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Rowe Int’l Corp. v. Ecast, Inc., No. 06 C 2703, 2007 WL 1498958 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2007) (Kennelly, J.).*
Judge Kennelly issued this claim construction opinion construing the claims of eight patents related to computer jukeboxes and computer jukebox networks. Of particular note, the Court construed “song selection means” in USPN 5,355,302 (the “‘302 patent”) as a keyboard separate from a display for generating a signal representing a song selected from the set of songs stored in the jukebox. Plaintiffs sought a construction that would include a visual touchscreen, arguing that the Court should consider the following language from an unrelated patent by the same patentee (the “‘398 patent”), that was not part of the patent in suit or its prosecution history: “song selection means displayed on said visual screen.” Plaintiffs argued that this language showed that “song selection means” could include on-screen displays. But the Court held that considering the language was not permissible and that, even if it were, the language only showed that the inventors were capable of claiming an on-screen display, but chose not to in the ‘302 patent.
* You can read more about this case in the Blog’s archives.
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Continue Reading Claim Construction Cannot be Expanded Based Upon Language in an Unrelated Patent

Rowe Int’l Corp. v. Ecast, Inc., No. 06 C 2703, 2007 WL 1438370 (N.D. Ill. May 14, 2007) (Kennelly, J.).
Judge Kennelly denied defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ patent infringement complaint for lack of standing. As to two patents that were not expressly assigned to plaintiffs before the suit was filed (the “Progeny Patents”), the Court used Illinois contract law to interpret the following blanket provision in the assignment agreement regarding the parent patent, which assigned the parent application and any improvements or related applications:
any and all other applications . . . which the undersigned may file . . . on said invention or improvements, and in any and all Letters Patent of the United States and foreign countries, which may be obtained on any of said applications . . . .
The Court held that this provision was unambiguous. Pursuant to this provision, the inventors assigned plaintiffs any related patents or improvements to the original application. Because the Progeny Patents were related to the parent patent, they were assigned to plaintiffs. And, therefore, plaintiffs had standing to file suit. Additionally, the Court noted that the express assignment of the Progeny Patents that plaintiffs received post-filing did not retroactively confer standing upon plaintiffs for this suit.
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Continue Reading Progeny Patents Conveyed by Blanket Assignment of Parent

Trading Techs. Int’l., Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No 04 C 5312, 2007 WL 1628352 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 1, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).
Judge Moran denied plaintiff Trading Technologies’ (“TT”) motion for a protective order to prevent the deposition of Robert Klinger, related to defendant eSpeed’s inequitable conduct defense (more on this case in the Blog’s archives). The Court held that discovery is a “balancing act.” eSpeed’s assertion that Klinger was involved in drafting a response to a USPTO Office Action at the center of its inequitable conduct claim outweighed TT’s best argument — that the deposition was duplicative because defendants had deposed or have scheduled the depositions of two lead outside patent prosecutors, TT’s in-house patent prosecutor and the relevant patent examiner. The Court also noted that the case is approaching the discovery close, so we may start seeing fewer discovery motions in the case and more substantive motions.
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Continue Reading Duplicative Deposition May Go Forward

Trading Techs. Int’l., Inc. v. GL Consultants, No. 5 C 4120, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2007) (Gottschall, J.).*
Judge Gottschall denied defendant GL Trade SA’s (“GL SA”) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, with leave to refile after completion of jurisdictional discovery. GL SA is a French company located in Paris. GL SA does not have an office or any assets in Illinois, but it does have a subsidiary, defendant GL Americas, Inc. (“GL Americas”). GL Americas maintains a regional office in Chicago. The Court noted that despite three rounds of briefing on jurisdiction, neither party “provided anything of substance to the court.” Plaintiff Trading Technologies (“TT”) treated GL SA’s subsidiary GL Americas as GL SA, and had not submitted evidence of GL SA’s specific contacts with Illinois. GL SA submitted several declarations, but none sufficiently clarified that GL SA did not have minimum contacts with Illinois. As a result, the Court held that it lacked sufficient evidence to rule upon the motion, and granted TT’s motion for jurisdictional discovery.
After ruling on the motions, the Court continued to offer some of its jurisdictional analysis as a “framework” for the issues the parties should address through the discovery process. First, the Court pointed out that neither party had detailed GL SA’s specific contacts with Illinois. Neither party identified which software products were GL SA products and which were GL Americas products. Furthermore, neither party identified any sales of GL SA or GL Americas products to Illinois consumers. The Court noted that if none of the GL SA products at issue were sold in Illinois, the Court would not have specific jurisdiction over GL SA. And if there were sales to Illinois consumers, discovery was still required to show whether GL SA had a purpose and intent to serve the Illinois market. Finally, the Court noted that TT must make its case for the Court’s jurisdiction over GL SA based upon GL SA’s actions, without imputing GL America’s actions or contacts to GL SA.
*More analysis of opinions from this case and the various related TT cases, can be found in the Blog’s archives.
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Continue Reading Court Lacks Sufficient Evidence to Rule Upon Personal Jurisdiction

