Santana Tesoro, LLC v. The P’ships Identified on Schedule A, No. 26 C 1395, (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 2026) (Gettleman, J.).

Judge Gettleman, in this Schedule A case, denied plaintiff Santana Tesoro’s motion for default judgment against the China-based defendants, holding that their addresses were known and, therefore, the Hague Convention applied. The Court granted default judgment only as to five defendants with United States addresses, which are not subject to the Hague Convention.

Santana Tesoro submitted an “Address Verification Results” exhibit listing an address for each defendant, while arguing that none of the addresses were known because none could be verified against public and paid resources. The Court found that argument made no sense from a common-sense standpoint. The Court traced the problem to the words “and verify” in NBA Properties, 549 F. Supp. 3d 790 (N.D. Ill. 2021), which plaintiffs have used to recast known addresses as unknown ones. In the Court’s view, the reasonable diligence standard, designed to keep plaintiffs from escaping the Hague Convention, had been distorted into a device for doing just that.

Of particular interest, the Court held:

  • The Court provided a fairly detailed history of Schedule A litigation in the Northern District at the outset of the opinion that is a useful primer for anyone new to the state of Schedule A litigation anywhere but particularly in the Northern District.
  • There is no burden on plaintiffs to verify each defendant’s address. When a plaintiff has address information, the Court will presume the address is known for purposes of the Hague Convention.
  • The reasonable diligence standard applies only when a plaintiff asserts that it has no address information for a defendant.
  • Reading “not known” in Article 1 to include addresses that cannot be verified by a second, independent source lacks textual support and frustrates the Convention’s purpose. The Convention entrusts each signatory’s central authority, not U.S. courts acting ex parte, with delivering documents to foreign addresses. The Court noted that it was ill-equipped to evaluate verification efforts concerning addresses in China.
  • The Convention’s negotiating history confirms that the drafters separated unknown addresses from incorrect addresses, and the “not known” provision addressed only the former. Interestingly, the Court noted that it used Claude and Google Translate to translate that history, which was published only in French.

The Court acknowledged the practical difficulties and expressed little sympathy for most Schedule A defendants. But it noted that Article 15 permits default judgment six months after service documents are transmitted, that asset restraints give defendants little reason to hide, and that plaintiffs remain free to contact defendants through other means. Because Santana Tesoro had not transmitted service documents by a method the Convention provides, default judgment against the foreign defendants was denied.

This is a significant opinion for Schedule A practitioners. If other judges follow it, plaintiffs that possess addresses for foreign defendants will need to serve through the Hague Convention before obtaining default judgment.

Dongguan Saien Chuangke Technology Co. Ltd. v. Shenzhen Huamingjun Rubber Co. Ltd., et al., No. 24-cv-8111, (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 2026).

Plaintiffs Dongguan Saien Chuangke Technology Co. Ltd. (“DSCT”) and Zuru Inc. jointly moved with defendant Shenzhen Huamingjun Rubber Co. Ltd. (“SHR”) and 27 Schedule A internet stores for entry of a consent judgment and permanent injunction in this design patent and trademark case involving magnetic reusable water balloons.

SHR and the internet stores conceded that U.S. Patent Nos. D1,030,929 and D1,034,861 are valid, enforceable, and infringed. The internet stores further conceded that DSCT’s registered SOPPYCID trademark, Reg. No. 6,850,955, is valid and enforceable and that they infringed it. As in the parties’ related consent judgment in No. 26-cv-6539, defendants stipulated to facts supporting each of the eBay factors for both the patents and the trademark, and the proposed order includes corresponding findings.

The proposed judgment enters judgment against SHR and the internet stores on the design patent claims, and against the internet stores on the trademark and Lanham Act § 43(a) claims. It permanently enjoins defendants from selling or importing reusable balloon products that infringe the design patents, and enjoins the internet stores from using SOPPYCID or any confusingly similar mark in connection with reusable water balloons. Each party bears its own costs and fees.

Notably, the case appears to have begun as a Schedule A case against 45 internet stores, a reminder that some Schedule A cases are litigated beyond just a default judgment.

Dongguan Saien Chuangke Technology Co. Ltd. v. Shenzhen Huamingjun Rubber, No. 26-cv-6539, (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 2026).

