Shen-Wei (USA), Inc. v. Ansell Healthcare Prods., Inc., No. 05 C 6003, Slip. Op. (N.D. Ill. Sep. 28, 2007) (Guzman, J.).
Judge Guzman denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment of invalidity pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Defendant argued that plaintiffs sold medical gloves embodying the claims of their patent, U.S. Patent No. 6, 953,582 (the “‘582 patent”), to a glove with a coating of a skin-soothing substance in July 1999, approximately two years before the ‘582 patent’s July 1, 2001 critical date. Furthermore, plaintiffs admitted that they sold patented gloves as early as July 1999 by failing to cite any contradictory evidence in their responses to defendant’s Local Rule 56.1 statement.
But plaintiffs argued that the ‘582 had a right to the filing date of its parent, U.S. Patent No. 6,274,154 (the “‘154 patent”). The ‘154 patent only disclosed coating a glove with aloe vera. But plaintiffs argued that the ‘154 patent inherently disclosed skin-soothing substances other than aloe vera. Plaintiffs supported its arguments with testimony from the inventor and plaintiffs’ expert.
Because, among other reasons, defendant failed to support its denials of inherency with any facts, the Court deemed admitted, at least, structural inherency and inherency of theory. Because defendant admitted inherent disclosure, plaintiffs’ ‘582 patent had the critical date of its parent ‘154 patent – April 7, 1998. Plaintiffs’ admitted July 1999 sales of patented gloves, therefore, were not an on-sale bar.
Practice tip: When making or responding to Local Rule 56.1 statements, always support your statements or responses with evidence.

Continue Reading Parties Make Each Others’ Cases With Unsupported LR 56.1 Statements

Coilcraft, Inc. v. Inductor Warehouse, Inc., No. 98 C 0140, 2007 WL 2728754 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 13, 2007) (Guzman, J.).
Judge Guzman conducted a Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 de novo review of Magistrate Judge Cole’s report which recommended that the Court hold defendant in contempt for violating the Court’s permanent injunction limiting defendant’s use of plaintiff’s Coilcraft mark (click here for further discussion in the Blog’s archive). The Court adopted Judge Cole’s Report in its entirety and gave plaintiff fourteen days to submit a proposed order and proof of its attorneys’ fees and costs related to this motion. The Court also held that Judge Cole was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing before issuing the Report because there were no genuine issues of material fact. The dispute was governed by the language of the Court’s injunction which was not disputed. And the only issue was whether defendant’s advertisements, the contents of which were not disputed, violated the injunction – a matter of law.

Continue Reading Evidentiary Hearing Not Required for Contempt Ruling Based Upon Undisputed Facts

Sunstar, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., No. 01 CV 736 & 5825, 2007 WL 2410069 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 2007) (Guzman, J.).
Judge Guzman denied defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 motion for a new trial and Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law and granted plaintiff’s motion for a permanent injunction, among other things assigning all trademarks at issue to plaintiff and enjoining defendants from using plaintiff’s trademarks. The Court held that the jury’s verdict of a breach of contract without a damages award was not inconsistent and, therefore, did not warrant a new trial. The jury was free to find that the contract was breached and to award nominal damages. But because plaintiff did not argue for nominal damages an award of no damages was warranted. Defendants also argued that the jury’s verdict was not supported by the evidence because plaintiff’s survey was not sufficient proof actual confusion. But the Court held that plaintiff’s breach-by-infringement claim only required proof of likely confusion. The jury could have considered the survey sufficient to prove likely confusion. Furthermore, plaintiff introduced fact evidence in addition to the survey which supported the jury’s findings, including the similarity of the marks at issue and the sale of similar products using the marks in the same areas as plaintiff’s trademarked products.
Finally, the Court enjoined defendants from, among other things using plaintiff’s trademarks and required that defendants assign any interest in the marks at issue to plaintiffs. Defendants argued that the Court could not require assignment of the marks to plaintiff because plaintiff never sought transfer of the marks in its complaint. But the Court held that plaintiff was seeking equitable relief that was appropriate in light of the jury’s verdict.

Continue Reading Breach of Contract Verdict Without Damages Award Not Inconsistent

Sitrick v. Freehand Sys., Inc., No. 02 C 1568, 2007 WL 2298362 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2007) (Guzman, J.).
Judge Guzman denied plaintiff’s motion to amend the Court’s final order dismissing plaintiff’s patent infringement case with prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1). Plaintiff sought to amend the order to include the terms of the parties’ settlement agreement because in Lynch v. SamataMason, Inc., 279 F.3d 487, 489 (7th Cir. 2006), the Seventh Circuit held that a court only maintains ancillary jurisdiction to enforce settlement agreements if the dismissal order contains (not just by incorporation) the terms of the agreement. But the Court denied the motion for two reasons. First, the Court’s original order was a nullity because it was issued after the parties filed their unconditional stipulation of dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1) which immediately ended the Court’s jurisdiction. Second, because the amendment was not clerical, sought within one year of entry of the order or otherwise justified, Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 prevented the Court from amending the order.

