On February 11, 2026 from 3:00 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, in collaboration with the Federal Bar Association Chicago Chapter and the Black Women Lawyers’ Association of Greater Chicago, Inc., is hosting what promises to be an interesting and timely program titled “A Critical Review of the 1913 Federal Mann Act Prosecution of Jack Johnson”.

The program will explore the federal government’s use of the Mann Act against Jack Johnson – the first Black world heavyweight boxing champion.  Award-winning CBS News Chicago journalist Dorothy Tucker and Pulitzer Prize-winning biographer David Maraniss of The Washington Post will examine the prosecution, its legal significance and issues of race, power and the rule of law.

This free in-person event will take place at the U.S. District Court, Ceremonial Courtroom, Room 2525. Attendees will receive 1.5 hours of D&I CLE credit.

Please register by clicking here. 

RBG Plastics d/b/ Restaurantware, LLC v. Sparkles Gift & Party Shop, Inc., No. 24-cv-02155 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2025) (Valderrama, J.).

Judge Valderrama denied defendants’ motion to dismiss trademark infringement claims but granted dismissal of false advertising and Illinois Consumer Fraud Act (ICFA) claims in this dispute over plaintiff’s RESTAURANTWARE trademark.

As an initial matter, plaintiff RBG Plastics was correct that defendant Sparkles’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) motion was premature because RBG Plastics had not yet responded to Sparkles’ counterclaims. The Court, therefore, did not hear the Rule 12(c) motion, but following the lead of numerous other courts, it treated the motion as a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion and decided it based upon the motion to dismiss standard. Furthermore, while Sparkles’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion was late because it had already answered RBG’s complaint, the Court still decided it because it was already considering the Rule 12(c) grounds under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard.

On the trademark claims, the Court methodically analyzed the seven-factor likelihood of confusion test (except the degree of care factor because neither party addressed it in briefing), finding plaintiff RBG sufficiently pled most factors despite some conclusory allegations. The Court noted that the identical marks, similar products (food service items), and overlapping distribution channels supported confusion. While allegations of actual confusion and intent to “palm off” were conclusory, the Court held this did not defeat the claims at the pleading stage, noting the “fact-intensive analysis” typically required.

The Court rejected defendants’ fair use defense at this stage, stating it would not engage in the fact-intensive analysis fair use requires at the motion to dismiss stage.

However, the Court dismissed the false advertising claim under Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard, finding plaintiff failed to identify any false statement of fact about defendants’ products. The Court distinguished trademark infringement from false advertising, noting the latter requires statements about “the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin” of goods.

The Court also dismissed the ICFA claim, holding plaintiff lacked standing as it was neither a consumer nor demonstrated the required “consumer nexus” showing market-wide impact.

Bala Bangles, Inc. v. The P’ships & Unincorporated Assocs. Identified on Schedule A, No. 23-cv-16721 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2024) (Valderrama, J.).

Judge Valderrama granted defendant Blueocean Furniture’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss in this Schedule A case, holding that plaintiff Bala Bangles failed to state a claim for patent infringement because it did not identify any specific accused Blueocean product.

The Court held that merely providing an internet store name and link in Schedule A, without identifying the actual product allegedly infringing the design patent, amounts to bare  allegations insufficient to meet plausibility requirements under Iqbal and Twombly. The Court cited Federal Circuit precedent requiring plaintiffs to sufficiently identify accused products “by photograph or name” rather than “by broad functional language.”

This decision reinforces that Schedule A plaintiffs cannot rely on generic allegations when asserting patent infringement claims. The Court distinguished patent pleading requirements from the more general allegations often accepted in trademark counterfeiting cases. Having failed to identify any specific infringing product from Blueocean, the Court dismissed the complaint without prejudice and dissolved the preliminary injunction as to Blueocean.

The Court also denied Blueocean’s request for sanctions because it was raised for the first time in reply, finding it would be “patently unfair” to consider arguments not raised in the opening brief.

The Kyjen Company, LLC v. The Individuals, Corporations, No. 23 C 15119 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2025) (Kendall, C.J.).

Chief Judge Kendall denied defendant ThinkPet’s motion for summary judgment in this trademark infringement case involving the “Fun Feeder” mark for slow feeder pet bowls. Kyjen alleged ThinkPet infringed its registered trademark by including “Fun Feeder” in Amazon product listings.

ThinkPet asserted a fair use defense, arguing it used the term descriptively. However, the Court found a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether ThinkPet acted in good faith. The Court explained that if evidence establishes the defendant “intends to trade on the good will of the trademark owner by creating confusion as to the source,” the use is not in good faith.