Trading Techs. Int’l., Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).
Judge Moran denied plaintiff Trading Technologies’ (“TT”) motion to compel additional production from third party Chicago Mercantile Exchange (“CME”). TT served CME with a subpoena seeking, among other things, anything referring or relating to potential prior art to the patents at issue and communications between CME and any other entity regarding the patents at issue, including any joint defense agreement between CME and such parties. After TT filed the motion to compel, CME produced thousands of pages, including what it stated were all documents in its possession regarding possible prior art. Because all prior art documents had been produced, the Court denied TT’s motion to compel additional prior art-related documents.
The Court also denied TT’s motion to the extent it sought communications regarding the possible prior art. First, the Court considered any communications CME might have had with defendants in the currently pending cases. The Court referred to its May 1, 2007, order which required defendants to produce a list of all members in their joint defense agreement (that opinion and order, as well as numerous other opinions from this and its related cases, are in the Blog’s archives). The Court held that defendants’ list would allow TT to discover whether CME was involved in a joint defense and that no further discovery from CME was necessary.
Second, the Court considered CME’s communications, including potential joint defense agreements, with any parties not involved in TT’s pending suits. The Court held that the common interest doctrine could attach to communications even before the filing of a suit, so long as the parties anticipated litigation. Furthermore, the Court held that regardless of whether CME’s communications with other third parties were part of a joint defense, they were not discoverable because they were “irrelevant” to this case. The Court explained that while relevance is broadly defined, it does have boundaries and TT’s motion ran “up against such a boundary.”
* Because Westlaw has not published this opinion yet, here is a copy of Judge Moran’s original, signed opinion.
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Continue Reading Third Parties’ Communications With Other Third Parties Are Not Relevant

Trading Techs. Int’l., Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 05 C 4120, (N.D. Ill. May 16, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).
Judge Moran granted in part and denied in part plaintiff Trading Technologies’ (“TT”) motion to compel additional production from defendants GL Consultants, Inc. and GL Trade SA (collectively “GL”). The Court required GL to update certain interrogatory responses and to produce documents based upon a priority date GL had argued for, as opposed to stopping at TT’s alleged priority date. The Court also required GL to provide TT access to original source code and certain electronic archives, without regard to whether TT had provided GL similar access. Finally, the Court denied TT’s request to lower the confidentiality designation of the source code for GL’s GL Tradepad software. But what is most interesting about the Court’s opinion is its reminder to the parties about how the Court expects them to conduct discovery:
At the outset, we reiterate some of the points regarding discovery that we have stressed throughout this complicated and contentious litigation. First, parties should err on the side of over-production; relevance should he argued sparingly. Second, counsel are officers of the court and their word is generally sufficient. Third, there will always be additional persons to interview, additional documents to discover, and alleged prior art to be found; we must, however, put an end to discovery at some point. . . . With such guidelines in mind, we address the current dispute.
* Because Westlaw has not published this opinion yet, here is a copy of Judge Moran’s original, signed opinion.
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Continue Reading Court Reminds Parties of Their Discovery Obligations

Vanguard Prods. Group, Inc. v. Diam USA, Inc., No. 05 C 1323, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. May 16, 2007) (Bucklo, J.).*
Judge Bucklo granted plaintiffs summary judgment of infringement and denied defendants summary judgment of invalidity. The Court first construed the two claim terms at issue — “electrically coupled” and “via the modular connector.” In both cases, the Court adopted the plaintiffs’ construction after a detailed review of the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence. Because neither term was in the original application or appears in the specification, the intrinsic evidence focused on the use of the terms within the claims. Defendants also attempted to use claim language from a parent application to support their constructions, but the Court held that the prosecution of a term in a parent application generally does not limit different terms in its progeny. In the instant case, the Court found that the parent application had used the broader term “electrical connection” instead of “electrically coupled” which weighed against defendants’ construction. Having ruled in plaintiffs’ favor on the claim construction, the Court held that defendants’ products infringed the asserted claims of plaintiffs’ patents. And the Court held that defendants’ asserted prior art did not anticipate plaintiffs’ patents.
* Because I beat Westlaw on this one, you can access a copy of the Court’s opinion here. Please note that the Court issued a subsequent order modifying the opinion by deleting footnotes three and four, which were not intended to be part of the opinion.
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Continue Reading Court Grants Summary Judgment of Infringement & Denies Invalidity

