Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc. v. Limited Brands, Inc., No. 05 C 3684, 2007 WL 2570351 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 4, 2007) (Der-Yeghiayan, J.).

Judge Der-Yeghiayan granted plaintiff Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container (“BASC”) summary judgment on the issue of patent damages, held that the case was exceptional and then doubled some of the damages and trebled the remainder. The Court previously construed the claims of BASC’s patent for a candle tin with a cover that can be used as a base and granted plaintiff summary judgment of infringement. In this opinion, the Court weighed the Georgia Pacific factors and held that they warranted a royalty rate of 20%. This rate represented an increase over the 17% rate BASC argued it would have granted in an arms-length negotiation to compensate BASC for the compulsory license. The Court then found that the case was exceptional because, among other reasons, defendants continued selling infringing product after the Court granted summary judgment of infringement. Based on the exceptional case holding, the Court doubled the damages from sales before the Court granted BASC summary judgment of infringement and trebled the damages for all sales after summary judgment.

Summary judgment of damages is a fairly rare occurrence. A quick review of the docket does not suggest that the parties waived their right to a jury. So, the facts in this case must have been very strong.

Coilcraft, Inc. v. Inductor Warehouse, Inc., No. 98 C 0140, 2007 WL 2728754 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 13, 2007) (Guzman, J.).

Judge Guzman conducted a Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 de novo review of Magistrate Judge Cole’s report which recommended that the Court hold defendant in contempt for violating the Court’s permanent injunction limiting defendant’s use of plaintiff’s Coilcraft mark (click here for further discussion in the Blog’s archive). The Court adopted Judge Cole’s Report in its entirety and gave plaintiff fourteen days to submit a proposed order and proof of its attorneys’ fees and costs related to this motion. The Court also held that Judge Cole was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing before issuing the Report because there were no genuine issues of material fact. The dispute was governed by the language of the Court’s injunction which was not disputed. And the only issue was whether defendant’s advertisements, the contents of which were not disputed, violated the injunction – a matter of law.

Sotelo v. Suburban 171, Inc., No. 07 C 2447, 2007 WL 2570355 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 2007) (Der-Yeghiayan, J.).

Judge Der-Yeghiayan denied defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ Lanham Act unfair competition claim. Plaintiffs operated a salon called “Studio 171.” Defendants took over the location of plaintiffs’ salon and operated their own salon using all of the Studio 171 signage and marks. Defendants argued that plaintiffs’ unfair competition claim should be dismissed because the Studio 171 mark was either descriptive or generic and plaintiff did not plead secondary meaning. But the Court held that the argument was premature. A plaintiff need not plead secondary meaning.* And furthermore, plaintiffs did plead secondary meaning, stating that the Studio 171 mark had developed “considerable value” and become “uniquely associated” with plaintiffs’ business. The Court did, however, dismiss plaintiffs’ RICO claim for failing to plead their fraud allegations with particularity pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).

* The Court did not cite the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007) (read more about the decision at the University of Chicago Faculty Blog).  But based on other recent opinions citing Twombly for heightened pleading requirements, I wonder if plaintiffs at least should plead secondary meaning now.

Many — myself included — thought the Supreme Court may have had its fill of patent law.  But yesterday, the Supreme Court granted cert in  Quanta Computer Inc. v. LG Electronics Inc., 06-937, to consider whether parties can contract around patent exhaustion.  The patent exhaustion doctrine, also known as the first sale doctrine, holds that a royalty can only be charged once per product.  Once one link in the supply chain has paid a royalty for a patented product, or a key component, the patent is exhausted and no other link in the chain must pay a royalty for the same patent.  LG Electronics attempted to contract around patent exhaustion.

LG Electronics owned a group of patents claiming microprocessors used in personal computers.  They licensed the patents to Intel, but expressly excluded from the license any Intel customer that combined a licensed Intel microprocessor with non-Intel components.  As part of the license, Intel sent letters to its customers warning of this license exclusion.  LG Electronics sued Intel’s post-license customers that were allegedly combining the licensed Intel chips with non-Intel products.   

The district court held that Intel’s license exhausted LG Electronics’ downstream patent royalty rights.  But the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that when parties expressly restrict a license a court should infer that the parties also negotiated a more limited royalty to reflect the limited rights given in the license.  As a result, patent exhaustion should not apply to restricted licenses.  Quanta argues that the Federal Circuit’s decision contradicts a long history of both Federal Circuit and Supreme Court precedent requiring that patent licenses cannot be restricted to one link in the supply chain.

This is another case that has major implications for the business of patent law.  If the Supreme Court overturns the Federal Circuit it could dramatically change the model of many patent licensing programs.

