Guiness World Records Ltd. v. John Doe, d/b/a World Records Academy, No. 09 C 2812, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Oct. 20, 2009) (Shadur, Sen. J.)
Judge Shadur granted defendant World Records Academy’s (Academy”) Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in this trademark dispute regarding plaintiff’s GUINESS WORLD RECORD and WORLD RECORD trademarks. Academy’s website alone did not create specific jurisdiction because it did not allow users to purchase Academy’s products, it only told them how to buy the products. Academy did have limited sales into Illinois – three sales to two customers – and sent form email solicitations to world record holders from Illinois. And the Court held that Academy’s emails and de minimis sales could not create jurisdiction, either general or specific. The Court reasoned that if de minimis sales created jurisdiction, alleged intellectual property infringers could be hailed into almost any jurisdiction nationwide.

Continue Reading De Minimis Sales Do Not Create Specific Jurisdiction

More Cupcakes, LLC v. Lovemore LLC, No. 09 C 3555, Slip. Op. (N.D. Ill. Sep. 29, 2009) (Kocoras, J.)
Judge Kocoras denied defendants (collectively “Lovemore”) Fed. R. Cir. P. 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and Fed. R. Cir. P.12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the individual Lovemore defendants’ (collectively “Lovemore individuals”) based upon the fiduciary shield doctrine in this Lanham Act dispute regarding plaintiff More Cupcake’s LOVE MORE mark for use on t-shirts. The Court did, however, grant Lovemore’s §1404 motion to transfer the case to the Eastern District of New York.
The parties agreed that the Court lacked general jurisdiction and argued only specific jurisdiction. The Court held that it had specific jurisdiction based upon the effects test. Lovemore’s alleged infringing acts were aimed at More Cupcakes in Illinois when Lovemore approved sales of allegedly infringing t-shirts to Illinois addresses after being warned of the alleged infringement in a Patent & Trademark Office proceeding and in settlement talks with More Cupcakes. Lovemore’s interactive website coupled with sales to Illinois also created specific jurisdiction. The fact that Lovemore’s most recent Illinois sale was to More Cupcakes’ counsel did not impact the analysis. Lovemore still knowingly sold product within Illinois.
The fiduciary shield doctrine did not apply to the individual defendants, who were both owners and operators of Lovemore. The fiduciary shield doctrine denies personal jurisdiction over individuals who contact Illinois solely for the benefit of their employees and not themselves. But the doctrine does not apply to owners of a company that have discretion over whether or not they do business in Illinois. As Lovemore owners, therefore, the Lovemore individuals are not protected by the fiduciary shield doctrine.
For similar reasons, while corporate officers are generally not personally liable for corporate trademark infringement claims, More Cupcakes’ claims against the Lovemore individuals survived. Both individuals were owners of Lovemore and the Complaint alleged that they personally directed the allegedly infringing acts.
Finally, the Court transferred the case to the Eastern District of New York. While More Cupcakes’ chosen forum deserves deference, the material events regarding the alleged infringement all occurred in New York where the t-shirts were designed, made, offered for sale and sold. And the Court held that the convenience factors, such as locations of documents and witnesses, were all neutral.

Continue Reading Owner Can Be Personally Liable for Corporate Trademark Infringement

The Ticketreserve, Inc. v. Viagogo, Inc., No. 08 C 502, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2009) (Kendall, J.).
Judge Kendall denied defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) motion in limine for improper venue and granted defendant Viagogo, Inc.’s (“Viagogo”) Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Defendants agreed that venue was improper based on an arbitration clause in a nondisclosure agreement the parties requested when they explored a joint venture. Defendants agreed that the patented technology was disclosed pursuant to the nondisclosure agreement.
But because plaintiff’s international patent on the same technology as the U.S. patent, issued before the nondisclosure agreement the patent infringement claim was expressly excluded from the nondisclosure agreement and its arbitration claims.
The Court then dismissed Viagogo for lack of personal jurisdiction. Viagogo had no contract with Illinois to create personal jurisdiction. And while the viagogo.com interactive website likely created specific jurisdiction for its owner, the evidence suggested that Viagogo Ltd., which did not contest personal jurisdiction owned and operated the website, not Viagogo, Inc.