The parties in this design patent case filed a joint motion for entry of a consent judgment and permanent injunction in which defendant Shenzhen Huamingjun Rubber Co. Ltd. (“SHR”) conceded that plaintiffs Dongguan Saien Chuangke Technology Co. Ltd.’s (“DSCT”) and Zuru Inc.’s design patents covering magnetic reusable water balloons, U.S. Patent Nos. D1,030,929 and D1,101,076, are valid, enforceable, and infringed by all past and present versions of SHR’s reusable balloon products.

Of particular interest, the proposed consent judgment does not stop at liability. SHR also stipulated to facts supporting each of the four eBay permanent injunction factors: irreparable harm through lost market share, price erosion, and lost goodwill; the inadequacy of legal remedies; a balance of hardships favoring plaintiffs; and a public interest that would not be disserved because adequate non-infringing substitutes are available. The proposed order includes corresponding proposed  findings by the Court.

The proposed injunction would bar SHR, its affiliates, and any internet sellers it controls from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing reusable balloon products that are colorable imitations of, or have substantially the same overall design as, the patented designs. Each party bears its own costs and fees, and the Court retains jurisdiction to enforce the order.

This is a useful example of how parties can build a record supporting injunctive relief into a settlement. It is also the second consent judgment between these parties. See the related 24-cv-8111 consent judgment between these parties discussed below.

Stanley Black & Decker, Inc. v. The P’ships & Uninc. Assocs. Identified on Schedule “A”, No. 26-cv-1387, (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2026) (Rowland, J.).

In this Schedule A case, Judge Rowland granted plaintiff Stanley Black & Decker’s (“SBD”) motion for a preliminary injunction against two Temu sellers, Super Hardware Factory and Tire Inflation S, that allegedly sold power tools bearing SBD’s XR trademarks. The Court, however, narrowed the injunction and asset restraint to the accused products.

Five of the seven likelihood of confusion factors favored SBD, and none favored defendants. Notably, Super Hardware’s use of its own HANWISE house mark did not avoid confusion. The prominent, placement of “XR” where consumers expect a brand name could still lead consumers to believe that SBD sponsored or licensed the products. Defendants’ fair use defense was defendant’s burden to prove. Fair use failed because defendants used XR in its registered, stylized form, which suggests trademark use rather than descriptive use.

SBD was entitled to a presumption of irreparable harm as a trademark holder. A three-month delay between discovering the infringement and filing suit was not unreasonable and did not rebut the presumption, nor did defendants’ claim that they had stopped selling the accused products. A defendant that is not enjoined may resume infringing.

The Court agreed with defendants, however, that the injunction must be strictly limited to the accused products. Temu had removed all of defendants’ listings, including non-infringing products. And because SBD sought an asset restraint based on disgorgement of profits, SBD was entitled only to restrain profits from the accused products. Absent an existing asset freeze, it was SBD’s burden to identify those proceeds with sufficient specificity. SBD met that burden. The restrained amounts of $15,409.07 and $8,514.23 were well below the revenues of $24,752.84 and $102,616.64 implied by defendants’ unit sales.

The Court also observed that the TRO had expired months earlier, yet restraints apparently remained in place at Temu. The Court generally viewed notifying third parties of a TRO’s expiration as the plaintiff’s obligation, though it did not fault SBD here because the Court had not instructed SBD to do so.

Finally, the Court rejected defendants’ argument that they had not been properly served under the Hague Convention. Rule 65(a) requires only notice, not service, and defendants had appeared and opposed the motion. The Court also kept the $54,000 bond because defendants proposed no alternative amount.

Toulabi v. Siddiqui, et al., No. 25 CV 9228, (N.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 2026) (Daniel, J.).

Judge Daniel granted-in-part and denied-in-part defendants Siddiqui’s and TLC Consultants’ (“TLC”) Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss in this Lanham Act trademark case involving the REZA’S restaurant mark. The Court dismissed plaintiff Toulabi’s dilution claims, but the other challenged claims survived.

Toulabi opened the first Reza’s Persian and Mediterranean restaurant in Chicago in 1984 (as an aside, I met my wife when we were both new associates at a large Chicago law firm, we got to know each other over many late night associate dinners many of them from Reza’s as one of the few healthier options), and later opened additional locations, including one in Oakbrook. Toulabi closed the Oakbrook location in early 2024. Shortly thereafter, Siddiqui formed a corporation called Reza’s of Oakbrook, and Siddiqui and TLC bought the property on which the Oakbrook restaurant had operated. Defendants opened “Reza’s restaurant” there, advertising that it was “under new management” and that they had acquired the restaurant. Toulabi alleged that he never sold the restaurant to anyone.

