Feit Elec. Co., Inc. v. CFL Techs., LLC, Slip Op., No. 13 C 9339, (N.D. Ill. Kendall, C.J. & McShain, Mag. J.) (Oct. 22, 2025).

Chief Judge Kendall affirmed Magistrate Judge McShain’s order denying declaratory judgment defendant and patentholder CFL Technologies’ (CFL) motion to compel and for spoliation sanctions. The decision is a cautionary tale on timeliness and strategy in complex patent litigation, particularly in increasingly common long-stayed, complex patent cases.

CFL sought broad discovery concerning “all non-dimmable Feit CFLs,” vendor identities, and confidential materials under Local Patent Rule 1.4’s default protective order, reviving disputes first raised in 2018 but not pursued until nine-and-a-half months after a discovery stay was lifted in 2021. The Magistrate denied the motion as untimely and later declined CFL’s sanctions motion. The District Court affirmed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a)’s deferential “clearly erroneous or contrary to law” standard.

The Court affirmed that district courts have broad discretion to deny motions to compel for undue delay, even before discovery closes. The Court cataloged extended periods of inaction, party representations that no ripe disputes existed, and the reality that resolving the motion would force a discovery extension—previously denied for lack of good cause. Arguments that CFL prioritized other litigation issues, or believed a meet-and-confer resolved long-pending disputes, were insufficient. The Court also confirmed that parties cannot defer motion practice on foundational disputes while negotiating protective orders late in discovery and then salvage delay by claiming a new “impasse.”

On sanctions, the Court upheld denial of an adverse inference for alleged spoliation of product samples. The Court required evidence of intentional destruction in bad faith to conceal adverse evidence—a stringent standard that mere unavailability of samples does not satisfy, especially where product lines sunset over time and the later-accused products were not identified until years into the case.

Two practitioner takeaways stand out. First, timeliness is measured by the totality of conduct: delay length, explanations, and contemporaneous actions. Courts in the Northern District often, although not always, deny late-arising motions that would require reopening discovery absent compelling justification. Second, Rule 72(a) review is a high bar—objections must demonstrate misapplication of law or clear factual error, not merely disagreement with case management decisions. Strategically, preserving discovery disputes contemporaneously, documenting meet-and-confers, and moving promptly where impasse is evident are best practices, recognizing that each of those is a somewhat subjective requirement.

Quiju Chen v. John Does 1–10, et al., No. 25 C 6611, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Oct. 29, 2025) (Tharp, J.).

In an omnibus order Judge Tharp resolved a number of motions in a Lanham Act trademark “Schedule A” Doe case, providing helpful guidance on Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 pleading sufficiency, the standard and burdens for dissolving a Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 preliminary injunction (PI), the handling of Rule 12(b)(1) factual jurisdictional challenges, and Rule 11 sanctions.

The Court denied defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motions, finding the complaint met Rule 8’s plausibility standard by alleging a valid registration, unauthorized use in commerce via online marketplaces, and likelihood of confusion. The Court reasoned that at the pleadings stage, well-pled ownership and use/confusion allegations need not include granular transaction-level particulars to survive dismissal in Lanham Act claims, particularly where the allegations identify marketplace conduct directed at U.S. consumers.

On the motion to dissolve a preliminary injunction, the Court applied the Seventh Circuit’s Centurion framework, reaffirming that courts consider the same factors as in granting injunctive relief. As an initial matter, the Court held that in this instance defendant bears the burden to show dissolution is warranted. The Court rejected defendant’s attempt to shift the burden based on the injunction’s origins as a temporary restraining order (TRO) because the TRO was converted to a preliminary injunction after notice and an opportunity to respond, which defendant chose to ignore. Practically, the ruling signals that defendants seeking to dissolve previously noticed injunctions must make a substantive showing negating likelihood of success and irreparable harm at least where they had notice before the PI was issued; bare assertions of ownership disputes or generalized hardship will not suffice to reverse a PI once issued.

On Rule 12(b)(1), the Court rejected a factual standing challenge, holding the plaintiff’s registration materials sufficed at the Rule 12 stage to establish a protectable interest, and defendants did not carry their burden to show a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court also denied Rule 11 sanctions, emphasizing that the complaint’s survival under Rules 12(b)(1) & (6) undermines claims that the filing was frivolous or for an improper purpose.

