Mobile Motherboard Inc. v. AIOEXPC, ALADAWN, and AKLWY, No. 24 CV 8703, (N.D. Ill. May 29, 2026) (Shah, J.).

Judge Shah denied plaintiff’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) & 60(b) motion to alter or amend the judgment and for leave to amend in this patent infringement case related to a two-part computer system comprising a “computer box” and a separate, external, handheld “motherboard” that connects to it. The Court had previously granted judgment on the pleadings for defendants, Chinese companies selling handheld “computer sticks.” The Court found no manifest error warranting the extraordinary relief available under Rule 59(e). Plaintiff’s own claim charts demonstrated that defendants’ computer sticks satisfied both the “computer box” limitations (housing, internal circuitry, communication ports, internal bus) and nearly all the “motherboard” limitations in a single integrated product. This was fundamentally inconsistent with the patent’s requirement of two physically separate components. Because the accused products cannot simultaneously be both the external motherboard and the computer box under the patent’s own claim language, plaintiff had pleaded itself out of court.

The Court denied leave to amend as futile because the same claim-chart specifications would still show the integrated single-device design.

GZ Long Ya Trading Co., Ltd. v. The Partnerships and Unincorporated Associations Identified on Schedule “A” (Defendant Tonchean), No. 24-cv-4193, (N.D. Ill. May 29, 2026) (Holleb Hotaling, Mag. J.).

Magistrate Judge Holleb Hotaling, after granting summary judgment and a permanent injunction for plaintiff in this design patent case regarding a puzzle table, addressed damages under 35 U.S.C. § 289. Under the framework established by Samsung Electronics Co. v. Apple, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016), the Court first identified the “article of manufacture” to which the infringed design was applied and then calculated the infringer’s total profit on that article. Plaintiff identified the infringing puzzle tables themselves as the article of manufacture and demonstrated through Wayfair sales data that defendant Tonchean sold at least 402 infringing units generating at least $55,300 in net revenue. The burden then shifted to defendant to identify an alternative article of manufacture or substantiate deductible costs, citing WMS Gaming, Inc. v. WPC Prods. Ltd., 542 F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2008), and Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203 (1942). Defendant never contested the article of manufacture, proposed an alternative article, or documented any deductible costs—offering only an unverified claimed per-unit cost without supporting documentation. The Court found defendant waived the argument, citing Bonte v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 624 F.3d 461 (7th Cir. 2010), and awarded $55,300 in damages.

Blue Spring Partners, LLC v. The Individuals, Corporations, LLCs, Partnerships, and Unincorporated Associations Identified on Schedule A, No. 23 C 983, (N.D. Ill. May 18, 2026) (Kendall, C.J.).

Chief Judge Kendall denied a non-party’s motion to intervene and for relief from judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) in this trademark and copyright Schedule A case involving swimmable mermaid tails allegedly sold by over 177 e-commerce defendants. The case had been terminated following entry of default judgment more than a year and a half before movant Shenzhenshi Hengzhiyi E-Commerce Co., Ltd. filed its motions.

On intervention, the Court held that motions to intervene after a case has ended are almost always denied as untimely absent unusual circumstances, citing Humphrey v. Sheriff and CE Design Ltd. v. King Supply Co., 791 F.3d 722 (7th Cir. 2015). One cannot intervene in a dismissed case. On the Rule 60(b) motion, the Court held that relief under Rule 60(b)(1) was barred outright because it was filed more than one year after judgment. Even construing the motion under Rule 60(b)(5) or (6), which require filing within a “reasonable time,” the approximately eighteen-month delay was unreasonable given movant’s unconvincing excuses for not learning of the default order sooner. The Court emphasized that Rule 60(b) is not a license to sleep on rights.” Lobrow v. Vill. of Port Barrington, 406 F. App’x 60 (7th Cir. 2010).

Bright Hand LLC v. Shenzhen Aoya Kuajing Dianzi Shangwu Youxiangongsi d/b/a Mylivell, No. 1:25-cv-11700, (N.D. Ill. May 26, 2026) (Coleman, J.).

Judge Coleman, in this patent infringement action involving an LED “flashlight glove” granted defendant’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiff’s Lanham Act unfair competition claim. Plaintiff’s complaint asserted both false association and false advertising. Defendant argued these were improper attempts to repackage the patent infringement claim as a Lanham Act violation. The Court agreed, finding that plaintiff never alleged the use of its marks, passing off, false designation of origin, or any specific false or misleading statement. The complaint merely alleged that defendant made and sold an infringing product, which does not state a cognizable Lanham Act claim. Relying heavily on Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003), the Court held that the Lanham Act cannot be used to backdoor patent-type claims absent a source-identifying mark or an affirmative misleading statement. Count I, the patent infringement claim, survived the motion.