Continue Reading Supreme Court to Tackle Patent Exhaustion

Trading Technologies Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, 2007 WL 2566291 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).

Judge Moran denied plaintiff Trading Technologies’ (“TT”) motion for a protective order to prevent depositions after the close of fact discovery and days before trial was scheduled to begin, although the Court did preclude one deposition. The Court held that defendant eSpeed could depose third party Lorin at Lorin’s convenience for no more than two hours. But eSpeed can only introduce Lorin’s testimony in support of its claim that the alleged prior art GL Win with Trade Pad software existed before the critical date (you can read more about the parties’ dispute over whether the GL Win with Trade Pad software invalidates TT’s patents in the Blog’s archives). The Court, however would not permit the deposition of third party Doug Moneison. TT relied upon Moneison’s declaration in opposing eSpeed’s GL Win with Trade Pad invalidity summary judgment motion. But in its reply brief, TT stated that it would not call Moneison at trial or directly rely upon his declaration. The Court, therefore, held that Moneison’s deposition was not necessary. The Court also allowed eSpeed to file an additional expert report regarding hard drives produced by third party Chicago Mercantile Exchange (“CME”) – CME’s production is discussed in the Blog’s archives – because the Court had been aware of the hard drives and their likely use at trial for some time. Finally, the Court denied TT’s request that evidence regarding GL’s Win with Trade Pad software be precluded at trial because of GL’s alleged failure to produce documents from its website regarding its software. The Court did, however, require that GL perform an additional word search of its website using terms specified by the Court and produce any additional materials found by the search.

Trial started the week of September 10. Expect to see several more opinions in this case and its related cases. Additionally, work has made it difficult for me to observe the trial, but I spent a few hours watching last week and will post some thoughts on it later this week.

*You can read much more about this case and related cases in the Blog’s archives.

Trading Technologies Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., (N.D. Ill.) (Moran, Sen. J.).

Last week, I attended several hours of the Trading Technologies (“TT”) v. eSpeed trial. I watched the direct exam of TT’s infringement expert. Unfortunately, because of an ill-timed lunch break and other responsibilities, I missed eSpeed’s cross-exam. The jury is made up of eight members and two alternates, equally split between men and women. To their credit and that of the Northern District’s jury pool generally, the jurors appeared very engaged, dressed appropriately for court and were taking detailed notes.

None of the issues that I have written about came up (click here for the Blog’s archive on the case), but I came away with several thoughts about making your case to a jury:

  • TT’s PowerPoint slides were often, although not always, very dense. This led to a jury that was over-focused on the slides and not listening to the testimony. Of course, TT’s infringement case was on the slides so they may be comfortable with that. But I want the jury focused on my expert and her credibility, not her slides.
  • Despite their occasional wordiness, TT’s expert interacted very well with his slides. When the expert stepped away from the witness stand and pointed out information on the slides, he recaptured the jury’s attention very well.
  • When the expert relied upon deposition or trial testimony, TT put the testimony on a slide next to the person’s picture. This was an excellent way of humanizing the cold transcript. I suspect it also helped the jurors remember the testimony by attaching the words to a face.

I understand that trial will continue at least this week and maybe in to next week. I will try to observe the trial again, but I am traveling most of this week so it will not be until late this week or early next. And if I do make it back, I will do my best to watch both the direct and the cross of a witness or maybe both sides’ closings. That way I will be able to provide more perspective on the substance of the trial.

Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Montrose Wholesale Candies & Sundries, Inc., No. 03 C 5311 & 4844, 2007 WL 2580491 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 10, 2007) (Cole, Mag. J.).

Judge Cole recommended awarding plaintiff $2.5M in statutory damages. The Court had previously entered a Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b) default judgment against defendants for sales of counterfeit Newport cigarettes in violation of the Lanham Act.* The Court recommended that a damages hearing was not necessary because of defendants’ four year pattern of avoiding discovery obligations leading to a default judgment, including failing to produce damages documents. Having actively avoided producing the information for four years, defendants were not now entitled to seek opportunities to present evidence in their defense. Furthermore, the Court reported that a $2.5 M award was reasonable. $2.5M was half of plaintiff’s estimate of defendants’ infringing sales and it was half of the potential $1M statutory award for each of the five marks defendants infringed.

* For more on this case, see the Blog’s archives.