The Court found this case paralleled Promatek, where the Seventh Circuit held that using a competitor’s trademark in metatags to increase search visibility could constitute initial interest confusion. Similarly, Kyjen alleged ThinkPet used “Fun Feeder” for search engine optimization (SEO) to benefit from Kyjen’s goodwill.

Evidence supporting bad faith included: (1) “Fun Feeder” appeared prominently in search results across multiple platforms; (2) the companies were direct competitors selling similar products; and (3) ThinkPet added the term to its listings around June 2023. A jury could reasonably infer ThinkPet intended to cause customer confusion.

On likelihood of confusion, the Court analyzed the seven-factor test and found six factors could support consumer confusion. The Court emphasized that likelihood of confusion is “ultimately a question of fact” that should go to a jury when evidence is not one-sided.

Middleton Mixology LLC v. The Partnerships and Unincorporated Associations, No. 24 C 12287 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2025) (Kendall, C.J.).

Chief Judge Kendall denied plaintiff Middleton’s motion for preliminary injunction against defendant HzSane in this patent infringement case involving smoker devices for infusing smoke flavor into food and beverages. Middleton alleged HzSane infringed claim 8 of its ‘769 Patent.

The dispute centered on claim construction of “through bore” in Claim 8, which required “a through bore extending from a first end of the body member to an opposite second end” with “opposing open ends along a longitudinal axis.” HzSane argued its product lacked this feature because it had a closed bottom rather than opposing open ends.

The Court found HzSane presented a “substantial question” regarding infringement. While Middleton correctly noted that “comprising” language means the apparatus “includes but is not limited to” listed components, this did not explain how HzSane’s device with a solid base met the “opposing open ends” requirement.

The Court also found Middleton failed to demonstrate irreparable harm beyond speculative assertions of lost goodwill and reputational damage. Without evidence that HzSane’s product was inferior or that customers were actually confused, the Court could not find irreparable harm.

Because Middleton failed to establish likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable harm, the balance of hardships tipped in HzSane’s favor. The Court emphasized that preliminary injunctive relief is extraordinary and not awarded of right.

POET Research, Inc. v. Hydrite Chemical Company, No. 24-cv-01285 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2025) (Wood, J.).

Judge Wood granted defendant Hydrite’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in this patent infringement case involving methods for remediating toxins in biorefinery processes. The Court held that POET failed to establish minimum contacts with Illinois sufficient to support specific jurisdiction or to show that the Northern District was the proper venue.

POET alleged that Hydrite infringed four patents covering mycotoxin remediation methods by selling products like Hydri-Maize CB-400. While Hydrite acknowledged conducting plant trials in Hennepin, Illinois, these occurred before the first patent was issued. The Court emphasized that pre-issuance conduct “cannot constitute infringing acts” under Federal Circuit precedent.

For direct infringement of method patents, the Court explained that all steps must be performed by a single entity. POET could not show Hydrite performed the patented processes in Illinois. Hydrite’s attendance at Illinois trade shows was insufficient because “mere demonstration or display of an accused product, even in an obviously commercial atmosphere is not an act of infringement.”

Regarding induced infringement, the Court found that Hydrite’s website offering to ship products anywhere in the United States was insufficient without evidence of actual sales to Illinois customers or affirmative acts encouraging infringement by Illinois residents.

The Court denied POET’s request for jurisdictional discovery, finding the request too speculative given Hydrite’s unrebutted declarations that it had not made, used, offered for sale, or sold the accused products in Illinois. Rather than dismissing, the Court transferred the case to the Eastern District of Wisconsin, where there appeared to be proper jurisdiction.

Putianshi Lichengqu Zhengchangpai E-Commerce Co., Ltd. v. Shuangfeng County Shuangwei Electronic Technology Co., Ltd., No. 23 C 2650 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 19, 2025) (Alonso, J.).

Judge Alonso dismissed this declaratory judgment patent infringement case after finding that plaintiff’s Rule 30(b)(6) witness committed perjury during deposition. In this case involving design patents for silicon sleeve bamboo lids, plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment of invalidity and non-infringement of defendant’s D959,896 patent.

During the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of plaintiff (the accused infringer), defendant patentholder showed the deponent nine screenshot exhibits of Amazon listings featuring tumblers with accused lids. When asked whether plaintiff was still selling these products, the deponent stated they had stopped selling all such lids. However, defendant’s counsel subsequently found several active listings on plaintiff’s Amazon store featuring identical lids.

The Court found the deponent’s testimony was willfully false, rejecting plaintiff’s “shifting and vacillating explanations” that the deponent was confused about which lids were being discussed. The Court noted that defense counsel’s questions clearly encompassed all lids shown during the deposition, and the deponent had unequivocally stated sales had stopped.