Continue Reading Nondisclosure Arbitration Clause Does Not Include Patent Infringement Claims

Poparic v. Lincoln Square Video, No. 08 C 3491, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jun. 25, 2009) (Kocoras, J.).
Judge Kocoras granted defendant Taste of Europe’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff alleged that Taste of Europe sold a single copy of plaintiff’s copyrighted movie in its Indiana store and argued only that the Court had general jurisdiction over Taste of Europe, without addressing specific jurisdiction. Taste of Europe presented evidence that it was an Indiana-based business that did not advertise in Illinois or conduct any business in or with Illinois. Plaintiff did not present any evidence of Taste of Europe’s Illinois connections, but sought jurisdictional discovery. The Court, however, found that it lacked personal jurisdiction, holding that jurisdictional discovery was not appropriate where plaintiff had identified no evidence showing Illinois connections to overcome Taste of Europe’s proofs.

Continue Reading Request for Jurisdictional Discovery Does Not Overcome Lack of Evidence

Merrill Primack v. Pearl B. Polto, Inc., No. 08 C 4539, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jul. 8, 2009) (Dow, J.).
Judge Dow granted the Polto defendants’ (collectively “Polto”) Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in this Lanham Act dispute regarding plaintiff’s “Credit Lifeline” mark. Plaintiff alleged only specific jurisdiction, not general jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s evidence of specific jurisdiction was based upon the following facts: 1) Polto’s 2006 trip to Chicago to put on a Credit Lifeline seminar; and 2) Polto’s interactive website. Polto, however, had not been aware of plaintiff’s trademark during the 2006 trip. Plaintiff did not file for its trademark until 2008. So, when Polto made its 2006 trip there was no evidence of notice of plaintiff’s mark. Furthermore, no one attended Polto’s 2006 Chicago seminar and Polto returned to Philadelphia immediately after leaving the seminar site. Finally, the Court held that Polto’s interactive website by itself could not confer specific jurisdiction.

Continue Reading Single Visit to Jurisdiction Before Notice of a Trademark Does Not Create Jurisdiction

Richter v. INSTAR Enterprises Int’l, Inc., No. 08 C 50026, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 2009) (Kapala, J.).
Judge Kapala granted defendant INSTAR’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss plaintiff’s copyright infringement claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. INSTAR did not have sufficient contacts with Illinois for general jurisdiction. INSTAR did not maintain offices or otherwise regularly do business in Illinois. Its contacts with Illinois were: 1) its interactive website; and 2) INSTAR’s customer’s resale of its products within Illinois. Additionally, INSTAR produced undisputed evidence that less than .1% of its business came from Illinois and that none of the accused products were sold directly into Illinois.
Similarly, the Court lacked specific jurisdiction. While plaintiff was allegedly harmed in Illinois, the effects doctrine was not satisfied because INSTAR was not charged with an intentional tort and INSTAR’s unrefuted evidence showed that it did not intend to infringe plaintiff’s copyrights. INSTAR’s website did not create specific jurisdiction either. There was no evidence that INSTAR made any sales into Illinois from its website. And the only evidence of anyone from Illinois accessing the website was based upon plaintiff’s representatives accessing the site. Finally, the entry of INSTAR’s products into the stream of commerce did not create specific jurisdiction because there was no evidence that INSTAR knew or expected that the stream of commerce would take its products into Illinois.

Continue Reading Website Not Sufficient to Create Personal Jurisdiction

C.S.B. Commodities, Inc. v. Urban Trend (HK) Ltd., No. 08 C 1548, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Jan. 7, 2009) (Dow, J.).
Judge Dow granted corporate defendant Urban Trend’s (“Urban Trend”) and denied the individual defendant’s respective Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) motions to dismiss plaintiff’s Lanham Act unfair competition and related state law claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff served the individual defendant, who was Urban Trend’s president, while he was representing Urban Trend at a trade show in Illinois. The Court held that personal service created jurisdiction over the individual defendant, even though the Court may not have had jurisdiction but for personal service. And while the individual defendant was in Illinois as part of his job responsibilities representing Urban Trend at the trade show, the Fiduciary Shield Doctrine did not protect him. As Urban Trend’s president, the individual defendant would have gained independent economic benefit from selling Urban Trend’s products at the trade show. And as president, the individual defendant had at least some control over whether to sell or promote products in Illinois.
The Court, however, held that personal service upon Urban Trend’s president was not sufficient to create jurisdiction over Urban Trend. And tradeshow attendance alone was not sufficient to create specific jurisdiction over Urban Trend. There was no evidence that Urban Trend’s tradeshow efforts were particularly focused on Illinois sales, or that Urban Trend completed any sales.