Hublot SA v. The Partnerships and Unincorporated Associations Identified on Schedule A, No. 26 C 4668, (N.D. Ill. May 18, 2026) (Kendall, C.J.).

Chief Judge Kendall, in this Schedule A case, dismissed plaintiff Hublot’s complaint without prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). The Court had previously denied Hublot’s ex parte TRO motion based on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Liu v. Monthly, 170 F.4th 1090 (7th Cir. 2026), and afforded Hublot an opportunity to supplement its jurisdictional showing. Hublot’s supplemental filing relied only on vague assertions of interactive communications, transaction-oriented conduct, and willingness to ship, without any evidence of a completed sale into Illinois. The Court held that under Liu and Curry v. Revolution Labs., 949 F.3d 385 (7th Cir. 2020), operating an interactive website accessible in Illinois is insufficient to establish specific personal jurisdiction. A plaintiff must demonstrate at least one completed sale into the forum state. The Court granted Hublot leave to amend within two weeks to demonstrate jurisdiction or face dismissal with prejudice and unsealing of the record.

GZ Long Ya Trading Co., Ltd. v. The Partnerships and Unincorporated Associations Identified on Schedule A, No. 24-cv-4193, (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2026) (Holleb Hotaling, Mag. J.).

Magistrate Judge Holleb Hotaling granted plaintiff GZ Long Ya Trading’s motion for summary judgment and permanent injunctive relief against the remaining Schedule A defendant Tonchean, denied plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees, and ordered supplemental briefing on damages in this design patent infringement case involving U.S. Design Patent No. D986,339, directed to an ornamental design for a puzzle table.

Of particular interest, the Court held:

  • Defendant failed to properly dispute plaintiff’s Local Rule 56.1 statement of undisputed material facts. Although Defendant filed a response, it failed to cite specific evidentiary material controverting the asserted facts, merely stating certain facts were disputed because “the licensee has a different name from that of the Plaintiff” or that certain evidence was “self-serving.” All properly supported facts were therefore deemed admitted.
  • The Court rejected Defendant’s standing challenge based on the difference between “GZ Long Ya Trading Co., Ltd.” and the assignment’s reference to “Guangzhou LongYa Trading Co. Ltd.” The Court found “GZ” is a common abbreviation for “Guangzhou,” and the inventor’s sworn declaration confirmed the assignment to plaintiff. Plaintiff had standing as sole assignee.
  • The ’339 Patent was valid despite containing functional features. The Court held that the existence of functional elements does not itself invalidate a design patent; rather, the claimed design must be viewed in its entirety. The shape of the tabletop, symmetrically arranged drawers, side placement of drawers, leg shape, and connecting bar placement were all ornamental features entitled to protection. Defendant conceded alternative designs exist, further supporting validity.
  • Infringement was established both by deemed admissions (Defendant served discovery responses more than three months late) and, independently, under the ordinary observer test. The Court’s side-by-side comparison found the accused Wayfair puzzle tables were substantially similar to the patented design, with the only identified difference being two additional drawers beneath the top flipped table.
  • The Court granted permanent injunctive relief, applying the same irreparable-harm findings that supported the earlier preliminary injunction: diminished goodwill, damage to reputation, loss of exclusivity, and loss of future sales.
  • The Court denied attorneys’ fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 because plaintiff had not shown the case was exceptional, notwithstanding Defendant’s late discovery responses and Local Rule noncompliance.
  • The Court requested supplemental briefing on whether plaintiff seeks more than $55,300 in damages and the basis for any additional amount.

Anderson Design Group, Inc. v. The Partnerships and Unincorporated Associations Identified on Schedule A, No. 25-cv-11640, (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2026) (Rowland, J.).

Judge Rowland held in abeyance the Group A Defendants’ motion to dismiss for misjoinder under Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2) and granted plaintiff Anderson Design Group 60 days of limited expedited discovery to probe relationships among the remaining Schedule A defendants in this copyright infringement Schedule A case.

The Group A Defendants, the only remaining defendants, moved to dismiss for improper joinder, arguing they are unrelated and unaffiliated. While acknowledging that joint representation alone does not automatically imply coordination, the Court found the scale difficult to ignore. By the Court’s count, counsel for the Group A Defendants represents roughly 290 Schedule A defendants across this case and ten other Northern District cases. Nearly identical misjoinder motions had been filed in at least eight of those cases.

The Court also pointed to counsel’s admission in a related case before Judge Durkin that he communicates with a “single representative” for all Schedule A defendants in that matter. Though no such admission was made in this case, when considered alongside the lockstep conduct across cases, the Court found those circumstances suggested central coordination inconsistent with defendants’ claim that they are unaffiliated.

