Millennium TGA, Inc. v. Doe, No. 10 C 5603, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 2011) (Manning, J.).
Judge Manning held in abeyance Doe defendant’s motion to quash a subpoena issued to its alleged internet service provider and Doe’s motion to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff Millennium TGA reasoned that the subpoenaed information would allow it to show that Doe’s actions were directed at Illinois and within the Courts’ jurisdiction.
The Court was “troubled” by Millennium TGA’s claims that it needed jurisdictional discovery, as opposed to discovery only seeking Doe’s identity. Millennium TGA already filed a complaint alleging jurisdiction upon information and belief. The Court, therefore, ordered Millennium TGA to file a brief detailing how the information it sought was necessary. And the Court held the motions in abeyance pending that brief. The Court also warned Millennium TGA that it would initiate sanctions proceedings if Millennium TGA had not met its Fed. R. Civ. P 11 obligations.

Continue Reading Potential Sanctions for Early Discovery Inconsistent With Pleadings

Boy Racer, Inc. v. Does 1-22, No. 11 C 2984, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. May 9, 2011) (Shadur, Sen. J.).
Judge Shadur sua sponte dismissed plaintiff Boy Racer’s copyright infringement complaint without prejudice. The Court held that Boy Racer could not “shoot first and identify [its] targets later” by suing twenty-two Doe defendants. Instead, Boy Racer was free to file its suits against identifiable individuals.

Continue Reading Naming Doe Defendants in Bit Torrent Copyright Case is Shooting First, Identifying Targets Later

Light Speed Media Corp. v. Does 1-1000, No. 10 C 5604, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2011) (Manning, J.).
Judge Manning dismissed without prejudice 999 of the 1,000 Doe defendants in this copyright infringement suit accusing unknown individuals of using BitTorrent to download copyrighted material without sufficient permissions. As in prior cases in the Northern District (click here for similar decisions), the Court held that the Doe defendants were not properly joined pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(A) because the use of a common internet service provider or network does not create sufficient commonality of action or transaction to warrant permissive joinder. The Court also held that joinder did not serve judicial interests or economy. A case with 1,000 Doe defendants could generate hundreds of factually dissimilar motions, just at the initial phase of the litigation.
The Court’s decision to sever was bolstered by its concerns about whether venue was proper. There was nothing to indicate that plaintiff or any Doe had contacts with Illinois. The Court, therefore, dismissed without prejudice each of the Does except the one individual who had been identified, although not yet named. Plaintiff was given seven days from the Order to notify the parties and their Internet Service Providers. Finally, the Court denied as premature the identified individual’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The motion was premature until the individual was actually named in the suit.

Continue Reading Another Case Dismissing Hundreds of Doe Copyright Defendants as Improperly Joined

Farag v. Defense Threat Reduction Agency, No. 07 C 1688, 2007 WL 2404625 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2007) (Hart, J.).
Judge Hart dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction plaintiff’s suit seeking that the Court order the PTO to place a secrecy order on plaintiff’s patent application for a process of separating an isotope from uranium for use in nuclear applications. Plaintiff’s application is about to be published and plaintiff believes that publication of the application would allow use of his process for illicit purposes that might threaten national security. The Invention Secrecy Act provides a patent applicant the right to appeal the issuance of a secrecy order, but not the right to appeal the denial of a secrecy order. See 35 U.S.C. Section 181; 35 C.F.R. Section 5.4. The Invention Secrecy Act also permits a suit for compensatory damages, but only based on damage created by a secrecy order, not the absence of one. Finally, the Court noted that plaintiff might have a claim pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (the “APA”), but the APA requires that the plaintiff by harmed by the agency (PTO) action. The Court noted that potential threat to national security based upon a review of plaintiff’s patent application was too remote and general to create standing pursuant to the APA. As a result, the Court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint. It is also interesting to note, the Court instructed plaintiff to file any appeal with the Seventh Circuit, instead of the Federal Circuit despite the fact that the case is focused on PTO procedure.

Continue Reading Court Cannot Force PTO to Issue a Secrecy Order