Continue Reading Personal Service Creates Jurisdiction Over Individuals, Not Corporations

Compliance Software Sol’ns. Corp. v. MODA Tech. Partners, Inc., No. 07 C 6752, 2008 WL 2960711 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 31, 2008) (Manning, J.)
Judge Manning granted defendants’ (collectively “MODA”) Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. MODA was a Pennsylvania resident, as were its employees. Its alleged Illinois contacts were: 1) attendance at an Illinois trade show, Pittcon, where it demonstrated its software – software that allegedly infringed plaintiff CSSC’s patent and copyright covering CSSC’s environmental monitoring software; and 2) signing a contract with an Illinois choice of law provision.
MODA’s Pittcon attendance did not create specific jurisdiction because MODA just presented its software and tried to generate interest in it. MODA did not sell its software or “use” it. Pittcon attendance, therefore, did not create jurisdiction. Similarly, MODA’s alleged offer to sell its software in Illinois did not create jurisdiction. The offer did not include a price term, a requirement for a legal offer to sell.
Finally, MODA’s execution of a contract governed by Illinois law did not create jurisdiction. While Illinois law governed the contract, it did not include a forum selection clause making Illinois the exclusive forum. Without the exclusive forum selection clause, the contract did not create jurisdiction.

Continue Reading Trade Show Presentations Do Not Create Jurisdiction Without Price Terms

Medline Indus., Inc. v. Strategic Comm. Sol’ns., No. 07 C 2783, __ F. Supp.2d __, 2008 WL 2091141 (N.D. Ill. May 5, 2008) (Castillo, J.).
Judge Castillo dismissed some defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction (the wrong defendants) and denied defendant Strategic Commercial Solutions (“SCS”). Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Plaintiff Medline alleged that defendants violated its trademark and related federal and state laws by selling “Medline Savings” packages with telemarketers.
Personal Jurisdiction
The Court did not have personal jurisdiction over the Wong defendants. The Wong defendants, all individuals, did not direct any of their allegedly infringing and fraudulent calls to Illinois residents. Their only contacts with Illinois were calls to and from Illinois banks regarding processing payments and refunds. These secondary contacts were not sufficient to create personal jurisdiction.
SCS similarly did not have sufficient contacts with Illinois. But Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(K)(2) provided for national, and therefore, there was personal jurisdiction in Illinois because SCS argued it was not subject to jurisdiction in any U.S. state or territory.
Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Act
SCS argued that Medline could not bring its Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Act claim because it was not a “private person” that was “adversely affected” by the telemarketing as required by the Act. But the Court held that while Medline was not an aggrieved consumer, the alleged unfair use of Medline’s trademarks could have caused Medline the harm it alleged.
Trademark Infringement
The Court noted that it was not aware of a similar case in which a party was accused of trademark infringement for using marks in telemarketing. But SCS’s alleged use of Medline’s marks was a use in commerce.

Continue Reading Using a Trademark in Telemarketing is a Use in Commerce

Hyperquest, Inc. v. Nugen I.T., Inc. and Dayle Phillips, No. 08 C 0485, Slip OP. (N.D. Ill. Jun. 18, 2008) (Norgle, J.)
Judge Norgle dismissed plaintiff’s copyright infringement case for lack of personal jurisdiction, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). The Court agreed with plaintiff that the alleged injury was suffered in Illinois because plaintiff was an Illinois resident. But that was not enough to create personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff identified no supported facts showing that defendants intended to impinge upon an Illinois interest or otherwise purposely availed themselves of Illinois.
And the individual defendants’ contract with plaintiff in Illinois did not create personal jurisdiction either. All of the individual defendants’ contracts occurred before the corporate defendant was incorporated. And after incorporation, the defendants did no business in Illinois or with Illinois residents. Defendants did maintain a website, but plaintiff’s evidence regarding the website was insufficient.

Continue Reading Prior Illinois Contacts do Not Create Jurisdiction