Significantly, the Court held that perjury about damages issues was material even though liability had not yet been established. The Court explained that litigants cannot “lie with impunity about damages issues merely because the Court might not reach them.”

Finding dismissal appropriate as a sanction, the Court emphasized that perjury “undermines the most basic foundations of our judicial system” and that no litigant should feel free to commit perjury hoping that “even if the lies are exposed, the rest of the case will progress unhindered.” Quoting Secrease v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 800 F.3d 397, 402 (7th Cir. 2015). The Court dismissed plaintiff’s claims with prejudice and defendant’s counterclaim without prejudice.

Hypertherm, Inc. v. The Individuals, Partnerships, No. 24 CV 11340, (N.D. Ill. Sept. 2, 2025) (Coleman, J.).

Judge Coleman granted in part and denied in part plaintiff Hypertherm’s motion for default judgment in this Schedule A patent infringement case involving plasma arc cutter replacement parts. While finding defendants liable for patent infringement and awarding $46,146.60 in lost profits, the Court significantly limited the scope of the requested asset freeze.

Most notably, the Court ordered the release of $3,940.83 in frozen funds belonging to thirteen defendants who sold no identified infringing products. The Court found that plaintiff’s chart clearly showed these defendants had zero sales revenue from alleged infringing products and offered no justification for continuing to restrain their accounts.

Additionally, the Court rejected plaintiff’s request to freeze all assets regardless of connection to the infringement. For defendants who did sell infringing products, the Court ordered that funds be frozen only up to the calculated damages for each specific defendant. Any excess frozen funds were ordered to be released, recognizing that defendants may sell non-infringing products.

The Court entered default judgment finding defendants liable for infringement of three patents, granted a permanent injunction, and awarded lost profits of $46,146.60, but limited asset restraints to amounts directly tied to each defendant’s infringing sales.

NS, Inc. v. The Partnerships, No. 25 CV 00596, (N.D. Ill. Sept. 2, 2025) (Coleman, J.).

Judge Coleman, in this Schedule A case, granted in part and denied in part plaintiff NewAge Supply’s motion for default judgment against five defaulting defendants accused of selling counterfeit products bearing plaintiff’s PROFITNESS trademarks. While finding defendants liable for trademark infringement, the Court significantly reduced the requested statutory damages from $100,000 to $1,000 per defendant.

The Court emphasized that statutory damages must bear relation to actual damages. The Court found plaintiff’s requested relief “entirely, and unnecessarily, overbroad” because plaintiff failed to provide any meaningful description of the circumstances of infringement. Specifically, plaintiff provided no information about the duration of defendants’ infringing activity, defendants’ profits, sales volume, plaintiff’s lost revenue, or the value and reputation of plaintiff’s trademarks.

The Court also terminated the asset freeze on defendants’ financial accounts, finding that without information about what percentage of assets derived from infringing sales, the freeze posed too great a risk of unfairly burdening defendants who may also sell non-infringing products. The Court entered default judgment with a permanent injunction against trademark infringement and awarded $1,000 per defendant, which may be transferred from defendants’ financial accounts.

This decision reinforces that plaintiffs in Schedule A cases must provide concrete evidence of harm to support substantial statutory damage awards, even in default judgment proceedings.

Dorna Sports, S.L. v. The Individuals, et al., No. 24 CV 11676, (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 2025) (Coleman, J.).

Judge Coleman entered default but denied default judgment in this Schedule A trademark case, finding that plaintiff Dorna Sports failed to establish a legitimate cause of action despite defendants’ default. The Court held that conclusory allegations of consumer confusion, without any facts explaining how consumers would be deceived, cannot support a trademark infringement claim—even against defaulting defendants.

Dorna Sports, organizer of the MOTOGP motorcycle championship, alleged that defendants sold counterfeit products using its registered MOTOGP trademarks. While the Court accepted the well-pleaded allegations regarding liability as true upon entry of default, it found that Dorna failed to provide any factual basis for its consumer confusion claims. The plaintiff repeatedly asserted that defendants’ use of the trademarks caused consumer confusion, but provided no facts explaining how or why consumers would be deceived.

Most significantly, the Court noted that Dorna never identified or described its own genuine products that consumers might confuse with the counterfeit items. Despite using the term “MOTOGP Products” across its pleadings, Dorna never defined or identified what the products actually were. Without information about the legitimate products, the Court could not evaluate whether defendants’ use of the trademarks was likely to cause confusion—a required element for trademark infringement, false designation of origin, and Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act claims.

The Court ordered the release of all frozen assets and directed Dorna to relay the order to all implicated third-party platforms.