Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Oct. 29, 2010) (Dow, J.).
Judge Dow denied defendants’ (collectively “eSpeed”) motion to strike or stay consideration of plaintiff Trading Technologies’ (“TT”) bill of costs, and awarded TT $381,831.04 in costs.* Because TT received a damages award at trial, TT was the prevailing party and costs were warranted, absent TT’s trial misconduct or eSpeed’s inability to pay. The fact that TT lost on the issue of eSpeed’s alleged willfulness did not change TT’s status as the prevailing party, nor did the fact that eSpeed was found not to infringe based upon several of its software packages. The Court had previously stayed a determination of the bill of costs pending the Federal Circuit appeal. So, with the appeal complete, there was no reason left to delay the Court’s decision.
The Court then turned to the bill of costs. The following determinations were of particular note:
The Court awarded all undisputed witness travel, attendance and subsistence costs, totaling approximately $21,000. The Court denied travel costs for a trial witness that was flown to trial from Switzerland, rather than from his home in Ohio. Witness fees are only allowed for the shortest possible route from the witness’s residence.
The Court awarded videography costs only for depositions of foreign witnesses that TT disclosed as potential trial witnesses.
Court reporter appearance fees were denied because they are only allowed to the extent the fee plus the per-page rate charged does not exceed the Judicial Conference’s limit. In this case, the per page rate was already more than the allowed per-page recovery.
Because hearing transcripts played a significant role in the case, the Court awarded TT the allowable hearing transcript fees.
The Court awarded 25% of TT’s photocopying request. The reduction accounted for various non-copying charges, such as OCR, blowbacks, etc. and multiple copies of some documents. Recovery is only allowed for a single copy of a document, in most cases.
No costs were awarded for translation because § 1920(6) does not authorize recovery of translation costs, except for “check interpreters” used at trial to dispute certain interpretations.
The Court refused to apportion TT’s costs based upon the portion of the case that eSpeed won (summary judgment of noninfringement) versus the jury award that TT won.
* Click here for much more on this case in the Blog’s archives.

Continue Reading Court Will Not Apportion Costs to Prevailing Party Based Upon How Much of the Case was Won

Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. Speed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Sep. 8, 2010) (Schenkier, Mag. J.).
Judge Schenkier recommended denying plaintiff Trading Technologies’ (“TT”) motion to enforce the final judgment and for sanctions. The Court also recommended correcting the final judgment to reflect the jury verdict and the remitted damages award. A jury previously awarded TT $3.5M in damages and found defendant’s infringement willful. The Court later overturned the willfulness finding and ordered a remittitur of damages to $2.5M, which TT accepted. The Court then granted a permanent injunction and entered a final judgment, but that judgment did not reflect the damages award.
Defendant argued that, despite the jury award and remittitur, there was no damages award because it was not reflected in the final judgment and after the Federal Circuit had decided to appeal it was too late to revise the final judgment.
The Court agreed that the first judgment should have included the award, but not that it was too late to fix it. The Court noted that the most likely explanation for the omission was “the fallibility of human beings (judges included).” The Court also noted that TT should have sought to correct the final judgment immediately. But despite the imprecise judgment, the Federal Circuit ruled upon several issues related to the jury verdict, although not the award itself. And neither TT nor defendants disputed the fact or the amount of the damages award. Based upon those facts, the Court recommended that revising the final judgment to reflect the award would merely “correct a clerical mistake or a mistake arising from oversight or omission” pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a). Finally, the Court recognized TT’s frustration over not having received payment 34 months after the jury verdict and 6 months after the Federal Circuit’s decision. But the Court recommended not awarding TT its fees because TT’s failure to promptly get the judgment corrected was the only reason there was a delay in paying the judgment.

Continue Reading Trading Technologies: Court Reconnect Altering Judgment to Reflect Jury Award

Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, Min. Order (N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2008) (Moran, Sen. J.).*
Judge Moran scheduled a two-day inequitable conduct hearing Wednesday and Thursday, April 2 and 3, thereby granting by implication defendant eSpeed’s motion for such a hearing. The Court also set a March 21 status hearing to discuss witness and privilege issues, presumably related to the inequitable conduct hearing. So, there is at least one more round of argument and possibly briefing before the Court’s judgment is complete and final. I hope to attend the inequitable conduct hearing and will blog about it if I do.
* Click here to read much more about this case in the Blog’s archives.

