plas-Tool was not able to identify any damage to the allegedly accessed files and the CFAA was not designed to deal with disgruntled former employees that took electronic files as they left. Also, Plas-Tool was unable to show the required $5,000 in damages within one year of the alleged damage. The loss Plas-Tool was able to show was not related to fixing damaged files, as required by the CFAA. Plas-Tool’s alleged damage was related to a forensic review that allegedly showed that the former employee tampered with the files.
Having granted summary judgment on the federal patent claim and the CFAA claim, the Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plas-Tool’s state law claims.

Continue Reading Evidence of Marking Required for Constructive Notice