Trading Techs. Int’l., Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No 04 C 5312, 05 C 1079, 05 C 4088, 05 C 4120, 05 C 4811 & 05 C 5164, 2007 WL 704525 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 1, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).
Judge Moran granted in part and denied in part plaintiff Trading Technologies’ (“TT”) motion to compel production of defendants’ communications between themselves (more on this case in the Blog’s archives). Defendants asserted claims of attorney-client and work product privileges regarding various communications and information exchanged as part of a joint defense agreement among, at least, the various defendants and DJ-plaintiff (collectively “defendants”) in the patent suits regarding TT’s patents. The Court explained that the joint defense privilege protects communications and exchange of information between parties that have expressly decided to cooperate in a litigation — with or without a written agreement. The Court held that defendants had expressed a sufficient intent to cooperate in their respective litigations against TT and, therefore, held that defendants need not produce communications made in relation to their joint defense. The Court required that defendants produce any written joint defense agreement or, in the absence of a written agreement, the identities of all members of the joint defense. The Court further held that third parties need not be identified to the extent that their identities are protected as work product, but that third parties should be identified if defendants’ communications with them are allegedly protected by attorney-client privilege. The Court also required that defendants produce all prior art in their possession, regardless of how it was located. And finally, the Court noted that “it must rely on the integrity of counsel to determine what is and is not privileged.” As a result, the Court required that defendants produce “any communications not protected by a legitimate privilege . . . .”
You can download the opinion here.
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Continue Reading Joint Defense Agreement May Protect Third Party Communications

Ortho-Tain, Inc. v. Rocky Mountain Orthodontics, Inc., No. 05 C 6656, 2007 WL 1238917 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 2007) (Leinenweber, J.).
Judge Leinenweber granted plaintiff’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) motion to strike, dismissing without prejudice defendants’ respective patent misuse affirmative defenses and all patent-related statements in defendants’ counterclaims. Plaintiff, Ortho-Tain (“OT”), sued Rocky Mountain Orthodontics (“RMO”) and Planmeca Oy (“Planmeca”) alleging that RMO breached the distributorship agreement between the OT and RMO. Pursuant to the Agreement, OT manufactured dental appliances (allegedly covered by OT’s patents) and RMO sold those appliances in France. RMO allegedly breached the Agreement by sourcing equivalent dental appliances from Planmeca. RMO counterclaimed for, among other things, declaratory judgment of noninfringement and unenforceability of OT’s relevant United States patents. The Court previously dismissed defendants’ patent-related declaratory judgment counterclaims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. OT now argues that the Court should strike RMO’s and Planmeca’s respective patent misuse affirmative defenses because they are insufficient. The Court first held that patent misuse was a proper affirmative defense, negating the first prong of a Rule 12(f) analysis.
But neither RMO nor Planmeca met their Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 notice pleading obligations as to the defense. RMO’s and Planmeca’s statement of their defenses were identical: “[OT’s] claims are barred by the doctrine of patent misuse.” The defense pled no facts and failed to identify which of OT’s “many patents” were allegedly misused. The Court, therefore, dismissed the affirmative defenses without prejudice. And because the defenses were not well pled, the Court did not address the third prong of a Rule 12(f) analysis — whether the defense could withstand a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The Court also briefly looked at whether Rule 8 notice pleading or Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) heightened pleading was required for a patent misuse defense, noting that at least one court had used Rule 9(b) pleading, but did not reach the issue, as the defenses did not meet the Rule 8 standard.
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Continue Reading Bald Statement of Patent Misuse Does Not Meet Pleading Standards

Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Lear Corp., No. 05 C 3449, 2007 WL 1238908 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 2007) (Moran, J.).

Judge Moran denied defendant Lear’s motion to stay the Court’s preliminary injunction pending appeal to the Federal Circuit,* but did allow third party General Motors ("GM") to intervene of right and modified the PI to limit harm to defendant and GM.  In a March 30, 2007 opinion and order, the Court granted plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, preventing defendant from marketing and selling its garage door opener transmitters based upon the Court’s prior claim constructions (these opinions are available in the Blog’s archives).  The Court held that Lear could not show a likelihood of success on the merits, in part because the Court’s "Markman decision and subsequent reconsideration dealt an enormous blow to [Lear’s] case."  The Court acknowledged that while plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm without the PI, both Lear and GM could suffer irreparable harm because of the PI.  In order to resolve the irreparable harm issue, the Court revised the PI to exempt Lear’s sales to GM.  Because GM was Lear’s only client and because the exemption allowed GM to continue sourcing Lear’s product  the revised PI would remove harm to GM and substantially reduce Lear’s harm.  While Lear would not be able to add new customers, it would not have to idle its related workers and factories because Lear would not lose any customers.  Because the removal of GM sales from the PI substantially limits Lear’s potential harm, the Court denied Lear’s motion, supported by GM, to increase the bond from $10,000,000 to $50,000,000.Continue Reading Exemption of Sales to Defendant’s Sole Customer Limits PI Harm