Continue Reading Trading Technologies v. eSpeed: Inequitable Conduct Hearing Scheduled

Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Feb. 5, 2008) (Moran, Sen. J.).*
Judge Moran denied defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 motion for a new trial of damages on the condition that plaintiff Trading Technologies (“TT”) accepted a remittitur of defendant eSpeed’s portion of the damages. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict for TT and awarded $3.5M in compensatory damages, split $2M against defendant Ecco and $1.5M against defendant eSpeed. At trial, TT’s damages model was based upon a proposed reasonable royalty of between $.15 and $.25 per trade and a total of approximately 18M to 23M trades for a damages range of about $3.5M to $4.6M. TT argued that the apportionment of damages was irrelevant because the total award was within the argued range and because eSpeed purchased Ecco and, therefore, would be paying the full amount. But the Court noted that Ecco’s award would be paid from an escrow account set up for because of TT’s patent claims when eSpeed purchased Ecco. Additionally, eSpeed’s $1.5M judgment was well beyond the highest award that could be supported by TT’s evidence. The evidence showed that during the relevant time, eSpeed completed approximately 2.1M trades. Even at $.25 per trade, TT’s highest proposed royalty, the possible damages were only $539,468. The Court, therefore, offered TT a remittitur of $539,468 or a new trial on damages.
The Court also awarded TT prejudgment interest set at the average prime rate for the period compounded monthly, because TT collected license fees monthly.
* Click here to read much more about this case in the Blog’s archives and click here for a copy of this opinion.

Continue Reading Trading Technologies v. eSpeed: Damages Remittitur

Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2008) (Moran, Sen. J.).*
Judge Moran denied defendants’ (collectively “eSpeed”) motion for judgment as a matter of law that plaintiff Trading Technologies’ (“TT”) patents were unenforceable because of patent misuse. TT’s open letter to the futures market was not patent misuse despite the facts that:
The letter requested a 2.5 cent fee for every transaction an exchange processed regardless of whether infringing software was used; and
The fees did not end when the patents expired.
Had such a license been entered, it would have been per se patent misuse. But because no exchange ever accepted the offer or even entered serious negotiations with TT based upon the offer, there was no patent misuse.
Terms in certain license agreements that prevented licensees from using eSpeed software, regardless of whether the eSpeed software infringed, were improper. But the terms did not rise to the level of patent misuse because the effect of the clauses was not anti-competitive. The clauses were only in two of TT’s fifteen settlement agreements. And TT argued that the intent of the parties in the two agreements was only to restrict the use of infringing eSpeed products. Furthermore, the other thirteen agreements only restrict use of infringing software.
Terms in the agreements requiring royalties on any trade for which licensed software could be used, as opposed to just those for which patented software was actually used, were not patent misuse. The agreements required only that royalties be paid on trades made using licensed products or any software when licensed and unlicensed software was linked such that either could be used to make the trade. If unlicensed software that was not linked to the licensed software was used, no royalty was due.
Finally, the provisions preventing licensees from assisting third parties to invalidate the TT patents were not patent misuse. Licensees that had not agreed to a consent judgment as part of a settlement were free to challenge the validity of the patents on their own. Furthermore, no licensee was prevented from participating in court-ordered invalidity proceedings or from assisting a government entity, such as the PTO, that was considering the validity of the patents.
* Click here to read much more about this case in the Blog’s archives and click here for a copy of the opinion.

Continue Reading Trading Technologies v. eSpeed: Restrictive License Agreements are not Patent Misuse

Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jan. 2, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).*
Judge Moran denied defendants’ (collectively “eSpeed”) motion for judgment as a matter of law that plaintiff Trading Technologies’ (“TT”) patent was invalid for indefiniteness based upon the claim term “single action of a user input device” (“Single Action”). The Court previously construed Single Action as “an action by a user within a short period of time that may comprise one or more clicks of a mouse button or other input device.” Before trial, the Court used the definition to exclude evidence regarding a Tokyo Stock Exchange (“TSE”) software package that required double clicking, entering a quantity and pressing “enter” – click here for the Blog’s discussion of that opinion.
TT argued that the phrases “one or more clicks” and “short period of time” in the Court’s construction were indefinite because they did not sufficiently delineate the scope of the term. The Court noted that it did not need absolute clarity to define a claim term and held that the Single Action was sufficiently definite. The Court reasoned that it had been able to construe the term based largely upon the specification. And neither “one or more clicks” nor “short period of time” rendered the claim indefinite because the phrases are part of the definition, not the claim language.
Additionally, the terms were designed to be less than precise because Single Action is defined from the perspective of the individual user, not objectively for all users. The Court gave the example that an experienced trader might set a double click as two clicks occurring within .3 seconds of each other – which would be a Single Action – while a novice trader might set a double click as any two clicks within one second of each other – which would be a Single Action for the novice, but not the experienced trader. Creating a more fixed definition based on an average user would import limitations into the claim.
Finally, the fact that the Court was able to determine that the TSE software did not require only a Single Action further proved that Single Action was sufficiently definite.
* Click here to read much more about this case in the Blog’s archives and click here for a copy of this opinion.