Of particular interest, the Court held:

  • Toulabi sufficiently pled a protectable mark by alleging that REZA’S had acquired secondary meaning through decades of use, and likelihood of confusion by pointing to similar names, menus, advertising, and web addresses, along with examples of customer confusion.
  • TLC argued that it never used the mark. But a landlord may be contributorily liable for its tenant’s infringement if it knew or had reason to know of it. Siddiqui was allegedly TLC’s president, secretary, and employee, TLC received Toulabi’s cease and desist letter, and TLC allegedly knew all along that Siddiqui would operate the restaurant. TLC’s contention that landlords are not liable absent control or participation misstated the standard, which allows that knowledge can be enough.
  • Defendants’ argument that Toulabi abandoned the mark when he closed the Oakbrook location was an affirmative defense that turned on facts outside the pleadings and could not be resolved at the Rule 12 stage.
  • Toulabi plausibly pled false advertising because defendants’ “under new management” and acquisition statements were allegedly false, and online reviews suggested that customers were deceived and that the deception was material.
  • The dilution claims failed because Toulabi alleged only that the mark was known for Illinois restaurants. Since at least the 2006 amendment, niche fame is not enough. A mark must be widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States.

The Court also allowed the unjust enrichment claims to proceed, noting that customers who might have traveled to another of Toulabi’s locations were plausibly diverted to defendants’ restaurant. And the respondeat superior claim against TLC survived because it is a theory of recovery that should not be resolved before liability.

Natsoft Corporation and Updraft, LLC v. Hexaware Technologies Limited, et al.., No. 25 CV 11517, (N.D. Ill. June 9, 2026) (Shah, J.).

Judge Shah granted defendant Hexaware’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, holding all nine asserted patents ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and the Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International framework, in this action brought by Natsoft and Updraft, affiliated companies that together developed tools for automated extraction of software “business rules,” automated testing, and automated modernization of legacy software (at a claimed cost exceeding $100 million over five to six years of development). Hexaware competes with products called Amaze, RapidX, and Tensai that use generative AI for similar modernization services. The complaint also alleged state-law claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and intentional interference arising from a proof-of-concept relationship that broke down between the parties.

Of particular interest, the Court held:

  • First Family (Seven Patents), Alice Step One: The patents automate the traditional four-step software development process (requirements, architecture, design, code generation) that previously involved manual steps prone to error. The Court found that automating mental or manual processes is a “quintessential ‘do it on a computer’” abstract idea. Plaintiffs failed to articulate what distinguished their technique from a computer’s ordinary capabilities, despite a 66-page specification with 61 figures.
  • First Family, Alice Step Two: The Court found no inventive concept. Plaintiffs’ “verification tools” and “verification feedback” were not described with enough specificity to be more than a “result-oriented” black box,. The Court noted that efficiency gains do not make an abstract idea less abstract.
  • Second Family (Two Patents): The Court also held these patents to be “do it on a computer” inventions, claiming a “method for execution by a computing device” that analyzes, groups, tests, and reprograms code. At step two, the claimed ability to generate “meaningfulness” feedback was not inventive because the specification never defined “meaningfulness” or the threshold for triggering an adjustment. It was the kind of process that can be performed in the human mind.
  • State-Law Claims Dismissed Without Prejudice: With all patent claims dismissed as ineligible, the Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims (breach of contract, unjust enrichment, tortious interference) and dismissed them without prejudice. Patent claims were dismissed with prejudice as incurable, but plaintiffs were given until June 24, 2026 to file an amended complaint limited to a new Defend Trade Secrets Act claim plus the state-law claims.

On Wednesday, November 4, 2026, from 11:30 a.m. to 1:00 p.m., the Federal Bar Association Chicago Chapter will present “Artificial Intelligence at Work: Corporate Policies, Legal Risks & the Role of In-House Counsel.” Kirkland & Ellis LLP is sponsoring and hosting the program at 333 West Wolf Point Plaza, Chicago.

The moderated panel will explore how corporations, law firms, and courts use and manage AI, with practical examples of its applications, governing policies, and shortcomings. Topics will include confidentiality, privilege, data security, supervision, and professional responsibility.