Finally, the Court granted in part a motion to strike foreign-language exhibits lacking certified translations under Fed. Rule of Evidence 604 and declined to revisit an administrative text entry issue after missed deadlines.

For practitioners, two procedural points stand out. First, when litigating motions to dissolve, anticipate a re-weighing of the factors with the moving party carrying the laboring oar absent a lack of notice to defendant in the underlying injunctive proceedings. Second, registration evidence continues to provide strong early-stage grounding for standing and Rule 12(b)(6) sufficiency; defendants challenging ownership should be prepared with competent proof, not mere competing assertions.

Art Ask Agency v. Schedule A Does, No. 25 C 4359, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 2025) (Coleman, J.).

Judge Coleman denied plaintiff Art Ask Agency’s motion for default judgment and dismissed Art Ask Agency’s Schedule A copyright case for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). The Court held that screenshots of Temu listings and allegations that products “could be” sold into Illinois were inadequate without proof of an actual Illinois sale or shipment.

Key IP Rulings and Implications. The Court did not reach the merits of the copyright claim because personal jurisdiction was lacking. Consistent with the Northern District’s evolving treatment of marketplace cases, the opinion underscores that plaintiffs must substantiate purposeful availment with more than a product page showing the ability to ship to Illinois. In copyright cases, as in trademark Schedule A cases, a test purchase or comparable sales evidence into Illinois remains the gold standard for establishing jurisdiction. The Court emphasized that specific jurisdiction is a defendant-focused inquiry requiring a nexus between forum contacts and the alleged infringement. Screenshots with an Illinois address field, absent purchase confirmation or shipping records, do not establish that nexus. The Court’s refusal to enter default judgment without personal jurisdiction reflects a broader trend of increased scrutiny at the default stage in Schedule A actions. Plaintiffs who cannot meet the jurisdictional threshold will likely see their cases dismissed irrespective of default status.

Practice Pointers. Plaintiffs should plan for admissible evidence of at least one Illinois transaction tied to the alleged infringing listing, preferably authenticated by declaration or affidavit. In other words, obtain and paper a test purchase before seeking ex parte relief or default judgments, and ideally before filing suit. Defendants should review marketplace histories for Illinois sales and, if none exist, move promptly to contest jurisdiction and to dissolve asset restraints predicated on insufficient contacts.

Societe Pour Loeuvre et la Memoire Dantoine de Saint Exupery – Succession De Saint Exupery-Dagay v. Schedule A Does, No. 25 C 579, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2025) (Durkin, J.).

Judge Durkin denied a Schedule A defendant’s motion to dismiss trademark claims centering on “The Little Prince,” novella rejecting arguments under Fed. Civ. P. R. 12(b)(2), 12(b)(5), and 12(b)(6), finding personal jurisdiction based upon an Illinois sale documented by plaintiff and declined to dismiss on service or fair-use grounds at the pleadings stage.

Key IP Rulings and Implications. The complaint plausibly alleged likelihood of confusion where the product listing not only referenced “the little prince” but visually emphasized the phrase in a way that could signal association. The Court treated the similarity inquiry as consumer-facing: would a buyer reasonably associate the product with the source of the registered mark? Under that standard, the Court allowed the claim to proceed notwithstanding aesthetic differences between the registered stylized mark and the listing’s text.

The Court next considered defendant’s fair use arguments, both descriptive and nominative. The Court noted that fair use defenses are fact-heavy defenses generally unsuited to Rule 12 motions, unless the complaint pleads the defense’s elements on its face. Plaintiff did not affirmatively plead the facts making a fair use case against it in this instance. Brand owners alleging misuse of famous titles and imagery (or trademarks) will be well-served to capture and preserve the listing context, including how the mark is presented and marketed to consumers.

Procedural Issues and Their Influence. The Court denied defendant’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) jurisdiction challenge, crediting plaintiff’s claimed evidence of an actual sale into Illinois. That actual sale satisfied minimum-contacts requirements for specific jurisdiction.

The Court also rejected a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5) challenge to plaintiff’s email service despite the fact that the Court previously authorized email service, and where defendant’s explanation for nonresponse amounted to internal staffing changes rather than a legal defect in service or not having received the service email.