Arminak & Assocs., Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Calmar, Inc., No. 06-1561, Slip Op. (Fed. Cir. Sept. 12, 2007) (Holderman, C.J., sitting by designation.).*

On behalf of Chief Judge Michel and Judge Gajarsa, the Northern District’s Chief Judge Holderman affirmed C.D. California’s holding that declaratory judgment plaintiffs’ (“Arminak”) “AA Trigger” shroud design for a spray bottle did not infringe declaratory judgment defendant’s (“Calmar”) design patents covering certain design elements of shrouds. The main issue, and one of first impression, was whether the “ordinary observer” for purposes of design patent infringement should be the end-user/purchaser of spray bottles or the industrial purchaser that buys triggers or shrouds for assembly into a finished spray bottle product. The district court held that the ordinary observer was the industrial purchaser and the evidence clearly established that industrial purchasers would not be confused by similarities between Arminak’s and Calmar’s patented shrouds. Calmar argued, however, that the Supreme Court in Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511 (1871), expressly excluded experts from being ordinary observers and that, therefore, retail purchasers had to be the ordinary observer. But the Federal Circuit noted that did not sell shrouds or fully assembled spray bottles including their respective shrouds to retail purchasers. The parties sell shrouds to industrial purchasers. Industrial purchasers, therefore, are the appropriate population of ordinary observers. The ordinary observer is:

A person who is either a purchaser or, or sufficiently interested in, the item that displays the patented designs and who has the capability of making a reasonably discerning decision when observing the accused item’s design whether the accused item is substantially the same as the item claimed in the design patent.

* This is not an appeal from the Northern District, but I am covering it because Chief Judge Holderman authored the Opinion. Thanks to Dennis Crouch at Patently-O for bringing the case to my attention.

Trading Technologies Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).

Judge Moran denied the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment regarding whether GL Win with Trade Pad (“GL Trade Pad”) was invalidating prior art to plaintiff Trading Technologies’ (“TT”) patents. Defendant argued that the GL Trade Pad product was on sale prior to the critical date (the critical date was either March 2, 1999 or June 9, 1999, the Court previously held that it was a question of fact for the jury) based upon a February 19, 1999 software license (“February License”). But because the February License did not specifically name the GL Trade Pad software as part of the licensed software, both parties relied upon extrinsic evidence to prove whether GL Trade Pad was part of the February. The Court held that oral invalidity testimony must be corroborated by evidence other than additional interested oral testimony. eSpeed, therefore, corroborated its main witness’s testimony with Trade Pad software code and catalogs. eSpeed argued that this evidence showed that the Trade Pad software was made and sold on or before the February License and would have been included in the February License. But the Court held that eSpeed’s evidence did not meet its evidence of proving the sale by clear and convincing evidence. TT challenged each piece of eSpeed’s evidence and the Court could not decide summary judgment of invalidity based upon eSpeed’s remaining evidence – oral testimony of an interested party (GL is a defendant in a related case). The jury must weigh competing testimony and judge the witnesses’ credibility. 

Trial started in this case the week of September 10. Expect to see several more opinions in this case and its related cases (there are two weighty summary judgment opinions still in my queue, as well as several other smaller opinions and orders). Additionally, I have some other obligations, but am planning to blog some of the trial. Stay tuned.

*You can read much more about this case and related cases in the Blog’s archives.

Trading Technologies Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 2007) (Moran, Sen. J.).*

Judge Moran granted in part plaintiff Trading Technologies’ (“TT”) motion for summary judgment regarding prior use and denied defendant eSpeed’s cross motion for summary judgment. TT argued for a March 2, 1999 critical date (one year before the March 2, 2000 filing of TT’s related provisional application). eSpeed argued that the provisional application did not fully describe the patented invention and that, therefore, the critical date was June 9, 1999 (one year before filing of TT’s parent application). The Court held that whether the provision application met the written description requirements was a question of fact for the jury. The Court, therefore, determined this summary judgment motion in the alternative, either if the jury found a March 2 or a June 9 critical date. eSpeed argued that various uses of TT’s software before March 2 constituted public use because trades were either completely or partially performed to test the software. But the Court held that this use of the software was only experimental and done solely for the purpose of making sure the software functioned properly. The trades that were initiated during the testing were canceled prior to completion, except in several discreet incidents where the users testified that they had intended to cancel the trades but forgot. eSpeed also argued that the software was reduced to practice before March 2. But the Court held that the software was not reduced to practice until March 2 based upon the developers’ testimony that they did not believe the software was fully functioning and were still testing it prior to March 2. The Court, therefore, granted TT summary judgment for pre-March 2 use of the software. 

The Court held that the March 2 to June 9 alleged use was a question of fact for the jury. eSpeed’s email, video and trading record evidence for the March 2 to June 9 period might constitute public use, but a question of fact remained.

Trial started in this case the week of September 10. Expect to see several more opinions in this case and its related cases (there are two weighty summary judgment opinions still in my queue, as well as several other smaller opinions and orders). Additionally, I have some other obligations, but am planning to blog some of the trial. Stay tuned.

*You can read much more about this case and related cases in the Blog’s archives.

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