Continue Reading Court Cannot Amend Its Final Order

Gencor Pacific, Inc. v. Federal Labs., Corp., No. 07 C 168, 2007 WL 2298367 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2007) (Guzman, J.).
Judge Guzman granted defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) motion to dismiss for lack of venue. Plaintiff Gencor Pacific (“Gencor”) and defendant Federal Laboratories (“Fedlabs”) both distribute products including caralluma powder. Gencor alleged that Fedlabs infringed Gencor’s copyrights, engaged in unfair competition and other related state law claims by using various Gencor studies and literature to promote Fedlabs’s products. Gencor also alleged that Fedlabs’s Chairman defendant Jeffery Taub left a defamatory voicemail message for an Illinois-based Gencor distributor. Because defendants are all New York residents, venue was only proper in the Northern District if a substantial part of the events at issue occurred in Illinois. Gencor argued that the Illinois voicemail and various Fedlabs mailings to Illinois residents including the copyrighted studies constituted a substantial part of the events at issue. In support of its contentions, Gencor submitted only a transcript of the alleged voicemail. Gencor did not submit any mailings that had been sent to Northern District residents or a declaration stating that the voicemail had been received at a Northern District telephone number. The Court held that Gencor’s unsupported “bare allegations” did not meet Gencor’s burden of proving that venue was proper.
Practice tip: You must support factual allegations with evidence. Local Rule 56.1 forces parties to follow this advice for summary judgment motions (although many fail to follow the rule). But the requirement, although unwritten, is no less important for other motions. If you are ever not sure whether an allegation requires evidentiary support, err on the side of providing the support. I have never seen an argument lost because a party unnecessarily supported its factual allegations.

Continue Reading Unwritten LR 56.1: Evidentiary Support is Not Just for Summary Judgment

Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Chester Bros. Mach. Prods., Inc., No. 05 C 5002, 2007 WL 2278448 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 6, 2007) (Guzman, J.).
Judge Guzman granted in part plaintiff’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) motion to dismiss, dismissing the case with prejudice but awarding defendant’s costs. The Court also denied defendant’s motion for attorneys fees. After sending several cease and desist letters, plaintiff Illinois Tool Works (“ITW”) filed suit against Chester Brothers Machined Products (“Chester”) alleging that Chester infringed plaintiff’s trademark in the color orange used with pneumatic nailers and staplers. ITW amended its complaint after Chester served ITW with a Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 motion explaining that Chester did not sell pneumatic nailers. Chester answered the amended complaint and the case proceeded. But during discovery one of ITW’s customers began selling orange pneumatic nailers. As a result, ITW amended its trademark registration to exclude pneumatic nailers and filed the instant motion. The Court agreed to dismiss the claims with prejudice, but held that costs were justified because Chester had not engaged in litigation misconduct. The Court, however, denied defendant’s motion for attorneys fees because Chester never explicitly told ITW that it did not manufacture pneumatic nailers and because ITW’s claims survived Chester’s motion to dismiss.

Continue Reading Rule 41(a)(2) Dismissal With Prejudice Warrants Costs But Not Fees

After Hours Formalwear, Inc. v. Tuxedos, Inc., No. 06 C 2460, 2007 WL 404005 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 2007) (Guzman, J.).

Judge Guzman denied plaintiff’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss certain of defendants’ tortious interference and antitrust claims.  Plaintiff, After Hours Formalwear ("AHF"), controls at least 50% of Chicago’s formalwear market.  AHF acquired a group of formalwear stores operating under the mark "Modern Tuxedo" and converted them to its AHF mark.  Shortly thereafter, defendants, including Tuxedos, Inc., (collectively "Tuxedos") renamed its stores, "Formally Modern Tuxedo."  This renaming led to AHF’s suit against Tuxedos for trademark infringement and unfair competition.  Tuxedos responded with counterclaims alleging tortious interference of various kinds, and both federal and state antitrust violations.  Basically, Tuxedos alleged that AHF was using baseless trademark infringement claims to harass Tuxedos’ customers and push Tuxedos out of the market.Continue Reading Sherman Act Antitrust Claims Are Not Held to Rule 9(b) Heightened Pleading Standards

Shen Wei (USA) Inc. v. Sempermed, Inc., No. 05 C 6004, 2007 WL 328846 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 30, 2007) (Guzman, J.).

Judge Guzman granted defendant leave to amend its answer adding inequitable conduct affirmative defenses and counterclaims alleging that plaintiffs failed to disclose their prior art sale of a medical glove embodying their invention

American Fam. Mutual Insur. Co. v. Roth, No. 05 C 3839, 2007 WL 63983 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 2007) (Cole, Mag. J.).

Judge Cole recommended denying defendants’ motion to modify Judge Guzman’s preliminary injunction for lack of jurisdiction.  Judge Guzman, following Judge Cole’s recommendation, issued a preliminary injunction to prevent defendants from using a

Underwriters Labs. Inc. v. Hydrofilm L.P., No. 05 C 5509, 2006 WL 2494748 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2006) (Guzman, J.).

Although this opinion deals solely with non-IP issues, it is interesting because it addresses how corporate websites fit into a personal jurisdiction analysis.  Judge Guzman held that while the Court had subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s declaratory judgment claims (based upon defendants’s voluntary withdrawal without prejudice of a related suit against plaintiff), the Court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants.  Continue Reading Websites Alone Cannot Create Personal Jurisdiction