Strategy Notes. Plaintiffs should lead with proof of an Illinois sale, preferably with purchase, shipment, and delivery documentation. Defendants seeking early dismissal should address jurisdiction with specificity and avoid relegating core arguments to reply briefs; thin jurisdictional showings—especially in the face of a documented Illinois transaction may not prevail.

Tee Turtle LLC v. Schedule A Does, No. 25 C 2910, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 2025) (Coleman, J.)

Judge Coleman denied default judgment and dismissed Tee Turtle’s Schedule A case for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) after the plaintiff failed to offer evidence of even a single completed Illinois sale, shipment, or order confirmation, despite screenshots showing product listings and the ability to ship to an Illinois address in this copyright case. The decision underscores an increasingly consistent Northern District trend: for online marketplace defendants, a purchase into Illinois—or similarly concrete sales evidence—remains the most reliable jurisdictional anchor.

Key IP Rulings and Implications. Although Tee Turtle asserted Lanham Act and Copyright Act claims, the Court did not reach the merits because it did not have jurisdiction. In Schedule A cases involving foreign online sellers, plaintiffs cannot rely on “on information and belief” allegations or shopping-cart screenshots alone. The Court stressed the defendant-focused nature of specific jurisdiction and the need for evidence connecting the alleged infringement to Illinois. Practically, this means that plaintiffs should be ready to provide authenticated proof of an Illinois transaction—order confirmation, shipment data, and/or delivery records—to avoid early dismissal. The case is part of a line of decisions making clear that bare screenshots are insufficient when they do not reflect an actual sale into the forum. A test purchase likely would have solved these issues, although there is no guarantee of that.

Strategic Takeaways. For plaintiffs, invest early in test purchases and record trails that show order confirmations and shipments delivered to Illinois customers. Anticipate that screenshots of product pages with an Illinois address field will not suffice. For defendants, a clean record—no Illinois sales—paired with a prompt jurisdictional challenge can short-circuit default motions and asset restraints. Counsel should also expect courts to scrutinize affidavit support and to deny default judgment where jurisdiction is not clearly established on the record.

The Northern District and the Chicago Chapter of the Federal Bar Association are seeking nominations – no later than March 3, 2026 – for exceptional pro bono and public interest representation in civil and criminal matters before the Court.

Factors considered include: 

  • dedication to pro bono or public interest work;
  • outstanding achievement resulting from the representation of a large group of indigents, successful representation in a difficult case, outstanding negotiation and settlement skills in achieving a result without trial;
  • extraordinary number of hours committed to pro bono work; or
  • other distinguished performance. 

Nominations must pertain to work performed in the Northern District on matters that are fully resolved and no longer pending before the Court.

Nominations using this fillable form may be emailed to: ProBono_Awards_ILND@ilnd.uscourts.gov. Awards will be presented at the Court’s twenty-sixth annual awards ceremony on Friday, May 1, 2026, at 1:00 pm.

On February 11, 2026 from 3:00 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, in collaboration with the Federal Bar Association Chicago Chapter and the Black Women Lawyers’ Association of Greater Chicago, Inc., is hosting what promises to be an interesting and timely program titled “A Critical Review of the 1913 Federal Mann Act Prosecution of Jack Johnson”.

The program will explore the federal government’s use of the Mann Act against Jack Johnson – the first Black world heavyweight boxing champion.  Award-winning CBS News Chicago journalist Dorothy Tucker and Pulitzer Prize-winning biographer David Maraniss of The Washington Post will examine the prosecution, its legal significance and issues of race, power and the rule of law.

This free in-person event will take place at the U.S. District Court, Ceremonial Courtroom, Room 2525. Attendees will receive 1.5 hours of D&I CLE credit.

Please register by clicking here. 

RBG Plastics d/b/ Restaurantware, LLC v. Sparkles Gift & Party Shop, Inc., No. 24-cv-02155 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2025) (Valderrama, J.).

Judge Valderrama denied defendants’ motion to dismiss trademark infringement claims but granted dismissal of false advertising and Illinois Consumer Fraud Act (ICFA) claims in this dispute over plaintiff’s RESTAURANTWARE trademark.