Continue Reading Trading Technologies v. eSpeed: Ambiguous Term Not Indefinite Because it can be Construed

Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, Min. Orders (N.D. Ill. Jan. 3, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).*
In addition to the willfulness decision discussed earlier today (click here for the post) and the invalidity decision that I will blog about early next week, Judge Moran also issued two minute orders deciding several of the outstanding post-trial motions. The Court denied defendant eSpeed’s motion for a new trial and its combined motion for judgment as a matter of law that: 1) the claims are invalid because of anticipation, obviousness, prior sale; and 2) because the claims have a June 9, 2000 priority date they were not infringed.
There are still several pending motions, including various motions regarding damages and interest on the jury’s award and eSpeed’s motion for an evidentiary hearing regarding inequitable conduct. I will keep you posted as those are decided.
* Click here to read much more about this case in the Blog’s archives.

Continue Reading Trading Technologies v. eSpeed: Minute Orders

Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jan. 3, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).*
Judge Moran granted defendants’ (collectively “eSpeed”) motion for judgment as a matter of law that their infringement was no willful. The Court instructed the jury using the objective recklessness standard from In re Seagate Techs., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007), but when the Court reviewed the totality of the circumstances it found no support for the willfulness verdict and, more specifically that plaintiff Trading Technologies (“TT”) had not met its burden of proving that there was an objectively high likelihood of infringement when eSpeed sold its infringing product, Futures View. When eSpeed launched Futures View, TT’s patent had not issued. And while eSpeed was aware of the application, knowledge of an application does not prove willfulness. Furthermore, TT produced no evidence of post-issuance willfulness. TT submitted two internal eSpeed emails, but both were sent before TT’s patent issued and the emails only suggested that eSpeed should mimic certain features of the TT software. And upon learning of TT’s issued patent, eSpeed immediately began a redesign of Futures View, resulting in new software products that the Court granted summary judgment of noninfringement. As a result of the redesign, the infringing Futures View was only on the market for five months after TT’s patent issued.
TT also argued that eSpeed’s failure to make noninfringement arguments in preliminary injunction proceedings showed willfulness. But the Court held that eSpeed denied infringement in its answer and that there was no need to argue noninfringement of Future View in preliminary injunction proceedings because eSpeed was not selling Future View. There was no danger of an injunction over a product eSpeed was not selling.
Finally, TT argued that eSpeed’s creation of a $4M escrow account related to potential infringement of the TT patent when it purchased defendant Ecco was proof of willfulness. The Court, however, held that the escrow account was merely assignment of risk in a business deal. When eSpeed purchased Ecco, TT had already sued eSpeed and to the extent that there was any risk that Ecco products could infringe the TT patent, the escrow account was not an admission, but a “shrewd business practice.”
Expect to see more on TT v. eSpeed this week. The Court has issued its first few post-trial opinions and I am sure others are on their way before this case heads, presumably, to the Federal Circuit.
* Click here to read much more about this case in the Blog’s archives and click here for a copy of this opinion.

Continue Reading Trading Technologies v. eSpeed: Court Overturns Jury’s Willfulness Verdict

II have not been able to fulfill my promised additional coverage of the inequitable conduct portion of the Trading Technologies v. eSpeed case, but it is not my fault.* The Court decided to consider eSpeed’s inequitable conduct and patent misuse defenses on the papers. The Court ordered a briefing schedule that will complete briefing by early December for eSpeed’s inequitable conduct and patent misuse defenses , as well as eSpeed’s post-trial motions regarding willfulness and damages remittitur and TT’s motions for its attorneys’ fees and costs. The Court has scheduled a status conference for December 20th. Perhaps the parties will have rulings by the end of the year.
Practice tip: In my experience, one of the dangers of doing inequitable conduct after the conclusion of the jury trial is that both the Court and the parties are exhausted and emotionally drained at the end of the jury trial (particularly after a multi-week trial like this one). So, when it is time to try inequitable conduct, either the Court no longer wants the trial or the parties and the Court are so exhausted that they have trouble keeping their focus and energy level where it was for the jury trial despite the importance of the issues. I do not know why the parties or the Court decided that inequitable conduct should be decided on the papers in this case. But any time that inequitable conduct is to be tried after a jury trial, you run the risk that no live evidence will come in on inequitable conduct.
* Click here to read much more about this case and Trading Technologies’ (“TT”) related cases in the Blog’s archives

Continue Reading Trading Technologies v. eSpeed: Inequitable Conduct Proceedings Update

I have already posted on the verdict generally, but the jury’s completed verdict form is now available and provides some more detailed information — click here for a copy. The jury found infringement, either literal, contributory or induced, for every accused product on every asserted claim. The $3.5M damages award was split $1.5M against eSpeed and $2M against Ecco. And both eSpeed and Ecco were found to have willfully infringed the patents.
Additionally, click here for the final jury instructions. Of particular interest, the willfulness instruction, at page 35, is likely one of the first that used the new objective recklessness standard from In re Seagate.

Continue Reading Trading Technologies v. eSpeed: Jury Verdit Form