Program speakers include:

  • Hon. Andrea R. Wood, U.S. District Judge, Northern District of Illinois (Moderator)
  • Mark Schneider, Partner, Kirkland & Ellis LLP
  • Aaron Weinzierl, Senior Managing Counsel, IP, Transactions, and AI, United Airlines
  • Angela Crawford, Founder, Crawford & Associates PLLC
  • Kristofer Swanson, Executive Director, Global Investigations & Dispute Resolution, Hilco Global

The program is open to FBA members and nonmembers, and lunch will be provided. Attendees will receive 1.0 hour of Illinois CLE credit, pending approval. A photo ID is required to enter the building.  Click here to register for the event.

On November 5, 2026, at 3:00 p.m., the Settlement Assistance Program Committee of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District and Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights will host a CLE program and celebration marking the Settlement Assistance Program’s (SAP) 20th anniversary. The event will be held at the Everett McKinley Dirksen United States Courthouse, 219 South Dearborn Street, Ceremonial Courtroom, 25th Floor, Chicago, Illinois.

The program will include:

3:00 p.m. –  Ethical Considerations When Representing a Party for Settlement Purposes Only: Presented by Professor Wendy J. Muchman of Northwestern Pritzker Law. One hour of ethics CLE credit is available.

4:00 p.m. –  20th Anniversary Celebration and Attorney Volunteer Recognition: Featuring Chief Judge Virginia Kendall and Retired Magistrate Judge Morton Denlow. A reception with light refreshments will immediately follow.

The event is sponsored by the Federal Bar Association, Seventh Circuit Bar Association, and Northern District of Illinois Court Historical Association.

Please RSVP by Friday, October 30, 2026, at https://tinyurl.com/SAP20Celebration.

On Thursday, November 5, 2026 from 3:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. the Settlement Assistance Program Committee of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois and the Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights invite you to commemorate the Settlement Assistance Program’s 20th anniversary.

The event is sponsored by the Federal Bar Association Chicago Chapter, the Seventh Circuit Bar Association, and the Northern District of Illinois Court Historical Association.  The celebration will take place in the Ceremonial Courtroom on the 25th floor of the Everett McKinley Dirksen United States Courthouse, 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago.

The program begins at 3:00 p.m. with a CLE presentation, “Ethical Considerations When Representing a Party for Settlement Purposes Only,” followed at 4:00 p.m. by the anniversary celebration and attorney volunteer recognition. A reception with light refreshments will follow.

Settlement Assistance Program Speakers include:

Attendance is free and open to FBA members and nonmembers.  The program offers one hour of Ethics CLE credit, pending approval. Please RSVP by Friday, October 30, and remember to bring a photo ID for courthouse entry.

Endurance Warranty Services, LLC v. Nationwide AutoProtect, LLC, No. 26 C 3622, (N.D. Ill. June 7, 2026) (Kennelly, J.).

Judge Kennelly granted plaintiff Endurance Warranty Services’ motion for a preliminary injunction (PI) in this Lanham Act case alleging that direct competitor Nationwide AutoProtect posed as Endurance via deceptive websites and telephone calls and directly contacted Endurance customers with false accusations to induce them to cancel their Endurance contracts and switch to Nationwide. The Court held an expedited PI hearing at which Endurance presented testimony and exhibits. Nationwide called no witnesses.

Of particular interest, the Court held:

  • False Advertising: Endurance introduced evidence of numerous customer reports of calls in which callers, reasonably inferred to be acting for Nationwide, since they tried to switch customers to Nationwide, falsely claimed Endurance was going out of business, had been “red flagged” by the government, was under DOJ investigation, or was a fraudulent business not paying claims. Call transcripts showed material deception on matters significant to a reasonable customer’s contract decision. The interstate telephone calls established the interstate-commerce nexus.
  • Trademark Infringement: Endurance submitted evidence of a Google banner ad appearing in searches for “Endurance” that identified Nationwide as “Endurance Car Warranty” and routed customers seeking Endurance’s customer service to Nationwide instead. The Court found this was sufficient evidence of likelihood of confusion and misappropriation of Endurance’s goodwill. Nationwide did not contest the validity of Endurance’s mark at this stage.
  • Irreparable Harm: The Court found it reasonable to infer that customers who did not personally contact Endurance about the misleading calls simply canceled their contracts. Both the deceptive calls and the false search ad created a significant, hard-to-quantify risk of goodwill impairment not compensable by money damages alone.
  • Balance of Harms and Public Interest: The balance favored Endurance. Nationwide did not even argue the balance of harms tipped against an injunction. The Lanham Act reflects a public policy favoring enforcement of valid trademarks and preventing deceptive advertising.

The Court directed Endurance to submit a draft injunction order.