As an initial matter, plaintiff RBG Plastics was correct that defendant Sparkles’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) motion was premature because RBG Plastics had not yet responded to Sparkles’ counterclaims. The Court, therefore, did not hear the Rule 12(c) motion, but following the lead of numerous other courts, it treated the motion as a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion and decided it based upon the motion to dismiss standard. Furthermore, while Sparkles’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion was late because it had already answered RBG’s complaint, the Court still decided it because it was already considering the Rule 12(c) grounds under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard.

On the trademark claims, the Court methodically analyzed the seven-factor likelihood of confusion test (except the degree of care factor because neither party addressed it in briefing), finding plaintiff RBG sufficiently pled most factors despite some conclusory allegations. The Court noted that the identical marks, similar products (food service items), and overlapping distribution channels supported confusion. While allegations of actual confusion and intent to “palm off” were conclusory, the Court held this did not defeat the claims at the pleading stage, noting the “fact-intensive analysis” typically required.

The Court rejected defendants’ fair use defense at this stage, stating it would not engage in the fact-intensive analysis fair use requires at the motion to dismiss stage.

However, the Court dismissed the false advertising claim under Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard, finding plaintiff failed to identify any false statement of fact about defendants’ products. The Court distinguished trademark infringement from false advertising, noting the latter requires statements about “the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin” of goods.

The Court also dismissed the ICFA claim, holding plaintiff lacked standing as it was neither a consumer nor demonstrated the required “consumer nexus” showing market-wide impact.

Bala Bangles, Inc. v. The P’ships & Unincorporated Assocs. Identified on Schedule A, No. 23-cv-16721 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2024) (Valderrama, J.).

Judge Valderrama granted defendant Blueocean Furniture’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss in this Schedule A case, holding that plaintiff Bala Bangles failed to state a claim for patent infringement because it did not identify any specific accused Blueocean product.

The Court held that merely providing an internet store name and link in Schedule A, without identifying the actual product allegedly infringing the design patent, amounts to bare  allegations insufficient to meet plausibility requirements under Iqbal and Twombly. The Court cited Federal Circuit precedent requiring plaintiffs to sufficiently identify accused products “by photograph or name” rather than “by broad functional language.”

This decision reinforces that Schedule A plaintiffs cannot rely on generic allegations when asserting patent infringement claims. The Court distinguished patent pleading requirements from the more general allegations often accepted in trademark counterfeiting cases. Having failed to identify any specific infringing product from Blueocean, the Court dismissed the complaint without prejudice and dissolved the preliminary injunction as to Blueocean.

The Court also denied Blueocean’s request for sanctions because it was raised for the first time in reply, finding it would be “patently unfair” to consider arguments not raised in the opening brief.

The Kyjen Company, LLC v. The Individuals, Corporations, No. 23 C 15119 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2025) (Kendall, C.J.).

Chief Judge Kendall denied defendant ThinkPet’s motion for summary judgment in this trademark infringement case involving the “Fun Feeder” mark for slow feeder pet bowls. Kyjen alleged ThinkPet infringed its registered trademark by including “Fun Feeder” in Amazon product listings.

ThinkPet asserted a fair use defense, arguing it used the term descriptively. However, the Court found a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether ThinkPet acted in good faith. The Court explained that if evidence establishes the defendant “intends to trade on the good will of the trademark owner by creating confusion as to the source,” the use is not in good faith.

The Court found this case paralleled Promatek, where the Seventh Circuit held that using a competitor’s trademark in metatags to increase search visibility could constitute initial interest confusion. Similarly, Kyjen alleged ThinkPet used “Fun Feeder” for search engine optimization (SEO) to benefit from Kyjen’s goodwill.

Evidence supporting bad faith included: (1) “Fun Feeder” appeared prominently in search results across multiple platforms; (2) the companies were direct competitors selling similar products; and (3) ThinkPet added the term to its listings around June 2023. A jury could reasonably infer ThinkPet intended to cause customer confusion.

On likelihood of confusion, the Court analyzed the seven-factor test and found six factors could support consumer confusion. The Court emphasized that likelihood of confusion is “ultimately a question of fact” that should go to a jury when evidence is not one-sided.