The Court granted 60 days of limited expedited discovery and required the parties to submit a joint status report by May 1, 2026 with agreed-upon dates and discovery parameters.

On Thursday, September 17, 2026, from 3:00 p.m. – 4:00 p.m. CT, the Federal Bar Association Chicago Chapter and the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois will present Celebrating Hispanic Contributions to the Law, a complimentary CLE program honoring Hispanic Heritage Month.

The in-person event will be held in the Ceremonial Courtroom of the Everett McKinley Dirksen United States Courthouse, 219 S. Dearborn Street, Chicago, IL 60604. The program offers 1 hour of Professional Responsibility/DEI CLE credit, pending approval, and attendees are invited to a reception immediately following the program.

Highlights of the program include:

  • Hon. Rubén Castillo, Former U.S. District Chief Judge, Northern District of Illinois
  • Hon. Sonia Antolec, Judge, Illinois Court of Claims
  • Hon. Alfredo Maldonado, Associate Judge, Circuit Court of Cook County
  • Susana A. Sandoval Vargas, Midwest Regional Counsel, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund

Click here to register.

AbbVie Inc. v. BeiGene, LTD., et al., No. 24-cv-8167, (N.D. Ill. May 12, 2026) (Cummings, J.).

Judge Cummings denied defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss AbbVie’s Defend Trade Secrets Act claim. AbbVie alleges that BeiGene lured former AbbVie Senior Research Scientist Dr. Huaqing Liu out of retirement to serve as Executive Director of BeiGene’s Department of Chemistry in order to gain access to AbbVie’s BTK degrader trade secrets. AbbVie further alleges that BeiGene then used those secrets to dramatically change the course of its own BTK degrader development, filing at least six patent applications containing designs that closely resembled or exactly replicated AbbVie’s trade secret designs.

Defendants raised four arguments:

  1. AbbVie failed to allege Liu took any tangible information;
  2. AbbVie did not plead protective measures specific to the BTK program;
  3. AbbVie failed to plausibly allege BeiGene’s patent applications were derived from AbbVie; and
  4. the Complaint failed to adequately specify the alleged trade secrets.

The Court rejected each argument. Of particular interest, the Court held:

  • AbbVie only needs to plausibly plead misappropriation of a single trade secret to survive a motion to dismiss. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion does not permit piecemeal dismissals of parts of claims, chipping away at claims is the role of summary judgment.
  • Combinations of publicly available components can still qualify as trade secrets where the unique combination affords a competitive advantage.
  • The Seventh Circuit requires only that protective measures be “reasonable,” and it is “immaterial” that AbbVie applies the same confidentiality policy to other information. AbbVie need not necessarily show a heightened protection program for the specific trade secrets at issue.
  • Trade secrets can exist in employees’ memories. A trade secret plaintiff does not need to show that an actual document was taken.
  • Circumstantial evidence, including suspicious timing between Liu’s departure and BeiGene’s filing of patent applications containing AbbVie’s designs, is sufficient to support misappropriation allegations at the pleading stage.
  • Claims under the DTSA are not subject to a heightened pleading standard. At the pleading stage, plaintiffs can plead specificity “in broad strokes.”

The motion to dismiss was denied in its entirety.

Chicago Cubs Baseball Club, LLC v. Dunican and Rooftop by the Firehouse, Inc. d/b/a Wrigley View Rooftop, No. 24-cv-05086, (N.D. Ill. May 1, 2026) (Coleman, J.).

Judge Coleman denied defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the Cubs’ Lanham Act misappropriation and unjust enrichment claims.

The Cubs alleged that defendants sold tickets to view Cubs games from their rooftop across the street from Wrigley Field after the Cubs informed defendants that their license to sell such tickets would not be renewed for the 2024 season. Despite that notice, defendants listed the Cubs’ schedule on their website and sold tickets to access the rooftop, even selling out on several dates.

Defendants argued that the Cubs do not possess a property right in the experience of live games and that defendants are entitled to profit from the views around their own rooftop. The Court disagreed, relying on Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broad. Co. and Right Field Rooftops, LLC v. Chicago Baseball Holdings, LLC to recognize a property right in profits from live games. The Court held that the Cubs plausibly alleged misappropriation: (1) the Cubs created a product through substantial investment approaching a billion dollars annually; (2) defendants used that product in competition with the Cubs for their own commercial benefit without bearing any of the production costs; and (3) the Cubs alleged commercial damage in the form of lost revenue from ticket sales, concessions, and merchandise.

The unjust enrichment claim likewise survived because it “stand[s] . . . with the related claim” of misappropriation. The Court also noted that defendants’ own Answer raised disputes of material fact—by denying facts essential to the Cubs’ claims and asserting facts of their own—which independently precluded judgment on the pleadings.